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would not have been able to finish. Thanks a lot to all of you!  
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work.  
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thesis. Your response and e-mails have been treats which filled me with new energy and 
inspiration. Thanks also to professor Susan Halford, Southampton and professor Christel 
Lane, Cambridge, for comments and contacts, to Jan Inge Søreng in Bodø and Svein Tvedt 
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‘Trust is of all times. It is pervasive and indispensable’.1 
               – BART NOOTEBOOM                             
 
 
Trust is a diffuse, multi-faceted quality pervading social life, a social process and a condition 
for unforced social interaction. Social life is largely managed through trust; it functions as 
social glue and lubricant – it holds people together and eases social interaction. Trust is 
mainly taken for granted, but if it is violated or absent, we become aware of its necessity. 
Trust is thus at the core of social life, perhaps the core. This makes trust an fascinating issue 
for sociological research. 
 
1.1 Background: erosion of trust? 
On a personal level betrayal of trust is a painful relational experience. On a societal level the 
fear of erosion of trust in vital societal institutions, for instance in the financial system, is 
upsetting and banks and governments are forced to intervene to prevent loss of trust. There 
are some alarming indications that the production of trust, as essential to social integration 
and as social glue, is threatened. Existing social bases for trust seem to be eroded by new risks 
and increased social complexity, and suspicion and distrust appear to be growing. Does this 
mean that trust is a diminishing quality nowadays?  
 
Everyday life in the modern world is permeated by social risk and complexity; of situations 
beyond individual control, social change, contingency and lack of predictability (Luhmann 
1979, 1990, Beck 1993, Giddens 1993, Bauman 2005). This state of social risk is generated 
by unexpected and unfamiliar events, the necessity of acting under conditions of uncertainty 
and insufficient knowledge, and the encounter with or reliance on strangers in ever more 
situations. Modernisation occurs through transformations of social organisations and social 
perception – the way things are done and how we think about them. This creates social risk 
and increased social complexity. Taken for granted patterns and social bases for trust – on 
what and where we place our trust are being transformed, while familiar patterns for actions 
and are being eroded.   
 
                                                 
1 Nooteboom 2001:1 
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Trusting is a way to reduce social risk and complexity by making it intellectually 
manageable.2 Trust increases the tolerance of uncertainty and reduces the indeterminate 
complexity of possible events (Luhmann 1979, 1990). By trusting risk, and complexity are 
suspended and one can act as if there is no risk (Luhmann 1979, 1990, Beck 1993, Giddens 
1993, Misztal 1996, Sztompka 1999, Seligman 2000, Möllering 2006). There is an apparently 
increasing need of trust in modern society, a need enhanced both by expanding social 
suspicion (O’Neill 2003) and intensified social change (Giddens 1993). This trust situation 
gives rise to concern about trust and its relationship to social change, but despite the increase 
in trust research in various academic fields, the dynamics of trust and its relationship to social 
change is not fully explored. This is the background to the exploration in this thesis of the 
dynamics between trust and social change.     
 
1.2 Method: a theoretical exploration of empirical grounding  
The interest in trust developed through a study in the early 1990s; of how the trust 
relationship between savings banks and their customers was affected by the deregulation of 
banks.3 The study was based on grounded theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss 1967) and 
was an empirical study of the trust process between customer and bank, and how changes in 
the legal and social conditions for this process transformed the trust relationship.  
 
The main findings were that: 1) deregulation of banks also proved to be a deregulation of the 
trust relationship between bank and customer. Analytically this was an exploration of micro 
level consequences of macro level processes, and 2) the generation of an empirically 
grounded theory of trust as a dynamic social process; the composite concept of trust.  
 
The fascination with trust has accompanied my work as an applied researcher. I have used the 
composite concept in various projects, and it has been proven to have an explanatory power of 
                                                 
2 In a recent publication, Möllering (2012) recommends the term trusting to denote the process element of trust. I 
agree that the word trust should be reserved for trust as a quality, while the word trusting should refer to the 
dynamic process of creating trust. The conceptualisation in the thesis is based on a process perspective – the 
composite concept of trust – refers to trust as a process of social construction. This could have been called the 
composite concept of trusting, following the recommendations from Möllering, but the thesis is based on use of 
the term trust. Although is tempting now to use trusting instead, a shift in terminology needs further exploration 
which is a subject in this thesis. Trust is a state and an event as well as social quality and a social process – it is 
both trust and trusting. The term trusting is used here and there in the thesis to emphasise the active process of 
trust development.  
3 The study was my master thesis Konto for tillit (translated: The account of trust), referred to as Nordnes 1993, 
which was my surname at that time. My surname is now Ellingsen. 
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trust processes in different social contexts (see note 140, chapter 14.2). The concept grew 
from the work with empirical data, and its analytical power is strengthened by connecting the 
concept to existing sociological theory. This thesis uses the study of trust between bank and 
customer as an example of how trust can be explored with grounded theory methodology. The 
study is a relevant demonstration of how social change initiated on the macro level can affect 
trust processes at the micro level, and how deregulation and organisational change can cause 
loss of trust. These processes are also of current interest as there is a global decline in trust in 
financial institutions as well as in governments and politicians (Barber 1983, Sennett 1998, 
Warren 1999, Cook 2001, Putnam 1995, Roth et al. 2013).  
 
Grounded theory is an inductive method and one of the major approaches in qualitative 
research (Midré 2009). The grounded theory method aims to generate concepts and theory 
based on findings in empirical data and the theory has conceptual specifications, not 
definitions (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Grounded theories are generated for distinguishable 
levels of generality, as substantive or formal theory. Substantive theory is generated for ‘a 
substantive, or empirical, area of sociological inquiry’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967:32), while 
formal theory is more abstract. The term grounded theory means that the theory is based on 
empirical data. The process of theory generation involves the development of concepts that 
are grounded in empirical data – that is abstracted from data. This provides a broader 
applicability, also called work and fit, to the concepts and grounded theory. The concepts are 
removed from raw data from which the theory is generated. The composite concept of trust is 
based on a variety of observations and interview data which are systematised, categorised and 
analysed as the basis for the generation of a theory – a conceptualisation of how trust is 
developed, maintained or infringed.  
 
A grounded theory has the quality of sensitising concepts. Sensitising concepts ‘give the user 
a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching the empirical instance’, in contrast 
to definitive concepts that ‘refer precisely to what is common to a class of objects, by the aid 
of a clear definition’ (Blumer 1954, p. 7). The sensitising character of a grounded theory is a 
methodical strength; it stimulates creativity through enabling the discovery of new processes 
and elements in addition to inclusion of supplementary data and theory. The sensitising 
aspects of the composite concept of trust means that the theory can be applied to explore basic 





In grounded theory methodology the theory is a set of statements grounded in comparative 
analysis of empirical data, and not a set of logically interrelated propositions to be verified 
(Glaser 1978). A grounded theory conceptualises a latent pattern and is a well developed 
framework for the explanation of processes and relationships. A grounded theory is a work in 
progress and is expanded and strengthened through the collection of supplementary data 
called theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1998).  
 
Throughout the use of the composite concept in analyses of data from various trust processes 
a question emerged: can the empirically generated theory of trust be supplemented and 
strengthened through theoretical grounding? Here, theoretical grounding means exploring 
how an empirically grounded theory can be integrated with existing sociological theory. This 
is an under-explored subject in the classic grounded theory literature. According to my 
literature studies there is a knowledge gap when it comes to this subject. The focus in this 
literature is mainly about how to conduct grounded theory, and not about how to integrate 
empirical based conceptualisations with existing sociological theory.  
 
This thesis will therefore take the grounded theory of trust a step further and explores how the 
use of general sociological terms can integrate the empirically grounded theory into sociology 
and how existing sociological theory can be used to supplement and deepen the empirically 
grounded theory. Inclusion of existing theory into a grounded theory has to be done on the 
terms of the grounded theory according to Glaser & Strauss (1967). Can there be other 
strategies for integration between grounded theory and existing theory? Does grounded theory 
have particular barriers against integration with existing theory? An answer to these questions 
demands an exploration of grounded theory as methodology and how it discusses theoretical 
integration.  
 
There is an additional reason to elaborate on grounded theory in a study of trust. This has to 
do with trust as a diffuse social phenomenon and the underexplored relationship between trust 
and social change. Grounded theory is a suitable methodology to examine unexplored 
empirical subjects, and this is necessary to expand the sociological understanding of trust. In 
addition, developing cumulative sociological knowledge about a subject studied through a 
grounded theory methodology, demands further insight into integration between empirically 
grounded conceptualisations and existing theory.   
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1.3 Focus and aims  
The analytical focus of the thesis is trust as a social and dynamic quality. Although this is a 
theoretical thesis, the aim is not to test or verify hypotheses based on existing theory. The 
ambition is to explore trust as a social phenomenon through a particular conceptualisation of 
trust I developed through grounded theory methodology, called the composite concept of 
trust, in the thesis also referred to as the grounded theory of trust. This concept is examined 
through sociological theory and applied as a means of analysing the relationship between trust 
and social change. Furthermore the thesis explores the theoretical conditions for integration 
between empirically grounded theory and existing sociological theory. These ambitions will 
be pursued through three main sets of working questions and aims:    
 
1) What characterises trust as a process of social construction?  The exploration of 
trust as a social process and its social foundations is conducted as a theoretical 
grounding and integration of the composite concept of trust with existing 
sociological theory. This exploration is the main theoretical body of the thesis. 
 
2) Does the grounded theory method open up possibilities for integration between 
existing sociological theory and empirically grounded theory? Is this feasible based 
on the terms of grounded theory? Grounded theory as a methodology for 
conceptualising trust, and how grounded theory based conceptualisations can be 
integrated with existing sociological theory, is explored in the methodological part of 
the thesis.  
 
3) How is the relationship between trust and social change? The composite concept 
is applied to an analysis of the relationship between trust and social change, 
discussed here as the trust paradox and as the social configuration of trust bases.   
 
In the verification tradition the working hypotheses grows from existing theory. This thesis is 
built on a grounded theory tradition and is an exploration of various aspects of an empirically 
grounded theory of trust. Grounded theory is an inductive methodology where hypothesis and 
concepts come from the empirical data. This necessitates an introductory presentation of the 
grounded theory of trust, which provides background for the methodological work, the 




Subsequent parts present the main elements in the composite concept of trust and thereafter 
the trust paradox. Finally, an outline of the structure of the thesis is provided. 
 
1.4 Social construction of trust: the development of mutual 
understanding   
The grounded theory of trust is briefly presented below as a dynamic process perspective on 
trusting. 
 
Trusting is a process of social construction, a dynamic between individual perception and 
external input. The construction of trust in social relationships, which is the focus here, is a 
reliance on others to keep implicit and explicit promises and act predictably, that they will 
stick to assumed common social scripts and taken for granted tacit social rules and norms. 
The social construction of trust is a process of establishing a belief in the expected fulfilment 
of a promise about future behaviour. The belief is based on a mutual understanding which 
functions as an implicit contract between individuals. Mutual understanding, which is the core 
element in my grounded theory of trust, is the trigger for bestowing trust. When an actor feels 
sufficiently assured that there is a mutual understanding of the social promise and that the 
other will keep this, he takes the risk of trusting. To take the risk of trusting also means to 
suspend possible doubt in the fulfilment of the social promise. According to Möllering (2006) 
is suspension of doubt is the critical element in the process of developing trust.  
 
Suspension of doubt and establishing belief is based on reciprocal acknowledgment of mutual 
understanding. Mutual understanding means a mutual acknowledgement of a shared tacit 
social contract. This acknowledgement is the basis for making the leap of faith; to categorise 
the contract as trustworthy, and it is the social ‘springboard’ that makes the participants take 
the risk of suspending doubt and trusting their expectations. The acknowledgement is at the 
heart of social interaction, it is a confirmation of self and the other as socially competent, as 
mastering the relevant social scripts and as able to foresee and adjust to the other. Through 
interaction, the participants mutually confirm the tacit agreement that they act in a way that is 
predictable for the other and trust is maintained. 
 
Möllering (2006:72) points out that ‘trust is essentially not so much a choice between one 
course of action (trusting) and the other (distrusting), but between either accepting a given 
level of assurance or looking for further controls and safeguards.’ I hold that mutual 
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understanding is the point of acknowledging a satisfactory level of assurance that the other 
shares the social script and a feeling that he/she will behave in accordance with this. The term 
social script presupposes interaction and mediation between the social and the individual, and 
that the individual has freedom not to follow the script. Trust is eroded if the behaviour or 
values performed deviates too much from the script.  
 
The level of satisfactory acknowledgement as a platform for the leap of faith is constructed 
through individual interpretation and sense-making. Empirical exploration is needed to show 
the extent to which individuals share or feel obliged by social norms and rules, they can be 
taken for granted or take the form of considerate acceptance. Everyday life is to a great extent 
based on taken for granted mutual understanding; this is trust as the omnipresent condition for 
social interaction, and when it is violated, it has to be re-negotiated and re-constructed.  
 
1.5 Three social bases for trust 
Trust is both an individual feeling, and a social quality. I therefore hold that development of 
mutual understanding is dependent on a common social foundation, a contextual basis to 
secure the belief in others’ fulfilment of one’s expectations. The social basis is the common 
source of trust; a necessary common ground for social interaction and the platform for 
performing the leap of faith. The dynamics in the social basis for mutual understanding is a 
key to understanding how trust is developed, maintained and re-constructed. An exploration of 
these processes will give insight in the sources of trust and the process of trust development.  
 
In the study of trust processes I discovered that the three social bases for trust are common 
bases for interaction and foundations for the development of mutual understanding. Without 
something in common, development of mutual understanding has to start from scratch 
through stepwise interaction and mutual acknowledgement of social platforms for interaction. 
The trust bases are broad analytical categories which refer to general dimensions of social 
life; pre-contractual taken for granted social assumptions, relational processes created 
through social interaction, mediated or ascribed familiarity, and formal structures such as 
laws, rules, and regulations backed with legitimate sanctions. These general social processes 





The social bases for trust enhance social predictability and contribute to securing the belief in 
fulfilment of expectations. Developing and maintaining trust under changing social conditions 
requires reconstruction and reconfiguration of the common social bases. Pre-contractual, 
relational and structural bases or platforms for trust also refer to three analytically different 
strategies to develop trust. Trust is not one quality, but can be separated into these three forms 
pre-contractual, relational and structural, which are related to the three social bases and 
general social qualities of trusting. 
 
The three forms are briefly presented below and each will be discussed in depth in the 
theoretical part II of the thesis. 
 
i)  Interaction, transactions and contracts, indeed all aspects of social life are deeply rooted in 
a series of habitual, taken for granted assumptions about common norms and rules of action. 
This is an assumed common stock of knowledge. Actors need confidence in the belief that 
others in the same setting to a certain extent share this knowledge and that they will, 
accordingly, behave reasonably (Weber 1978, Luhmann, 1990, Misztal 1996, Brenkert 1998, 
Sztompka 1999). This trust in others willingness to keep to the social script is pre-contractual 
trust, a mainly implicit form of trust established over time through socialisation, experience 
and interaction; we learn to take for granted that numerous tacit promises will be kept.  
 
Pre-contractual trust is a basic social quality and an element in relational and structural trust. 
The basis for pre-contractual trust is recreated through social experience and learning; 
socialisation is a never-ending process. Social experiences influence pre-contractual trust; 
social processes maintain or violate relational trust, while structural trust is a macro level 
quality, dependent first and foremost on legitimate power. Development of pre-contractual 
trust is a continuous process inherent in everyday life. Socialisation means acquiring a pre-
contractual base for trust and this is an on-going social process. Action and interaction implies 
confirmation or violation of tacit or explicit expectations and the outcomes contribute to 
strengthening or undermining pre-contractual trust. Small daily surprises or moments of 
unpredictability can, but do not necessarily, have long lasting effect on pre-contractual trust. 
 
ii)  Relational trust is based on some form of familiarity and develops in social processes 
through interpretation, communication and interaction. This kind of trust has traditionally 
been linked to face to face relationships where those involved know each other and have the 
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reassurance of sharing common rules and norms (Luhmann 1979, Giddens 1993, Misztal 
1996, Sztompka 1999). Relational trust is rooted in previous relationships and may be linked 
to reciprocity (Zucker 1986, Misztal 1996, Sztompka 1999). It develops through social 
processes such as communication, cooperation and negotiations. Experiences through 
interaction contribute to convince us about the others willingness to keep the promise, or the 
opposite, which may lead to erosion of trust. 
 
The social construction of trust is a dynamic interaction between perception and 
interpretation, construction of meaning and confirmation of mutual understanding. Relational 
trust bridges the barrier between oneself and the other. It is based on personal relationships 
and reciprocity (Zucker 1986, Misztal 1996, Sztompka 1999), on face to face relationships 
and small group relationships where those involved know each other and share common rules 
and norms (Luhmann, 1979, Hart 1990, Giddens 1993). Relational trust can also be based on 
one-sided distant relationships, as ascribed or mediated familiarity (Ellingsen 2003). This 
interpersonal trust pervades social life and is constructed and re-constructed through social 
interaction and communication. Relational trust is the quality we probably intuitively perceive 
as ‘trust’ in our everyday language.  
 
iii)  Structural trust is rooted in formal social structures and positions and has much in 
common with institutional or system trust (Luhmann 1979, Giddens 1993, Misztal 1996, Lane 
& Bachmann 1996, Sztompka 1999) and it applies beyond the individual level. Structural 
trust is gradually institutionalised through formal organisations, laws, property rights, 
business regulations, contracts and professions. Formal structures are basis for structural trust 
and function as general promises backed by sanctions from a legitimate power. The 
possibility of legitimate sanctions serves to safeguard the trustor; it brackets out the risk and is 
a basis for mutual understanding.    
 
The legitimate system of sanctions, in practice the judicial system, is a platform for structural 
trust, but other formal structures may have the same social function such as for instance 
technical and procedural standards (Lane & Bachmann, 1996). Development of bases for 
structural trust is closely woven together with the institutionalisation of a legitimate nation 
state, expert systems and in some cases supranational institutions. Lack of predictable legal 




The structural trust concept refers to non-personal trust and generalised trust. This form of 
trust is also referred to as institution-based trust, generalised trust and macro level trust. 
Institution is a complex and ambiguous concept and the question of ‘how and when 
institutions matter with regard to trust building is one of the least understood areas within 
trust research.’ according to Bachmann & Inkpen (2011, p. 282). A further clarification of 
structural trust and its relationship to generalisation of trust and institution-based trust is 
additionally discussed in the thesis, in the chapter about structural trust. 
 
As long as expectations are confirmed and everything works as expected, trust is maintained 
and these processes remain invisible. Analysis of trust processes involves making the various 
elements in the process visible, and to establish relationships and causality between elements 
to explain how processes unfold – that is to make visible the social construction of trust.  
 
Trust is a personal feeling with a social basis and the dynamics between the social basis and 
individual sense-making is fundamental to the process of developing and maintaining trust. 
An exploration of the dynamics between the social basis of trusting and the individual sense-
making will provide a richer understanding of trust as a social phenomenon and trusting as a 
social process. These dynamics are key to the composite concept of trust and the focus for the 
exploration of trust in this thesis. On the next page the trust process is exemplified through a 
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are not fulfilled or obligations not met, we may feel that trust is affected; that it erodes, 
disappears or turns into distrust. Trust seems to be needed more than ever, while the social 
foundations for trust are eroding under new risks, suspicion, social change and complexity.  
 
These processes are not necessarily indications of a deeper erosion of trust. This thesis 
discusses how social change tends to lead to a trust paradox. The research focus in trust 
studies has not usually been directed towards the dynamics between the social transformation 
of trust bases and the conditions for (re)-building of trust. New analytical tools are needed to 
discover these processes and the thesis contributes to this through the theoretical exploration 
of the grounded theory of trust. This conceptualisation of trust is an analytical tool for 
exploring how micro level processes are affected by social change and modernisation; how 
changes in roles and rationalities and structural transformations on the macro level affect 
trusting on a micro level and the general level of trust in society. Institutionalisation, 
deregulation and development of new roles are processes that affect social organisation and 
social perception – the way things are done and the way we think about them.  
 
The trust paradox summarises two main lines of argument in the literature on trust. 
Möllering (2006:2) uses the metaphor of wells and pumps to describe the different views. 
One position is the argument that ‘the wells are drying up’, which is set forth by those 
concerned about the erosion of trust; that the sources of trust are declining (Barber 1983, 
Beck 1993, Putnam 1995, Sennett 1998, Cook 2001, O‘Neill 2003). The other position is 
marked by the argument that ‘pumps cannot keep up’, suggesting that there is an increasing 
demand for trust in more areas of life (Giddens 1994, Misztal 1996, Seligman 2000, 
Sztompka 1999). The ‘wells are drying up’ position is concerned with how to live with the 
erosion of social ties, while the ‘pumps cannot keep up’ position is focused on how to rebuild 
trust and why that is becoming increasingly difficult. 
 
However, could the trust paradox lead us to a third position? Is the crisis of trust in the late 
modernity either a question of ‘drying wells’ or ‘insufficient pumps’? Can there be another 
perspective which suggests that ‘the wells are invisible’ and ‘the pumps are under 
reconstruction’? The present theoretical perspectives and analytical tools for exploring trust 
do not explicitly address the relationship between ‘drying wells’ and ‘insufficient pumps’ for 
trusting. The analytical tools do not recognise either new wells or restored pumps; they do 
not recognise new bases for trust or processes for construction and reconstruction of trust. 
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Limited insight into the dynamics between trust and social change may lead to a 
misinterpretation of changes in trust bases and trust processes as crises, rather than as on- 
going social processes.   
 
The third perspective is explored in the thesis. The hypothesis is that there is not a crisis of 
trust in the sense that trust is simply declining. What we have is a social paradox – a trust 
paradox – this means that there is an increasing demand for trust in parallel with erosion of 
the social foundations of trust. The need for trust increases, but conditions for development 
of trust are undermined.  
 
This observation will be further examined through discussion of the following question:   
 
Do we have a breakdown of the social contract and basis for trust, or is the trust paradox an 
indication of reformulation and new configurations of trust forms rather than breakdown of 
trust on a societal level?  
 
In order to explore the relationship between trust and social change, we have to make the 
‘wells’ of trust and the ‘process of reconstructing the pumps’ more visible. This necessitates 
a theoretical exploration of ‘the wells and pumps’ of trust, which indicates a research focus 
directed towards the dynamics between social transformation of trust bases and rebuilding of 
trust. The composite concept of trust conceptualises the social bases for trust – the sources of 
trusting, whereas the concept of mutual understanding conceptualises the trigger for the 
process of trust development – the pumps of trust.  Social transformations alter the 
foundations for trust; the tacit social contract and the bases for mutual understanding. 
Restoring trust means developing new social bases for mutual understanding; that is 
accessing new wells, and reconstructing the pumps. Pumps need continuous maintenance – 
as does trust; it is a dynamic quality and mutual understanding has to be acknowledged and 
maintained through everyday actions and interactions.   
 
An exploration of the interaction between different social bases of trust – the configuration of 
trusting – will contribute to a better understanding of the social dynamics and functions of 
trust. The composite concept of trust is an analytical tool that contributes to a  better 
insight into the social foundations for developing trust and the relation between trust 
and social change. 
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1.7 Reconfiguration of trust  
Change, renewal and innovation transform tacit and explicit social foundations for trust; 
creating transformations that erode familiar bases for social interaction and increase social 
risk and complexity. Change involves a leap from the familiar to the unfamiliar (Luhmann 
1979), a leap that involves risk and the possibility of failing. This demands additional trust, 
but operating in a changing environment makes it difficult to develop mutual understanding. 
By their nature, changes transform the social basis for developing mutual understanding. This 
is the core of the trust paradox; the erosion of the social basis for trust that occurs in parallel 
to increasing demands for trust.  
 
The trust paradox points to the relationship between trust and social change: Are changes in 
trust a result of social change or will changes in trust cause social change? Is crumbling trust 
an effect of social disintegration or the cause of it? Perhaps are these wrong questions – 
perhaps the relationship between social change and trust is not a question of cause and effect 
– but rather a question of on-going transformations of our common bases for trust? Change 
erodes the familiar social basis for trust and hence has an effect on trust, directly and 
indirectly, depending on the situation.  
 
The distinction between erosion of trust and erosion of the social basis for trust is important. 
Erosion of the social bases for trust is not about trust transformed to distrust or lack of trust; it 
is about the way the social foundations for trusting are changing. Hence, there can still be 
trust. The trust is not lost, but the familiar social basis for trust is under transformation. 
Transformation of the social basis of trust influences trusting and demands maintenance and 
reconstruction of trust. This suggests that change processes affect the development and 
maintenance of trust. Organisational change, for instance, will transform the social foundation 
for construction of trust in that particular organisational context, but trust consequences are 
rarely taken into consideration in processes of organisational transformation because trust is 
invisible and mostly taken for granted. We do not notice it unless it is violated, either in 
practice or analytically.  
 
The relationship between trust, social change and modernity is mainly discussed by 
sociologists such as Luhmann (1979), Zucker (1986), Giddens (1993), Fukuyama (1995), 
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Sztompka (1999), and Seligman (2000).4 Except for Zucker’s analysis of the transformation 
of the US economic system during 1840-1920, and Giddens’ (1993) analysis of modernity, 
none of the above-mentioned works have focused explicitly on the dynamics between 
different forms of trust and social transformation, or on trust as a process of social 
construction. These subjects must be explored to get a better understanding of the relationship 
between trust and social change and will be examined here through the composite concept of 
trust.  
 
As discussed above, the development of trust involves suspending doubt and making a leap 
of faith (Möllering 2006). The “trigger” for this leap is the sufficient recognition of mutual 
understanding of the promise and the fulfilment of it. The leap of faith is a socially 
constructed outcome, which presupposes a common social platform for interaction and 
mutual understanding. The leap of faith requires us to generalise from the familiar into the 
unknown, and trust functions as a kind of substitute for the unknown. Analytically, this 
substitute has pre-contractual, relational and structural platforms. These interrelated 
platforms are social sources of familiar knowledge which trust is based upon and generalised 
from. An exploration of trust and social change requires the investigation of the configuration 
of common social bases for developing and confirming mutual understanding.  
 
The composite model of trust is a sociological perspective on trust and social change. The 
conceptualisation takes into account that trust is a pre-condition for, and a possible outcome 
of, social action; that social processes contribute to maintaining or weakening trust, and that 
trust is a psychological state and relational quality as well as a dynamic social process of 
interpretation, interaction and social construction. The three forms of trust, pre-contractual, 
relational and structural, are not mutually exclusive, and the configuration of the forms varies 
with context.  
 
In summary the composite conceptualisation of trust means that trust is not one quality, but is 
comprised of three main elements or forms related to the three social bases. These trust forms 
are general social qualities. They are not mutually exclusive or phases in a process, but can 
operate side by side, partially influencing each other. The exploration of the interaction 
                                                 
4 Some forms of change might have been the implicit reason for investigating the phenomenon of trust in several 
subjects, for instance in organisation studies (Kramer & Tyler 1996, Lane & Bachmann (eds.) 1998, Bachmann 
& Zaheer (eds.) 2006), but the subject of trust and social change is not the explicit focus in those studies. 
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between different forms of trust will expand our understanding of the social dynamics and 
functions of trust. The composite concept of trust is an analytical tool that will provide 
insight into the social foundations for developing trust, the relationship between trust and 
social change, and in the role of trust as a dynamic process of social construction.  
 
1.8 Contribution and structure of the thesis  
The social processes discovered in the grounded theory of trust, are general social processes 
discussed in sociological literature, but are not explicitly related to the development of trust. 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis is therefore:  
 
1) The presentation and discussion of a grounded theory of trust as a process of social 
construction.  
2) The exploration of how the main elements of the theory are discussed in sociology. 
These elements are the core concept mutual understanding and the pre-
contractual, relational and structural social bases for the development of mutual 
understanding.  
3) The development of a process perspective on trust, grounded both in empirical data 
and in sociological theory, and an application of this perspective in the discussion 
of the trust paradox, which is an analysis of the relationship between trust and 
social change.  
4) The exploration of how grounded theory relates to existing theory, here 
exemplified by  sociology, and a model for stages in integration of grounded 
theory and existing theory.   
 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to make a theoretical exploration of trust as a social 
phenomenon through a discussion of the composite concept of trust. This concept is grounded 
in empirical data on a substantive level, and is expanded to a formal grounded theory concept. 
The grounded theory method recommends postponing literature readings in the particular 
research topic until the theory has been generated. Then, in the final stage of a grounded 
theory work, the generated theory should be carefully weaved into its place in the existing 
literature (Glaser 1978:137). This thesis is about weaving a grounded theory of trust into 
existing sociological theory. Trusting is a general social process and the theoretical part 
explores how the existing sociological theory of trust together with general sociological 
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theory can contribute to expand, nuance and enrich an empirically grounded theory. The 
theoretical exploration seeks to position the composite concept in relation to sociological 
theory and to discuss it in relation to main sociological works of trust. This I hold, is more 
than to wave it into the literature, it is to generate a sociological grounding of the concept and 
demonstrate that both empirical and theoretical grounding can contribute to expanding the 
knowledge about a subject.  
   
The thesis has three main parts: I) Literature review and methodology, II) Theory and 
integration, and III) Analyses, empirical examples and final reflections. The parts can be read 
independently of each other even though they build on each other. The first part starts with 
chapter 2 and a review of trust literature which is not discussed further in the theoretical part, 
chapter 3 discusses methodological roots and the ambiguity of grounded theory. Chapter 4 
explores the methodological roots of the composite concept and chapter 5 elaborates on the 
process of conceptual development and concludes with four strategies for integration between 
grounded theory based concepts and existing theory. The next part opens with chapter 6 that 
explores mutual understanding and the social construction of trust. Chapter 7 addresses pre-
contractual trust and its relationship to familiarity and confidence, and chapter 8 elaborates on 
pre-contractual trust and social change. Chapter 9 focuses on relational trust and presents a 
table of expectations for analysis of trust processes. Chapter 10 analyses structural trust and 
the relationship between structural trust, systems trust and institutional trust. Thereafter 
follows the third and last part. Chapter 11 demonstrates the conceptual tool in an analysis of 
the trust paradox through a discussion of different social configurations of trust. Chapter 12 
analyses long term social change and trust exemplified by a study of institutionalisation of 
trust in savings banks. Chapter 13 analyses how social change on the macro level affects trust 
on a micro level. This is illustrated by the study of how deregulation of savings banks 
deregulated the trust relationship between bank and customer. The final chapter 14, concludes 
the thesis, summarises the main findings and contributions, and discusses the implications for 
development of trust and its relation to social change. The chapter also points to limitations 
and raises questions for further research. The appendix provides further information about 























































2. CONCEPTUAL DIVERSITY IN THE TRUST 
LITERATURE 
 
‘An adequate analysis of trust begins with 
 recognising its multi-faceted character.’ 5 
– DAVID LEWIS, ANDREW WEIGERT 
 
 
What characterises trust? How is it constructed socially? What is the relationship between 
trust and social change?  
 
These questions have been on my mind for almost three decades; they do not have one 
definitive answer, but can be explored from various academic disciplines. Today trust is a 
research topic in several disciplines, but when I started to study the trust relationship between 
savings banks and customers twenty five years ago, trust was a poorly examined topic. My 
tutor therefore recommended using grounded theory methodology to study the phenomenon.  
 
The aim of a grounded theory study is to generate empirically based theory. To prevent bias 
and theoretical disturbance of the empirically based theory generation, the method 
recommends postponing of literature studies. If necessary, a literature review can be 
conducted when the theory is generated; the empirical grounded theory has priority and the 
existing literature can be referred to in footnotes and should not be used as a key (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967).6   
 
The initial generation of the composite concept of trust was therefore not based on existing 
trust literature, but on empirical data and reading of general sociological literature. This 
means that the literature review presented here does not lead to a theory driven research 
hypothesis, but provides a brief overview of relevant trust research, and discusses how a few 
perspectives on trust, particularly those prevalent in organisation theory, can be related to the 
grounded theory of trust.  
 
                                                 
5 Lewis, Weigert (1985:969) 
6 The relationship between grounded theory and existing theory is a common thread of the thesis and will be 
explicit discussed further in the methodological part of the thesis. 
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If the thesis followed the structure of a grounded theory work, the literature review could be 
left out and references made in footnotes, or at least presented after the methodological part. 
Here the literature review is presented as a general introduction to the subject of trust, and as a 
background to the methodological and theoretical parts. The theoretical part, succeeds the 
methodological part, and is an exploration of trust and how the grounded theory concept of 
trust can be integrated with sociological trust theory. As early sociological works on trust, 
such as those by Luhmann (1979), Barber (1983), Zucker (1986) and Giddens (1993), are 
focused on in the theoretical part (chapter 6-10), these works will therefore not be discussed 
in this literature review. 
 
2.1 Trust and process perspectives  
Although there is no common definition of trust, there seems to be consensus in the literature 
about the following characteristics: Trust is a foundation of social life; it is a relational 
quality, a device for coping with the risk associated with the freedom of others, and a strategy 
for handling complexity and social risk (Luhmann 1979, Barber 1983, Zucker 1986, Misztal 
1996, Rousseau et al. 1998, Sztompka 1999, Seligman 2000, Giddens 1993 and Möllering 
2006). Trust is about expectations and anticipation of others’ future actions, but the theories 
differ in how, why and what role trust plays in this. There are a number of approaches about 
how to characterise trust and the development of trust, but the dynamic and process nature of 
trust is under-explored, according to Möllering (2012).  
 
The perspective suggested in the thesis, is to analyse trusting as a dynamic process of social 
construction. This thesis aims to reduce knowledge gaps on trust as a dynamic process and 
present a theoretical discussion of an empirically grounded theory of trust as a dynamic 
process of social construction. This theory is based on the composite concept of trust and 
mutual understanding as analytical tools for exploration of the dynamic nature of trust. The 
following three chapters in part I discuss the empirical grounding and generation of these 
concepts, the scientific perspectives of the conceptualisation and suggest four strategies for 
integration and theoretical grounding of an empirical grounded theory.  
 
In the last decade, trust has been the subject of increased focus among scholars within a wide 
range of disciplines. The literature on trust has ‘exploded’ in social sciences as well as in 
management and business literature (Misztal 1996, Seligman 2000, Sztompka 1999, 
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Möllering, Bachman & Lee 2004, Bachmann & Zaheer 2006, Möllering 2006), but the 
prevailing perspectives in these studies focus on measurement, forms or qualities of trust.  
 
There are a number of studies discussing phases or cycles in trust development, but the main 
thrust of trust literature has been a rather static and descriptive focus on trust, although with a 
rich literature on different qualities of trust. Möllering (2012) therefore suggests a process 
view of trust as a dynamic and continuous process, as trusting. A process view means 
perceiving trust as a continuous and on-going quality, not as a static outcome. ‘Process views 
of ‘trusting’ emphasise that trust is always ‘in process’ and is even a process in itself’ 
(Möllering 2012:2). Trusting can be examined as social or mental, or as a dynamic between 
these dimensions. To examine trust as a process, Möllering suggests five process views of 
trusting to inspire researchers to position their work in relation to trust processes. To some 
extent these views or labels on trust processes build on each other, they describe and 
emphasise different processes and ‘develop from relatively moderate to more pronounced 
notions of process’ (ibid:5). The five processes also represent a gradual development towards 
more a complex perspective on analyses of trusting and they can be considered as steps in the 
development of studies in trust as a dynamic and continuous quality. The five process labels 
are 1) trusting as continuous and as a development from phase to phase, 2) trusting as 
processing of information, as input and outcome, 3) trusting as learning, 4) trusting as 
becoming and identity formation, and 5) trusting as constituting.  
 
The work in this thesis is a continuation and extension of trusting as constituting. The 
perspective in the thesis may prove to be a sixth process label on trusting; trusting as social 
construction. The thesis explores the dynamic interaction between social and individual 
processes in the generation of trusting; trusting as practice. The thesis also explores the 
dynamics between trust processes at the social micro and macro level and the dynamics 
between trust and social change.   
 
In order to undertake further theoretical exploration of the grounded theory of trust, it is 
necessary to situate the trust perspective – trust as social construction – in the theoretical trust 
landscape. This chapter presents a brief overview of the main approaches to trust as a 
phenomenon in different subject areas and concludes with pointing out some qualities of trust 




2.2 A multitude of perspectives on trust 
Trust is a multi-dimensional phenomenon (Barber 1983, Nordnes 1995, Misztal 1996, Lane 
1998, Hardin 2001, Möllering 2006) and has a multi-faceted character with ‘distinct 
cognitive, emotional and behavioural dimensions, which are merged into a unitary social 
experience’ (Lewis & Weigert 1985:969). Trust is a basic and pervasive element of social life, 
located in the space between us. Analytically this relational space is a black box in the trust 
research and the elaboration of the composite concept of trust and mutual understanding is an 
exploration of this black box.  
 
Trust is a prerequisite for social relations and is maintained through social interaction and 
fulfilment of mutual obligations. Neither trust nor lack of trust can be identified as objective 
facts, but if trust is absent, this is evident through social consequences such as exit or 
withdrawal. Further, I hold that by trusting, one takes the risk of acting in anticipation of 
possible future actions, of entering into long-lasting relationships and obligations and of 
making generalisations from the known to the unknown. Trust suspends social risk, 
uncertainty, and vulnerability (Luhmann 1979, Lane 1998, Rousseau et al. 1998, Möllering 
2006) and it is a mechanism for social coordination (Bachmann 2001).  
 
The analytical focus on trust varies between disciplines. In philosophy trust is discussed in 
relation to moral dilemmas, norms and ethics and the problem of social order (Hollis 1998, 
Seligman 2000). Political science focuses on the role of trust in the functioning of civil 
society and as an element in political processes, participatory democracy and the production 
of social capital (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Cook 2001, Warren 1999, Uslaner 2002).  
 
Economists discuss and measure trust as a strategic calculation of risk and rational choice 
based on individual interests, or they analyse trust as an institutional phenomenon 
(Williamson 1983, Coleman 1988, 1994, Braithwaite & Levi 1998, Cvetkovich & Løfstedt 
eds. 1999, Cook ed. 2001, Hardin 2002, Nooteboom 2002 and Kramer, Cook 2004). In 
rational choice theory and transaction cost economic approaches, trust is discussed as a 
strategic calculation of probability (Collins 1982, Coleman 1988, Nooteboom 2002, Hardin 
2002). Rational calculation can be one of several possible mental processes or approaches to 
bestowing trust, and theoretical perspectives define which processes that are emphasised in a 
trust analysis. Rational calculation alone is not sufficient to facilitate trust, at least not from a 
sociological point of view (Lane 1998). As Bachmann (2006:396) points out ‘it is grossly 
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misleading to assume that a trustor can ever ‘calculate’ the risk that is involved in a trust 
investment’. Möllering (2006:48) rejects calculative trust and considers it as ‘mechanistic 
decision-making under risk’ and states, with reference to Lewis & Weigert (1985:969), that 
‘trust succeeds where rational prediction alone would fail’.  
 
This thesis explores trust from a sociological perspective; as a relational quality and process 
of social interaction and construction, not as a strategic calculation of possibilities for gain or 
loss. Apart from a discussion of calculus-based trust in a later section, rational choice 
approaches to trust will therefore not be discussed further, either in the context of trust and 
social capital, or in terms of trust as an element in civic society.7  
 
2.3 Trust from a sociological perspective 
A wide range of issues related to trust are discussed in sociology. The main subjects are the 
foundations of trust production, the function of trust, and how trust contributes to social order. 
This includes trust as the basis of society and social action, as well as trust as a relational 
quality in various social settings from institutional to actor level. The main sociological 
perspectives on trust are only briefly mentioned here as they will be more fully discussed in 
the theoretical part of the thesis. 
 
A sociological perspective on trust on a conceptual and general level is addressed by 
Luhmann (1979), Barber (1983), Lewis & Weigert (1985), and Giddens (1993). These 
contributions focus on the functions of trust, while Misztal (1996), Seligman (2000) and 
Sztompka (1999) explore trust and the problem of order in a wider sense.  A process 
perspective on trust is discussed by Zucker’s (1986) study of the institutionalisation of new 
economic structures in USA during the most intense immigration period between 1840 and 
1920. A rather new conceptual discussion by Möllering (2006:1) aims ‘to demonstrate the 
many facets of trust and the value of taking different perspectives on trust…’ in the book 
‘Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity’. Möllering’s discussion of the leap of faith and 
reflexivity as the core processes for developing trust is an important contribution to the 
conceptualisation of trust as a dynamic process of social construction.  
                                                 




The potentially unlimited possibilities of actions in our time create social complexity and risk. 
Luhmann emphasises the function of trust and considers it to be a solution to problems of 
risk, uncertainty and social complexity in general (Luhmann 1990:95, 1979:5). Trusting is a 
way of creating individual and social predictability. It is a way of coping with the freedom of 
others and enabling individuals to handle risk and complexity related to the outcome of future 
actions (Luhmann 1979, Gambetta 1990a:219, Misztal 1996, Sztompka 1999). This 
perspective focuses on the abstract system level, but can be applied at a micro level. Others, 
for instance, Gambetta (1990a), Misztal (1996) and Sztompka (1999) discuss trust and risk at 
the micro level in relation to action, expectations and intention, respectively. The function of 
trust is discussed in Luhmann’s book Trust and power (1979), a classic work widely referred 
in the trust literature, also in fields other than sociology (Bachman 1996).8 Luhmann’s work 
has influenced later sociological contributions such as Giddens (1993), Misztal (1996), 
Sztompka (1999), Bachman (2001) and Möllering et al. (2004).  
 
Categorisation of trust literature according to the general problem focus reveals that the level 
of familiarity constitutes a fundamental distinction between forms of trust (Bigley & Pearce 
1998:409). There are three main categories of problem focus for trust and distrust research 
that can be discerned: 1) interaction among unfamiliar actors, 2) interaction among familiar 
actors, and 3) organisation of economic transactions.9 These three categories raise different 
questions, approaches, and explanations. The review of Bigley & Pearce’s trust forms, which 
they claim to be distinct for interaction among unfamiliar actors indicate that to a great extent, 
these strategies for developing trust among strangers are also relevant to familiar actors. This 
does not mean that the distinction between familiar and unfamiliar is of no relevance, but that 
a disposition to trust, calculus-based trust and institutional trust, or structural trust as 
suggested in the thesis, is not dependent on the distinction between familiar-unfamiliar. These 
forms of trust have different bases; disposition to trust is an individual quality, calculus-based 
trust is related to a particular rationality and structural trust to a formal basis, and these forms 
of trust are not dependent on familiarity or unfamiliarity. The level of familiarity, disposition 
to trust, and rationality in the trust process will affect the social construction of trust in 
                                                 
8 For instance, in The Academy of Management Review vol. 23, No 3 1998, a special issue on trust, seven out of 
14 articles refers to Luhmann. 
9 In their categorisation, Bigley & Pearce (1998) omit works on trust that are not within the field of 
organisational science. These are works that primarily focus on trust and the problem of social order, and works 




different ways. In the exploration of the social construction of trust it is useful to make 
distinctions between the levels of familiarity.  
 
The thesis focuses on the social construction of trust and the pre-contractual, relational and 
structural bases for trust which facilitates the development of mutual understanding which is 
the precondition for making the leap of faith into trusting. Each of these elements in the 
grounded theory will be explored further in the theoretical chapters when looking at 
sociological theory and sociological theory about trust.  
 
2.4 Trust - individual cognition and social construction  
Trusting is a social process, something that goes on between oneself and others. A person’s 
propensity and basic disposition for trusting will affect the generation of trust. Even though 
this thesis does not focus on the psychological aspects, some psychological elements are 
presented below as an exploration of the premises for the social construction of trust.  
 
A readiness to trust, how this readiness is shaped, how cognition affects trust, and the 
measurement of trust as an individual quality and inner feeling fall within the domain of 
psychology. Socio-psychological approaches explore trust on a group level; as transactions, 
behaviour, motivations, and choices. The loci are most often organisational contexts. In 
addition to rational choice, psychological and socio-psychological perspectives focus on 
cognitive processes at the individual and socio-psychological level to explain the 
development of trust. 
 
Both socio-psychological and sociological perspectives study the social element in the 
construction of trust, but they emphasise different processes. Socio-psychological approaches 
focus on the social influence on psychological processes in the development of trust, while 
sociological approaches study the social basis for developing trust in the dynamic processes in 
the space between the actors and trust as an ordering element in the society.   
 
The analytical distinction between the socio-psychological and the sociological approach is of 
relevance to this work. The main perspective in this thesis is sociological; trust is a social 
phenomenon, it is discussed in sociological terms as a social and relational quality, and the 
psychological aspects of trust are not emphasised in the analysis, other than as a state of mind 
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in the trust process. The analytical focus here is on trust as a social quality that is located in 
the space between the society and the individual – as a psychological state constructed in the 
dynamics between the social and the self. In the thesis the social context, “input” and bases of 
the trust process are explored rather than the psychological “throughput” process.  
 
Individual cognition and social interaction are different analytical processes and fields of 
research, and the composite concept of trust focuses on the social bases as a common 
foundation for the development of mutual understanding. Distinctions between social and 
individual elements in the trust process are analytical and may not have great significance to 
the understanding of trust development in practical life. The distinctions are the basis for 
situating the grounded theory in the theoretical trust landscape and provide guidance for the 
selection of relevant literature which contributes to expanding the grounded theory.    
 
The concept of mutual understanding connects the dynamic between individual cognition and 
social construction. The social construction of trust unfolds as interaction between the social 
foundations of trust and the individual’s basic disposition to trust. The basic disposition to 
trust affects the social construction of trust in practical life and it is therefore necessary to 
discuss it briefly. The social foundations for trust, the interaction between these foundationd, 
and the mutual social construction processes that generates trust will be explored in part II as 
this perspective is not explicit in the literature, but a theoretical contribution from the thesis.   
 
Basic disposition to trust  
Individual disposition to trust is a psychological quality based on early-life experiences 
(Rotter 1971). Giddens (1993:92), with reference to Erikson, is connecting trust and 
‘ontological security’, which is an emotional phenomenon rooted in the unconscious and 
provided through trusting experiences during childhood. A child’s trust develops as an 
element of its self-identity and through its experience of consistency and attention from the 
caretaker. Development of basic trust ‘implies a mutuality of experience’ this is a process 
where both child and caretakers behave reliably (Giddens 1993:95). If a child does not 
experience this, it is very likely that the child’s basic trust and disposition to trust will be 
damaged. Basic trust can be categorised as an individual element in a person’s pre-contractual 





According to Giddens there is an intimate connection between ontological security, habits and 
routines. Habits and routines contribute to creating a predictable world and ontological 
security. ‘Routine is psychologically relaxing’ (Giddens 1993:98) and accomplishment of 
routines contributes to a reduction in social complexity. Breaking everyday routines has 
negative effects on trust, and results in confusion, embarrassment and distrust (Garfinkel 
1963, Goffman 1967). Habits and routines confirm and maintain the tacit ‘social contracts’ 
and are social steps in the long-term process of institutionalising social practices and action 
patterns (Berger & Luckmann 1991). The guiding norms for practices and actions are 
gradually taken for granted and become incorporated in the pre-contractual basis for trust. The 
individual disposition to trust affects not only the threshold for making the leap of faith, but is 
a more or less prevalent element in any situation where trust is involved. From a sociological 
position this disposition is hard to determine analytically, and the focus in the thesis is on the 
social foundation for making the leap of faith, not on the individual disposition to trust. 
 
2.5 Relational forms of trust 
Trust in relationships, often called relational trust, is perhaps the most examined form of trust 
and is mainly presented as forms or types of trust. The types of trust are conceptualised from a 
socio-psychological perspective and categorised on the basis of rationality or behaviour in the 
trust setting; for instance as knowledge-, identification-, calculation-, affect-, or cognition-
based.  
 
There is a multitude of trust perspectives focusing on different relational aspects of trust, but 
these approaches are not congruent. When Misztal (1996), for instance, discusses trust as 
passion in relation to friends and family, this is about trust as a relational quality. In an 
analysis of trust, modernity, and role segmentation; Seligman (2000) focuses on trust and 
relational qualities, and Zucker (1986) analyses relational trust as process- and characteristic 
based trust. I will return to these sociological contributions to the study of trust in subsequent 
chapters. In this thesis the discussion of trust as a relational quality is first and foremost made 





Relational trust in the organisation literature 
While the basic disposition to trust is considered as a ‘pure’ individual and psychological 
quality affecting trusting, studies in the socio-psychological tradition are mainly focused on 
rationality, psychological considerations, and cognitive processes for developing trust. Even 
though these studies also are about trust as psychological processes, they have a broader focus 
than basic disposition. Trust is categorised in relation to different forms or bases. It is 
analysed in terms of processing and as various strategies for handling of information, or as 
processes moving between different forms or stages of cognition, or as forms of rationality. 
These analyses are most often conducted in organisational studies and often based on 
empirical case studies. 
 
Trust has gained increasing interest as a subject in studies of organisations and inter- 
organisational interaction, from the 1990’s for example, in edited volumes by Gambetta 
(1990), Kramer & Tyler (1996), Lane & Bachman (1998) Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa 
(2005) and the Handbook of Trust Research (Bachmann & Zaheer 2006). One of the latest 
trends in organisation research is studies of trust and culture where the focus is on trust across 
national cultures, on inter-organisational and intra-organisational trust challenges (Saunders et 
al. ed. 2010).  
 
Conceptual issues are less frequently discussed in the organisational literature; it mainly 
focuses on trust in specific empirical cases among a wide range of organisational settings 
(Bachman 2001, Möllering et al. 2004). One exception is the collection of articles edited by 
Lane & Bachman (1998). Lane presents a comprehensive overview of theories and issues in 
the study of trust. Bachman discusses conceptual issues in addition to empirical analyses of 
trust between organisations. Trust has been a topic in periodicals in different fields, and there 
are special issues with multidisciplinary views on trust in organisations.10  
 
The analytical emphasises can be on the propensity to trust (Mayer et al. 1995). There are 
studies of various bases or rationalities for trusting; such as trust based on calculation, 
knowledge or identification (Lewicki & Bunker 1996), trust based on deterrence, knowledge 
                                                 
10 For instance The Academy of Management Journal (1995/38-1), Academy of Management Review (1998/23-
3), Organisation Studies (2001/22-2), Journal of Managerial Psychology (2004/19-6) and International 
Sociology (2005/20-3), frequent articles on trust in journal of Management. The above mentioned publications 
are mainly in sociology and social psychology and from 2011 the Journal of Trust Research.    
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or identification (Sheppard & Tuchinsky 1996), cognition-, behavioural-, or emotional/affect-
based trust (Lewis & Weigert 1985, McAllister 1995) or cognitive, behavioural and emotional 
trust (Gillespie & Mann 2004) and trust based on cognitive, normative, and calculative 
perspectives (Bachmann 1998). The different perspectives on trust and trust bases have 
elements in common and refer to characteristics of the bases and prevailing rationalities in the 
process of trust development. In analyses of the multi-faceted character of trust, three main 
forms of trust are suggested: cognition-, affect-, and behavioural-based trust (Lewis & 
Weigert 1985, Lewicki & Bunker 1996). These trust forms merge several trust forms together. 
Apart from the studies by Lewis & Weigert and Bachmann, the contributions above mainly 
focus on the psychological basis for considerations of trust.  
 
As previously indicated, the focus in the thesis is on trust in the relationship between actors 
and as a societal quality. In this perspective the psychological and socio-psychological 
categorisations of trust forms are useful as a means of specifying the content of expectations 
in empirical analysis of various bases and rationalities for development of expectations (see 
for instance the model of expectations in chapter 9).  
 
In analyses of trust as a process of social construction, psychological and socio-psychological 
approaches would extend and specify the content of expectations and provide insight in the 
rationality of social interaction. If, for instance, actor A has a calculus-based approach as a 
frame of meaning, while actor B has an emotional approach, mutual understanding cannot be 
taken for granted, it has to be negotiated and may not even be achieved. If mutual 
understanding is taken for granted in situations with different action rationality among the 
interaction partners, there is a high risk of unfulfilled expectations and no generation of trust – 
and that trust even may turn into distrust at some point. 
 
The following section discusses calculus- and identification-based trust as these forms of trust 
are two approaches to relational trust which are common within the field of organisational 
studies. The organisation literature is more relevant as examples of analysis of empirical cases 
of trust processes than as explorations of conceptual issues. In this literature there is a 
predominance of empirical cases exploring the development of relational trust and the 
perspective is mainly socio-psychological. In the thesis these studies are of relevance as a 
description of different qualities and variation of trust forms and as an exploration of the 
content and basis of trust relations. 
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Deterrence-based trust   
In a reference article with a cross-discipline overview of trust, three forms of trust are 
suggested; relational, calculative and institutional trust. In addition is the concept deterrence-
based trust discussed (Rousseau et al. 1998).  
 
Relational trust ‘derives from repeated interactions over time between trustor and trustee’ and 
‘information available to the trustor from within the relationship itself forms the basis of 
relational trust’ according to Rousseau et al. (1998:399). Repeated interaction as well as 
information from within a relationship is based on familiarity and experience, and positive 
experiences contribute to maintaining and reinforcing trust.  
 
Deterrence-based trust, on the other hand, is not a form of trust. It is control based on 
sanctions, fear and almost equal to low levels of distrust (Rousseau et al. 1998).11 According 
to Shapiro et al. (1992) deterrence-based trust is based on fear of punishment as prevention of 
inconsistent action. I hold that trusting has to be based on the possibility to choose exit, which 
means that trust cannot be based on deterrence. On the other hand; structural trust, a form of 
generalised trust based on legitimate formal structures and the possibility of sanctions, can 
have some superficial similarities with deterrence-based trust. It is the possibility of sanctions 
which generalises trust between strangers and over time and distance. However, structurally 
based trust is not the same as deterrence-based trust; the social bases are different. Structural 
trust is based on the facilitating and securing potential of formal structures. Contracts and 
sanctions support and secure trust; they are platforms for making the leap into faith and 
bestowing trust (see chapter 10). In a discussion of trust in work relationships, Lewicki & 
Bunker (1996) suggest that deterrence-based trust is included in calculus-based trust; fear of 
punishment and calculation of risk and possible reward are similar motivators.   
 
Trust is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional (Luhmann 1979, Lewis & Weigert 1985, Barber 
1983) and the distinction between deterrence-based trust and structural trust are one of the 
indications of this. The characterisation of trust depends on what is considered as the defining 
element or basis of it: When it comes to deterrence-based trust, deterrence strategies facilitate 
                                                 
11 There is a debate in trust research whether contract and sanctions are devices for trust or for control (Shapiro 
1987). See also Special Issue on The Trust-Control Nexus in Organisational Relations, Long & Sitkin 2006, for 
an overview of this debate, and whether trust is a substitute for control and sanctions (Rousseau et al., Möllering 
2005, Das & Teng 1998). The debate also focuses on the relationship between trust and contract (Deakin & 
Michie eds. 1997, Deakin & Wilkinson 1998, Deakin 2006). 
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trust, in calculus-based trust it is the calculation of risk that is the focus as the defining 
element for trusting. When it comes to structural trust it is the assurance provided by formal 
structures which provides the basis for trust. There is another difference between the three 
approaches outlined above; calculation and deterrence is related to individual rationality, 
whereas structural trust is related to the social level, the analytical focus is on formal 
structures as a common basis for trust.  
 
 
Calculus-based trust  
Calculus-based trust is based on rational choice and related to economic exchange. 
Development of trust is based on calculation of risk and advantages, of interests and resources 
(Bachmann 1998) or of ‘the value of benefits and loss of cheating (Lewicki & Bunker 
1996:120). This rational choice approach to trust (1994) is common in agency theory and 
transaction costs economics as well as in game theory approaches to trust (Lane 1998) and is 
mainly a description of trust between strangers or in professional relations. Möllering (2006) 
provides a relevant examination of different aspects of calculus-based trust. According to 
Sheppard & Tuchinsky (1996) and Lewicki & Bunker (1996) this form of rationality is 
characteristic of the initial stage of trust development in a professional relationship. In a 
model of development of trust over time (Rousseau et al. 1998:401), calculative and relational 
trust is indicated on a time line. Calculative trust is characteristic of the early phase in a 
relationship and can through repeated interaction develop into relational trust, which 
characterises the mature phase of a relationship. A continuous relationship may be based on 
calculus-based trust, but this can over time and after repeated interaction become transformed 
into knowledge and familiarity based trust. Even though calculus-based trust may develop 
into relational trust through interaction over time, it is questionable how much analytical 
power there is in categorising trust forms as they do not tell us much about processes.  
 
The existence of a common element of calculative rationality in a relationship is not sufficient 
as a basis for trust. Calculation is not trust; calculation is a mental process and an attitude, not 
a social basis. If actor A is considering whether to trust actor B or not, A needs to base these 
considerations on knowledge, information, emotions, and some taken for granted 
assumptions. These elements are bases for trust considerations or calculations of possible risk 
and gain, but the final step, the trusting, is beyond reason and calculation (Simmel 2004:179). 
The suggestion here is that a calculative attitude can be one of several possible rationalities in 
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an interaction, and trust is then based on a mutual understanding of this rationality as basis for 
the interaction.  
 
Behavioural decision theory focuses on trust from a rational choice perspective, on trust as a 
game among strangers, with reference to studies by Axelrod (1984), Deutsch and Krauss 
(1962) and Bigley & Pearce (1998). Game theory and rational choice theory constitute a 
separate research field and are out of scope for this work. These perspectives differ from 
sociological approaches to trust (Möllering 2006a), and it can be questioned as to whether 
rational calculation in Coleman’s (1994) perspective has anything to do with trust or whether 
it represents a different logic (Bachmann 2006). Calculus-based trust is different from 
relational trust (Rousseau et al. 1998), but it is a trust form that can be relevant in the early 
stage of a relationship as well as in stable relations based on calculation of possible risk, 
deterrence, and ‘the value of benefits and the costs of cheating’ (Lewicki & Bunker 
1996:120). To conclude this discussion; according to McAllister (1995:25) there are two 
principal forms of interpersonal trust bases; cognitive and affective bases, and McAllister 
referrers to empirical evidence from social-psychological literature which supports this 
argument. Deterrence- and calculus-based trust can be categorised as affective bases for trust, 
or not as trust bases, but as rationalities for a decision on whether to trust or not.  
 
Institutional based trust 
Institutional trust is the third major approach to trust among strangers (Bigley & Pearce 
(1998). Institutional trust is not clearly defined by Rousseau et al. (1998: 400), this form of 
trust can be a variation of deterrence-based trust and can ‘ease the way to formulating both 
calculus-based trust and relational trust.’  This form of trust is either dependent on ‘guardians 
of impersonal trust’ (Shapiro 1987), which are the social mechanisms facilitating trust among 
strangers, such as procedural norms, structural constrains, and insurance-like arrangements or 
it is facilitated by institutional arrangements (Zucker 1986), such as rational bureaucratic 
organisations, professions, regulations, and laws. The role of structural arrangements will be 
further discussed in the chapter Structural trust (chapter 10), from the perspective that this 
form of trust is related to pre-contractual and structural elements as trust bases. The concept 
of structural trust is a relevant form of trust not only to describe the relationship between 
strangers, but between familiar actors as well. Structural bases of trust are particularly 
relevant in relationships with high risk and low level of predictability, for instance 
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relationships maintained over time or distance. Trusting is a complex social process and in 
most situations there is a mix of trust bases, which can be transformed through repeated 
actions or particular events which undermine or maintain trust processes. 
 
Identification-, behavioural- and cognition-based trust 
The third level in Lewicki & Bunker’s (1998) model of gradual evolution of trust is 
identification-based trust, a form of trust which is reserved for relatively few relationships. 
This form of trust is based on identification with the other’s desires and intentions and 
involves a deep level of mutual understanding of needs, choices, preferences and intentions, 
and so that ‘each can effectively act for the other’ (Lewicki & Bunker: 122). This form of 
mutual understanding appears to be very demanding to achieve, even within family 
relationships. It involves not only identification with the other, but also willingness to act in 
accordance with that identification. In reality, violation of identification-based trust will 
probably be experienced as betrayal, and this form of trust violation is hard to reconstruct 
(Weber & Carter 2003).  
 
Trust suspends the social risk generated by the other’s free will and unpredictability. The need 
for trust arises in social relationships, ‘the primary function of trust is sociological rather than 
psychological’ (Lewis & Weigert 1985: 969). Trust does not have a single pure basis, but has 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioural elements. These elements are complementary and the 
mix between them varies contextually and situationally. They ‘are interpenetrating and 
mutually supporting aspects of the one, unitary experience and social imperative that we 
simply call “trust”.’ (Lewis & Weigert 1985:971).   
 
Trust is based on cognitive processes; actors consider whom to trust and under what 
circumstances, familiarity and knowledge are the basis for these decisions (Lewis & Weigert 
1985:970). This is the leap of faith, which according to Lewis & Weigert is a ‘cognitive 
“leap”, and ‘the cognitive content of trust is a collective cognitive reality that transcends the 
realm of individual psychology,’. This involves a ‘trust in trust’ (Luhmann 1979), an 
assumption that others share our bases for trust. From a sociological perspective cognitive 
scripts and shared frames for understanding are emphasised as the basis for cognitive trust 
(Bachman 1998).  
Cognitive scripts and shared frames for understanding are the tacit bases for social action. 
They are pivotal for facilitating social relations and interaction, and provide the basis for the 
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development of mutual understanding. The term pre-contractual is suggested here to 
characterise cognitive scripts and frames for interaction bases for trust. Others, such as 
McAllister (1995) categorise pre-contractual elements such as past interaction, social 
similarity, and organisational context as the bases for cognition-based trust. These elements 
are of a different kind than those suggested by Lewis & Weigert (1985) and Bachmann (1998) 
as cognition-based trust. This is an additional example of different perspectives on trust in 
sociology and social psychology. Knowledge based trust (Lewicki & Bunker 1996, Sheppard 
& Tuchinsky 1996) is founded on information, interaction, and communication; which are 
social processes and facilitate predictability. These bases of trust have much in common with 
McAllister’s bases for cognition-based trust.  
 
Behavioural trust is the third form of trust in Lewis & Weigert’s (1985) perspective. This 
form of trust is based on acting as if one is certain and this trustful action provides the basis 
for further development and maintaining of trust. To act as if one is certain is about 
suspending doubt, and as if there is a confirmed mutual understanding. This perspective will 
be further discussed throughout the thesis. Behavioural trust seems to have much in common 
with interaction based trust, and as suggested in the thesis, process based trust, which is one 
of the three relational forms of trust. This will be discussed further in the chapter about 
Relational trust, (chapter 9).  
 
In summary, the perspectives above see trust as a relational quality. It is suggested that the 
perspectives are descriptions of different relational bases for the development of mutual 
understanding. This raises the question of whether trust is possible in situations where the 
actors are governed by different social foundations as bases for their relationship. For 
instance, if A has a calculative base for considering trust in a relationship with B, and B has a 
cognitive approach – will the interaction between the two contribute to development of trust? 
From an analytical point of view, the initial answer is no, the two do not have mutual 
understanding. On the other hand, they may develop mutual understanding through repeated 
interaction, and the basis for this will be a mutual confirmation of a calculative, cognitive, or 
what-ever the common basis is for the relationship. If A and B do not develop trust, the 
question of whether there is a calculative, cognitive, or behavioural approach may or may not 
give analytical clues to why the development of trust fails. An investigation of the bases for 
trust does not give sufficient knowledge about trust processes. Möllering (2006) points out 
that the exploration of various forms and bases of trust does not tell us anything more about 
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trust. Perhaps not, although it provides some insight into the various elements of input and 
bases for developing trust, there is no insight into the construction of trust as a social process 
and trust as a general social phenomenon. Relational trust is a wide category. It involves trust 
based on familiarity and/or interaction. The different forms of relational trust described in this 
section, can also be categorised as different kinds of familiarity as bases for mutual 
understanding, varying from calculation to identification.  
 
2.6 Conclusion – definition and further development  
There is no common agreement on the definition of trust, but based on a collection of cross-
disciplinary scholarly writing, Rousseau et al. (1998) presents a definition based on a socio-
psychological perspective. This definition has gained ground in studies of trust in 
organisational contexts: ‘Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another’ 
(Rousseau et al. 1998:395). According to Rousseau et al. there could be fairly broad consent 
on this definition, which emphasises individual mental processes as sources of trust rather the 
social dimensions – the psychological rather than sociological aspects of trust. Individual 
aspects of trust, such as one’s psychological state, intentions and expectations about others 
intentions, are elements that to a lesser degree capture social, constructive and mutual aspects 
of trust. From a sociological point of view, these are the key elements of what trust and 
trusting is about.  
 
Moreover, as the definition in Rousseau et al. focuses on individual mental processes as 
sources of trust it under-communicates the social dimensions of trust. The social foundations 
and social construction of trust are invisible in this definition, but they are the theoretical and 
explorative focus of this thesis, and will be further discussed in the theoretical part. An 
exploration of the trust paradox demands a focus on trust and the social construction of trust. 
Social change is about change in the basis of trust and about creating new strategies for 
building trust. Social actions need trust – when it is threatened, it is necessary to reconstruct it 
or to exit, to withdraw from action.  
 
As each discipline explores trust from its particular perspective, a broad range of trust 
definitions exist. Apart from Rousseau et al. (1998) little effort has been made to integrate the 
different perspectives (Hosmer 1995, Lewicki & Bunker 1996, Bigley & Pierce 1998, Lane 
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1998, Bachmann 1998, Möllering et al. 2004). The diversity in trust approaches represents an 
academic challenge as well as a potential for interdisciplinary work. The possibilities are 
related to the concept of ‘connectability’ (Möllering 2006:5) which refers to the characteristic 
of trust as an everyday quality that most of us have experienced and can relate to. At the same 
time trust is an analytical concept. As an analytical concept, trust refers to basic social 
challenges in social interaction, and is discussed in most social sciences. This familiarity on 
two levels is a possible platform for future interdisciplinary research.  
 
One challenge in interdisciplinary work is to agree about some defining qualities of trust. This 
challenge is difficult to solve as the classification of qualities is inherent in the disciplinary 
perspectives. Perhaps interdisciplinary work on trust has to presuppose differences, and 
therefore clarify perspectives and defining qualities as a platform for works on trust. Another 
challenge is about building cumulative knowledge of the phenomenon in addition to the 
‘impressive numbers of articles which analyse specific empirical cases and suggest various 
classifications of trust’ (Bachman 2001:339). The theoretical fruitfulness of comprehensive 
classification can be questioned, as classification studies do not necessarily generate deeper 
knowledge about trust as a phenomenon. Qualitative inductive studies, such as those based on 
grounded theory methodology, can generate deeper empirically based insight, but to 
contribute to cumulative development of sociological knowledge, I suggest that an 
empirically grounded theory has to be integrated with existing sociological theory, or at least 
to be positioned in relation to it.  
 
Trust as a social process and how micro level trust interactions with trust processes on the 
macro level are understudied. To expand our knowledge about this it is necessary to 
undertake empirical studies of trust processes in micro and macro contexts. Grounded theory 
methodology is a relevant tool for exploring understudied processes as the method gives 
primacy to empirical discovery and new insight as the foundation for theory generation. The 
exploration of trust in this thesis is therefore based on grounded theory methodology as a 
method for discovery, but to develop the empirical knowledge further, it is necessary to 
elaborate on the grounded theory conceptualisation using classic sociological theory. The 
methodological part of the thesis is therefore also a discussion of the grounded theory 
methodology conditions and perspectives on the integration of a grounded theory of trust into 




Further development  
In order to move trust research forward, conceptual development related to trust as a dynamic 
process and the relationship between trust on the micro and macro level has to be emphasised. 
The thesis contributes to reducing this gap in knowledge by elaborating on a dynamic 
perspective on trust that includes the social context of trusting. The composite concept of trust 
and mutual understanding conceptualises trust as social construction and sense-making 
embedded in social macro contexts. The conceptualisation is a middle-range theory, a formal 
grounded theory of trust as a social process. The terms and methods will be elaborated in the 
following methodological chapters, and are therefore not discussed further at this point.   
 
The methodological chapters clarify the hallmarks of grounded theory method, position the 
theory in the general theoretical landscape, and discuss the process of theory generation and 
the integration between an empirically grounded theory and sociology. The main elements of 
the grounded theory of trust was generated during the work on my master thesis almost 
twenty five years ago (Nordnes 1993), and the theory has been applied regularly through-out 
my work as an applied researcher. The application functions as a further collection of data and 
a test of the work and fit of the theory; that shows the functioning and the explanatory power 
(validity) of the theory. The aim of the thesis is to explore trust as a social process through a 
theoretical study of how an empirically grounded theory of trust can be discussed in relation 
to and integrated with general sociological theory and some of the main sociological works on 
trust. The discussion of the concept generation is therefore based on a work undertaken 
twenty five years ago. This thesis develops the sociological aspects of the grounded concept 
and explores how an empirically grounded theory can be expanded through application of 
general sociology and how the explanatory power of sociological theory can be enhanced by a 





3. GROUNDED THEORY: METHODOLOGICAL ROOTS  
 
‘Sociologists live, and suffer, from their dual task: to develop generalisations  
and to explain particular cases. This is the raison d’être of sociology 
as well as its inherent tension’.12 
                    – GUENTHER ROTH     
 
 
The thesis aims to make a sociological grounding of the composite concept of trust. This 
means discussing and integrating a grounded theory concept with sociological theory and 
involves an exploration of the concept from methodological and theoretical perspectives.  
 
The working hypothesis here is that the theoretical exploration of trust will show that the 
analytical power of the grounded theory concept is strengthened through integration with 
sociology, but there seems to be a ‘reluctance’ in grounded theory towards conceptual 
integration with traditional theory (read sociology) while sociology seem to be uninterested in 
this subject. Does this reluctance have roots in grounded theory or is it a general 
misinterpretation of the method? A discussion of this question demands an exploration of the 
methodological foundations in grounded theory to enable integration between grounded 
theory concepts and sociological theory and the methodological part is also a positioning of 
the conceptualisation of trust in the methodological landscape. This means that the subject 
trust is not focused upon in this chapter of the methodological section, but in the next two 
chapters of this part of the thesis.       
 
The following three chapters discuss the methodological foundations for grounded theory, the 
methodological influences on the composite concept of trust, and how the methods and 
conceptual development connects with sociological theory. The methodological discussion is 
also an analytical exploration of an empirical grounded theory of trust, referred to as the 
composite concept of trust.   
 
3.1 The empirical work and fit of concepts   
In 1967 Barney G. Glaser & Anselm Strauss, in the pioneering book The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory: Strategies for qualitative research introduced grounded theory as a new 
                                                 
12 Roth in Weber 1978:xxxvii consecutive 
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sociological research methodology. Grounded theory is for them an inductive method 
introduced as an alternative to verification and ‘theory generated by logical deduction from a 
priori assumptions’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967:3).13 They argued for ‘the discovery of theory 
from data systematically obtained from social research’ (ibid: 2) and aimed to strengthen 
qualitative, sociological research by freeing it from the demands of verification of grand 
theories and logic-deductive theorising. Their aim was to encourage dynamic theory 
generation based on empirical data and a general method of comparative analysis (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967). The method has gained widespread use, but is contested among its adherents as 
well as in the wider scientific community. The main disagreements will be discussed further 
in this chapter.  
 
The composite concept of trust has been applied in various research projects and has been 
presented to researchers and lay people throughout my work as researcher in applied social 
science. The concept works and fits. In grounded theory this means that a concept has 
explanatory power; here it explains trust processes in various contexts; it has predictable and 
interpretative power and there is a good fit between theory and empirical data. When 
presented as a concept, people clearly recognise the analysis and description.  
 
The strength and distinctive stamp of grounded theory is the empirical grounding of concepts; 
the work and fit of concepts in relation to the empirical phenomenon under investigation 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967). But do empirically grounded concepts work and fit with existing 
sociological theory? Do they expand sociological explanation, prediction and interpretation 
and enhance better fit between theory and data?  
 
The classic grounded theory literature does not appear to examine this issue in detail. Why is 
the focus in grounded theory literature mainly on methods and reflections on the development 
of concepts and their empirical work and fit, and not on their relationship to existing 
knowledge? The suggestion here is that this lack of focus can be related to the methods and 
methodological foundations of grounded theory, to procedures and epistemological roots. 
These elements contribute to inhibit integration between grounded theory and existing 
theories. Lack of integration is a barrier against contributions from grounded theory to 
cumulative development of knowledge in existing theory.   
                                                 
13 According to some theorists grounded theory also has elements of abduction (Bryant & Charmaz 2010:16).   
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This chapter is therefore a discussion of the divergent epistemological roots of grounded 
theory and how they may challenge development of cumulative knowledge across knowledge 
communities. The role of classic grounded theory method in the cumulative development of 
knowledge in existing theory is an under-studied topic, and the aim here is to expand the 
existing knowledge in this field.  
 
3.2 Grounded theory – two intellectual traditions in one method 
Grounded theory has now become one of the major approaches in qualitative research applied 
across a range of disciplines and subject areas (Denzin 1998b:329, Hood 2010, Charmaz 
2008, Midré 2009). Practice varies; grounded theory has been described as a ‘landscape’ and 
a ‘family of methods claiming the grounded theory method mantle’ (Bryant & Charmaz 
2010a:11). There is thus no agreement on what constitutes a grounded theory (Dey 2010), and 
method is contested within the grounded theory community. The main contested issues are: 
whether Glaser or Strauss represent the ‘correct’ version including the main direction for 
future development; the classic grounded theory or the constructivist approach (Glaser 1992, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009, Bryant 2003, Atkinson & Delamont 2005:833, Clarke 
2005:4,  Bryant & Charmaz 2010a, 2010, Charmaz 2009:134); and what is the most 
influential philosophical basis for the method; quantitative methodology, symbolic 
interactionism or positivism (Annells 1996, Glaser 1998:22, Guba & Lincoln 1998, Alvesson 
& Sköldberg 1994, Charmaz 2008).  
 
The method Glaser & Strauss presented in 1967 in the Discovery is rooted in two intellectual 
traditions; quantitative methodology and interactionism (Glaser 1992, 1998:22, Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 1994, Annells 1996, Guba & Lincoln 1998, Strauss & Corbin 1998). The 
juxtaposition of these two traditions creates an inherent ambiguity between positivism and 
inductive perspectives, and it opens up the method for future development in positivist/classic 
or constructivist directions and for incorporation into interactionist and interpretive methods 
in general (Glaser 1992, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009, Bryant 2003, Atkinson & 
Delamont 2005:833, Clarke 2005:4, Bryant & Charmaz 2010a, 2010b, Charmaz 2009:134).  
 
After some years the two founding fathers of grounded theory drifted in different 
methodological directions. They, and in particular Glaser, contested the other’s development 
and version of the method (Glaser 1992, 1994), and both claim to represent the authentic 
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methodology (Glaser 1978, 1992, Strauss & Corbin 1998a). The final schism between Glaser 
& Strauss came in the late nineteen eighties. Strauss & Corbin introduced the book Basics of 
Qualitative research (1988), which Glaser described as a misconception, almost as a 
destruction of grounded theory. The Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis (Glaser 1992) was 
introduced as a discussion and correction of Strauss & Corbin. One of Glaser’s main 
objections was that the coding paradigm and axial coding model of Strauss & Corbin are 
theoretical preconceptions and force coding of data. According to Glaser this hinders the 
emergence of new categories, concepts and theory. Glaser continues to defend grounded 
theory against the forcing of data.   
 
After the turn of the millennium, Glaser worked to prevent grounded theory being ‘taken 
over’ by symbolic interactionism, transformed into traditional qualitative data analysis, or 
conceptualised as constructivist grounded theory. According to Glaser, these perspectives are 
a remodelling of grounded theory into traditional, descriptive qualitative analysis. As a result 
core elements such as rigorous methods, conceptualisation and theoretical coding will 
disappear. Glaser therefore continues to defend grounded theory as a general method 
independent of theoretical perspectives and that uses all kinds of data, including quantitative 
data (Glaser 1992, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007).   
 
Now there are at least three main versions of grounded theory: the classic version, often called 
the Glaserian version; the Strauss-Corbin school, which is developing in traditional, inductive 
and qualitative directions and is perhaps the most influential variant to-day, and what is often 
called the second generation grounded theory; the constructivist version, mainly developed in 
the 21st century by Charmaz (Bryant & Charmaz 2010, Charmaz 2008).  
 
3.3 Three methods in one?  
The three variations of grounded theory all have the aim of generating theory from empirical 
data and have the main procedures of the method in common. What varies between the three 
versions is how the method is put into practice and interpretations of the procedures, how 
grounded theory relates to other theories, and the philosophical basis for the method. The 
methodological recommendations and the epistemological and ontological foundations are 
also different. Over time the three variations have emphasised different elements of grounded 
theory. In any discussion of the relationship between grounded theory and traditional theory, 
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it is necessary to clarify to which of the theoretical communities one relates; otherwise the 
discussion will be too complex and comprehensive. The focus in the thesis will be on the 
classic, Glaserian variant of grounded theory. The other two; the Straussian and the 
constructivist variant developed by Charmaz, will be revisited and briefly explained later on. 
 
A thesis is a statement of knowledge and a contribution to development of knowledge. 
Statements are transformed into scientific knowledge through a process of social construction, 
trust and acceptance in a community of knowledge. Scientific paradigms, methods, theories 
and empirical fields define the community and are the foundations of mutual understanding 
and trust among the members. A paradigm can be defined as a world view; a set of basic 
beliefs about the world and the individual’s place in it (Guba & Lincoln 1998:200). 
Paradigms frame the construction of meaning, direct analytical focus, and influence the 
selection of what to include and exclude in collection of data, in analysis, and construction of 
theories. Scientific positioning of a work is necessary to establish a foundation for acceptance 
in a community of knowledge, creating a frame of reference and clarifying the main methods. 
In classic grounded theory though, neither scientific positioning nor the relation to extant 
theory are emphasised. This lack of focus is related to methods as well as paradigm. Here, a 
discussion of these is necessary to get a better understanding of how a theory developed 
through grounded theory methodology can find a position in the existing scientific landscape.  
 
In a perfect world, a grounded theory concept would have analytical roots in one of the three 
versions. In the real world, complexity and diversity mean that a grounded theory work can 
belong methodologically to more than one of the versions. This complicates the discussion of 
a grounded theory concept. The composite concept of trust, for instance, is not purely based 
on one of the grounded theory versions, but can be related at least to two of them. The main 
methodological influence came from the classic version of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 
1967), but the current constructivist version by Charmaz (2008) is relevant as my conceptual 
work is heavily inspired by symbolic interactionism. The work on the composite concept of 
trust has roots in Glaserian procedural rigour, while the methodological foundation is that of 
interactionism and constructivism which Strauss’ Chicago School influence brought to the 




The methodological variety requires a reflection on the paradigms in which the grounded 
theory is rooted. The inquiry paradigm defines for the inquirer ‘what is important, what is 
legitimate and what is reasonable’ (Annells 1996:383 with reference to Sarantakos 1993:30, 
Guba & Lincoln 1998). The inquiry paradigm is the lens that filters what the researcher sees, 
hears and interprets. It influences the focus and what to exclude and this moulds the analysis 
and development of theory. Grounded theory is not only a method for collecting and 
analysing data; it is a perspective on knowledge, research and on how things are related. 
According to Clarke (2005:4) it is a theory/methods package containing the ‘integral – and 
ultimately non-fungible – aspects of ontology, epistemology, and practice, as these are co-
constitutive’ in the methodology of grounded theory.  
 
3.4 Intellectual roots in positivism and pragmatism   
The historical context of the seminal work of Glaser & Strauss was a period characterised by 
positivism as the prevailing perspective in social sciences. Positivist science strives for 
objective knowledge and general laws based on systematic observation, replicable 
experiments, operational definitions of concepts, testing and verification of logically deducted 
hypotheses and quantitative methods. Quantitative methods had precedence over qualitative 
methods, which were considered by positivists as less- or even non-scientific (Charmaz 2008, 
Bryant & Charmaz 2010). Inductive, qualitative and interpretative methods challenged this 
epistemology – at that time as they do today.  
 
Glaser & Strauss’s educational backgrounds were in different sociological schools, but they 
cooperated closely throughout the 1960s. Their studies of health care, in particular caring for 
the dying, were the basis for The Discovery. Each of them moulded different elements of the 
theory. Glaser’s background was at Columbia University, a university with strong traditions 
for quantitative methods and development of middle-range theories; that is theories based on 
intermediate minor working hypotheses and grand theory. Strauss had his intellectual roots in 
pragmatism and symbolic interactionism with the focus on action and construction of 
meaning (Glaser 1998, Charmaz 2003, Clarke 2005, 2010, Bryant & Charmaz 2010). Before 
his collaboration with Glaser, Strauss played a significant role in advancing the Chicago 
School social constructionist analyses (Bryant & Charmaz 2010:37). Strauss had worked with 
leading qualitative Chicago school scientists; the symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer and 
was influenced by the pragmatist philosopher Georg H. Mead (Strübing 2010). The Discovery 
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is inspired by Blumer, for instance in the critique of verification and quantification and the 
discussion of sensitising concepts, which Blumer (1954) discusses. After a few years, the two 
founding fathers drifted apart intellectually and developed the methodology in different 
directions. 
 
The aim of grounded theory is to generate theories grounded in empirical data and analysed 
through systematic procedures and rigorous codifying (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 
1998, 2007). According to Glaser systematic procedures, conceptualisation and development 
of theory are the main elements that separate grounded theory from most qualitative research, 
which he defines as research that first and foremost aims at accurate descriptions (Glaser 
2001, 2003, 2004). Strauss moved the method in constructivist directions by emphasising 
action and construction of meaning (Strauss & Corbin 1998, Strauss & Corbin 1998a, Bryant 
& Charmaz 2010a:8). In addition Strauss has, in cooperation with Corbin, strengthened the 
positivistic elements of grounded theory by moving the method towards verification (Glaser 
1998, Charmaz 2008) and through the development of ‘axial coding’ and ‘coding matrix’ 
(Glaser 1994).  
 
Comparative analysis together with a perspective that views theory as emergent are the basic 
elements of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2005, 
2007). These elements emphasise the process character of the methodology and importantly, 
‘theory as an ever-developing entity, not as a perfected product’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967:32). 
The generation of grounded theory is an iterative dynamic between the collection of empirical 
data and refinement of the theory, where new data can expand the scope and analytical level 
of the theory.  
 
The key elements of grounded theory: generation instead of verification, induction instead of 
logic-deduction, comparison instead of exampling, and the attempt to bridge the qualitative-
quantitative methodological divide as well as the theory-method divide – positioned grounded 
theory as an alternative to the prevailing positivism (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Kelle 2005, 
2010, Holton 2010a).  Glaser & Strauss ‘contested notions of methodological consensus and 
offered systematic strategies for qualitative research practice’ (Charmaz 2008:5).  
 
From the outset grounded theory was positioned in contrast to traditional sociological theory 
and method. The ambition of raising the status of qualitative research, the focus on research 
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as discovery of emerging concepts from the data, and the rejection of verification and 
theoretical preconceptions combined with an articulated opposition against positivism (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967) all contributed to a new and alternative methodology. To-day this is 
considered to be a ‘counter culture’ alternative by the adherents of Glaserian grounded theory 
(Holton 2010a: ii). In retrospect, a closer look reveals the influence of positivism in grounded 
theory as a ‘new’ alternative. This influence is related to the assumptions about the researcher 
as a neutral and scientific observer and the emphasis placed on methodological rigour, 
recognising that theory is emerging from data, not as a result of the researcher’s constructions 
and the co-constructions between researcher and actors in the field (Bryant 2002, Charmaz 
2003, Clarke 2005).  
 
3.5 Classic, Glaserian grounded theory 
Strauss died in 1996 and his theoretical legacy is now carried forward by Corbin. Glaser still 
defends the purity of the original, mainly referred to as classic grounded theory (2004, 4th 
paragraph), Glaserian theory or orthodox grounded theory.14 In the rest of this thesis the term 
grounded theory refers to the classic and Glaserian version.  
 
There are several reasons for this: the study of trust is based on the Discovery as handbook of 
methods, Glaser defends classic grounded theory as the method of grounded theory, and the 
general image of grounded theory seems to refer to the classic version.15 In addition, classic 
grounded theory is in a rather distinct position in a multitudinous landscape, and this position 
delimits the focus for this discussion. Glaser is still a leading force in promoting the method 
and asserts that the new versions are not grounded theory at all (Glaser 1978, 1992, 1998, 
2001, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011). He is eager to ‘protect’ the classic version from being applied 
as descriptive qualitative data analysis, adopted by theorists using preconceptions that force 
data, or are co-opted and transformed by constructivists or postmodernists (Glaser 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2007a, Glaser & Holton 2004).        
                                                 
14 ‘The Grounded Theory Institute is dedicated to helping people learn about authentic Grounded Theory 
(otherwise knows as Glaserian, Classic, or Orthodox Grounded Theory)’. Friday, October 28, 2011, Jillian 
Rhine, http://www.groundedtheory.com/, viewed 14.11.11.  
15 As researcher in applied social science I have been using grounded theory methodology and methods for more 
than twenty years. My experience is that the methodology appears to have a weak legitimacy among researchers 
unfamiliar with it. Their idea of the method seems to refer to the classic version, but with some 
misinterpretations – the importance of analytical rigor is underestimated and lack of prior theoretical studies 




To promote the methodology Glaser has founded The Grounded Theory Institute which 
provides the following definition of grounded theory: 
 
All research is "grounded" in data, but few studies produce a "grounded theory." 
Grounded Theory is an inductive methodology. Although many call Grounded Theory a 
qualitative method, it is not. It is a general method. It is the systematic generation of theory 
from systematic research. It is a set of rigorous research procedures leading to the 
emergence of conceptual categories. These concepts/categories are related to each other 
as a theoretical explanation of the action(s) that continually resolves the main concern of 
the participants in a substantive area. Grounded Theory can be used with either qualitative 
or quantitative data.16 
 
Grounded theory, along with knowledge generated by other methods, is a contextual social 
construction which is dynamic and subject to change and development. The strong defence of 
classic grounded theory, on the other hand, appears as an attempt to prevent development and 
transformation of knowledge. During the last twenty years Glaser stands out as engaged in an 
endless defence of the seminal work, discussing the same issues with repetition and a few 
variations without altering or extending the main positions.  
 
Glaser’s insistence on the discovery and emergence of concepts, that research should not be 
based on preconceptions, and that grounded theory is a general method making researcher 
positioning unnecessary (Glaser1992, 2002, 2005), indicates an objectivist position in contrast 
to constructivist position. The viewpoint advanced in this thesis is that the Glaserian position 
gives grounded theory a static and repetitive stamp, and Glaser appears to echo the theoretical 
capitalists whom the methodology was intended to oppose. Charmaz, on the other hand, a 
former student of Strauss, has developed a constructivist approach to grounded theory (2006, 
2008, 2009). Constructivist grounded theory is strongly rejected by Glaser (2002, 2004, 
2004a, 2005, 2009, 2011), a rejection probably influenced by his roots in positivism. Second 
generation grounded theory scholars, for instance Morse et al. (2009) argue for further 
development of grounded theory in accordance with theoretical progress in social sciences. 
Theoretical progress in these cases means applying grounded theory elements together with 
other methods, for instance dimensional analysis (Bowers & Schatzman 2009), situational 
                                                 
16 Grounded Theory Institute Homepage, 16.03.2009, by Jill Rhine, http://www.groundedtheory.com/what-is-





analysis (Clarke 2009) or including new theoretical perspectives, such as incorporating 
constructivism into grounded theory methods, as used by Charmaz (2008).   
 
3.6 Positivism and constructivism in grounded theory 
In the seminal grounded theory the researcher is described as a neutral observer, open and 
unaffected by theoretical preconceptions. The researcher is discovering data and emerging 
theories as if theories are present ‘out there’ waiting to be identified. This objectivist position 
is easily misinterpreted as rejection of existing theory, a position resembling naïve empiricism 
according to Kelle (2005). Pre-framing grounded theory in a particular theoretical perspective 
precludes other perspectives and pre-determines data collection and analysis (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2005). This does not mean that the researcher 
‘approaches reality as a tabula rasa,’ but that collection of data is not based on theories 
generated by logical deduction from a priori assumptions (Glaser & Strauss 1967:3, n3, 6). 
‘He (the researcher) must have a perspective that will help him see relevant data and abstract 
significant categories from his scrutiny of data’ (ibid: n3). Generation of sociological theory 
demands a sociologist with scientific skills, as well as scientific bent, theoretical insight into 
the relevant area of research, being a good observer and with the ability to use these insights 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967: 7, 46).  
 
In later debates about grounded theory and constructivism, questions related to the 
researcher’s role in constructing data are not focused on in Glaserian grounded theory. 
According to Glaser (1992, 1998, 2002, 2004 and 2005) grounded theory is a value-free 
method, based on general methods and independent of the researcher’s perspectives. The 
methodology is ‘in essence epistemologically and ontologically neutral’ and in classic 
grounded theory researcher positioning is therefore considered to be unnecessary (Holton 
2010: 268). Insisting on neutrality and avoidance of reflexivity in the researcher role and 
epistemological foundations is a positivist element in the methodology. Glaser’s argument 
against being confined to one theoretical lens is also a defence against associating grounded 
theory and symbolic interactionism. Classic grounded theory should not be regarded as 
symbolic interactionism as this is not consistent with rigorous methods and procedures, which 
is a hallmark of grounded theory methods according to Glaser. The strong defence of 
methodological rigour and a neutral researcher position is an adaption of an inductive 




Does the positivist element in grounded theory have analytical consequences? Or is 
positivism particularly stressed by contemporary leading theorists on constructivist and 
postmodernist grounded theory, in particular Charmaz and Clarke? The positivist assumption 
about research as objective and neutral is incompatible with a constructionist perspective. I 
will assert that objectivity is not possible; perceptions are selective. Data are not neutral 
entities waiting to be discovered ‘out there’. They are social constructions made by the 
researcher interacting with the field, being selective, interpretive and constructive. Even if 
grounded theory is considered as a general methodology, the researcher’s position and 
theoretical lenses require reflection. A general methodology demands epistemological 
grounding as the main implicit foundations of the methodology have to be made explicit to 
inform the reader.  Epistemological position is of importance for developing concepts, for 
framing the questions asked and the theoretical discoveries made and thus I will conclude that 
the researcher’s perspectives are decisive in the social construction of data and knowledge.  
 
Glaser & Strauss opposed elements restraining intellectual freedom and creativity, and the 
hegemony of ‘intellectual capitalists’, such as Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Cooley and Mead 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967:10). Theoretical pre-conceptualisation and verification of theory 
restrict the researcher’s focus and force conceptual development in specific theoretical 
directions. Existing theories force preconceptions on the empirical data, it can make it hard 
for the researcher to stay open in the process of discovering and cause bias towards particular 
perspectives on the interpretation and categorisation of data (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 
1998, 2005). Results from pre-research literature are inimical to generating grounded theory 
(Glaser 1998:67). They contaminate the researchers mind; prevent the researcher from 
discovering the main concern of the participants in the field and block conceptual grounding. 
This lets real; on-going processes remain undiscovered (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 
Glaser 1998, Glaser 2005). The risks of ‘re-inventing the wheel’ and ‘discovering’ findings 
well documented by others are avoided by treating the literature as a source of data to be 
integrated in the analysis when the core category and basic conceptual development is well 
under way (Glaser & Holton 2004:3.4). Systematising, on the other hand, should encourage 
creativity not curb it (Glaser & Strauss 1967:8) and allows the researcher to avoid being 




Grounding in data, generating, and discovery are analytical processes dependent on the 
researcher’s theoretical sensitivity and general academic skills according to Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). Applying reconceptualised logic theories distances the researcher from the 
field and hampers ‘work and fit’ of the theory. Work and fit is one of the properties that 
validate a grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967, 1978). Glaser & Strauss encourage open-
minded discussions about methods and aim ’to stimulate other theorists to codify and publish 
their own methods for generating theory’ (1967:8-9). From this perspective grounded theory 
allows the constructivist focus on researcher position and social construction. 
 
Grounded theory proposes an alternative to verification and logo-deductive theorising but the 
alternative is to some extent based on a positivist frame of reference. The implicit foundations 
of the theory contribute to the maintenance of the prevailing scientific paradigm. On the other 
hand, the method enables the researcher to become free from theoretical constraints. This 
together with open-mindedness to empirical processes allows flexibility in the research 
process, and the reliance on the researcher’s skills makes grounded theory adaptable for 
postmodern and constructivist approaches. The classic elements of grounded theory are 
incorporated in constructivist grounded theory in addition to the reflexive researcher role and 
focus on construction of theories and data as dynamic social processes. Flexibility and 
construction of meaning is emphasised instead of methodological rigour. The result is an 
interpretive, flexible and dynamic grounded theory as an updated alternative to the classic and 
more positivist version.      
 
3.7 Conclusion: grounded theory and development of cumulative 
knowledge 
In summary, two different sociological traditions, Colombia University positivism and 
Chicago school pragmatism and field research are mixed in grounded theory (Glaser 
1998:32). The quantitative and positivistic heritage from Glaser combined with interactionism 
and constructivism from Strauss lead to a combination of theoretical freedom and rigorous 
methods that makes it possible to ‘stretch’ grounded theory in different epistemological 
directions. This elasticity opens the method to further development in positivist or 
constructivist direction, and makes it difficult to label grounded theory as either positivist or 




On the one hand, the inherent ambiguity in the methodology and the insistence on grounded 
theory as a general method (Glaser 2009, 2005, 1998, Holton 2010) can enable an adaptability 
that allows the integration between grounded theory and other theories. In this perspective 
grounded theory could fit with different communities of knowledge. On the other hand, 
integration between grounded theories and traditional theory – either speculative theory as 
Glaser refers to (Glaser & Strauss 1967:261, Glaser 2007) or constructivism and qualitative 
data analyses – is contested by the classics (Glaser 1992, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 
Holton 2010, 2010a). The classic theorists fear that ambiguity will make the method 
vulnerable to misinterpretation and transformation; risking inappropriate reinforcing or 
omitting of elements in the method based on what a researcher wants to advance or position 
against. Last but not least, the conceptual ambiguity combined with a lack of epistemological 
reflection in classic grounded theory, can reduce the diffusion of grounded theory-based 
knowledge outside this epistemic community. Constructivist grounded theory is based on a 
methodological platform that aims at construction of new knowledge rather than defending 
rigorous procedures. Constructivist grounded theory has a stronger potential to address 
theoretical development beyond a grounded theory community than the classic, Glaserian 
version. 
 
Grounded theory allows for various methodological foundations. The next chapter is a 
positioning of the thesis in the sociological landscape. The positioning is done through a 
discussion of the methodological foundations of the composite concept of trust and how this 








4. SOCIOLOGICAL INSPIRATION: A LOOK INTO THE 
BLACK BOX 
 
 ‘Grounded theory is NOT a methodology guided by one  
theoretical perspective and its theoretical codes. It is a general method ...’ 17 
– BARNEY GLASER  
 
 
Does the quotation above suggest or reject that a grounded theory can be guided by more than 
one theoretical perspective? Glaser & Strauss (1967:249) point out that developing an 
applicable grounded theory demands a skilled sociologist. Being a skilled sociologist requires 
the acquisition of a sound and secure methodological platform, which influences the selection 
of problems to be addressed, and the methods, cases, analyses and findings. In constructivist 
social science these elements are the subject of reflection, but not in the classic version of 
grounded theory as mentioned in the preceding chapter. Researcher positioning is unnecessary 
as grounded theory is a value-free method in the sense that analytical procedures are neutral 
and can be used with qualitative as well as quantitative data according to Glaser (1992, 2002, 
2005).  
 
However, research methods are not neutral, mechanical tools. Independent of methods, 
procedures and quantitative or qualitative data; the researcher decides postulations, population 
and questions. Research is coloured by the researcher’s interpretations, theoretical frame, tacit 
assumptions, and paradigm (Kincherloe & Laren 1998, Kelle 2005, 2010), by background, 
education, and experiences (Glaser & Strauss 1967). In qualitative social sciences the 
researcher is a part of the field, often interacting with those being studied (Schwandt 
1998:221). Assuming that research is objective means not to question the researcher’s 
position, and thereby relevant clues are left out of the analysis. The diversity of perspectives 
and research methods demand a reflection on methodological position (Guba & Lincoln 1998, 
Strauss & Corbin 1998, Haavind et al. 2000, Charmaz 2008).  
 
4.1 Positioning or preconceptions 
Methodological positioning in this thesis is an exploration of how a mix of sociological 
perspectives; symbolic interactionism, constructivism and system theory, frame the 
                                                 
17 In the text, Glaser uses the abbreviation TC in stead of the full word  theoretical code (Glaser 2005:3) 
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construction of meaning, direct analytical focus, and guide decisions about what to include 
and leave out in collection of data, analysis and conceptualisation. The discussion of basic 
assumptions and perspectives, which influences the development of the composite concept of 
trust, is to some extent a retrospective look into the black box of analytical work. The aim is 
to show how methodological perspectives influence the generation of concepts and the focus 
in this chapter is not on how grounded theory is applied, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
The issue here is to show how empirically based theory generation is inspired and expanded 
by existing sociological theory. To be inspired by existing theories is different from 
verification of existing theory. Verification involves testing of theory based hypothesis while 
inspiration means using existing theory to look at empirical data from new angles and 
discover new social patterns. The balance between inspiration and expansion, and forcing and 
preconceptions, was a minor issue in this work on trust as the sociological literature was not 
related to the particular empirical field and processes under exploration. The literature on trust 
is now significant and there are empirical studies from a great selection of trust contexts, but 
there is also a greater risk of acquiring preconceptions.   
 
In addition to positioning the thesis in the general sociological landscape, this chapter will 
illustrate the methodological flexibility of grounded theory. In this context flexibility means 
that a work of grounded theory can have roots both in general sociological perspectives and 
contribute to new insights based on empirical data. This flexibility is important as it is the 
foundation for the theoretical discussion of the composite concept and its contribution to 
general sociological theory about trust. A grounded theory has its roots in sociology (and 
other sciences), but the lack of reflection on researcher position makes the roots invisible. The 
invisible methodological roots create an undeserved image of grounded theory as non-
theoretical, and make it difficult to integrate grounded theory works in the cumulative 
production of knowledge outside the grounded theory community. Methodological reflection 
makes the platform for theory generation visible and creates opportunities for cumulative 
contributions of grounded theory based knowledge to the knowledge community outside the 
grounded theory community.  
 
Reflection is an adequate means of making tacit dynamics visible not only with regard to 
methodological platforms, but also when it comes to the understanding of trust as a social 
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process. The theoretical part of the thesis is an exploration and elaboration on conceptual 
tools for analysing trust processes and making the tacit elements in this process visible.   
 
This chapter presents constructivism and system theory as the methodological platform for the 
development of the composite concept of trust, and demonstrates how these perspectives have 
influenced the conceptualisation of trust. 
 
4.2 Constructing trust    
Constructivism is about the process of creating meaning and knowledge, ‘an emphasis on the 
generative, organisational and selective nature of human perception (Spivey 1997: 3). 
According to Gergen (1999:237), the terms constructivism and constructionism are often used 
interchangeably.18 A brief search in various literatures indicates that the first term is by far the 
most commonly used, and that the terms are used interchangeably. There are some differences 
in the two as analytical concepts according to Gergen (ibid); both emphasise human 
construction of what we take to be “the reality”, but constructivism is related to construction 
of meaning as a psychological process. Constructionism takes the outcome of social 
relationships to be “the reality”. Individual cognition and social relations are different 
analytical focuses, but a hybrid position is developed, social constructivism. Social 
constructivism combines the two and hold that the individual mentally constructs the world, 
based on categories supplied by social relationships (Gergen 1999). As the two terms are used 
interchangeably, social constructionism and social constructivism are read to be about the 
same phenomenon and the term constructivism is used in the thesis and refers to what Gergen 
refers to as social constructivism. 
 
People are considered to be active and constructive, and the research focus here is on the 
construction of meaning and how this is manifested. According to Denzin & Lincoln 
(1998:186) ‘positivist and post positivist paradigms provide the backdrop against which other 
paradigms and perspectives operate’. A constructivist approach means being in opposition to 
positivist perspectives, but interpretative sociological approaches can, on their own terms, 
adapt to positivist, scientific demands (Guba & Lincoln 1998, Strauss & Corbin 1998, 1998a). 
Classic grounded theory is in some sense adapting to positivism, as pointed out in the 
previous chapter. The generation of the composite concept of trust is based on classic 
                                                 
18 In Norwegian, these terms can be translated to konstruktivisme and konstruksjonisme. 
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methods and Glaserian grounded theory. The methodological roots of the concept are inspired 
by the heritage from Strauss, interactionism and constructivism.   
 
Constructivism has roots in philosophy and is interdisciplinary, but to some extent, the 
research focus varies among disciplines. In psychology, where the individual is the unit of 
analysis, much constructivist work is about cognitive processes and ordering of knowledge, 
often labelled cognitive constructivism. Alternatively, what is often labelled as social 
constructivism uses group processes as the unit of analysis and is conducted in a wide range 
of fields, for instance in different branches of sociology, in anthropology and in philosophy of 
science.   
 
According to Spivey (1997), social constructivism can focus on different levels of the process 
of social construction. These are 1) the social aspects of the individual constructs, 2) the 
social construction of meaning and knowledge in communities of interacting actors, and 3) 
the social construction of large discourses, for example at the society level. The perspective of 
the thesis is that the process of developing and maintaining trust is a social process of 
construction ranging across the three levels. Trust is constructed in the individual mind, as a 
social process with a social basis and is a relationship between individuals sharing a common 
social basis. The individual mind makes the leap of faith; that is moving into trust. The 
platform or ‘input’ for this move is social – something people have in common – and is based 
on the acknowledgement of mutual understanding of the matters at stake. The thesis discusses 
the social process of constructing trust and the pre-contractual, relational, and structural social 
bases for this construction.  
 
Constructivism is not a uniform paradigm, nor does it have a specific definition. There are 
several related approaches and different forms, dependent on which aspects of the 
construction process that are being scrutinised (Spivey 1997, Gergen 1999, Guba & Lincoln 









As Spivey (1997:3) points out:  
 
Whereas some constructivists favour one focus and other constructivists favour another, 
the foci that are not taken are not inherently “wrong.” In fact, each  can show us some-
thing that the others cannot.[...] and thus these different perspectives  can be considered 
complementary as well as oppositional.  
 
In this thesis the constructivist foundation means, in a meta-perspective, that the theory about 
trust presented here is a theory focusing on dynamic, social and interactive elements of trust. 
This theory represents one tile in the magnificent ‘mosaic’ called trust. These constructivist 
foundations contradict classic grounded theory and they are consistent with today’s 
constructivist version of the method – even though the initial work on trust was done more 
than twenty years ago.  
 
The ontological basis for constructivism is that reality is dependent on and constructed by our 
conceptualisation of it (Collin 1998:41, Gergen 1999:69). The actor is an active constructor of 
the social reality. In the long run, these social constructions appear as ‘objective’ and as taken 
for granted structures and frameworks for action (Berger & Luckmann 1991). The Chicago 
School’s influence on grounded theory methods directed the research focus on social 
interaction and basic social processes (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978). Interpretation 
and social dynamics are the main elements in interaction, and The Chicago School 
perspectives influenced how I studied trust processes: the empirical focus was on interaction, 
relations and the social construction of meaning.   
 
The trust relationship between bank and customer was chosen as the analytical subject in the 
master thesis, and the research explored the actual interaction between bank and customer. 
The focus was on the course of interaction, on expectations and fulfilment of expectations, on 
interpretation and construction of meaning, and on changes in expectations and interaction. 
This perspective influenced the conceptualisation of trust as a composite and dynamic process 
of social construction of meaning. Data indicated that the trust relationship between bank and 
customer was based on a complex mix of socially created and taken for granted social scripts, 
codes, and norms. This mix is the social basis for interaction, creation of meaning and 
construction of trust. In this perspective, the actor is not passive and norm-guided. She is an 
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active constructor of her social world – within social constraints but with a free will to act 
innovatively or contrary to social constraints.19     
 
Social constructivism is an epistemological as well as methodological basis of the thesis. The 
perspective is that scientific knowledge does not provide everlasting truths. Knowledge 
develops and changes, paradigms are replaced, and hypotheses falsified. In the long run, 
scientific knowledge comprises provisional suggestions of knowledge in a given time and 
context, and this thesis is one of many possible suggestions and constructions. This statement 
does not mean that ‘anything goes’ as knowledge. On the contrary, for a work to be accepted 
as knowledge in a social constructivist perspective, it has to ‘communicate’ within the 
scientific context. The work has to satisfy necessary demands from the specific scientific 
community and answer questions about whether the knowledge fits the aims of being useful 
and bringing new insights.  
  
Social constructivism inspired the analytical focus and what to look for in the collection of 
data as well as in the generation of concepts and theory. In addition this process was inspired 
by Luhmann’s system theory and general sociological theory. The following section therefore 
focuses on how system theory can function as analytical inspiration for exploration of the 
social construction of trust on a micro level. Luhmann’s system theory is abstract and is 
usually applied to the analysis of processes on a macro level. Applying this system theory to 
the analysis of empirical data and micro level processes is perhaps not so common, but 
Luhmann’s system theory is a powerful analytical tool and can be applied across the micro –  
macro divide.   
 
4.3 A trust producing system   
Grounded theory recommends postponing literature studies related to the actual subject under 
exploration until a fundamental process is discovered. This is not anti-scholarship, but 
practical advice to allow for freedom of discovery, unbiased by preconceptions and goal-
oriented literature studies (Glaser 1978:69, 1992:31). In this particular case there was no 
sociological literature about trust in interaction between bank and customer. Despite trust 
playing an important, but invisible and tacit role in social coordination, there was little 
sociological literature on the subject when I started working with it back in the 1980s. Trust 
                                                 
19 Acting in an innovative way or going beyond social constraints may have its costs, such as lack of trust. 
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had received little attention in sociology twenty five years ago. Postponing of literature 
readings related to trust was both methodologically sound and a practical solution to the 
limitations of literature. The grounded theory method by Glaser & Strauss (1967) was means 
of turning a disadvantage into a positive strategy. Data collection was therefore based on 
experience of banking and readings from general sociology, in particular micro sociology and 
interpretive perspectives. After some studying, I discovered Luhmann’s seminal writing on 
trust, which I found to be a powerful analytical source.  
 
The conceptualisation of trust is theoretically inspired by Luhmann and in particular the trust 
section in ‘Trust and power’ (1979). According to Luhmann’s analysis, the function of trust is 
to reduce problems of risk and complexity. Even though my analysis of trust is based on the 
premise that the social role of trust is to reduce social risk and complexity at micro and macro 
level, the composite concept of trust does not involve a purely functional or system theoretical 
analysis. The system theoretical perspective has to be regarded as both context and inspiration 
for the conceptual development. 
   
The following is a review of how functionalist and system theoretical inspiration from 
Luhmann is combined with a social constructivist and interactionist approach in the process 
of theory generation. Although this combination is perhaps not the most obvious, I refer to 
Gergen (1999) who asserts that multiple forms of knowledge can coexist, and together 
contribute to new insights. In the discussion below the emphasis is on system theoretical 
elements, underpinned by constructivist and interactionist perspectives which influence the 
application of system theory to help understand social interaction.   
 
Trust is explored as a relational quality – and the focus is on how it is constructed, 
maintained, and broken. The focus is on social interaction and relationships, interpretation 
and construction of meaning. Determining the individual thresholds of when the level of 
mutual understanding is too low to generate trust is an empirical question. Trust is also 
regarded as contextual quality and, analytically, a particular context for developing trust is a 
trust producing system, as the model presented in the introduction (paragraph 1.5) illustrates. 
Trust producing systems have particular social codes for development of mutual 
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understanding.20 To gain insight into how trust is created in social relations, it is necessary to 
study the social basis for, and the social construction of mutual understanding and common 
social codes.  
 
4.5 Mutual understanding and common codes  
A minimum level of mutual understanding is a necessary condition for developing trust, 
mutual understanding is the platform for the suspension of doubt and making the leap of faith, 
which is the transition from a state of doubt into trusting. Mutual understanding is the core 
process in the composite concept of trust and embraces the dynamic between the social 
context, social interaction and individual sense-making. Chapter 6 will elaborate further on 
the concept; this chapter describes how system theory has inspired the generation of the 
concept of mutual understanding.  
 
Systems as discussed here are not interacting individuals but analytical constructions. 
Constructions do not exist independently of acting individuals; ‘social systems are those 
constituted and operating through the communication of meaning’ (Luhmann 1979 xi).21 
Social systems are communication systems where the participants share codes and 
interpretations; they are communities of meaning.22 For instance, analytically, the bank-
customer relation is a communication system and community of meaning. Actors may be 
regarded as ‘Systems of a special kind’ – they are in this sense ‘assumed to possess a 
personality, to constitute an ordered, not arbitrary, centre of a system of action’ (Luhmann 
1979:39). Every individual is a system of meaning and communication and represents an 
abundance of possible actions. The system acts in relation to its environment and the 
analytical constructed system of communication has a practical, definable, and acting part – 
the actor. Action involves the construction of meaning and makes sense when it is interpreted 
in the context in which it is performed. The meaning system, like all systems, is self-
                                                 
20 The term code as it is used in this chapter is based on Luhmann, and must not be confused with code used in 
grounded theory; the terms are applied differently. In system theory is a code a self-referential entity that 
constructs the system by defining system borders (Luhmann 1979). In grounded theory the codes conceptualise 
the underlying pattern (Glaser 1978). In one sense the codes have a similar function in the two theoretical 
perspectives; they order and include/exclude, but they belong to different contexts of knowledge.  
21 Some critics accuse Luhmann for using a too concrete system concept (Schmidt in Hagen 1992). This may be 
so, but it is not the focus here, the aim is to show how system theory is used as a meta-theoretical perspective 
and how this perspective can be applied to analyse qualitative data and micro level processes.  
22 It goes without saying that social systems exist in the real world as well, such as communities, organisations, 
or individuals, but these are not the concern here.  
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referential. Systems define themselves in relation to their environment and interpret the 
environment through their code (Luhmann 1979).  
 
If Luhmann’s system theory is applied as an abstract ‘map’ for analysing micro level 
processes, an actor can analytically be regarded as a system, and so can the relationship that 
this actor has with the other. A system has its own codes; that is the sense-making context of 
experiences, knowledge and expectations that filter how an actor perceives a situation. This 
means that a human being, regarded as a system of meaning and communication, uses her 
personal codes to interpret the world and transforms incidents and messages into her universe 
of meaning and experience. This subjective universe is the individual knowledge and 
experience which is used to interpret and decode meaning. In the trust relation between bank 
and customer, for instance, the bank clerk as well as the customer will have their inner 
versions of the social codes in the particular setting. Through interaction, a sufficient level of 
mutual understanding of the codes is acknowledged. An actor comprehends and acts by 
assessing phenomena in relation to each other, and then linking these to her own categories 
and systems of meaning.23  
 
Each actor is unlikely to interpret an occurrence precisely in the same manner.  
Simultaneously, the interpretation is related to a larger community of meaning where the 
members share some context and general interpretations of codes, values, and expectations. 
They participate in a common culture and are thereby parts of a large meaning and 
communication system. The actors, analytically regarded as communication systems, are parts 
of larger systems, which comprise the context or social field in which they interact. Both the 
subjective and the social are present in interactions, each actor using her subjective personal 
codes for interpretation of the social situation and inserting her own content into the 
interpretation and construction of meaning.  
 
Interaction and communication are about using common codes, sharing systems of meaning, 
and developing mutual understanding. The single communication system – each actor in an 
interaction – takes part in larger systems through the use of common codes for system 
definitions, and the simultaneous transformation of these codes to individual, internal codes. 
Social interaction is about handling the point of intersection between mutual and individual 
                                                 
23 Confer J. Piaget’s concepts of accommodation, assimilation, and equilibrium as descriptions of how human 
beings adapt to the world (Evenshaug og Hallen 1979, Frøyland-Nilsen 1969, Furth 1985).    
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interpretation of various aspects of a social situation. If there is no mutual understanding, it 
will be hard to develop trust. Mutual understanding can be taken for granted in familiar 
situations, it emerges through socialisation and participation in social contexts, but has to be 
constructed in new situations and maintained through communication, interaction, and 
confirmations.  
 
System theory may serve as an analytical perspective that highlights complexity and 
coherence among several elements in the trust process. The system approach allows a holistic 
understanding of a complex social phenomenon such as trust.  
 
I hold that the process of creating trust can be analysed through a combination of social 
constructivism and system theoretical perspective according to the following premises: Social 
actors, analytically regarded as systems, are part of two systems and refer to two sets of 
codes: the subjective and the social. Mutual understanding in social interaction is about 
assuming and acknowledging through action that social codes are shared. Trust is created or 
maintained as an acknowledgement of this.  
  
Analytically, a family, a relationship, a group, an organisation, a municipality, a community 
or a social context can be regarded as a system with its particular codes and structures. These 
systems are social systems with common internal codes, codes which are the bases for trust 
processes within the particular system. Participating in, and becoming a trusted member of the 
system, presupposes the acquisition of system codes. Socialisation and relational processes 
are strategies for the acquisition of codes, processes that will be further discussed as the social 
bases for pre-contractual, relational and structural forms of trust.  
 
4.5 An empirical example: the ‘economic man’ as system code 
In a simplified perspective, a system is defined by its codes and participation demands use of 
the system codes. For instance, analytically a market can be regarded as a system with money 
as the communicating code. This means that products, labour, and even care need to be given 
a price; that is to be converted to money, to be communicated through this system. The 
inverse is also the case. Items that are given a price constitute a part of a market system. Trust 
operates according to similar system rules. Analytically, a particular social relationship can be 
regarded as a system of trust. The communication code in this system is mutual 
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understanding, which contains the dynamic between the social context, social interaction and 
individual sense-making and is the ‘trigger’ for trust. To be a part of the trust system, one has 
to follow this code, which means to develop mutual understanding based on a common social 
basis.  
 
An empirical example of how a system theoretical perspective inspired the process of 
generating the concept of mutual understanding is to regard the bank – customer relationship 
as a trust system. This system is an analytical construction and a way of thinking about trust 
relations. The prevailing rationality, that is the tacit norms guiding the relationship, is a 
common system code and basis for mutual understanding. Today’s savings banks act as 
economic, rational market actors; as an ‘economic man’. The banks presuppose the same 
rationality from the customer. The ‘economic man’ is a code that presupposes economic 
optimisation as the guiding norm. One basis for the trust relationship between bank and 
customer is mutual understanding and acceptance of this norm as premise for interaction. It is 
expected that the bank optimises profit through competitive pricing and that the customer 
optimizes economic gain through comparing prices and selecting the best price.  
 
The ‘economic man’ code has not always been prevalent. In the post-war period Norway had 
credit rationing and a strong regulation of the banks, which ended with deregulation in 1984. 
During the period of strong regulations there was little competition for customers among 
savings banks, their services were free of charge and interest on credit was politically 
determined. The main duty of the savings banks was to protect the customers’ savings and 
manage credit rationing. Responsibility and carefulness were prevailing common codes, not 
the ‘economic man’ norm (Nordnes 1993). The trust system in the pre-deregulation phase was 
based on different social codes than today’s banking. Deregulation was a major change in the 
legal framework for banking, and resulted in a deregulation of the social relationship between 
bank and customer as savings banks introduced new codes such as economic rationality as the 
governing norm for the trust system. The introduction of new social codes was a unilateral 
change of social codes and guiding norms for the trust relationship with the customers. 
Gradually customers became aware of the changes in the common basis for mutual 
understanding and the trust system. An effect of this was a decline in the customers’ trust in 
banks. In 1985 about 76 percent of the Norwegian population reported a high level of trust in 
banks. In 1991, when the Norwegian banking crisis was at its peak, the reported level of trust 
had sunk to 29 percent. In 2005 the level of trust was restored to 76 percent, and economic 
66 
 
rationality is now taken for granted as the common basis for mutual understanding (the table 
is presented in chapter 13.1).24  
   
New codes result in a change in the tacit basis for mutual understanding, in this case between 
bank and customer. If the change in the trust system is one-sided, as was the situation 
following banking deregulation, trust breaks down because the tacit contract is infringed. The 
social codes are different and the development of mutual understanding is difficult. The trust 
system has to be restored through development of common codes. In the bank – customer 
trust system, data relating to levels of trust indicate that the restoration process took fifteen 
years. Restoration times for trust systems can hardly be determined analytically, but 
conditions for this process can be explored as elements in trust processes. This thesis 
examines restoration of trust as a question of trust configuration in chapter eleven. 
 
Using system theory as an analytical inspiration is one way to throw light on trust in social 
interaction. By regarding the actor as a system, it is possible to understand that construction of 
meaning and communication is made up of both subjective and collective elements. Actors 
develop mutual understanding through interaction, learning, socialisation, and 
institutionalisation, and these processes contribute to the development of a common culture 
and common social codes. Actors acquire values, expectations, rights, and duties in various 
social contexts – these are the social codes that are vital as social definitions of a specific 
situation or context. Gradually, some codes become taken for granted as they are assimilated 
and become a part of the subject. Actors internalise various common codes, generating a “this 
is the way we do things here” thinking in different situations – which is what I call the pre-
contractual basis for trust.  
 
To build, maintain, and bestow trust depends upon sufficient mastering of social codes. Social 
incompetence as well as deceit undermines trust. The thresholds where trust disappears or 
turns into distrust vary empirically and are dependent on the social setting and personal 
elements. Thresholds for trust are not fixed absolutely, they are negotiable and susceptible to 
influence.    
                                                 
24 The figures are from MMI (from 2006 called MMI-Univero). MMI is former Norwegian survey company that 
makes regular, national surveys of the level of trust in various organisations and institutions. These surveys are 




To summarise; Luhmann’s system theory works as an analytical inspiration for the process of 
theory generation, and is not, as Glaser & Strauss would have it, a preconception hampering 
the empirical explorations. In the spirit of grounded theory; Luhmann’s work was discovered 
as a response to a search for general knowledge about trust, and has thus informed the 
research process and provided essential guidance to my sociological understanding. 
Luhmann’s perspectives stimulated the analytical process and generation of theory, and in 
retrospect considered, the development of concepts and thinking is inspired from a 
combination of Luhmann (1979) and Zucker (1986).   
 
4.6 Conclusion: towards a cumulative development of knowledge  
In addition to undertaking researcher positioning and situating grounded theory work in the 
general sociological landscape, one of the ambitions of this chapter was to show that 
positioning and situating do not necessarily entail acquiring preconceptions. Positioning and 
situating are about making explicit the main implicit theoretical grounding of a grounded 
theory work. Research is not done from a tabula rasa position; rather it is based on long-
established scientific skills and systematic method. This is also the case for research using 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967). By not being explicit about the positioning and 
situating of knowledge, grounded theory research skips over a process that has become one of 
the traditional scientific hallmarks. This omits the stage of building a platform for cumulative 
development of knowledge within the scientific community.  
 
Trust is fundamental to social life and is therefore closely intertwined with social interaction, 
and social systems are the glue that makes society possible. Social life in its various forms is 
the sociological research focus. A study of trust processes therefore sits at the core of 
sociology and should contribute to the cumulative development of knowledge in this field, 
independently of research methods. Opening up the analytical black box of the grounded 
theory study of trust as a social system and dynamic process of social construction, situates 
the study in a sociological context. By situating the study in this way, it legitimises the 
contribution of grounded theory to the cumulative development of sociological theory about 
trust.  
 
Finally, the primary aim in this thesis is not to develop a Theory or the Theory about trust, 
but to explore and develop analytical tools that stimulate further questions and relevant 
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hypotheses on trust formation. From a constructivist point of view, theories and knowledge 
are not firm and everlasting, they are provisional social constructions situated in time and 
scientific discourses. The perspectives in this thesis and the methods used to generate 
knowledge are rooted in classic sociology, system theory and constructivism with influence 
from symbolic interactionism. The integration of the grounded theory perspective on trust – 
that is the composite concept of trust – with classic sociology related to trust forms, is the 
topic of the theoretical part of the thesis and is therefore not discussed further in the 
methodological chapters.   
 
This chapter highlighted sociological theory as the methodological roots and analytical 
inspiration in the generation of a grounded theory of trust. The next and final methodological 
chapter will discuss the application of grounded theory method as a strategy for analysing 
data, and will particularly look at how the method is applied to generate the composite 
concept of trust and its qualities as a substantive and a formal concept. This application of 
grounded theory concludes with a discussion of strategies to integrate grounded theory 
concepts with sociology without ‘being taken over’ or directed by preconceptions, which is 
Glaser’s fear when it comes to relating grounded theory concepts to conventional theory 












                                                 
25 The term conventional theory (Mjøset 2000) does not suggest that grounded theory is unconventional, but that 
it differs from the conventional idea of theory as law like and logic deductive. 
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5. FROM SUBSTANTIVE TO SOCIOLOGICALLY 
GROUNDED THEORY 
 
‘The theory is an integrated set of hypotheses, not findings.’26 
– BARNEY GLASER  
 
 
The relationship between grounded theory and sociology is relatively unexplored in grounded 
theory literature. This is despite the method having its roots in sociology, the stated aim ‘to be 
useful in theoretical advance in sociology’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967:3), and that ‘The theory 
can be developed only27 by professionally trained sociologists’ (1967:249). Integrating a 
grounded theory into the existing literature is the final stage of a scholarly work (Glaser 1978: 
126), and, as pointed out previously, the existing literature should not be used as a ‘key’ for 
the grounded theory (ibid: 137-139). The theory should be woven into pertinent theoretical 
and substantive literature, preferably through footnotes and ‘as supplements and contrasts, if 
at all’ (Glaser 1978: 131). The last part of the quotation indicates an ambiguous relationship 
between classic grounded theory and other theories.   
 
Outside the grounded theory community, integration between grounded theory and existing 
theory is rarely discussed. One exception is Goldkuhl & Cronholm (2010, 2003) who 
introduce the concept multi-grounded theory (MGT). MGT is based on three forms of 
grounding; empirical, theoretical and internal. Empirical grounding refers to the traditional 
grounding as described in grounded theory methodology. Internal grounding refers to 
validation of the concepts and theory; a checking of work and fit. Theoretical grounding 
means here to confront and compare the evolving theory with other existing theories. 
Classical grounded theory advises strongly against this way of using existing theory as basis 
for comparison as suggested in MGT, and this perspective will therefore not be further 
discussed here. The recommendation of using existing theory as basis for comparison is 
perhaps one reason to why MGT does not appear to have been widely disseminated, the 
perspective is for instance not included in the Handbook of grounded theory (Bryant & 
Charmaz 2010).  
 
                                                 
26 Glaser 1978:134 
27 My italic 
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Even though a modicum of integration is recommended to show the contribution of grounded 
theory to existing theory (Glaser 1992), grounded theory discussions first and foremost focus 
on the potential risk of preconception and inhibited creativity in the generation process that 
existing theory represents. Discussion of relevant literature studies in the generation process 
may direct attention away from abstraction and generalisation, from the cumulative 
development of knowledge and from development of formal grounded theory.    
 
As stated in the introduction, one of the aims of the thesis is to discuss and integrate the 
composite concept of trust into the sociological theory of trust. Conceptual integration 
involves an exploration of the composite concept as a formal grounded concept and the 
contribution of a grounded theory concept to sociology. This is also a sociological grounding 
of the concept. The concept is generated from empirical data and is a combination of the core 
concept, mutual understanding and the sociological terms relational, structural and pre-
contractual. The combination has two implications: the concept has the abstract character of a 
formal grounded concept, and an inherent relation to sociology. The process of concept 
generation will be further discussed throughout this chapter.  
 
This chapter is structured with empirical sections alternating with theoretical elaborations. 
The theoretical sections present the main characteristics of the grounded theory method to 
establish a platform for assessment of examples. These examples are taken from the process 
of generation of the composite concept of trust and methodological challenges in this work. 
The discussion demonstrates one possible approach to the integration of grounded theory and 
sociology and how sociology can be applied as an inspiration for generating grounded theory.    
 
5.1 Substantive grounded theory – main procedural steps    
In grounded theory, theory is a set of statements grounded in empirical data; it is not a set of 
logically interrelated propositions to be verified. A grounded theory conceptualises a latent 
pattern and is a well-developed framework for the explanation of processes and relationships. 
It has conceptual specifications, not definitions; a grounded theory is a work in progress 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967). Theory is generated through systematic comparative analysis and 




The major difference between qualitative research methods in general and grounded theory is 
the generation of concepts and theory without prior hypothesis and literature studies of the 
substantive area under inquiry. Theory generation is creative analytical work based on 
knowledge of the substantive field of inquiry, on general analytical skills, also called 
theoretical sensitivity (Glaser 1978:45) and on insight based on experience and theory as a 
root source of theorising and reading of literature outside the substantial area for inquiry 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1998). As previously mentioned, reading the literature 
from the substantive field under study can block the processes of discovery and theory 
generation inquiry and hinder the emergence of creative conceptualisations from the data 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1998).  
 
Collection, initial coding, and categorisation of data and writing memos are essential 
procedural steps in theory generation (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1998, Strauss and 
Corbin 1998, 1998a, Charmaz 2008, Birks & Mills 2011). The procedures form a distinctive 
grounded theory methodology; a way of studying social reality and ordering relations between 
researcher and data (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 2002, 2004, 2007, Glaser & Holton 
2004, Charmaz 2003, 2008, Strauss and Corbin 1998). Testing and verification are the basis 
of legitimacy in hypothetic-deductive methods. Legitimacy of grounded theory method is 
rooted in the procedures and steps in the method; they are the scientific hallmark of doing 
grounded theory. The aim is not verification of existing theory, but the generation of theory 
that works and fits. The term ‘work and fit’ means that the theory can explain, predict, and 
interpret what happens in an area of inquiry and that the categories fit the data – the categories 
are applicable to and indicated by data (Glaser 1978:4, Glaser & Strauss 1967:3). If the 
procedures for collection and analysis of data are neglected, the results are likely to be 
qualitative descriptions rather than analyses and conceptual development (Glaser 1978, 1998, 
2001, 2005).  
 
The initial selection of focus and the choice of questions to be researched are based on 
theoretical sensitivity which influences the collection of data, coding and theoretical sampling 
(Glaser 1978:45). Theoretical sampling is the on-going, joint process of collecting, coding 
and analysing of data. The initial coding directs further data collection; sampling evolves 
during the research and is based on concepts developed from data. Sampling ceases when 
coding is sufficiently saturated, that is when further data collection does not generate new 
categories (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1998). The aim of theoretical sampling is to 
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collect and compare data along various dimensions to get an extensive insight in dimensions 
related to the concept under generation. According to Glaser (1978:37-38) this is ‘to elicit 
codes from raw data’ and is based on constant comparative analysis of collected data. 
Theoretical sampling creates fit between data and analysis. Data grounds the analysis and the 
empirical grounding result in theory that fits; the theory is ‘relevant for the area it purports to 
explain’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967:261). In hypothetic deductive methods, relevance is a 
question of validity and reliability, in grounded theory the theory is fitted to the data.  
 
This brief overview suggests that grounded theory is neither easy to conduct or that it is 
indisputable. On the contrary, the methodological ambiguity that characterises the roots of 
grounded theory also characterises the method and its procedures. Classic “Glaserians”, 
constructivists and other qualitative researchers using grounded theory may have divergent 
opinions about how to conduct the method. These disagreements will not be explored further 
in the thesis as the aim is not to evaluate procedural practice in general, but to discuss how it 
is practiced in order to generate the composite concept of trust.28  
 
The joint work of coding, category and concept generation are not easy to sort out and discuss 
in a structured way. There are no clear distinctions between categories, properties and 
dimensions (Dey 1999); the terminology can be confusing and is often used differently in the 
grounded theory literature. A solution to this confusion, according to Birks & Mills (2011:89), 
is to realize that the terms concepts, codes and categories mean the same and (with reference 
to Holloway 2007) are about ‘a descriptive or explanatory idea, its meaning embedded in a 
word, label or symbol’. Theory generation is the process of transforming data from empirical 
processes, from descriptions to new meaning-laden words that can explain, interpret and 
predict these processes. The method for doing this is to find properties, to identify and 
establish relations through comparison and iteration.  
 
The next section of this chapter will focus on coding and category development followed by a 
section about theory and the generation of formal theory. These discussions are followed by 
empirical examples. The final section concludes with a discussion of strategies for integration 
between grounded theory and sociology.   
                                                 
28 Ian Dey (1999) elaborates on the ambiguity of grounded theory and suggests improvements of procedures and 




5.2 Empirical insight - a basis for theory generation    
As mentioned, the composite concept of trust was generated from an explorative in-depth 
study of the trust relationship between savings banks and customers as a part of my master 
degree work. At that time, there was no accessible literature about trust in the relationship 
between bank and customer, but grounded theory provided an appropriate method. Readings 
of general sociology, organisational studies and literature about corporate social responsibility 
were conducted in parallel with my studies of the method. The literature did not result in 
preconceptions about the substantive topic of trust in savings bank relations, but did have 
some influence on the analytical focus, on social relations, social construction and the social 
responsibility of banks, and the coding of relations, roles, and bank attitudes.     
 
The initial collection of data was initiated early in the study. 29 I was not a novice empirically 
or as an academic, and had quite an extensive knowledge of the savings bank field, in addition 
to the education as a college lecturer. My banking knowledge was acquired through 
experience as a bank clerk, bank training and friends who had worked in banks over many 
years. In addition my spouse was a bank manager and I also had experience as a private 
customer and as a business customer (I was a female entrepreneur for some years). My 
working life began in a small countryside bank so I observed the mergers and the 
transformations of savings banks from the mid 1970s.  
 
The varied background knowledge of the field turned out to be an invaluable resource. 
Knowledge about whom to ask, and what to ask about, gave me unique access to a lot of data 
and the opportunity to compare different perceptions of the same situation. In addition to 
talking with two and sometimes three actors about the same incident, it was possible to 
compare documents, implementation processes and opinions. Taken together, this provided a 
rich and nuanced picture of the internal operations of a savings bank and allowed me to 
generate thick descriptions that could elucidate the development of categories. The collection 
of data had both a bottom-up and top-down perspective. Front-line employees interacted with 
the customers and were directly involved in producing relational trust. Bank managers (top 
and middle level) made decisions that affected the interaction with and relation to the 
customers. Management transformed the tacit social contract and pre-contractual basis for 
trust. Customer data was collected from personal banking customers.  
                                                 




Grounded theory was a methodological opportunity to explore a rich source of empirical data, 
to follow interesting cues and listen to the informants’ voices. Even though the procedures in 
grounded theory provide guidelines on how to transform the material into concepts and 
theory, I experienced the generation process as quite complicated and confusing.     
 
In retrospect, as I was a sociological novice, it would have been difficult to apply grounded 
theory method without an insight in, familiarity with, and access to the rich data. Empirical 
knowledge did to some extent compensate for theoretical sensitivity as rich and relevant data 
is a prerequisite to the generation of concepts and theories. Procedures provide guidelines for 
collection, selection and analyses of empirical data and generation of theory, but cannot 
compensate for superficial empirical knowledge of the substantive field. Sampling is critical 
in grounded theory and involves asking relevant questions, selecting appropriate informants 
and accessing empirical knowledge. Sampling is dependent on substantive knowledge as well 
as scholarly skills. Lack of familiarity with the substantive field would, for instance, make it 
difficult to identify core categories, a basic social process or other elements relevant for 
theory generation. 
 
In hypothetic deductive research, literature studies and existing theory are the basis for the 
development of hypotheses. The aim of data collection is the testing and verification of 
hypothesis and theory. In grounded theory on the other hand, none of this is relevant; 
substantive knowledge and scholarly skills direct the focus and the collection of data with the 
aim of theory generation. Implicit in this approach is the tacit premise that grounded theory 
scholars either only explore familiar substantive fields or that substantive, empirical 
knowledge is not a necessary prerequisite for a grounded theory study as this knowledge will 
be generated through the collection of data.  
 
The necessity of empirical background knowledge seems to be rarely discussed in grounded 
theory method even though empirical grounding is based on substantive knowledge. The fear 
of ‘conceptual contamination’ of the explorative process (Glaser & Strauss 1967:37), the 
inhibition of creativity, and acquisition of preconceptions, result in caution against literature 
studies within the substantive field. The result may be that theory generation potentially has a 
weak empirical foundation if the initial substantive knowledge is insufficient for the 
development of relevant questions, collecting rich data and relevant sampling. One indication 
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of this weakness is research that results in descriptive studies rather than generation of 
concepts and theory. ‘Worrisome accuracy’ and descriptive studies are elements against 
which Glaser warns in his later works (2001, 2004a, 2007).  
 
5.3 Coding and categories    
As pointed out above, generation of grounded theory is an iterative process between 
collection of data, analysis and writing. This means that coding, conceptualisation and 
category development are processes that go back and forth and the entities can be 
continuously developed.  
 
Coding and category development are analytical steps in grounding theory. Coding transforms 
empirical data to analytical entities; to concepts, categories and their properties. According to 
Glaser (1978:55) a ‘code conceptualises the underlying pattern of a set of empirical indicators 
within the data’. In quantitative research coding is based on predefined categories, whereas in 
grounded theory coding emerges throughout the collection and analysis of data. Substantive 
codes conceptualise the empirical substance and theoretical codes conceptualise how 
‘substantive codes may relate to each other as hypotheses to be integrated in the theory’ 
(Glaser 1978:72).  
 
Theoretical codes are auxiliaries in the coding process. They establish connections and 
function as implicit, integrative theoretical cues, not as preconceptions such as theories in 
hypothetical deductive methods. Theoretical codes influence conceptualisation and generate 
analysis instead of empirical descriptions. Glaser suggests a coding family of a minimum of 
six codes, but this can be extended to eighteen theoretical coding families (Glaser 1978). 
These codes are theoretical terms imported from sociology, based on traditional sociological 
perspectives on social action. Examples of coding families and some of their codes are the 
strategy family with strategies, tactics and mechanisms, the cultural family with social norms, 
social values and social beliefs, and the interactive family with mutual effects, reciprocity and 
mutual dependence.  
 
A code does not determine one particular relation. Codes are flexible and several codes can 
work with the same data. There are four forms of coding. Open coding is the initial phase of 
the coding process. In this phase coding is unbounded and there are no preconceived codes. 
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Later on in the process selective coding can be used to delimit the coding only to those 
variables that relate to one core variable. Theoretical coding is used to provide conceptual 
connectors in the writing of the theory (Glaser 1978). Finally, the term constant comparative 
coding is used for coding of incidents for categories and their properties and the theoretical 
codes that connect them (Glaser 1992:38).       
 
A grounded theory has two elements: conceptual categories and properties, and hypothesis or 
generalised relations among the categories and their properties (Glaser & Strauss 1967:35). 
Generation of theory means the selection of significant codes and raising these to a category 
on an abstract and conceptual level. Categories and properties are not data by themselves; 
they are not descriptions but concepts indicated by the data. A category is a conceptual 
element of the theory while a property is a conceptual aspect or element in a category (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967:36). Thick descriptions elucidate categories (Glaser 1978, 1998) and a core 
variable or category is the basis for theory generation.30  
 
Coding is the building block of grounded theory generation. Coding procedures and 
discussion of coding are one of the main subjects in Glaser’s later writings. Disagreement 
about coding caused the schism between Glaser & Strauss twenty years ago (Glaser 1992, 
Strauss & Corbin 1998). Discovery versus construction of theory; the question of forcing or 
emergence and qualitative description versus generation of theory, are all contested issues by 
classic and constructivist grounded theory adherents. These debates can be related to different 
methodological positions and were discussed in chapter two. The question of preconceptions 
and forcing of data can also be related to the discovery of a basic social process and use of 
coding families. These elements will be further discussed in relation to their potential for 
generating formal grounded theory in the last sections of this chapter. 
 
5.4 Thinking conceptually  
A concept in grounded theory is the naming of a social pattern based on research (Glaser 
2001:10). The aim of grounded theory is conceptual specification, not conceptual definition. 
A conceptual definition is a statement of a precise meaning. It defines by including a limited 
                                                 
30 Thick descriptions give context of an experience, state meanings and interpretations and reveal the experience 
as a process (Denzin 1998b:325, with reference to Geertz 1973). In grounded theory method the term refers to 
rich background data as basis for generation of categories, which must not be confused with descriptive studies 
that Glaser warns strongly against. 
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group of elements, other elements are thereby excluded. In addition, conceptual definitions 
belong to the verification tradition that Glaser & Strauss contradicted. A conceptual 
specification, on the other hand, is open in the sense that it specifies a group of elements but 
does not exclude other potential elements. In relation to grounded theory, conceptual 
definitions have a delimiting function while conceptual specifications are dynamic. A 
grounded theory concept is not definitive; it can be further specified with new data.  
 
Grounded theory concepts should be sensitising and help to grasp a meaningful picture of 
what is happening in the empirical field (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Sensitising concepts ‘give 
the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching the empirical instance’ in 
contrast to definitive concepts that ‘refer precisely to what is common to a class of objects, by 
the aid of a clear definition’ (Blumer 1954:7). A criterion of a good grounded theory is that it 
works and fits – the concepts work to explain and predict and the theory fits the data (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967, 1998). A grounded theory is not a definitive, proven hypothesis; it is 
integrated and has an empirically grounded hypothesis. Despite the positivist roots of the 
method, grounded theory has a sensitising character; theory is suggested knowledge, it is a 
process rather than everlasting truths (Glaser & Strauss 1967). The flexible perspective on the 
development of knowledge is not an explicitly constructivist position, but an acknowledgment 
of the empirical basis for development of theory and the changing, process character of social 
life.    
 
Grounding concepts in data means thinking conceptually (Glaser 2004:[p.30]). According to 
Glaser, thinking conceptually is the characteristic that distinguishes grounded theory from 
traditional qualitative data analysis, which is a ‘conceptual description method with 
worrisome accuracy at issue.’ (Glaser 2002: [p.38]). Thinking conceptually is about 
establishing a relationship between data and theory through comparison of indicators,31 
properties, and dimensions. Constant comparison highlights similarities and differences, 
specific qualities and uniformed patterns emerge among the compared entities. This process 
creates the empirical grounding and specification of a concept. Conceptual specification 
allows for flexibility and adaption to social change as grounded theory is work in progress. 
Concepts are dynamic and ever-developing frameworks as new data can extend and specify 
                                                 
31 In grounded theory a concept is based on multi-indicators, not only one-indicator (Glaser 1978:65). Indicators 
are the empirical findings that are interpreted to ‘indicate’ the generated concept. Properties are the conceptual 
elements of a category and dimensions are variations of a property (Glaser & Strauss 19667, Glaser 1978, 1998). 
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the concept, giving a better fit between data and analysis. If the empirical basis or meaning of 
the concept changes – that is the indicators and properties – the concept can be modified and 
adapted to these changes (Glaser 1978:64).  
 
Coding of data, development of categories and establishing relations between them are 
iterative analytical processes. The analytical process continues until saturation is achieved, 
where additional data does not contribute to development of properties of the category (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967:61, Glaser 1998:141). Or, as in most cases (including the generation of the 
trust concept) there are practical reasons for stopping, such as time and money. Through the 
dynamic iteration process, the fit of the theory improves; it works better in explaining the 
empirical processes (Glaser 1978, 1998). The iterative analytical process is supported by 
continuous writing of memos about codes, emerging concept and categories. The memos help 
to clarify thoughts and analysis, and they can constitute a part of the drafts for publication of 
the grounded theory. 
 
The main challenges that occurred during the theory generation process will be discussed in 
relation to empirical examples in the next section.  
 
5.5 Coding and theory generation - an empirical example   
During the bank crisis in the late 1980s, the Norwegian newspapers wrote frequently about 
declining trust in banks. People accused banks of high interest rates and of being greedy and 
risk-seeking. My interest in the trust process aspects of this relationship was triggered, 
through observation of the apparently changing relationship between savings banks and 
customers, and it became the focus of my master thesis (Nordnes 1993).  
 
Data collection for the master thesis was based on observations of interactions between bank 
and customer in different bank branches and interviews with bank managers, bank employees 
and bank customers. Customer interviews were supplemented with informal talks with bank 
customers in general (that is almost everyone in my network who was willing to share their 
experiences as a bank customer).32 The aim was to gain insights into why and how trust 
declined and to grasp the informants’ meanings and interpretations related to trust between 
                                                 
32 The word bank and savings bank are used interchangeably. See appendix for further specification of 
informants and data collection and Nordnes (1993).   
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bank and customer. The focus in the interviews was on trust as a social process; how it was 
broken down, maintained and constructed through social interaction. Access to rich data 
resulted in memos with thick descriptions, observations, and comments as the basis for 
coding, for further systematic data collection and categorisation. Analyses of data indicated 
that infringement of expectations undermined trust. Systematic collection of data was 
concentrated on the interaction process; the content of customer’s expectations of the bank 
and how the expectations were infringed.  
 
The iterative process of data collection and analysis focused on the following questions: What 
exactly did the customer expect, what were the foundations for their expectations, what did 
the bank promise and how were their promises fulfilled? In the following paragraph I will 
present a few elements from the interview data to show how the concept mutual 
understanding emerged.  
 
Customers told about how the bank had disappointed them and acted in an unforeseen way. 
Banks were seen to conduct an irresponsible policy, they charged interests and fees at too 
high a rate, and they appeared to be unpredictable from the customers’ point of view. 
Customers felt that the bank had one-sidedly broken a tacit contract, as one informant said: ‘I 
thought the bank was an institution such as the church and the school, but no’. Another 
customer told that ‘If it is so that every customer is served differently, but they believe that 
they are treated equally -.then there is a formidable gap between expectations and realities’ 
(Nordnes 1993:94, 122).33 The bank clerks told that they sometimes felt embarrassed when 
they face to face with the customers had to charge for services that formerly were free and 
that they often found it hard to defend the new bank policy in front of the customers. One 
bank clerk expressed in this way the dilemma that several clerks described: ’Often I have a 
bad conscience. One knows what it costs to provide for a family and kids. It is hard. I have 
feelings, but I have to think about business on behalf of the bank. We are losing money and 
may lose our workplace’ (Nordnes 1993:151). The clerks talked about loyalty dilemmas and a 
feeling of being unfamiliar with their workplace and of a lack of information. Structural 
change and mergers transformed local, independent savings banks into branches of a few 
large banking groups with ambitions to rapidly turn traditional, local savings banks into 
                                                 
33All the empirical quotations are my translations of Norwegian statements referred in Nordnes (1993). 
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modern financial institutions within a few years. As a bank manager said: ’Now we have to 
think business as they call it’ (Nordnes 1993:147).      
 
As the quotations above indicate, the customers and different groups in the bank experienced 
different aspects of the bank transformation – but they all felt that previously held 
expectations had been infringed. There was no mutual understanding of how relations should 
unfold. Mutual understanding gradually emerged as a conceptual code and a core category 
that conceptualised the underlying pattern – that the common social basis for the trust relation 
between bank and customer was fundamentally transformed. The bank had terminated the old 
tacit contract with the customer and unilaterally changed the social basis for the relationship.  
 
5.6 Theoretical codes and sociological sense-making   
Coding is the organising of data into categories according to properties and dimensions. Data 
was coded into several substantive codes and categories relating to situations characterised by 
infringed expectations. Substantive coding was based on empirical descriptions of customer 
characteristics, the relationship to the bank, bank actions and bank attitudes and various social 
bases for expectations. The initial, open coding was manageable. The challenge was the 
further categorisation and establishing of connections – the application of theoretical codes 
and generation of theory.    
 
Coding and categorisation are analytical steps in the conceptualisation of on-going social 
processes and patterns of action. Categories were further sorted into some main, substantive 
categories such as infringed expectations about bank procedures, role performance of bank 
clerks and attitudes signalled by the clerk and by the bank organisation. To gain a broader 
picture of the on-going processes, establish connections and raise the empirical findings 
above substantive descriptions and categories, I needed theoretical codes. Classic sociological 
categories were necessary as analytical tools. The core of the categorisation work was a 
matrix of relations and expectations, categorised on the basis of Parsons Pattern variables; 
they functioned as theoretical codes.34  The main category of expectations was categorised as 
diffuse or specific and this was further combined with role theory and categorised as 
                                                 
34 Talcott Parsons describes five pairs of pattern alternatives of value-orientation focusing on the relational 
aspect in roles (Parsons 1979:66-67). I used three pairs of value orientations; specificity vs diffuseness, 
universalism vs particularism and self-orientation vs collectivity-orientation. 
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constitutive and background expectations. This matrix of expectations is inspired by Zucker 
(1986), and is elaborated on in chapter 9 about relational trust.  
 
At a micro level, in interactions between bank and customer, data indicated that expectations 
and mutual understanding are a prerequisite for developing trust. But what is the foundation 
for mutual understanding? The master study indicated that there are three main social bases 
for mutual understanding between bank and customer: 1) implicit expectations regarding bank 
procedures, attitudes and interaction, 2) experiences and ‘talk’ about the bank, and 3) 
contracts and security arrangements. The social bases for mutual understanding could be 
categorised as 1) a taken for granted tacit social ‘contract’, 2) relational experiences and 3) 
formal structures. General sociological terms were the clue in categorising these findings, 
they were the theoretical codes. The bases could be categorised as pre-contractual, relational 
and structural foundations for developing mutual understanding and trust (Nordnes 1993).  
 
Literature studies and sociological analytical tools were required to order and inspire the 
sense-making of the rich empirical material. Parsons Pattern variables made sense of the 
various categories of data and at last I was able sort the categories in a comprehensible 
pattern. In retrospect I will assert that concepts and theory imported from sociology, and 
which functioned as theoretical codes, were crucial to complete the generation of theory.  
 
As prescribed in the seminal grounded theory work by Glaser & Strauss (1967), the study of 
the bank-customer relation started out with no deliberate theoretical preconceptions of the 
substantive field. Thanks to empirical experience and rich knowledge of the savings banks 
field (and emerging analytical skills), substantial numbers of memos were produced and data 
was coded into content rich categories. A core category and basic social process was 
discovered; the construction of mutual understanding as a premise for trust. But I was unable 
to tie the picture together and explain in a systematic way how trust was infringed until the 
material was categorised in accordance with Parsons Pattern variables. This experience can be 
interpreted as acknowledgement of the statement that only a skilled sociologist can do 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967). If so, then the method is unsuitable for students, 
who according to Glaser (2001:213) are the principal current users of grounded theory. This is 
a pity because grounded theory allows for creativity and a fresh and explorative look on 
empirical challenges. However, my experience also indicates that one challenge of grounded 




5.7 Literature studies and preconceptions 
Reading literature about the substantive field may or may not cause pre-conceptions. 
According to Corbin and Strauss (1998), Charmaz (2008), Urquhart (2010) a literature review 
combined with reflexivity towards existing theory is acceptable as an introduction to the 
research problem in grounded theory, although there is a risk of ‘contamination’ of creativity 
and exploration. On the other hand, not to read is to be unfamiliar with current thinking in the 
field and the researcher runs the risk of ‘reinventing the wheel’ and incorrectly classifying 
one’s own findings as truly original. The ‘no-reading’ dictum distances grounded theory work 
from existing theory and this is perhaps the most challenging aspect of the approach. Even 
though broad reading is recommended from the start and category directed, specific reading is 
recommended in the latter stages when integrating grounded theory into existing theory, these 
messages are under communicated. The no-reading dictum is an implicit, but integral part of 
the method. The focus is on coding and categorisation of empirical data independently of 
existing literature and theory, and the subject of integrating grounded theory with existing 
theory is not emphasised in the grounded theory literature.  
 
Theoretical coding can at best function as a connection to existing theory, but on the whole 
there are recommendations in the method that distance grounded theory from existing theory. 
Distance makes it harder to generate theory and integrate grounded theory and existing theory 
while openness will have positive effects. A critical step is to move from description to 
abstraction and generation of theory. Elements and concepts from existing theory can 
contribute to a strengthening of this process, facilitate categorisation and conceptualisation, 
and raise the analytical power of a grounded theory.  In addition, openness can prevent 
development of a grounded theory lock-in state, and facilitate integration between grounded 
theory and existing theory.  
 
A lock-in state is not in line with grounded theory recommendations. Integration of theories 
and concepts with the literature will strengthen grounded theory contributions and legitimise 
the method (Glaser 1978, 1998), as well as protecting the researcher’s creativity and freedom, 
stimulating analytical openness and sensitivity, and preventing a preconceived mind imbued 




Glaser’s (1998:67) advice is not to do an initial literature review in the substantive area, but to 
start the literature search when the theory is nearly complete. Relevant literature is unknown 
until the researcher gains insights into the main concerns of the participants in the substantive 
field (ibid: 68). Grounded theories should therefore be woven into relevant literature during 
writing of the research findings. This premise of grounded theory method can be read as a 
rejection of existing knowledge. Without initial literature readings it is difficult to establish a 
basis from the start of a research process to relate grounded theory to existing theory. The 
recommendations of postponing the literature review do not mean not reading at all. On the 
contrary; ‘It is vital to read, but in a substantive field different from the research’ to avoid 
preconceptions and derailing (Glaser 1978:31). The researcher is recommended to read for 
stimulation of ideas, sensitivity and style (ibid: 32) – this is a general recommendation which 
is relevant independently of method.  
 
5.8 Towards a formal grounded theory and the trust paradox 
Why was the tacit contract between savings banks and customers eroded? Data from bank 
managers indicated that the explanation was related to macro level processes; the deregulation 
of saving banks. Deregulation was the engine of the transformation of the trust relation 
between bank and customer; it was a transformation of the foundations of trust between 
customer and bank. The change in the legal framework for economic transactions was also a 
deregulation of the social contract between bank and customer. Deregulation altered the basic 
social process (BSP) of trust development and was a transformation of a basic social 
structural process (BSSP) – the formal regulation of banks. Generation of grounded theory on 
a micro level revealed macro level processes. To understand the underlying dynamics on the 
micro level, macro level processes had to be integrated in the analysis as a driving force for 
transformation of the substantive field.     
 
The grounded theory approach resulted in five discoveries: 1) deregulation of the formal 
structures that embedded the bank-customer relationship transformed the foundations of trust 
on several levels 2) trust is not a static quality but a dynamic process of social construction 3) 
existing sociological analytical tools did not grasp the trust dynamics sufficiently 4) grounded 
theory works to discover macro processes and 5) general sociology enhances the analytical 




A product of the master thesis (Nordnes 1993) was the joining of the above mentioned 
elements into an early stage of a composite model of trust; a dynamic analytical framework 
based on sociological concepts for studying trust as a process of social construction. Quite 
early in the process of theory generation, it was evident that the substantive categories could 
be sorted into larger groups and the use of general sociological terms improved the clarity, 
and work and fit of the theory. This step in the generation process moves the theory from the 
substantive to the formal level as it makes the theory more abstract and hence generalisable. 
On the other hand, it raises the question as to whether this process is not an empirical 
grounding of a formal theory – a distinction that will be further discussed in the final section 
about formal grounded theory.  
 
Working as social scientist at an applied research institute, it became clear that the dynamic 
trust perspective has wide relevance as a conceptual framework to study other social 
processes and contexts in which the production of trust was an important element. The 
process perspective on trust, the core category mutual understanding and the discovery of the 
pre-contractual, relational and structural social bases for trust have explanatory power which 
provides a better understanding of the conditions for cooperation and trust. This approach is 
one way to make production of trust visible and highlight hidden processes and dynamics 
which otherwise would remain undiscovered, for instance the trust paradox and social 
configurations of trust.  
 
The trust paradox emerges in situations of social change and is a combination of two 
characteristics of trust: 1) trust as a strategy for coping with risk, uncertainty and the 
unfamiliar and 2) trust as a leap of faith based on mutual understanding. Social change 
involves risk and increases the demand for trust. Social change is a transformation of the 
social bases for trust; it alters the composition of trust bases – the social configuration – and 
platform for mutual understanding. Change in social configuration may disrupt mutual 
understanding and cause diminishing trust. This is the trust paradox; in situations where there 
is an increased need for trust, the social foundations for developing it are diminishing. 
Exploration of the social configuration of trust means exploring how the dynamics between 
the three social bases unfold in situations of social change. 
 
The methodological point related to the trust paradox is that the paradox is made visible 
through the generation of the composite concept of trust. This particular conceptualisation 
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highlights mutual understanding and social bases as core concepts to understand the trust 
process. The core concepts are inextricably connected elements of the composite concept. 
This dynamic framework enables us to ask key research questions that identify relevant 
processes in the empirical field, and which lead to elaboration of the conceptual framework in 
a way that makes it applicable more generally – as a formal grounded theory. 
 
Every substantive case of grounded theory may have its particularities, but at the same time 
there are general social processes in play. Examples of this are the development of trust, 
awareness contexts or the development of new social identities, such as becoming a 
professional or becoming a non-addicted. Sociological theory is a relevant tool to analyse 
social processes and forces, and the intersection between substantive processes and general 
social forces is one door between grounded theory and sociology.    
 
5.9 Generation of formal grounded theory – a door into sociology  
While there are many good substantive grounded theories, there are few works about 
developing formal grounded theory (Glaser 2010:99, Kearney 2010). Formal grounded theory 
has ‘received scant attention’ and ‘is virtually ignored’ because it ‘does not fit the typical 
qualitative data analysis’ according to Glaser (2007:2); qualitative data analysis is descriptive 
and does not aim for generation of theory (Glaser 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007).  
 
Glaser refers to several reasons for ignoring generation of formal grounded theory: researcher 
specialisation, the gap between substantive and abstract knowledge, lack of academic support, 
discipline lock-in, the fear of depersonalisation of a substantive theory, and lack of skills in 
applying formal grounded theory. Moreover, most attempts to develop formal grounded 
theory fail because of misconceptions of the concept and procedures (Glaser 2007). The post-
modern rejection of grand narratives and focus on the partial character of knowledge (Lyotard 
1997) leads attention toward substantive theory rather than formal theory (Kearny 2010). 
Generating formal grounded theory is an ‘arduous task’ according to Stern (2009:62), and 
novices are advised against doing formal grounded theory (Glaser 2007:83). All these 
elements might be good reasons for a deficiency of formal grounded theory, but further 




Here the attention is on the elements inherent in the method, elements that may inhibit 
development of formal grounded theory. One risk is that generalisation and generation of 
formal grounded theory can be ignored because of the strong focus on generation of 
substantive theory and on empirical work and fit of theory. Procedural rigour and warnings 
against reading relevant literature until work is finalised can also turn attention away from 
abstraction and generalisation.  
 
On the other hand, analysis of basic social processes has an inherent potential for enhancing 
development of formal grounded theory. This potential is somewhat underdeveloped and 
could have been more strongly elaborated in the grounded theory literature; it is scarcely 
discussed as relevant for generation of formal grounded theory. Basic social processes are 
general features of social life and as such they constitute a potential for abstraction. In 
addition, when substantive grounded theory is advanced to formal grounded theory, this 
enhances the theory’s potential for integration with middle range sociological theory. The 
theories ‘communicate’ better if they are at the same conceptual level.    
 
Formal grounded theory  
Empirical grounding instead of logical deduction is the fundamental distinction between 
grounded theory and conventional theory. A formal grounded theory is rather abstract; the 
theory is removed from the raw data upon which it is based and the theory has broad 
applicability. It is developed for a conceptual area of sociological inquiry and differs from 
substantive grounded theory in the level of abstraction and generality (Glaser & Strauss 
1967:32-33, Glaser 2007:5). There is not a sharp division between the two forms of theory, 
the point where a substantive theory moves into a formal will be a question of interpretation 
and cannot be decided once and for all. As there is no dichotomous distinction between the 
two forms of theory, the difference between them is a question of degrees of generality (Dey 
1999:41).   
 
According to Glaser (2007:4) a formal grounded theory is ‘a theory of a SGT’s general 
implications generated from, as widely as possible, other data and studies in the same 
substantive area and in other substantive areas’.35 The study of trust discussed in this thesis is 
an example. The initial theory was developed for a substantive area, the relationship between 
                                                 
35 SGT – substantive grounded theory 
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saving banks and their personal customers (not businesses customers). Data indicated that the 
mutual understanding between bank and customer was a foundation for the leap of faith and 
trusting. Mutual understanding is based on a combination of three social bases: interaction, 
tacit social agreements and formal contracts. These social bases could be categorised by 
general sociological terms, as relational, pre-contractual and structural. Gradually it became 
clear that the process discovered in the substantive case, was a general process. The 
applicability of the theory to the analyses of various trust situations resulted in a formal 
grounded theory about trust as a compound and dynamic social process.36  
 
Formal grounded theory is an extension of a substantive grounded theory and is generated 
through the same procedures as substantive theory, in particular, constant comparison and 
theoretical sampling. There is an exception in the relationship to conventional theory. 
Grounding of formal grounded theory can be done using literature as sources of data, and 
Glaser (2007: 91) recommends a literature review for conceptual comparisons and theoretical 
sampling. It is recommended that a formal grounded theory departs from a substantive theory 
as categories and concepts develop, so that there is no risk for ‘contamination’ of originality. 
In this strategy there is a risk of being descriptive or rewriting of the substantive theory.  
 
Rewriting is a possible, but not recommended strategy for developing formal grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 2007). It involves a linguistic transformation of the theory and 
writing it in a more general manner. The result is neither an empirical grounded formal theory 
nor a theory built on logic deduction. Formal grounded theory can be generated directly from 
data, but this can easily become just an ‘ordering of a mass of data under a logically worked-
out set of categories’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967:92). The strength of a grounded theory, whether 
it is at the substantive or formal level, is that it is generated from data and that there is 
empirical work and fit. A formal theory generated directly from data may not have this as it is 
likely that the process of abstraction into constructed concepts has involved forcing of data.    
 
One aim of generating formal grounded theory is to expand the use of the theory. This means 
applying it to study a particular phenomenon in new contexts and through this expanding 
existing theoretical and empirical knowledge. An additional aim is to develop an analytic tool 
                                                 
36 The general applicability was discovered through various projects as a social scientist at an applied research 
institute. The theory was rarely applied at the design of the project, but throughout the work, trust processes 
emerged as one of the explanatory elements (see note 140, chapter 14.2).      
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applicable to consultants and lay people (Glaser 2007). Empirical applicability demands 
empirical work and fit of the theory. But can the existing formal grounded theories be applied 
to further studies? Is empirical work and fit the difference between these preconceptions and 
preconceptions from conventional theory? Does applying formal grounded theory not force 
data as the conceptualisations are used to compare and not to verify? Can empirical fit and 
relevance also be applied on theoretical fit and relevance? Are these criteria relevant when 
expanding grounded theory concepts into general theory? The theoretical integration between 
the composite concept of trust and sociology is one form of elaboration on these questions. 
 
5.10 Basic social processes and macro analyses in grounded 
theory 
A basic social process can be a core category (Glaser 1978:96) and it ‘explains a considerable 
portion of the action in an area and relates to most categories of lesser weight used in or 
making the theory work’ (Glaser 1978:5). Basic social processes have general implications 
and this give them the character of formal theory. Mutual understanding, for instance, is a 
basic social process discovered on a substantive level, but has scope as a formal theory. It is a 
process that is abstracted from time and space and fits well into the hallmarks of a basic social 
process (BSP): ’BSP’s are pervasive since they are fundamental, patterned processes in the 
organisation of social behaviours which occur over time and go on irrespective of the 
conditional variation of place’ (Glaser 1978:100).  
 
Basic social processes are fundamental processes that can be found anywhere and are 
independent of time and place, but ‘can account for change over time…’ (Glaser 1978:101). 
Processes unfold as sequences of action or events over time. Transformation and the emerging 
of new conditions are indications of change in a basic social process. Development of trust for 
instance, is a basic social process unfolding as a sequence of interactions that can be analysed 
in short and long term perspective. The establishment of mutual understanding is a core 
process based on social foundations. Transformations in the foundation do not necessarily 
alter trust as a basic social process, but its substantive basis.   
 
The general character of a basic social process directs the attention toward generalisation and 
possibilities for development of formal theory, but this analytical opportunity is hardly 
mentioned in Glaser’s (1978) discussion of the concept. A basic social process is a 
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substantive process and an abstraction. It has the character of a general social process which 
can be at various levels of analytical abstraction; as substantive theory, general substantive 
theory and formal theory (ibid: 107). The analytical potential of a basic social process for the 
generation of formal grounded theory appears to be underdeveloped in the literature about 
how to practice grounded theory method.   
 
There are two types of basic social processes; basic social psychological processes 
(abbreviated BSPP) and basic social structural processes (abbreviated BSSP). According to 
Glaser (1978:102) a basic social process mainly refers to the BSPP type of process; action and 
social psychological processes. If a basic social process refers to a BSSP this should be made 
explicit. One of the arguments against grounded theory is that it lacks the potential for 
generating analyses of macro level processes and is a method only for analyses of action and 
micro level processes. I hold that the basic social structural process is an analytical approach 
to study macro level processes such as structural transformation by using grounded theory 
method.  
 
For instance, the composite concept of trust is as a basic social process grounded in actions at 
a micro level, but the analysis of trust configuration (chapter 12, 13) also focuses on macro 
level social change and transformation of social structures. The composite concept is 
generated from a study of how one BSSP, deregulation of banks, transformed another basic 
social process; trust between customer and bank. Micro level analysis generated knowledge of 
the dynamic between micro and macro level processes and the theoretical discussion about 
integration between grounded theory and sociology goes deeper into the micro – macro 
dynamic. The analytical potential of the composite trust concept illustrates the analytical 
potential of grounded theory method. This potential is, I suggest, enhanced by the 
combination of a core concept and general sociological terms. The combination raises the 
level of conceptual abstraction and reduces the gap between a grounded theory and sociology.  
 
Grounded theory allows for the import of coding families (Glaser 1978, 1998), which use 
general sociological terms as auxiliaries in coding. In the composite concept of trust, this is 
taken a step further as the terms are incorporated in the concept. This is perhaps not totally in 
line with the classic grounded theory tradition, but it enhances the analytical potential – an 




5.11  Rejection of existing theory 
The strength of grounded theory method is the explorative approach and the aim of theory 
generation and discovery. At best this stimulates creativity and originality and contributes to 
bringing research forward. As a premise, this requires approaching the field without 
preconceptions and predefined hypothesis (Glaser & Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1992, 1998). 
In Glaser & Strauss seminal work (1967:253) a combination of readings and insight from the 
field is recommended, in later (read Glasereian) versions of grounded theory, the warning 
about preconceptions is linked to advice about avoiding initial literature readings. This advice 
in combination with the refusal of hypotheses seems to have conveyed the impression that 
grounded theory rejects existing theory. 
 
Integration between grounded theory and other theories contributes to the development of 
cumulative knowledge – how to weave grounded theory based conceptualisation into 
knowledge based on conventional theory. Grounded theory method was developed in 
opposition to existing theory. In the literature the focus of the discussion of the relationship 
between grounded theory and other methods is mainly on elements that separate grounded 
theory from other theories, rather than an integration of theory. The rejection of researcher 
positioning, the idea that concepts are emerging from data, the emphasis on generating and 
not verification, the dictum about not forcing data, postponing of literature reading and the 
focus on the development of substantive theory – when these elements are taken together they 
can easily distance grounded theory from conventional theory; both logic-deductive and 
constructivist theories, and may also function as a possibly unintended rejection of existing 
theory.   
 
The separation logic is reinforced in several ways. There are few if any references to non-
grounded theory studies in Glaser’s books. This and the establishment of Grounded Theory 
Institute with its journal The Grounded Theory Review and book series dedicated to classic 
grounded theory, protects the method from critical questions and prevents influence from new 
theoretical developments. This exclusiveness is a double-edged sword as it protects the classic 
grounded theory but demonstrates a dismissal of the existing research community so that the 
method can be interpreted as rejection of other theories. It is likely that this functions as a 
barrier against exchange and the cumulative development of knowledge. Classic grounded 
theory researchers risk being socialised into separate research communities, alien from non-
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grounded theory studies, and end up in a kind of lock-in situation in the grounded theory 
community.  
 
This separation logic was not necessarily intended in the seminal work by Glaser & Strauss, 
but has grown as a kind of misinterpretation of the method, partly enhanced by Glaser’s 
‘protective’ attitude. Last but not least, this development ‘protects’ the established research 
community from being exposed to the alternative perspectives that grounded theory 
represents. In defence of the protective position; it should be read as a protection of researcher 
creativity and stimulation of analytical openness and sensitivity, but in the long run this 
position represents a risk of isolation and through this a weakening of works in the classic 
grounded theory tradition. 
 
As a whole these elements distance grounded theory from existing theory and the cumulative 
development of knowledge. Separation makes it harder to generate theory and to integrate 
grounded theory and existing theory, while openness will have positive effects. A critical step 
toward integration is to move from description to abstraction and generation of theory. 
Elements and concepts from existing theory can contribute to strengthening this process, 
facilitating categorisation and conceptualisation and raising the analytical power of a 
grounded theory. In addition greater openness will prevent the development of a grounded 
theory lock-in state, and facilitate integration between grounded theory and existing theory.  
   
5.12  Integration of existing theory - a process with four positions  
The thesis explores the sociological roots of the grounded theory of trust and how sociological 
concepts can contribute to expanding the empirical grounded theory of trust. The aim is to 
show that this combination and integration of grounded theory and sociological theory 
extends our insight into trust as a pervasive and dynamic social phenomenon. A premise for 
the discussion is that a grounded theory is accepted as a contribution to sociology, but this is 
not necessarily the case. Grounded theory has its roots in sociology and requires sociological 
skills, but it is developed in contrast to the quantitative, verification and hypothesis-based 
version of sociology (Glaser & Strauss 1967). These elements indicate an ambiguous 
relationship between grounded theory and sociology. As pointed out earlier, grounded theory 
appears to distance itself from this form of sociology, which in turn, appears to give limited 
recognition to grounded theory.     
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An insistence on rigorous methods is a means of making grounded theory visible as a 
scientific method and legitimising the grounded theory as a scientific theory, but this may be 
insufficient. The sociological community of knowledge may, for instance, not accept 
grounded theory works as valid contributions unless it is made explicit how a grounded theory 
can be integrated with, and contribute to, sociology. In grounded theory the term integration 
refers to how conceptual categories relate to another in a systematic fashion (Simmons 
1994:60). Integration of a grounded theory with existing theory is rarely explicitly discussed, 
but the writings on the use of literature in grounded theory provide some clues about the 
relationship to other theories. The following discussion refers to the relationship between 
grounded theory and sociology, but the positions can be also applied to the relationship 
between grounded theory and other theoretical perspectives. 
 
There are several possible positions about how to integrate a grounded theory and existing 
theory. Based on the discussions in the methodological chapters I suggest four positions 
which relate grounded theory and sociology: 1) separation; grounded theory and sociology 
are separate communities of knowledge; 2) incorporation; sociological elements are used in 
the generation of grounded theory; 3) integration; grounded theory is worked into the 
sociological body of theory; or 4) synthesis; grounded theory and sociology are merged into a 
new unified theory.37 Each of these options can be further specified; they have different 
implications for development of theory and methods, and are more or less ‘acceptable’ in the 
respective communities of knowledge. The positions must not be regarded as dichotomous, 
but as a continuum stretching from a somewhat superficial relationship, referred to as 
separation, and the fourth position which is more a synthesis of two theoretical bodies.  
 
The first position, separation, is probably perceived as the most characteristic position for 
classic grounded theory in relation to sociology and is referred to just throughout the 
discussions in the thesis. The separation position recommends postponing of literature studies, 
but allows for inclusion of existing literature as data in later stages of the generation process 
(Glaser 1978). Existing literature should not be used as a key and yardstick, and it is 
recommended that footnotes are used to integrate the generated theory into existing literature. 
This means that existing theory can be credited in footnotes as sources of ideas, but the 
                                                 
37 The words incorporation and integration can be used as synonyms according to the Merriam-Webster on-line 
dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/), but the definitions are a little bit different, and this 
difference is the basis for the use here.   
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generated theory has precedence and should be accentuated in writing (Glaser 1978). As 
suggested above, this position may exclude grounded theory from other communities of 
knowledge, and inhibit grounded theory contribution to the cumulative development of 
knowledge in for instance sociology. 
 
The second position, incorporation, is the use of sociological theory elements or terms in the 
process of theory generation, for instance axial coding (Strauss & Corbin 1998) or coding 
families (Glaser 1978, 1998). Literature readings are not necessarily postponed and there is a 
possible risk of forcing preconceptions on data. This position establishes deeper connections 
between grounded theory and sociology through the use of theoretical codes. Theoretical 
codes represent traditional sociological perspectives on social action; they are an element in 
the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity and incorporate sociological perspectives into the 
grounded theory. Theoretical codes establish connections between the substantive codes and 
incorporate the grounded theory by relating the concepts to each other. Through this 
sociology is absorbed into the grounded theory. The incorporation position appears to be 
overlooked in the mainstream picture of grounded theory’s relationship to existing theory, 
perhaps because theoretical codes are abstract and the use of them appears somewhat implicit. 
Theoretical coding is difficult, and it is the least understood aspect of theory generation 
according to Glaser (2005:11). The use of sociological theory as data in theory generation can 
also be regarded as absorption of sociological theory into a grounded theory. 
 
The third position, integration, means that grounded theory is worked into sociology and can 
modify or reconstruct existing theory, for instance by strengthening the empirical grounding 
of sociology. Integration indicates an acceptance of grounded theory as a contribution to the 
cumulative development of sociology. Through integration the grounded theory can be 
absorbed by sociology, but according to Strauss (1994:365) grounded theory should be linked 
to other grounded theories and not to speculative theory, for instance such as hypothetic 
deductive sociology. This recommendation can restrict grounded theory’s potential to 
contribute to the cumulative development of knowledge, and this is a disadvantaged position 
for both grounded theory and other theory.                  
 
The fourth and final position, synthesis, means to combine, relate and integrate grounded 
theory and sociology into a unified whole and to generate new theory. The new theory is 
characterised by the work and fit of a grounded theory and has a sociological frame and 
94 
 
grounding. Sociology extends the content and analytical power of a grounded theory, and the 
empirical basis of sociological knowledge is expanded through integration of a grounded 
theory. Synthesis will probably work best with theories on the same analytical level, but this 
needs to be explored further.  
 
Classic grounded theory method does not discuss synthesis, but according to the arguments 
previously set out in the thesis, it is likely that this position will be rejected by the classic 
proponents of grounded theory. On the other hand, synthesis does not necessarily transform 
the basic procedures in grounded theory method; it is an opportunity to supplement and 
expand a generated grounded theory, rather than forcing the data or bending the theory. The 
aim of synthesis is to strengthen and increase the relevance of the grounded theory by further 
grounding, in addition to contributing to the expansion of existing sociological knowledge. 
This benefits grounded theory as well as the cumulative development of sociological 
knowledge.   
 
The different positions are summarised into a table of integration levels, presented below. 
  
Table 1 Integration levels 
Level Characteristics Implications for 
theory 
development  
Relationship to the 
sociological community 
of knowledge 
Separation GT* and sociology are 
separate communities of 
knowledge 
Existing theory 
can be used as 
data in GT  
No exchange of 
knowledge between GT 
and other communities 
of knowledge  
Incorporation Sociological elements are 
used in the generation of 
GT 
Existing theory 
can be absorbed 
into GT 
One sided flow of 
sociology into GT 
Integration GT is worked into the 
sociological body of theory 
Existing theory 
can be modified 
by GT, and GT 







knowledge is possible 
Synthesis GT and sociology are 





the relevance of 
the GT   




* Grounded theory 
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The next and theoretical section attempts to integrate the grounded theory of trust and 
sociology, and contribute to the cumulative development of the sociological knowledge about 
trust.  
 
5.13  Conclusion: A formal grounded theory of trust? 
A formal grounded theory is not a grand theory; it is a middle-range theory with an extended 
empirical grounding compared to a substantive theory. The expanded substantive basis for 
comparison and sampling can be similar to or different from the basis of the substantive 
theory (Glaser 2007).  
 
The composite concept of trust for instance, was developed for the relationship and 
interaction between customer and savings bank, but has been generated into a formal 
grounded theory about the development of trust as a basic social process. This was not the 
aim from the outset, but the substantive theory has been applied in several studies and has 
demonstrated work and fit in various empirical contexts quite different from the substantive 
field from which it was generated. Generation and applicability of the formal grounded theory 
was strengthened by the use of sociological terms, but is the incorporation of these terms an 
attempt to order mass data or do they force data?    
 
In the generation of the composite concept of trust, the sociological terms were incorporated 
on a substantive level and had an ordering function; they clarified the overall picture and 
enhanced parsimony, which is one of the hallmarks of a theoretical contribution (Whetten 
1989). The incorporated terms were grounded in the substantive categories, not the other way 
round. This is the difference between conceptual forcing and integration. In this case the 
sociological terms are abstractions and generalisations based on the substantive content. The 
terms strengthen the empirical work and fit of the composite concept of trust, which is a 
concept that has the character of a formal grounded theory. On an abstract level the theory 
explains the premises for the development of trust, how the trust process unfolds and predicts 
how trust can be broken. The theory works in analysing empirical trust processes at a micro 
level, by analysing the social configuration of trust at the macro level, and it fits by analysing 




The use of sociological terms as theoretical codes strengthens the grounded theory of trust. 
This indicates that there is a huge unused potential for the development of formal grounded 
theory, although this is ignored in the method and mostly unexplored by its users. Generation 
of formal grounded theory with sociological terms enhances the potential for abstraction and 
generalisation. It enables grounded theory to make a more feasible contribution to the 
cumulative development of knowledge in sociology, and expands the potential for generation 
of formal grounded theory, as long as the sociological terms are incorporated in a way that 
maintains the work and fit of the theory. The current distance between grounded theory and 
existing theory has to be replaced with integration, and this is not only a practical task but also 
a question of how this relation is perceived and discussed in the grounded theory literature.  
 
The use of sociological terms is referred to here as sociological grounding. The actual 
sociological grounding is the theoretical work presented in the next part of the thesis and is an 
exploration of how elements in the grounded theory can be integrated with sociological 
theory. The literature is used in a way that supports sociological grounding. It means 
integrating the composite concept into sociology, discussing the existing theory of trust in the 
light of the composite concept, and exploring how this concept contributes to expanding the 
existing theory of trust. Glaser & Strauss (1967) state that grounded theory concepts can 
contribute to extending existing theory, and Glaser (1998:207) recommends incorporation of 
literature as it strengthens the grounded theory so that it can be integrated and contributes to a 
field. Existing literature should be used to complement or contrast the grounded theory, not as 
a key to prove the functionality of the grounded theory concept (1978:131). Integration has to 
take place on the premises of grounded theory with the intention to modify and/or supplement 
existing theory, not vice versa. 
 
The sociological grounding facilitates generation of a formal grounded theory and strengthens 
the integration between grounded theory and sociology. This is beneficial for both; 
sociological knowledge in a substantive field is expanded and grounded theory gains ground 
and strengthens its legitimacy. Last, but not least, if there is a synthesis between a grounded 




5.14  Contributions and further research 
The theoretical project of the thesis is to establish a sociological grounding of the composite 
concept of trust. This is also an exploration of a synthesis between an empirical grounded 
theory of trust, general sociological theory and sociological theory of trust. The theoretical 
elaboration explores how the grounded theory of trust is rooted in sociology, how sociological 
concepts can be applied together with the composite concept of trust and how this synthesis 
can provide new insight into trust as a dynamic social phenomenon. In one sense this project 
presupposes that a grounded theory is accepted as a contribution to sociology, recognising at 
the same time that this may not be the case.    
 
The substantive concept of trust was expanded to a composite concept in a formal grounded 
theory – a conceptual framework – for analysing trust as a dynamic social phenomenon. The 
aim of this thesis is to explore and present one perspective on trust as social processes; it is 
not the ultimate theory about trust. The conceptualisation is a grounded theory – not the 
theory about trust as a process of social construction. It is a sensitising conceptualisation 
(Blumer 1954), the concept directs the analytical focus; what to look for in a study of trust. 
This grounded theory of trust has its methodological roots in social constructivism which 
acknowledges that our understandings are not everlasting truths, but dynamic social 
constructions and suggestions of knowledge. The dynamic perspective on trust is in line with 
the classic grounded theory methodology (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  
 
The composite concept works and fits in studying trust processes on micro level; as social 
construction of meaning and mutual understanding, and as social configuration of trust; this is 
the interaction of the three social bases of trust. These processes can be further explored on 
the micro as well as the macro level.  
 
The contribution to further development of grounded theory is through the exploration of 
understudied possibilities for the development of formal grounded theory and the elaboration 
of how grounded theory and sociology can be integrated. This is presented as four positions 
for integration, needing further research. The aim of grounded theory is not a rejection of 
existing theory, but as a means of liberating researchers from the “slavery of theoretical 
capitalists” and stimulating empirical exploration and conceptual creativity. An open attitude 
towards existing theory will enhance grounded theory’s potential for contribution to the 
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cumulative development of knowledge. To conclude with a quotation from Glaser (2007: 
115):  
‘if we do not practice such modes of extending grounded theory (generating formal 
theory), we relegate SGT’s <substantive grounded theory> to the status of respected little 
islands of knowledge, separated from others - each visited from time to time…’	.38  
 
I will add that generating formal grounded theory is not sufficient. It has to be related to, and 
integrated with, existing sociological theory, and in the next instance applied to empirical 
settings with the aim of continuous generation in order to acquire deeper understanding. The 




















                                                 





































6. TRUST – MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND DYNAMIC 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
 
‘Trust is a quintessentially social reality that penetrates 
not only individual psyches but also 
the whole institutional fabric of society.’39 
– DAVID LEWIS, ANDREW WEIGERT 
 
 
The literature review discussed trust as a concept; the following five theoretical chapters 
which constitute the main body of the thesis explore trust as a phenomenon and process of 
social construction. It is an exploration of how the social processes and qualities of trust 
discovered in my grounded theory study of trust are elaborated on in sociology. The aim is to 
situate the grounded theory of trust within sociological theory and to do a sociological 
grounding – that is to integrate the grounded theory with sociology. This does not mean using 
sociology as yardstick, but rather to expand the existing knowledge of trust and integrating a 
grounded theory perspective with sociological theory.    
 
The focus in the first of the five theoretical chapters is mutual understanding; the core 
concept in the grounded theory of trust. As previously pointed out, this concept is generated 
from empirical data and refers to social processes that generate trust. Elements of the 
processes discovered in the grounded theory are general social processes theorised in 
sociology, but not explicitly related to the development of trust. This means that the 
theoretical body of the thesis contributes to development of new knowledge, both 
theoretically and methodologically. It expands the knowledge about trust as a social 
phenomenon and about the relationship and integration between grounded theory and 
sociology.  
  
The aim of this chapter is to situate mutual understanding in sociological theory and explore 
how social processes conceptualised as mutual understanding and some of the main 
characteristics of trust are elaborated on within sociological theory. The conclusion 
summarises the discussions and suggests a process perspective on the development of trust. 
The chapter focuses on the actor level while trust as a social quality on the societal level will 
be discussed in the chapter about structural trust.   
                                                 
39 Lewis, Weigert 1985:969 
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6.1 The social construction of trust        
What is the trigger for trusting? Empirically this huge question has probably an unlimited set 
of answers. This thesis suggests that development of mutual understanding is one possible 
analytical approach to understanding how trust is generated. To trust is to make a leap of 
faith. This means to take the risk of presupposing and acting on the basis of a mutual 
understanding which may or may not be confirmed.  
 
Trust is generated in the social processes of interpretation and construction of meaning. It 
emerges in the interaction between social reality and individual perception, and is developed 
‘within a framework of interaction which is influenced by both personality and social system, 
and cannot be exclusively associated with either’ (Luhmann 1979:6). Trust is an individual 
emotion with a social basis (Lewis, Weigert 1985:969); it is a state and a dynamic process of 
social construction (Giddens 1993, 1993a, Nordnes 1993, Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa 2005) 
and it is an outcome when expectations are sufficiently fulfilled and develops through 
numerous daily procedures and rituals.40  
 
Social construction is based on shared knowledge of social settings, structures, and relations; 
these are the pre-contractual, relational and structural bases for trust. Knowledge is the basis 
of expectations and trust is the belief that they will be fulfilled to a reasonable extent. Shared 
knowledge is acquired through socialisation, which means internalising the social reality and 
transforming it to subjective reality (Berger and Luckmann 1991). Through internalisation, 
ownership of the social reality is achieved and transformed to become ‘my world’,41 a world 
or social reality that is partly, but not exactly the same as yours. The shared social elements 
are the social basis for expectations and predictions about the other and whether trust should 
be given.  
 
‘Trust, in the broadest sense of confidence in one's expectations, is a basic fact of social life’ 
asserts Luhmann (1979:4). An actor has more or less faith and self-assurance in his 
expectations (Luhmann 1990), a faith that can be related to ontological security; to a basic, 
existential trust and ‘the courage to be’ (Giddens 1993a:38). This individual element of 
                                                 
40 “Sufficient” is an individual construction, dependent on elements such as relation, situation, interaction and 
context.  
41 In terms of J. Piaget – adaption to the social reality through assimilation and accommodation (Evenshaug and 
Hallen 1979)   
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trusting is only one half of the process. Trusting is also a social quality; the construction of a 
shared social world and the relationship between me and you. This relationship emerges 
through interpretation and interaction and the development of mutual understanding between 
us.  
 
Expectations are at the heart of social interaction and process of social construction, but they 
are not sufficient to generate trust in social relationships. Different modes of expectations 
have different social bases; for instance interaction, formal structures or taken for granted 
social patterns. These bases are the social foundations of trust; they reduce risk, secure 
expectations and create predictability. These social bases for trust are the springboard for 
making the leap of faith which is the process of trusting (Giddens 1993a). The term mutual 
understanding conceptualises this relationship as a process and springboard for making a leap 
of faith – the suspension of doubt and leap into trusting.  
 
The conditions for making the leap of faith and the characteristics of the social bases of trust 
are the theoretical and analytical focus of the thesis and will be explored throughout the 
theoretical part. 
 
6.2 Trust and expectations 
Expectations are important in the social construction of trust. Unpredictability, social risk and 
complexity imply that action is based on an inverted time-causality, that assumptions of the 
other’s future actions steer today’s actions. Expectations about the other, about the future and 
the possible outcome of potential actions guide to-days actions. Expectations are based on 
knowledge, emotions and interpretation; they bridge the present and the future, create a sense 
of predictability in everyday life and are the basis for making decisions. Human beings have 
to take some social premises for granted and act on the basis of expectations and anticipations 
of possible consequences (Barber 1983, Dasgupta 1990, Luhmann 1979, March and Olsen 
1989).  
 
The content of expectations is both social and individual. Through socialisation and 
internalisation, the individual acquires social roles and scripts; these are patterns of roles and 
‘typifications of habitualised actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones’ 
(Berger and Luckmann 1991:72). But institutions are not actions; they are produced and 
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reproduced through social action (ibid). Social action is more or less predictable; although 
free will facilitates unpredictability as do role interstices (Seligman 2000) and the extent of 
institutionalisation (Berger and Luckmann 1991). Social action and interaction are about 
construction of meaning, and this implies that social institutions are subject to individual 
interpretations. Social action and interaction, then, are about trust; trusting that the other will 
behave as perceived.  
 
To trust I need confirmation that my perceptions to some extent are shared and that the other 
will behave in accordance with them. This mutual understanding will vary, for instance 
according to the level of familiarity, basic trust, pre-contractual trust, and timeframe. In 
instant trust situations, a nod or a glance could be sufficient confirmation of the necessary 
level of mutual understanding of a few constitutive and particular expectations. The 
development of a love relationship can be a lifetime trust relationship incorporating a number 
of various obligations with all kinds of expectations: background and constitutive 
expectations, as well as specific and unspecific, long-term and short term based 
expectations.42 In long-time relationships, mutual understanding has to be confirmed 
repeatedly; there has to be mutual understanding about some basic, general practices and 
obligations, and some of these can probably be renegotiated.  
 
Some theorists equate trust and expectations; among them are Barber’s (1983) and Zucker’s 
(1986) early sociological work on trust. According to Zucker, trust is an expectation that is 
taken for granted, and Barber refers to expectations as both meaning and trust: ‘Expectations 
are the meanings actors attribute to themselves and others… In its most general sense, trust 
means the expectations’ (Barber 1983:9). This general and comprehensive definition 
juxtaposes trust and expectations. Even though both trust and expectations express an 
assessment of future events they are not identical. It is possible to expect a breach of the law 
or a moral obligation – a belief in this is not to trust. Trust is one kind of expectation in 
contrast to distrust, which is another kind of expectation. Trust and expectations are not 
identical, any kind of expectation is not trustful; expectations or rather the content of 
expectations have to be considered apart from trust.  
 
                                                 
42 The various forms of expectations will be further discussed in chapter 9 about relational trust. 
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Expectations are assumptions about future events either in the short run or far ahead. We have 
expectations about fulfilment of a social promise, we have a social basis for our anticipation 
about fulfilment of the promise, and if we conclude that the other will fulfil the promise, then 
we bestow trust. Trust is a state and social quality; it is a belief in mutual understanding and 
develops through fulfilment of expectations. Through trusting a perceived risk is eliminated.   
 
On the other hand, trust is based on expectations; they are elements in, and the basis for 
mutual understanding, elements that serve to “secure” the leap of faith. To trust is a belief in 
one’s expectations and in that sense, trust is an expectation.    
 
6.3 Reduction of social risk and complexity – the function of trust  
Expectations may be implicit, in which case they are ‘baked into’ role patterns and formal 
structures, or they can be experience-based, that is based on previous interaction or 
communication. But a social pattern does not last for ever, and predictions and expectations 
can never be entirely sure. Interaction may have intended as well as unintended consequences, 
both of which generates social risk, hence social interaction can be a risky social ‘investment’.  
 
Human beings have free will; they are subjective, often unpredictable and non-rational. A and 
B will never perceive the world in exactly the same way, neither can be sure of the other’s 
motives, intentions and future actions, or that the other will act in accordance with 
expectations or predictions. Expectations are social constructions; they are based on an 
interpretation of the situation. Actors may not have an identical reading of a situation, despite 
their belief that this is the case and their different understandings are revealed through 
interactions. If they have been interacting on the basis of different social scripts and codes, 
expectations are not fulfilled and trust may be infringed. This is because there is always a risk 
of unforeseen circumstances, of opportunism, fraud, technical breakdown or disasters – even 
passivity and refraining from action can have social consequences (Bateson 1985).  
 
The unknown future, free will and the potentially unlimited possibilities of action in our time 
are sources of social risk and complexity. According to Luhmann (1979:4) ‘trust, in the 
broadest sense of confidence in one’s expectations, (is) a basic fact of social life’. To be 
trusted is a social gift, trusting is about the actor’s belief in their own expectations, the degree 
of security the actor has in his or hers predictions about the other’s actions, and it is about 
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social coordination mechanisms on societal level. ‘Trust reduces social complexity by going 
beyond available information and generalising expectations of behaviour in that it replaces 
missing information with an internally guaranteed security’ (Luhmann 1979:93). This 
internally guaranteed security is partly individual personality qualities, such as self-
confidence and basic trust (Giddens 1993, 1993a, Misztal 1996) – psychological qualities 
acquired through socialisation – and partly security as an effect of the social process of sense-
making.  
 
Social complexity is man-made and intensified through the expanding freedom of choice in 
every area of life. Religion and other social constraints play a diminishing role as social 
guidelines. In one sense the modern man is set free to act in a way that is socially 
unpredictable, the opportunities created by actions and selections appear unlimited and this 
enlarges social complexity. According to Luhmann (1979:39):  
‘It is through systems of special kind, namely human beings, that there comes into the 
world that enlargement of complexity on which trust is focused: freedom of action. 
Trust then, is the generalised expectation that the other will handle this freedom, […] 
in keeping with the personality which he has presented and made socially visible.’  
 
To keep with the presented and socially visible personality is a tacit promise about acting as 
expected and in accordance with common social rules. The tacit promise creates social 
predictability and is a premise for social interaction and development of trust. We normally 
take for granted that others will keep the social promise and behave as expected. The 
expectation of fulfilment of this obligation is a basic premise for the leap of faith and trusting. 
Mutual understanding is an anticipated confirmation of intentions of keeping the tacit promise 
and maintenance of trust depends on confirmation of this promise through action.  
 
To trust means to act on expectations of future actions and trusting implies the freedom to 
choose to take a risk or to choose to exit from a situation of no trust. Trust is an inner 
conviction and ‘a pure social construction which answers to our need for security by seeming 
to be a fact when it is always a projected assumption’ (Lewis and Weigert 1985:982).43  To 
feel certainty in this projected assumption, we have to have something in common with the 
other. The common element creates predictability and is basis for the will to believe that the 
other will act as expected.  
                                                 
43 My italic 
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The function of trust 
Trust is necessary to fill the contingency gap between expectations and action, its function is 
to reduce social risk and complexity by reducing uncertainty and suspending relational risk 
(Luhmann 1979, Gambetta 1990a:219, Misztal 1996, Sztompka 1999). By trusting, one 
makes generalisations from the known to the unknown; in one sense trust is a substitute for 
the unknown. This substitute has social foundations; the pre-contractual, relational and 
structural bases for mutual understanding. The bases for mutual understanding are the social 
source of knowledge in which the trust rests and is generalised from.   
 
A shared social basis is the foundation for forming expectations and for trusting that 
expectations will be reasonably satisfied. To trust is to assume that one’s social constructions 
are shared by the other, that they are socially accepted and that tacit and explicit promises will 
be fulfilled. Expectations are social constructions and are based on an interpretation of the 
situation. Interaction partners may not have an identical reading of a situation, they may 
believe and presuppose a mutual understanding, but through interaction it becomes evident 
that their understandings are different and hence they have been interacting on the basis of 
different social scripts and codes, their expectations are not fulfilled and the result is 
crumbling trust. When the other acts in accordance with the mutual understanding, trust is 
confirmed and trust is maintained.  
 
Mutual understanding is the basis for trust and deception. Deception means to convey the 
impression that one aims to fulfil the tacit promise which is a foundation for mutual 
understanding and trust. The betrayer confirms a false mutual understanding. When the victim 
makes a leap of faith, trust is achieved; the betrayer has got the necessary trust to fulfil the 
deception. The relationship between trust and deception is a huge discussion, but will not be 
explored further here. 
 
To sum up, the function of trust is social and oriented towards to the future – trust facilitates 
social action, ‘to show trust is to anticipate the future. It is to behave as though the future were 
certain’ (Luhmann 1979:10) and according to Misztal (1996:24): ‘to trust is to believe that the 
results of somebody’s intended action will be appropriate from our point of view’, and 
(Misztal 1996:18) ‘[...] in fact, to trust is to believe despite uncertainty.’ Trust is a belief in a 
shared tacit promise to act in a foreseen way and in accordance with common social rules. It 
is a belief that the other will act and behave in the way she/he has made socially visible and 
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which we anticipate. Trust is A's assumption that B will act and perform in the way A 
anticipates on the basis of A's interpretations of the social reality. Maintenance of trust 
depends on an expected confirmation of this promise through action. 
   
6.4 Mutual understanding – a shared promise   
As previously indicated, trust is both an individual feeling and a social quality that develops 
through social processes. In addition to the basic trust, which is the psychological courage to 
be and to take the risk to participate in social life, the individual trust process needs a social 
foundation, a contextual basis which serves to secure the belief in others’ fulfilment of one’s 
expectations. This social foundation is the source of trust; it is necessary common ground for 
social action and the springboard for developing mutual understanding and making the leap 
of faith.  
 
The leap of faith  
Basic trust is not sufficient as a basis for the suspension of doubt. Reciprocal confirmation of 
mutual understanding is the necessary ‘trigger’ to make the leap of faith. This confirmation is 
at the heart of social interaction. It is a confirmation of each other as socially competent, as 
mastering the relevant social scripts and as able to foresee and adjust to the other. In an 
interaction where B sufficiently confirms A’s definition of the situation and vice versa, this is 
a confirmation of mutual understanding that facilitates suspension of risk and triggers the leap 
of faith. This last ‘phase’ in the process of trusting is a non-rational process; it is the 
suspension of doubt in whether the other will fulfil the social promise or not. This process of 
suspending doubt means making the leap of faith. The moment of suspension gives an 
‘element of socio-psychological quasi-religious faith’ and ‘a state of mind that has nothing to 
do with knowledge, which is both less and more than knowledge’ (Simmel 2004:179). This 
state of mind is, according to Giddens (1993a: 19) ‘a leap to commitment, a quality of “faith” 
which is irreducible’.  
 
Faith is the crucial element in development of trust, and according to Giddens (1993:27):  
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‘Trust, in short, is a form of “faith,” in which the confidence vested in probable 
outcomes expresses a commitment to something rather than just a cognitive 
understanding.’  
 
Trust is ‘the vesting of confidence in persons or abstract systems, made on the basis of a “leap 
into faith” which brackets ignorance or lack of information’ (Giddens 1993a: 3, 244). Trust is 
‘a way of coping with the limits of our foresight’ (Gambetta 1990a:218 with reference to 
Shaklar 1984:151). Trust makes us act as if the risk is eliminated. A shared social basis 
contains cues for bestowing trust, but ‘The clues employed to form trust do not eliminate the 
risk, they simply make it less’ and ‘serve as a springboard for the leap into uncertainty’ 
(Luhmann 1979:33). This leap into uncertainty means to trust. The trustor makes the leap of 
faith (Möllering 2006), that is surrenders her vulnerability to the trustee.  
 
The social risk is generated by others’ free will to act unexpectedly, and combined with other 
possible risks it constitutes an element of doubt and uncertainty. Suspension does not 
eliminate the uncertainty, but makes it manageable (Möllering 2005:296). Suspension of 
doubt is facilitated by ‘bracketing out’ the risk as if it is solved or manageable (Luhmann 
1979). Möllering relates the capacity to suspend doubt to basic trust and ontological security, 
which according to Giddens (1993) is fundamental for taking the risk of suspending doubt and 
making the leap of faith. Möllering (2001) with reference to Giddens (1991) emphasises the 
importance of one element in the leap of faith: the suspension of doubt – that is, ‘the 
bracketing of the unknowable, which represents a defining aspect of the nature of trust’ 
(Möllering 2001:417). By holding back doubt, it is possible to suspend doubt and believe in 
fulfilment of one’s expectations.  
 
The process of developing mutual understanding refers to the connection between actors and 
their common social basis for development of trust, and this process is the foundation for 
suspending doubt and triggering the leap of faith. To trust is to believe in one’s expectations 
and assume that the other will behave in the way we expect. 
 
Möllering (2006) discusses this as ‘the will to believe’, and asserts that ‘this is still in the 
beginning of a new direction in trust research’ where suspension of doubt is very central to 
the concept of trust. The suspension of doubt about whether the other will fulfil the social 
promise and make the leap of faith is the critical step in the trust process, ‘suspension is the 
essence of trust’ according to Möllering (2001, 2005, 2006:110). The leap of faith is a non-
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rational process; one can never be sure, but has to suspend the doubt and believe in the other. 
The confirmation of mutual understanding installs a belief in the others willingness and 
capacity to fulfil the social promise – and triggers the leap of faith.  
 
 
Modernity and the transformation of faith into trust  
Faith is defined by Webster (1998) as ‘Belief without evidence’. A leap of faith implies that 
the deciding step in the process of trusting is to believe without evidence. Is this faith a 
religious quality and therefore out of analytical range? Faith is ‘trust in God’ asserts Seligman 
(2000:21), and warns against collapsing trust into faith as ‘The defining characteristic of faith 
is precisely its unconditionality and the same is true of trust – with important differences 
between them’ (ibid: 44). The difference is that faith is in God and trust is in man. This 
apparently trivial insight is substantiated by Seligman (2000) through a rather complicated 
argument (at least from my sociological point of view). In a simplified version the argument 
goes like this: Faith in God is based on the otherness of God, the sacred and ‘highly 
exceptional and extremely impressive Other’ in relation to man. ‘Ein begriffener Gott is kein 
Gott,’ as ‘the totally other, God can never be known’ (ibid: 46) and has to be grasped through 
faith.44 During the Protestant reformation and the further secularisation, the godly was 
replaced by human attributes, and thus ‘the search for faith is replaced with the search for 
trust.’ (Seligman 2000: 49).  
 
A key element in Seligman’s explanation of the transformation from faith in God to trust in 
man is the perspective on trust. According to Seligman (2000:25), ‘trust enters into social 
interaction in the interstices of system, or at system limit, when for one reason or another 
systemically defined role expectations are no longer viable.’ These are situations of 
unconditionality, a kind of “pure” social situations, ‘unconditioned by the different roles and 
statuses the participants hold within the social system’ (ibid: 45). These are situations where 
we have to trust, that is, to make the leap of faith, and the basis for this faith ‘It is in the very 
otherness of the Other that one puts one’s “faith” and not in any communality of traits shared’ 
(Seligman 2000:45). This otherness is not the same otherness that God represents. ‘God is 
conceived of as an “object” existing “over against the self”, as the totally other, God can 
never be known’, while ‘the Self is in no sense an Other […] it […] is what we already and 
                                                 
44 Italic in text 
111 
 
fundamentally are’ (Seligman 2000:46, with reference to Lovejoy 1961). Man’s common 
fellowship with God is the basis of the relationship between men, according to Christian 
thought. Secularisation ‘removed’ God, and the godly was replaced by human attributes. This 
process led to the emergence of ‘a direct relation between the individuals unmediated by the 
third relation common to both.’ (Seligman 2000:49). This relational transformation led to ‘the 
replacement of faith by trust (or rather, the search for faith with the search for trust)’ (ibid: 
49).  
 
The trust in the other’s otherness is an expression of “faith” in the other as a self. The ‘trigger’ 
for making the leap of faith, I state, is that we have faith in the other’s sociability; in the 
other’s otherness and believes that this otherness is manageable because the other is as 
oneself. My point is that making the leap of faith as a minimum presupposes a mutual 
understanding and confirmation of this sociability. This is to put one’s faith in the very 
otherness. And otherness as described here is related to the modern man with the free will to 
act without social constraints, but with sociability, that is acting as an individual but in 
accordance with common social frames.  
 
Erosion of social bases for trust?  
Seligman’s (2000) elaboration on trust appears, among other factors, to focus on trust as a 
kind of ‘last resort’ for the modern human in a world of transformation and social interstices 
in established roles and patterns for interaction. As Seligman points out (ibid: 74):   
 
 ’Only when the will of the other can no longer be conditioned – or rather when its 
conditionality can no longer be imputed on the basis of either familiarity in shared strong 
evaluations or confidence in the fulfilment of role expectations – does the problem of trust 
emerge in social formations and only then does Kirkegaard’s “leap of faith” become 
orientated toward a mundane order rather than a transcendal one.’  
 
Trust, from Seligman’s perspective, stands out as a quality that provides a bridge between the 
known and the unknown/unconditional in a risky social landscape imprinted by negotiation 
and increasing interstitial moments.  
 
This landscape of modernity involves changes and disruptions that undermine the basis for 
familiarity as well as for confidence (Seligman 2000) – the demand for trust increases. The 
leap of faith presupposes mutual understanding, and the basis for this is the self with free will, 
the otherness and the sociability. This means that social appearance and social interaction are 
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key processes – they are the basis for trust – my trust in you and your trust in me. The 
importance of the self, of developing self-identity, and the omnipresent focus on the 
individual is an expression of this mixture of self and otherness that is a necessity for 
modernity as well as for developing trust in the age of modernity. The development of 
modernity presupposes the individual agent with free will and ‘a moral locus of autonomous 




But continuous differentiation processes have led to a looser fit between the actor and the 
role, the social basis for role expectations loses importance, and every aspect of role 
behaviour and mutuality becomes negotiable. The more negotiation, the more need for trust 
(Seligman 2000:41). Taken to its social limits, this negotiability implies that the borders 
between role and person disappear, the actor ‘dissolves’ into the social, and  group affiliations 
gain an importance similar to pre-modern times. These processes can lead to ‘the loss of all 
individually constructed boundaries between roles and their replacement with the type of 
public social regulation that characterised earlier periods’, (Seligman 2000:168). By this, 
Seligman does not argue for a return to a kind of pre-modern condition with tight roles and 
social control. He argues for a fixed point; an essence of the self that is not negotiable, 
transformable or an object for self-reflexivity.  
 
If Seligman is right in his claim; that we are about to embark on the dissolution of the self – 
what is then our basis for the leap of faith? Do we have to turn our faith to God and base 
mutual understanding on creating familiarity through belonging to various communities, on 
ascribed familiarity, and strengthen our dependency on powers and feel confidence rather than 
trust – that trust based on a leap of faith disappears? From my point of view, this is the road to 
a totalitarian society, a society based on power rather than trust. We are not there yet, but 
seem to be in a social condition where the self and personal relationships have an increased 
importance as social basis for trust and mutual understanding.   
 
Further empirical exploration of trust and transformation of bases of trust, that is changes in 
the social configuration of trust, will provide insight into the deep connections between trust 
as a quality on the micro level and as a transformative social force on the macro level. This 
will be discussed further in the chapter about the social configuration of trust.   
 
6.5 Mutual understanding – a tacit agreement  
Mutual understanding is a relational quality and a tacit agreement generated through social 
interaction. Society is both a subjective and objective reality and trust functions as a social 
connection between the subjective and the social. In situations of interaction, mutual 
understanding implies a mutual confirmation of a shared perception of reality. Through 
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interaction A and B mutually confirm a tacit agreement that they will act in a way that is 
mutually predictable.  
 
Mutuality is a defining criterion on social relationships, ‘it is essential that there should be at 
least a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to that of the other’ (Weber 
1978:27). Confirmation of mutual understanding is a condition for making the leap of faith. 
This confirmation of the tacit agreement is crucial; it is the social springboard that makes 
actors take the risk to suspend doubt and trust their expectations. Möllering (2006:72) asserts 
that ‘trust is essentially not so much a choice between one course of action (trusting) and the 
other (distrusting), but between either accepting a given level of assurance or looking for 
further controls and safeguards.’ Mutual understanding is an individual interpretation of social 
input, an interpretation that the other shares the social script and a feeling that she will behave 
in accordance with this. It is the point of accepting a sufficient level of assurance on the basis 
of some kind of confirmation of a common social basis. This level is constructed through 
social interaction; it can be taken for granted or take the form of considerate acceptance. Our 
everyday life is to a great extent based on taken for granted mutual understanding, and when 
the taken for granted fails, it has to be renegotiated.  
 
Mutual understanding is flexible and contextual; its social basis can be very narrow, but also 
wide and emotionally deep. For instance, in short-term situations, a glance between two 
strangers can be sufficient to confirm the necessary moment of mutual understanding that is 
the basis for trust. Buying a newspaper from a news agent on the street is one example. You 
put a coin on the desk without saying a word, take a paper, nod or smile to the news agent, get 
the same greeting back and leave with your paper. There is a mutual understanding between 
the two strangers; they trust that they share each other’s social definitions of newspaper 
transactions.  
 
The newspaper example is a situation with low risk. In long term relationships and situations 
with high risk, mutual understanding needs a broader basis. The confirmation of mutual 
understanding can for instance be taken for granted, developed through interaction or 
confirmed by formal structures such as contracts. The moment of confirmation, is to a great 
extent, an individual interpretation and construction based on social input. A successful output 
of this “encounter” between the individual and the social is a decision to suspend the 
perceived risk, to make the leap of faith and bestow trust. Or the output can be the opposite, 
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where there is not sufficient mutual understanding, the risk is not suspended, and no trust is 
generated.     
 
Shared understanding and mutual concerns as elements in the development of trust are 
discussed in the literature. Shared understanding can arise from interactions and from shared 
or common knowledge (Rousseau et al. 1998). This approach has some similarities with how 
mutual understanding is applied in the thesis, but according to Rousseau et al., shared or 
mutual understanding is just a possibility, not a defining feature of developing trust. This is 
the main difference between the perspectives. In the grounded theory of trust, mutual 
understanding is the trigger of the leap of faith and a prerequisite for trusting. 
 
As previously mentioned, Lewicki & Bunker (1996) also suggest three different forms of 
trust; identification-, knowledge-, and calculus-based trust (identified by some as “deterrence-
based-trust”, see Shapiro et al. 1992). Lewicki & Bunker relate mutual understanding 
particularly to identification-based trust. This form of mutual understanding is based on 
identification of the other’s desires and intentions and that ‘the parties effectively understand 
and appreciate the other’s wants; the mutual understanding is developed to the point that each 
can effectively act for the other.’ Doney et al. (1998) emphasise shared values, common 
norms and goals as important for developing trust, elements which taken together appear to 
resemble the basis for identification-based trust. I find that Lewicki & Bunker apply the term 
mutual understanding to describe identification processes that are deeper and more extensive 
than the mutual understanding concept applied in this thesis to describe the basis for the leap 
of faith. 
 
Mutual understanding as an analytical concept has more in common with what Sydow (2006), 
Möllering (2006, 2006a) and Lane & Bachman (1996) refer to as common understanding. 
Common understanding is based on knowledge and familiarity and is necessary for 
developing trust. In the concept of mutual understanding, the core element is the mutual 
process of confirming/acknowledging a sufficient level of shared social definitions as a 
platform for the leap of faith.    
 
Mutuality is a defining criterion of social relationship, ‘it is essential that there should be at 
least a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to that of the other’ (Weber 
1978:27). Social life is based on mutuality and in the discussion of the concept of social 
116 
 
relationship, Weber (1978:28) states the following about what I will characterise as mutual 
understanding in a social relationship: 
 
‘The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent.45 This 
implies that the parties make promises covering their future behaviour, whether 
toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each party then normally 
counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on the fact that the other will 
orient his action to the meaning of the agreement as he (the first actor) understands it.    
 
The concept mutual understanding has much in common with Weber’s phrase mutual 
consent, even though Weber does not relate this to development of trust. Mutual consent 
means the tacit promise about mutual orientation of actions and a common meaning.  
 
To sum up, mutual understanding, common understanding, shared knowledge and/or values 
are expressions of various degrees of familiarity and information as basis for the trust process. 
The concept mutual understanding does not mean that there is a deep and total agreement or 
an amalgamation of understandings, it is a pragmatic concept which means that an assumption 
from A that B will behave in a way that is sufficiently predictable for A and that B has 
sufficiently confirmed this. The assumptions about predictability are ‘secured’ in taken for 
granted social scripts, existing relationships or formal structures – that is pre-contractual, 
relational or structural bases for trust.    
 
The contribution of the thesis is the use of mutual understanding as a concept to describe the 
mutual social process as the development of a platform for the leap of faith and the linking of 
this to trust. Mutual understanding is a defining feature in the process of development and 
maintenance of trust. It is the prerequisite for trusting. The social process of constructing trust 
is about developing and confirming sufficient mutual understanding to make the leap of faith 
into trust. Exploring the dynamics of developing mutual understanding is a key to 




6.6 Development of mutual understanding  
                                                 
45 Bold by me 
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In the study of trust development between bank and customer, the construction of mutual 
understanding was discovered as a defining element of the process. The social construction of 
this relationship was a striving for development of mutual understanding. When this failed, it 
caused disappointment and erosion of trust. The social construction of mutual understanding 
as defined here is scarcely explored in the sociological literature, but Luhmann's theory of 
social systems and communication provides a perspective on emerging social systems that 
resembles the process of development of mutual understanding (Østerberg 1989).46  
 
This can be illustrated in the following way: we may assume that the start of a social system is 
two black boxes. These are two psychological systems (actors and communication systems) 
which are neither transparent to each other nor can they predict or control each other. This 
conditions the emergence of the social system, constituted by the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of its ‘elements’ and the contingent situation is overcome through step by 
step interaction. According to Østerberg (1989: 260, with reference to Luhmann 1984:150):  
 
‘The first participant makes a tentative advance towards the other, and waits to see if the 
other accepts the suggested definition of situation. If an acceptance takes place, a step by 
step construction of a communication system is feasible whereby uncertainty and 
contingency is reduced’ 
  
Mutual understanding is developed through step by step communication with mutual 
acceptance and confirmation of the other’s definition of the situation. My assumption is that 
the step by step communication hardly ever starts with two totally black boxes, but with a 
social basis which that can be rich or narrow. Implicit in the confirmation of mutual 
understanding is a tacit contract, which implies that interacting partners share definitions of 
the social context to a sufficient extent, and intend to act in accordance with these. Belief in 
these intentions to act is the core of the tacit social contract that breeds trust; the process of 
step by step mutual confirmation of each other’s social definitions and intentions creates a 
social trust system. If acceptance and confirmation fail to develop, no mutual understanding is 
established and there is no ‘springboard’ for developing trust.  
 
Confirmation of expected mutual understanding is vital to suspend doubt and make the leap of 
faith. The confirmation acknowledges that B will behave as A expects, that A and B share and 
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are obliged to adhere to a common social script related to this particular setting. This does not 
mean that A and B totally agree or have the same values on a deeper level, they may do, but 
not necessarily; mutual understanding is related to the context of relevance in this particular 
trust situation. This implies that mutual understanding makes it possible to develop trust in 
spite of differences – where there is a mutual understanding and acceptance of these 
differences. As Weber (1978:27) reminds us: ’the subjective meaning need not necessarily be 
the same for all the parties who are mutually oriented in a given social relationship; there need 
not in this sense be “reciprocity”. 
 
The social basis for developing mutual understanding is essential for the social construction 
of trust. A study of development or disruption of trust must focus on this social basis which is 
between and shared by A and B. This is the input in the trust process and has both individual 
and social elements, and trusting develops in a dynamic between the psychological self and 
the social self.  
 
Trust is both a premise and an outcome of a social process, this implies a ‘trust in trust’ 
(Luhmann 1979), a trust that others will trust in the same way that as oneself. The actor has to 
trust his/her own assumptions, predictions and expectations about the other and to trust that 
the other will act in accordance with their predictions; that there is mutual understanding, 
which will be tested through the interaction process.  
 
The development of trust is dependent on a common social basis for the interpretation of the 
social reality and a minimum of mutual understanding of this basis. Mutual understanding is 
the prerequisite for the tacit social contract that facilitates suspension of doubt (Möllering 
2001, 2006) and the leap into faith (Giddens 1993a). This is to believe in one’s positive 
expectations and accept the vulnerability represented by the other (Rousseau &. al 1998). 
Mutual understanding does not mean total agreement, nor does it mean that the participants in 
a social setting have the same subjective meaning. It means that the participants have a 
sufficient level of mutuality regarding definitions of the relevant social setting, acceptance of 
the rules, and procedures for this context, and that they have intentions to act in accordance 
with them. Trust is developed or maintained when actors feel that their mutual understanding 
is confirmed, if this confirmation is lacking, trust will either be weakened or break.  
The individual emotional aspect in trust is an element that is hard to determine analytically. 
Individuals have their own threshold for sufficient mutual understanding to make the leap of 
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faith and trust in particular empirical relationships. This threshold will vary according to a 
wide range of variables, such as basic trust, social context, relationship, experiences, and 
knowledge, just to mention a few. Conditions for developing mutual understanding can be 
discussed analytically, but the empirical feeling of trust is still out of sociological scope. Pre-
contractual assumptions, social relationships and structures facilitate mutual understanding 
and construction of trust in different ways, and the social configuration – that is the 
interaction between them – is the key to understanding how social change affects trust.  
 
Garfinkel (1963) performed social experiments that showed how change in social patterns for 
interaction affects trust, and hence how a taken for granted mutual understanding is disrupted. 
The disruption caused diminishing trust. The next section discusses this experiment as a 
further elaboration on mutual understanding.  
        
6.7 Mutual understanding and social scripts 
This thesis assumes that mutual understanding and trust is an implicit or explicit human aim 
in social interaction. This aim is held deeply inside us and is about mastering the social and 
the self. Trust develops through communication and interpretation processes. Actors attach 
meaning to actions and interpret them in relation to the context in which they are they are 
performed. The sense-making process has both a social and an individual element. 
Institutionalisation and socialisation are the social elements of making sense, processes that 
provide actors with social scripts and common codes for interaction and communication. 
Interpretation and cognition are the individual elements of making sense, but this process also 
refers to a larger context, the cultural totality stretching beyond the actual situation of 
interaction. Through processes of assimilation and accommodation, an actor adapts new 
social realities into her cognitive universe and makes sense of the social reality.  
 
Interaction and communication require mutual exchange of social signs and codes, which are 
elements of social scripts. In general, interacting actors presuppose and aim at developing and 
confirming mutual understanding of the common social context (Garfinkel 1963, 1967, 
Goffman 1967). The common elements are the basis for predictability and expectations, and 
facilitate mutual understanding.  
 
Challenging the social script  
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In the following, the term social script refers to the whole range of input for social prediction, 
whether or not it is taken for granted.47 The script contains the defining elements of the 
situation, the context and frame for interaction and interpretation, the norms and values, 
experiences – the set of ‘recipes for action’ for the situation in question. Social scripts 
presuppose interaction and mediation between the social and the individual. There is room for 
individual variation and interpretation of social scripts, and the individual has the freedom not 
to follow the script. The term script emphasises that actors are not forced to follow particular 
patterns or rules, but that they exist as social and contextual possibilities that to a large extent 
are internalised by the actor. The term social indicates here that we are concerned with 
practice and rules as well as beliefs, norms, evaluations, interpretations and experiences, and 
that these are common and shared in a given context or society. To what extent individuals 
share or feel obliged by social scripts needs more exploration on an empirical level, but trust 
is eroded if the behaviour or values performed deviate too much from the script (Garfinkel 
1967).  
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Garfinkel (1967:36-37) used the concept common understanding to describe social scripts, 
including ‘the socially standardised and standardising ‘seen but unnoticed’,’ expected 
background features of everyday scenes. The member of the society uses background 
expectations as a scheme of interpretation’, and background expectations are ‘the attitude of 
daily life’ and are about ‘the world known in common’.  
 
Garfinkel’s studies of the routine grounds for everyday activities and mapping of background 
expectations and understandings are instructive examples of how daily activities and 
communication are pervaded by and dependent on taken for granted common social scripts 
and codes. People act in trust that these understandings are mutual and that others use them in 
the same way as themselves, at least to a reasonable extent. This is mainly a tacit premise, but 
is vital as a basis for building trust. This premise is a quality deeply rooted in some kind of 
community and in the social scripts. The basis for interpretation of a social situation is not 
only within the actual setting, but also within a larger cultural community. Mutual 
understanding might be a subject for negotiations and contracts, and contracts are signed 
when there is sufficient agreement about terms for future actions. The formal contract 
presupposes mutual understanding of a wide range of tacit agreements.     
 
According to Garfinkel (1967), trust is compliance to the constitutive order of everyday 
situations – which means that mutual understanding is confirmed and trust is generated when 
social interaction or events runs as expected. If it turns out that there are few or no common 
mutual background understandings, that the actors use different social scripts, trust is 
undermined, it may disappear and even turn into distrust.  
 
Garfinkel (1963) performed experiments to explore trust processes in daily life. Students were 
asked to behave unpredictably and break social rules in various ordinary everyday situations 
among friends, family and strangers. Garfinkel’s studies indicated that when the experimenter 
used another definition of the situation than the object of the study, the situation very soon 
resulted in anger and distrust. This revealed that trust was challenged by the experimenter’s 
one-sided change in the definition of the situation.48 The experimenter used an unexpected 
                                                 
48 The finding that one-sided change in social definitions undermines trust, was also a finding in my study of 
trust between bank and customer. The bank customers expressed, anger, disappointment and diminishing trust as 
a result of one-sided changes made by the bank.    
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social script, and this use of different social codes broke down the communication. These 
experiments were mainly conducted among friends or relatives, and it seemed that the 
threshold for distrust was low in these settings. One could expect that the threshold for 
breaking trust was higher among friends and relatives, that the trust among them was thicker 
and more robust and that non-conforming behaviour thus would be accepted more easily. On 
the other hand, friends and relatives have a long history and much in common, and much is 
taken for granted.  
 
Non-conforming activity between associates upsets a range of expectations and may therefore 
represent a greater deviance from the normal and well known than if it happens among 
strangers, where there probably are narrower expectations. Among strangers you are expected 
to share social and contextual scripts only to a limited extent, among the familiar you are 
expected to share personal scripts in addition to social and contextual scripts. Social 
interactions are situations of mutual confirmation and Garfinkels’ experiments indicate that 
mutuality in everyday interactions is more at stake among people who have close 
relationships and are well-known to each other than among strangers. Acknowledgement from 
strangers might not be as critical to your self-esteem as confirmations from those who are 
close and with whom you frequently communicate.  
 
Mutual understanding means that social definitions and willingness to act in accordance with 
these definitions are shared and mutually confirmed. It is the perceived mutuality that triggers 
the leap of faith. Trust develops in the intersection between social scripts and individual 
interpretation and performance. Interpretation is based on individual expectations and social 
scripts for the particular interaction or social setting. Last, but not least, expectations are not 
only about what to do – they are also about what not to do in a particular social setting 
(Garfinkel 1967, Goffman 1967).  
 
6.8 Conclusion: mutual understanding - a key to the social 
construction of trust 
To conclude, trust has a social and an individual basis. The social construction of trust is 
driven by the dynamics between the individual interpretation of the social realities and the 
continuous construction and reconstruction of the social. The development of trust is a 




process of establishing faith in the other and confirming a mutual understanding of the tacit 
social contract, of fulfilment of the ‘promise’ in question. Mutual understanding is a premise 
for the social construction of trust. In this perspective, establishing trust is a dynamic between 
an individual feeling, the faith, and a social process: establishing mutual understanding of a 
tacit social contract. In the trust literature, the focus has mainly been on one of the two sides 
in this dynamic, and not on the interaction between the social and the individual - which is a 
prerequisite for establishing trust.  
 
Trust is a social process which is constructed when: 
1) actors act on the premise that they to a sufficient extent share some basic social 
assumptions and willingness to act in accordance with them 
2)  they confirm this through communication and  
3) develop mutual understanding, which is a condition for making the leap of faith 
and maintaining trust 
4) mutual understanding is developed as a step by step process and has a social basis 
with pre-contractual, relational and structural elements  
 
These are the main elements in the grounded theory of trust and the rest of the thesis is based 
on this theory of trust.    
 
When actors confirm mutual understanding, trust develops. This process is dependent on a 
social basis which is the foundation for forming expectations and trusting that these will be 
fulfilled to a reasonable extent. The social basis serves to secure the leap of faith; it is the 
source of trust and the foundation for creation of mutual understanding.  
 
Analytically, the social foundation for establishing mutual understanding can be divided into 
pre-contractual, relational and structural bases as the common ground for social action and 
perception. This categorisation indicates that trust has various social forms and foundations. 
Culturally shared conceptions and beliefs, social relationships, social processes, and formal 
structures can be considered as contextual sources of different forms of trust. The trust forms 
are related to the mechanisms and processes that facilitate mutual understanding and the leap 
of faith.  
 
The pre-contractual basis is implicit and mainly taken for granted, while the relational basis is 
familiarity, acquaintance and interaction, and the structural basis is formal structures and 
positions (Nordnes 1993). These forms of trust are not mutually exclusive, they are 
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complementary and interact; this is the social configuration of trust. The trust forms are 
analytical constructs and the trust bases are formed through various social processes. Pre-
contractual trust is established over time through socialisation, while relational trust develops 
through interaction and negotiations, whereas structural trust is gradually institutionalised.  
Möllering (2005:413) asserts that the important element related to bases for trust is that they 
represent ‘good reasons’ for trust. Social bases are not only good reasons to trust, they are 
necessary conditions for trusting. The social bases are what Alter and Ego have in common, 
and that makes it possible to develop and confirm mutual understanding. Without anything in 
common, there is no foundation for developing mutual understanding and trust. The social 
constructions of trust are processes rooted in the three bases of trust and in the dynamics 
between them.  
Möllering further points out that there is a wealth of typologies and measurement scales for 
various bases and forms of trust, which do not necessarily tell us anything about trust in 
general, they just link different kinds of expectations to a form of trust. I agree with Möllering 
in this, but hold that trust presupposes social foundations. These social foundations are more 
than typologies; they are social facts (Durkheim 1982). The social bases of trust are of another 
kind than descriptions and characterisations of psychological states in the process of 
developing trust, as for instance the trust forms referred to by Lewicki & Bunker (1996), 
Rousseau et al. (1998) and Doney et al. (1998). These approaches have in common that they 
focus on psychological processes in trust formation rather than the social bases for trust.  
 
The social bases are springboards for developing mutual understanding; they have distinct 
social qualities that facilitate development of trust in various ways. The bases involve 
different ways of reducing social risk and securing trust. In the next chapters, these concepts 
and the foundations, development and maintenance of the three forms of trust will be 






7. PRE-CONTRACTUAL TRUST   
  
‘Society is a human product. 
Society is an objective reality. 
Man is a social product.’49 
– PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN 
 
The social landscape is changing. Familiar patterns of action are breaking down and 
established truths are under threat. Implicit habits, premises, norms, and values are being 
questioned. Social change is one of the hallmarks of contemporary society. These change 
processes challenge the social foundations of pre-contractual trust. Trust in organisations, 
professions, politicians and even in our loved ones cannot be taken for granted, but is 
constantly questioned and subject to reflection. The fast pace of social, cultural, economic, 
and political change causes the transformation and reconstruction of the social bases for pre-
contractual trust – processes that are perceived as declining trust.  
 
The previous chapter concluded with four points about development of trust. This chapter 
focuses on the first of those points: that actors act on the premise that they share sufficient 
basic social assumptions and a willingness to act in accordance with them. 
  
Basic social assumptions are the foundation for pre-contractual trust; they are usually tacit 
and taken for granted. This chapter explores pre-contractual trust as an analytical concept and 
the social basis for pre-contractual trust. The concept will be examined in relation to similar 
concepts discussed in sociological theory; an elaboration on the tacit and taken for granted 
aspects of trust. The chapter concludes with questions for further research on the subject of 
social change and the erosion of pre-contractual trust. 
 
7.1 Pre-contractual trust – a taken for granted common social 
basis  
Social interaction in everyday life can be challenging, but among the less obvious social 
challenges to be managed, are the following:  
Freedom of action; that the other can act in a totally unpredictable way, independent 
of my expectations. 
 
                                                 
49 Berger and Luckmann 1991:79 
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Mutual expectations; that we presuppose having something in common and sharing 
some social scripts, but we can never be sure about what we actually have in common. 
 
Subjectivity; that each of us, despite of the common social world, is a single system of 
communication; one can never have full access to the others’ perceptions and 
interpretations.   
 
These elements are basic social challenges related to predictability, expectations, and to the 
development of mutual understanding. To some extent they are managed by reliance on a tacit 
and taken for granted basis for social interaction, order and trust. The following chapter 
discusses the concept of pre-contractual as a basis for trust and as a corollary form of trust; 
pre-contractual trust.  
 
The pre-contractual as basis for trust  
The concept pre-contractual is an analytical tool for exploring the tacit and taken for granted 
basis for the social production of trust. The term pre-contractual is inspired by Durkheim’s 
pre-contractual solidarity which focuses on social context and community: ‘the contract is 
not sufficient by itself, but is only possible because of the regulation of contracts, which is of 
social origin’ (Durkheim 1984:162).  
 
Durkheim’s term collective representation refers to shared social concepts that appear to be 
social facts and consists of ‘ways of acting, thinking and feeling, external to the individual 
and endowed with a power of coercion by means of which they control him’ (Durkheim 
1982:52). In addition there is the collective conscience which refers to shared beliefs and 
moral attitudes that contribute to uniting a society, in particular in pre-modern societies based 
on mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1982). Collective representations and conscience 
constitute the social elements in the pre-contractual basis for trust. The analytical focus of 
Durkheim is on the social elements of social construction: how social forces tie society 
together, apparently independently of individual actors. Collective representation and 
collective conscience focus on social forces facilitating social order, while the term pre-
contractual refers to the common social basis and interaction between the social and the 
individual; the shared social scripts as the individual’s basis for trust. Social scripts are more 
or less taken for granted, they are basis for role-expectations and social predictability, and 




Perception and interaction are influenced by pre-contractual assumptions. The pre-contractual 
basis for trust is constructed in a dynamic between the social and the individual, as 
internalisation and individual interpretation of social scripts. This interaction makes social 
interaction possible; it is a bridge between actors and a basis for prediction of social risk and 
for bestowing trust. An actor’s pre-contractual basis for trust is based on her experiences and 
interpretation of a common social basis – that is on her internalisation of social realities.  
 
A taken for granted social basis   
Despite uncertainty and social risk, actors do not and cannot question every aspect of a 
situation. It is impossible to regulate everything by contract and to prepare for every potential 
decision in advance, many premises are implicit and taken for granted.  Communication and 
participation in social life and being a part of social interaction or a larger community of any 
kind are based on tacit knowledge about what to do and not do. The potential for acting 
otherwise than according to prescribed norms and rules are numerous and impossible to 
consider in advance for the other in an interaction. Contracts, transactions, action, and 
interaction - every aspect of social life and activities - is deeply rooted in a series of habitual 
and taken for granted assumptions concerning common norms and rules of action (Luhmann 
1990, Misztal 1996, Sztompka 1999). Social life and interaction would be extremely complex 
and uncertain if we could not take everyday social patterns for granted and bestow pre-
contractual trust. Möllering (2006:52) refers to this form of trust as routine: ‘the routine is 
performed without questioning its underlying assumptions, without assessing alternatives and 
without giving justifications every time’. Routines; the familiar, the ‘natural attitude’ and 
‘attitudes of daily life’ (Garfinkel 1963, Luhmann 1979, Möllering 2006) are the bases for 
pre-contractual trust. 
 
Pre-contractual trust is the taken for granted basis for contracts and social relationships. It is a 
diffuse trust in others that they will behave in a way that is reasonably predictable and that 
they are under an obligation of common basic rules for the social situation. The rules are 
related to a normative context, which the participant takes for granted that other participants 
share. Actors have to assume they share a common context with others as only the social 
knowledge they have in common is predictable to others. It is implicitly understood that the 
actors have some agreement about content and limits of the obligations in question, and 
furthermore that there is a mutual understanding of the distribution of rights and duties. This 
means that the actors reciprocally ascribe to each other this mutual understanding; that, for 
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instance, they agree in the implicit obligation that an agreement should be kept and that they 
act based on trust in this.  
 
In addition to explicit rules, actors have to rely on a set of implicit general as well as 
contextual rules and normative regulations. These social codes define the social setting, 
appropriate behaviour and correct attitudes. Smooth social interaction is based on a taken for 
granted understanding that others in the same social setting share the social codes and comply 
with implicit and explicit commitments to a reasonable extent (Garfinkel 1963, Goffman 
1967, Luhmann 1979, Giddens 1993, Misztal 1996, Bourdieu 1997, Sztompka 1999, 
Seligman 2000). When this process takes place without further considerations, as a taken for 
granted attitude, there is pre-contractual trust: actors have a pre-contractual trust in sharing a 
common basis for interaction and some level of mutual understanding. Through pre-
contractual trust, some predictability is established with regard to how other people will act 
under otherwise uncertain circumstances and that they will stick to the informal, unwritten 
norms and rules.  
 
Social action is not totally predictable. On the contrary, there is always a risk that the other 
will act differently, either deliberately or due to lack of social knowledge, or that a taken for 
granted mutual understanding does not exist: the level of what is taken for granted will vary 
individually and contextually, and social scripts are perceived and enacted individually. 
Everyone has her/his individual internal configuration of the perception and interpretation of 
social realities. We can never be sure about the extent of shared conceptions of social reality 
or social definitions, what is taken for granted, and how these will be enacted. But despite the 
risk that others may not act as foreseen, one normally takes for granted that there is mutual 
understanding about most everyday activities. These taken for granted, implicit, tacit, mutual, 
and shared dimensions in everyday actions – social scripts for action and norms in a wide 
sense – are the basis for pre-contractual trust.  
 
One step in an empirical exploration of development and breakdown of trust is to study the 
characteristics of the pre-contractual basis for trust in a particular social context. This involves 
examining what is taken for granted in this particular social setting, which are the main tacit 
expectations that actors have about each other and about the situation in question, and how the 
platform for the leap of faith is constructed. A study of the relationship between trust and 
social change demands a particular focus on the pre-contractual basis.   
129 
 
Pre-contractual trust – pivotal to social change 
Culture and social stereotypes are significant elements of the basis for pre-contractual trust. 
Pre-contractual trust is implicit and built into the culture; it is an element of the social contract 
and is maintained or impaired through individual actions in everyday life. It is supported by 
formal structures. Pre-contractual trust is based on a taken for granted premise that: 1) there is 
a mutual understanding of the implicit social scripts and cultural codes about what to do and 
not to do in various social contexts and situations, and 2) that the other will stick to and enact 
these codes and scripts and maintain the assumed world in common. These tacit assumptions 
are a precondition for cooperation and social activity; they pervade everyday action and are 
the basis of the apparently blind trust that is prevalent in relationships between strangers as 
well as acquaintances. Pre-contractual trust is the social basis for action, interaction, and the 
formation of relations. It is a link between the individual and the society and a precondition 
for cooperation. It is based on an implicit assumption of having something in common.  
 
Pre-contractual trust rests on an implicit supposition of some level of societal and cultural 
homogeneity, which makes it possible to take for granted social definitions, routines, and 
actions. This is a complicated supposition – does a reduction in social homogeneity beyond a 
certain point make pre-contractual trust impossible? Or is a minimum of pre-contractual trust 
a prerequisite as foundation for developing a society?  
 
In heterogeneous societies, such as the western late modern societies, there is doubt, 
questioning and uncertainty related to social scripts and assumptions. This means that the pre-
contractual basis for trust is constantly questioned, leading to an increased need for contracts 
and bureaucracy (Sennett 2006), standards (Brunsson & Jacobsson 1998), and normative 
clarifications and reflexivity (Giddens 1993, Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994, Möllering 2006).  
 
Social change, migration, and cross cultural cooperation are prevalent processes in late 
modernity. These processes challenge cultural homogeneity and the cultural basis for pre-
contractual trust is therefore affected. The pre-contractual basis for trust is pivotal to 
understanding how social change affects trust as social change is about transformation in our 
common basis for pre-contractual trust. New ways of acting or behaving, new values and 
grounds, and new patterns of action change our taken for granted social scripts. These 
processes undermine trust, but do not necessarily lead to distrust. On the contrary, social 
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processes such as dialogue, communication, interaction, and reflection can contribute to 
redefinition and restoration of a common pre-contractual basis for trust.  
 
Several types of activities in contemporary social life can be regarded as steps in a process of 
restoration of a common basis for pre-contractual trust. For instance, the global popular 
culture, including sport and football, communicates a common set of references for its 
participants and is a potential platform for interaction and further development of common 
social scripts and relations. The opportunities for world-wide interaction on the Internet 
through interactive games and establishment of various virtual communities, groups and web 
sites, such as Facebook and similar virtual groups, can be regarded as platforms for the 
development of pre-contractual trust. Other examples include the formation of subcultures 
and professional, ideological, or religious groups, which can be worldwide communities with 
common pre-contractual basis.  
 
In summary, the social basis for trust is not static, but subject to continuous change and 
redevelopment. One effect or driver of social change is the reconstruction of the social bases 
for trust. This perspective will be further discussed throughout the thesis. 
 
7.2 Pre-contractual trust and institutions 
Institution-based trust is a widespread notion for non-personal trust. This form of trust is 
described as system trust (Luhmann 1979, Lane 1998), trust in abstract systems or expert 
systems (Giddens 1993), and institutional trust (Zucker 1986, Lane & Bachman 1996). The 
concept of institution may have different meanings in various academic disciplines and is 
used in everyday language. In sociology the term institution refers to norms and habits, large 
organisations, and social formations such as marriage, education and economic structures. 
The term covers systems of meaning as well as formal and regulative structures. 
 
The term institutional trust (Zucker 1986, Lane & Bachman 1996, Lühiste 2006) has some 
similarities with pre-contractual trust, but the two terms are not entirely congruent. In the 
following discussion, the differences between these two concepts will be examined with the 
aim of clarifying the concept of pre-contractual trust, and this will be further elaborated 
through an exploration of pre-contractual trust in regard to other similar concepts in 




The pre-contractual basis for trust has much in common with institutions as ‘reciprocally 
typified actions habitualised for each in roles’ (Berger & Luckmann 1991:74), and as taken 
for granted common foundations for construction of meaning. This makes interaction 
reciprocally predictable, and over time, a sphere of taken for granted action patterns evolve, 
and the ‘institutional world, then, is experienced as an objective reality’ (ibid: 77). This 
objective reality is not static; ‘a social world will be in process of construction, containing 
within it the roots of an expanding institutional order’ (Berger & Luckmann 1991:75). The 
social world is under construction and appears as an objective reality, it is present and 
confronts and constrains the actors. At the same time the social world is internalised, we make 
our configurations of the common social basis for action. This dynamic between the social 
and the self is a source for relational risk. To manage this risk one has to take for granted and 
make assumptions, otherwise the social complexity and riskiness would be paralysing and 
intolerable. Pre-contractual trust helps to reduce social complexity and creates predictability 
by providing a kind of acceptance that ‘it is not all choices that are socially available and not 
all choices that are socially feasible’ (Berger & Kellner 1982:110).50  
 
Institutionalisation of a pre-contractual basis for trust is a part of the social construction of 
reality. The social constructions are taken for granted; the social reality and its institutions 
appear as objective facts independent of actors. According to Berger & Luckmann (1991) this 
process is a movement from externalising reality to objectification and internalisation of 
social reality. Social patterns and habits are transferred between generations and people 
through socialisation. Socialisation is to acquire taken for granted social frames of reference 
which forces one into particular actions and patterns of interpretations. These frames and pre-
contractual trust bases are elements in the taken for granted social reality.  
 
Institutions as meaning systems and formal structures  
Socialisation is a continuous process of internalisation of the social world, and the individual 
transforms and adapts the social to her experiences and cognitive universe. The social 
construction of reality has an individual, psychological element as well as a social element 
(Berger & Luckmann 1991. The interaction between these elements is an element in the social 
construction of trust. A study of trust must deal with this compound and dynamic aspect, and 
                                                 
50 This is my translation of the following Danish quotation: "det er ikke alle valg der er socialt tilgængelige, og 
ikke alle der er socialt gennemførlige"  
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by clarifying the distinction between pre-contractual and institutional trust contribute to the 
wider understanding of trusting.    
 
Berger & Luckmann (1991) focus on institutionalisation as a process of social construction of 
meaning and rather than the term institution. In a discussion of institutional change and 
globalisation, Campbell (2004:1) uses a definition of institutions which highlights the 
analytical vagueness and challenging aspects of the term institution: 
’Institutions consist of formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, and systems of meaning that define the context within which individuals, 
corporations, labour unions, nation states and other organisations operate and interact 
with each other.’  
 
This comprehensive definition of the concept hides two different analytical dimensions of the 
term institutions when it comes to development of trust: 1) Systems of meaning and informal 
rules and 2) formal structures, rules, and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Institutions as systems of meaning develop over time, they are social constructions, taken for 
granted and maintained by individuals, individually and collectively. Institutions, in this 
sense, are the social internalised in the individual, and they function as the basis for pre-
contractual trust. Institutions as formal structures and systems for monitoring and enforcement 
are related to power and external forces, which is sanctions outside the individual. Institutions 
in this sense are general and independent of the individual. Their social function is to facilitate 
trust independent of individuals. 
 
The two institutional dimensions; the “soft” construction of meaning and the “hard” formal 
systems are not independent of each other. A pre-contractual basis of meaning is a 
prerequisite for social interaction. The acceptance and support of institutions as formal 
systems, for instance, are based on legitimacy as a tacit social contract. The distinction 
between law and justice is another example. The law is a “hard” formal structure that can be 
implemented and enforced through formal sanctions, while justice is an issue of meaning and 
norms and can be related to institutions as “soft” constructions. This is an inherent vagueness 
in the concept of institutions.  
 
Campbell (2004:36) points to the vagueness by asserting that ‘institutions are 
multidimensional’, but when it comes to analysis, it is necessary to specify this 
133 
 
multidimensionality a bit further. The “soft” and “hard” dimensions of institutions function 
differently as bases for trust. The two elements have therefore to be separated into different 
terms in analyses of trust processes. The term pre-contractual trust is related to “soft” 
institutional dimensions, to the construction of meaning and informal bases for trust. When it 
comes to formal structures and sanctions as bases for trust, the term structural trust will be 
appropriate. This will be further discussed in chapter 10 which elaborates on structural trust.  
 
7.3 Social order and pre-contractual trust 
Luhmann focuses on one main function of trust: reduction of social complexity. The reduction 
of complexity facilitates social order. With reference to Luhmann, Misztal (1996:95) states 
‘that trust should be understood only from the point of view of its function and that this 
function cannot be reduced or replaced totally of the phenomena’. From this perspective the 
function of trust is associated with stable, cohesive and collaborative forms of social order. 
Trust has a different function in each form of social order and the three forms of trust are 
related to three forms of practice.  
 
In a stable order, trust has the form of habitus in Bourdieu’s sense: ‘trust is a strategy for 
securing the stability of social order’ (Misztal 1996:98). Trust facilitates predictability in 
everyday life through routines practiced as habit, reputation, and memory. In cohesive order, 
trust is a kind of passion and is based on familiarity and bonds of friendship, common values, 
and normative integration. It is ‘a device for coping with other people’s authenticity’ and is 
practiced among family, friends, and in societies where the members share some 
characteristics (Misztal 1996:99). The third form of order is collaborative. Trust can take the 
form of policy and is practiced through solidarity, toleration, and legitimacy in order to 
facilitate social cooperation. According to Misztal this trust is ‘a device for coping with the 
freedom of others’ (ibid: 99), and the two other functions – securing stability and coping with 
authenticity – are variations of this. Habits, memory, and reputation are practices linked to 
habitus. Various elements of habitus might be sources of pre-contractual trust in addition to 
values, norms, and social qualities such as solidarity, toleration, and legitimacy.  
 
Misztal, on the other hand, relates values and norms to trust as passion, as the emotional 
content of trust as an element in cohesive order. This conceptualisation of trust contributes to 
a further description of the sources of trust and the possible interaction between various kinds 
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of practices related to the forms of trust, but the focus on order does not take into 
consideration the order or lack of order that emerges when trust is threatened and the existing 
order changes. 
 
Pre-contractual trust in the relationship between bank and customer 
The sources and composition of pre-contractual trust will vary, dependent on the social 
setting. An example from the empirical bank material illustrates the difference in focus 
between Misztal’s conceptualisation of trust and the grounded theory based on 
conceptualisation of trust processes.  
 
In Norway, it is taken for granted that banks behave reliably and credibly.51 This is a pre-
contractual trust that most bank customers bestow in advance of their first visit to the bank, a 
trust based on internalised social scripts about banks. The script influences the customer’s 
expectations about how the bank ought to perform, the role of the bank clerks and which 
norms and values the bank should practice. If the bank’s performance fulfils these 
expectations to a reasonable extent, and this process runs as expected, then the pre-contractual 
trust between bank and customer is maintained without further reflection. Each interaction 
with the bank leads to maintenance or adjustment of the script.  
 
Can the relationship between bank and customer be characterised as a stable, cohesive, or 
collaborative order? A re-examination of the grounded theory study of the trust relationship 
between customer and bank indicates that this relationship was a stable order with 
collaborative and slightly cohesive traits.52 Customers expected saving banks to behave in 
accordance with values such as acting in the customers’ interest and taking social 
responsibility. These expectations were included in the customer’s pre-contractual basis for 
trust in the bank. Deregulation changed the pre-contractual basis and the stable order as well 
as the collaborative and cohesive traits of the relationship. Trust between bank and customer 
was undermined and had to be re-developed through renegotiation of values, norms, rules, 
and routines; they had to develop new social scripts and a new pre-contractual basis for the 
relationship.  
                                                 
51 At least it was so before the deregulation of Norwegian banks in 1983 (Nordnes 1993). 




Deregulation transformed the relation between bank and customer from one that was complex 
with traits of stable, collaborative, and even some cohesive order, to an unstable order where 
trust had to be based on rational, economic practice. The trust between bank and customers is 
restored, but the basis for pre-contractual trust in the renegotiated relationship is different.53 
The assumption of rational economic behaviour has now been institutionalised as a basic 
premise and economic self-interest has now emerged as the taken for granted foundation of 
the new trust relationship between bank and customer.  
 
In summary, different conceptualisations of trust highlight different aspects of trust. The trust 
forms related to social order is one suggested perspective on how to characterise the trust 
relations between bank and customer. But because this is not a process perspective, it appears 
to be somewhat insufficient as an analytical tool for exploring dynamics and change in trust.  
 
7.4 Pre-contractual trust and culture   
In sociological theory, the pre-contractual dimensions of social action are scarcely explored in 
relation to trust, but are discussed as for instance in the concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1997), 
customs and conventions (Weber 1978), and taken for granted knowledge (Berger & 
Luckmann 1991).  
 
Culture is another term for tacit, shared social patterns for action. There is no single definition 
of culture; ‘it is a dynamic phenomenon being enacted and created through social interaction 
(Schein 2004)’ and ‘shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, interpretations and meanings 
of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are 
transmitted across age generations’ (House et. al 2004:57). Culture is normative patterns and 
a ‘collective programming’ that varies among groups and nations (Doney et. al 1998); it is the 
basis for community and for distinguishing between members and outsiders (Hofstede & 
Hofstede 2005).  
 
To be trusted implies membership of a culture and to have internalised the basic social codes 
and scripts. Trust and culture are an elusive research topic, although recent studies of trust and 
culture have explored trust in a cross-cultural perspective (Saunders et al 2010). This thesis 
                                                 
53 The level of trust in banks is the same in 2006 as before deregulation, se table 4 in chapter 13.1. 
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will not address the topic of trust and culture in relation to their relationship, but as the pre-
contractual basis for trust has much in common with culture, this will be briefly discussed.  
 
Culture is one subject in the Polish sociologist P. Sztompka’s (1999) work on trust. Poland’s 
transition from a communistic low trust culture to a market economy with a more trusting 
culture is his empirical case. Sztompka (1999:25) defines trust as ‘a bet about future 
contingent actions of others’ and refers to three complementary dimensions of trust – 
relational, psychological and cultural – where ‘the bets of trust actually are located’ 
(Sztompka 1999:60). The location of trust is the basis that serves to secure the bet on trust; or 
from my perspective, the basis for developing mutual understanding. The psychological 
dimension is a quality of the trustor rather than a social quality, and influences the trusting 
capability. Relational dimensions of trust will be discussed in chapter nine.   
 
The cultural dimensions of trust have much in common with the pre-contractual bases for 
trust; they are ‘located among the “social facts”, ‘the property of social wholes’ and ‘there are 
normative obligations to trust and be trustworthy’ (Sztompka 1999:66). Trust as a cultural 
rule comprises the socially shared expectations and normative obligations about trusting and 
being trustworthy in particular roles and situations (Sztompka 1999). The focus of Sztompka 
is on rules for trusting and trustworthiness, which are deeply rooted in the normative system 
of a culture, rules that will vary among societies. These and the assumptions about shared 
concepts, norms, and cultural scripts for developing trust are elements that, according to 
Sztompka, are premises for a culture of trust and trust as a societal quality. I define these 
elements as pre-contractual elements in the basis of trust.  
 
Other approaches to trust cultures are the analysis of Southern Italy as a region with a culture 
of distrust and the mafia with a culture of strong internal trust and loyalty (Gambetta 1990b) 
(although it can be questioned whether this is fear, rather than trust). Another example is in 
the analysis of the differences between Russian and Anglo-Western trust cultures (Ayos 
2004). These approaches analyse trust from a cultural rule approach and focus on trust as a 
cultural quality and the normative obligations of being trustworthy linked to specific roles. 
Rules for trusting and trustworthiness are one of many elements in the pre-contractual basis 
for trust; which pre-contractual elements are of analytical relevance in a study of pre-
contractual trust, depends on the context being studied. Garfinkel’s (1963) experiments with 
breaking trust in daily life (see chapter 6.6 and 6.7) provides an exploration of pre-contractual 
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trust at a micro level and demonstrates how disturbance of this form of trust makes it a subject 
of reflection and it thus becomes visible.  
 
Summing up, the defining quality of pre-contractual trust is shared culturally-based 
assumptions. These assumptions, expectations, and/or predictions are usually taken for 
granted and acquired through socialisation. They are internalised and become individual 
interpretations of social concepts and hence a basis for pre-contractual trust.  
 
7.5 Pre-contractual trust and change – a state challenged by 
events 
If social assumptions are acceptably fulfilled, trust is maintained or may increase; there is a 
state of trust. A state is different from an event; they are mutually excluding categories 
(Luhmann 1979:11). A state is a lasting condition, a status quo, the on-going, ordinary, 
familiar situation as distinct from an event which is an episode, an occasion and something 
that happens as a disturbance or change of state. Social change can be an effect of particular 
events and events may strengthen, weaken, violate or maintain a state of trust; this depends on 
the actual events and the particular context.  
 
Distressing events and disturbance of pre-contractual trust 
A bus ride can be an example of both states and events. Riding a bus in London is an example 
of how a particular event can affect the state of trust, in this case particular pre-contractual 
trust. The relationship between people waiting for a bus can be described as seriality (Sartre 
1976), they do not relate to each other but to the material object, the bus, and the social 
practices of public transportation. There is no relationship between the passengers, but they 
have tacit mutual understanding of the common rules for this context. They have a pre-
contractual trust in that the others will follow the common rules for bus queuing as well as 
general social norms – they expect that social practice will unfold as usual. The passengers in 
the London bus queue are in a state of pre-contractual trust in their co-passengers, and for this 
reason they do normally not consider other potential outcomes such as queue jumping, or 
being killed in the queue or on the bus.  
 
However, a sudden event can change this state of trust, such as the bus-bombing in London on 
7th July 2005. After the bombing, passengers waiting for a bus in London kept an eye on their 
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co-passengers and their rucksacks. The bombing reduced the pre-contractual trust in the safety 
of London buses in general and the trust in the co-passengers. Their harmlessness was 
something that could no longer be taken for granted.  
 
A lonely young woman at the stop, waiting for the late night bus is another example of bus 
queuing and trust consideration. More or less independently of the location of the stop, most 
young women will perceive this as a risky situation, and the state of trust will be low, but for 
reasons other than fear of bombing. If, for instance, three unkempt and noisy young men with 
knife scars in their faces approached the stop, most young women will actively think about 
whether these men are potentially harmful. Young women are unlikely to take for granted that 
the men will follow common bus queue norms; neither does she have pre-contractual trust in 
their good intentions in general.  If a harmful event occurs, her low trust (or distrust) of this 
category of men is enhanced, on the other hand, if nothing happens, (which is most probable) 
the minimum state of trust is maintained. Bus queuing is normally based on a state of pre-
contractual trust, but this trust can be undermined both by unexpected and expected (feared) 
events.     
 
There is a long list of examples of sudden events such as accidents, natural disasters, terror, 
deceptive actions and unexpected violence which undermine the state of pre-contractual trust 
in everyday life. How deep and lasting the effects of these events have on pre-contractual 
trust, needs further empirical investigation.   
 
Open spaces and pre-contractual trust  
Situations of social change and transformation can be characterised by little or no mutual 
understanding. This occurs in situations where social processes do not unfold as expected and 
there is a kind of social ‘inertia’. At the same time this situation generates new social patterns. 
These possibilities are ‘open spaces’ and ‘interstices of systems’, or ‘system limits’ according 
to Seligman (2000). There is always a contingency and possibility of unexpected events in 
social life; open spaces and interstices of systems are arenas for developing new social 
patterns.  
 
Open spaces are situations where ‘for one reason or another systemically defined role 
expectations are no longer viable’ (Seligman 2000:25). In these situations, pre-contractual 
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trust is questioned and may be undermined, but this does not mean that it disappears or is 
transformed to distrust. On the contrary, open spaces allow for re-building of mutual 
understanding on a new basis, a reconstruction and transformation of the pre-contractual basis 
for trust. Situations with little or no trust are not only a possibility for distrust, they represent a 
potential for change and new social dynamics. The critical issue is the direction of change, 
and whether this is constructive or destructive.  
 
According to Seligman (2000:25) trust comes into being in certain events, in the open spaces; 
‘trust is something that enters into social relations when there is role negotiability, in what 
may be termed “open spaces” of roles and role expectations.’ But trust can be a state, such as 
the taken for granted pre-contractual trust as a basis for social interaction, as well as an event. 
Trust is both an input and the result of social processes and some form of trust is an inherent 
element in voluntary social relations. This means that trust is based on symmetrical power 
relations (no force). A social relationship is dependent on trust, and this can be inverted; a 
voluntary social relation is an indication of trust. Open spaces are situations where 
expectations are unfulfilled, where mutual understanding is low or absent and trust is 
questioned, broken or re-constructed on a new basis. In one sense, this is a ‘void’ situation 
which has to be re-constructed with new content and a new pre-contractual basis. It is a 
situation where trust is activated – trust comes into being as Seligman asserts. Open spaces 
are a departure from the existing state; they are a kind of event with possibilities for 
innovation and development of new patterns.  
 
7.6 Pre-contractual trust – a dynamic social quality 
Pre-contractual trust is a normal state in everyday life, an input and basic social platform for 
interaction and relations. It is based on mutual understanding of taken for granted foundations 
in social life. What does this actually mean? Is it a self-contradiction? If pre-contractual trust 
is taken for granted, what is the analytical use of the concept?  
 
Social life is not transparent, stable, or static, neither is the state of trust. As pointed out 
previously, A never knows for sure whether B shares her assumptions, intends to act in 
accordance with them, or whether totally unforeseen events may occur. Trust presupposes 
consideration of possibilities and expectations (Luhmann 1993), but pre-contractual trust 
mainly is taken for granted without any further consideration.  
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In a state of trust actors presuppose mutual understanding, but in practice there are many 
events that may alter a state of trust and raise questions about mutual understanding and pre-
contractual assumptions. Consideration of risk, lack of mutual understanding, disconnected 
expectations, indifference and inability to fulfil the supposed mutual understanding are all 
situations that may infringe pre-contractual trust. Events such as unexpected changes in 
organisational practices, in personal relations, in habits or routines are other events where role 
definitions and pre-contractual bases for trust and expectations are changed. The state of trust 
is disturbed. When actors assume they have mutual understanding, but their actions 
demonstrate that they do not use the same social scripts, trust is undermined and has to be re-
constructed.  
 
Reconstruction of pre-contractual trust  
The following example of disturbed pre-contractual trust in everyday life may illustrate the 
dynamics of undermining a state of trust due to particular events and lack of mutual 
understanding.  
 
One day my almost ten year old daughter and her friend visited me at the office. In the 
afternoon I had to decide whether they should be given permission to go by bus part of the 
way and then walk the rest of way. The alternative would be walking home together with one 
of the parents. I took for granted that my daughter and I had a mutual understanding about 
how and where to exit the bus. My considerations were therefore about the traffic and the 
girls being on their own, walking from the bus stop to our house. In agreement with the other 
mother, we decided to trust the girls to cope with this situation and allow them to go by bus. 
This was a decision based on a pre-contractual trust in their ability to manage a bus ride and a 
relational trust in their general ability to manage being on their own.   
 
It turned out that the girls did not cope with riding the bus on their own. They expected the 
bus to stop automatically at every stop, they did not know how to stop the bus, and in 
addition, they did not know where to get off the bus. The girls had to ride until the bus 
stopped, which was almost in the city centre, and from there they had to walk back home (a 
route they did not know very well). The girls and I did not have the mutual understanding I 
assumed and partly took for granted. My implicit expectations of them were broken and my 
pre-contractual trust in their competencies was disturbed. This disturbance activated a re-
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consideration of my basis for pre-contractual trust, and the episode taught me that little can be 
taken for granted when it comes to children’s practical knowledge. On the other hand, my 
relational trust in the girls was strengthened, they coped with this unexpected situation better 
than I would have assumed.  
 
A conceptualisation of the taken for granted elements in the trust process, that is the pre-
contractual basis, facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the dynamic of trust and is an 
analytical tool for exploring trust as a state, the influence of events, and the relationship 
between trust and social change. Even though something is taken for granted, it does not 
mean that it is static and not subject to change. It can be difficult to become aware of these 
changes because assumptions are taken for granted, and what we experience is that something 
unexpected occurs which undermines the state of trust. We experience the event and its 
consequences as diminishing trust – the process of changes in the pre-contractual basis are 
normally invisible. When the pre-contractual basis for trust is made explicit through 
reflexivity, one can be aware of which changes in the basis for pre-contractual trust that has 
the undermining effects. Working with the changes are the first steps towards restoration of 
trust by developing new bases for trust, which over time will be taken for granted and become 
a pre-contractual basis for trust.  
 
7.7 Conclusion: reconstruction of pre-contractual trust – the well 
of trust? 
It is analytically challenging to demonstrate diminishing trust, its causes and how it can be 
restored. One approach is the grounded theory of trust which conceptualises trust as a process 
of social construction; as a leap of faith based on construction of mutual understanding 
supported by pre-contractual, relational and structural social bases. This conceptualisation is 
an analytical tool for exploring trust and social change. The splitting up of the social 
construction of trust into three interrelated forms and corresponding social bases is one step in 
the process of achieving greater transparency in the process of trust construction, where each 
element in the trust process can then be further elaborated. 
 
Pre-contractual trust is a tacit, basic ‘social hypothesis’ which is continually tested through 
social action. An exploration of this form of trust demands that the taken for granted 
assumptions that is the basis for mutual understanding have to be made explicit. Through this 
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process, foundations for declining trust and lack of mutual understanding will be made 
explicit so that disagreements and misconceptions can be discussed and clarified. Overt 
dialogue about assumptions is the first step towards the development of new pre-contractual 
bases for mutual understanding. Through processes such as interaction, reflection and dialog 
reconstruction of mutual understanding is possible. Gradually, a new basis for mutual 
understanding will be taken for granted and pre-contractual trust restored – until the next 
event occurs that undermines trust. Social interaction influences pre-contractual trust – either 
by disturbing it, re-constructing it, or maintaining the taken for granted elements.  
 
The trust paradox mentioned ahead in the thesis, was based on the hypothesis that trust is not 
disappearing, but that the wells of trust and the process of reconstruction of trust are 
analytically hidden because the existing analytical tools for examining trust do not focus on 
these processes. The thesis therefore argues that conceptualisation of trust as a process of 
developing mutual understanding, and the discovery and exploration of the pre-contractual 
basis for trust, is pivotal to understanding the dynamics of the social construction of trust. 
This perspective is an analytical tool to explore the tacit and taken for granted foundations of 
trust, how social changes affect these elements and how development of trust is facilitated by 
the interaction of different social bases. The social – the elements we share and have in 
common – and the continuous process of reconstruction of mutual understanding are the 
wells of trust. But to see and understand these processes, a new analytical tool is required and 
that is the contribution of this thesis.       
 
The next chapter digs more deeply into the relationship between pre-contractual trust and 
familiarity. This is a further exploration of the characteristics of pre-contractual trust; 
contrasting the concept with relevant sociological concepts and contributing to the expansion 





8. PRE-CONTRACTUAL TRUST AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
 
 ‘Familiarity is an unavoidable fact of life;  
trust is a solution for specific problems of risk.’54 




As pointed out in previous chapters, trust can be categorised into many different forms related 
to diverse social qualities. The form of cognition-, affect- and behaviour-based trust (Lewis 
and Weigert 1985, Lewicki and Bunker 1996) characterise different individual processes for 
trust development. Misztal (1996) analyses the function of trust in various forms of social 
order, and describes trust as a type of habitus, passion or policy. The social foundation for 
trust is in turn basis for psychological, relational and cultural dimensions of trust (Sztompka 
1999). According to Zucker (1986:60) there are process, characteristic and institutional modes 
of trust production, based on exchange, person or formal social structures respectively. This 
thesis discusses pre-contractual, relational and structural bases for and types of trust, and 
Luhmann (1979) differentiates between trust, familiarity and confidence as trust forms and 
various modes for self-assurance in risk consideration.   
 
The different types of trust are somewhat difficult to compare, as different dimensions and 
qualities of trust are based on diverse scientific perspectives. If trust forms are discussed in 
relation to each other, as complementary rather than competing perspectives, this can draw 
attention to new dimensions of trust and enable a multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary 
perspective on trust.  
 
As previously mentioned, the work in the thesis is based on an empirical grounded 
conceptualisation of trust which also is theoretically inspired by works of Luhmann and 
Zucker. The latter’s contribution will be further elaborated upon in chapter 9 about relational 
trust. In this chapter, the focus is on Luhmann’s conceptualisation of trust, and in particular 
the concepts of familiarity and confidence. An exploration of these forms of trust in relation to 
pre-contractual trust and development of mutual understanding can expand our insight into 
the relationship between trust and social change.   
                                                 
54 Luhmann 1990:95 
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8.1 Familiarity – an individual and structural frame of reference  
On the individual level, trust is about certainty and belief in one’s own expectations. 
According to Luhmann (1990:99) familiarity, confidence and trust ‘are different modes of 
asserting expectations - different types, as it were, of self-assurance’. The different trust types 
are related to the individual basis for trust, and the relationship between them is complicated 
and subject to change. Luhmann desists from elaborating on an operational theory of 
familiarity, rather the focus is on the distinction between trust and confidence (ibid), a topic 
that will be further discussed in a later section of this chapter. In everyday language the terms 
trust, confidence, and familiarity seem to be used interchangeably to describe some form of 
reliance. Even among scholars there is a widespread confusion between the three trust forms 
and the sociological attempts to distinguish between them (Seligman 2000).  
 
Further analytical exploration of the concepts is therefore useful to widen our understanding 
of trust, and by using comparison, clarify concepts. A discussion of familiarity and confidence 
in relation to pre-contractual and structural trust will enable greater clarification of these 
concepts.55  
 
Familiarity and resemblance  
Luhmann (1990) distinguishes between familiarity, confidence, and trust as different ways of 
coping with different kinds of risk and unpredictability. The unfamiliar and unknown, 
asymmetric relations, dependency and the free will of others causes that almost everything 
can be subject to change. Expectations are strategies to create predictability by trusting a 
perceived risk is suspended.  
 
First, a distinction needs to be drawn between familiarity and trust. From Luhmann’s 
perspective, trust has a function: ‘trust is a solution for specific problems of risk’ (Luhmann 
1990:95). Trust is something an actor chooses on the basis of familiarity and considerations of 
risk and danger (Luhmann (1979, 1990).  
 
Familiarity and confidence are not solutions to the problems of risk but relate to other aspects 
of life, according to Luhmann (1990:95) ‘familiarity is an unavoidable fact of life’. 
Familiarity is about knowledge of the context in which one lives; people are familiar with 
                                                 
55 The concept structural trust will be elaborated on in chapter 10. 
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each other and their life-world which relates to ontological security (Giddens 1990, Misztal 
1996). The past, experiences, and habits are basis for familiarity, one is socialised into 
familiarity and it affects how risk, the unknown/unfamiliar, and the future are faced. 
Familiarity can be taken for granted; it is a frame of reference and an element in the basis for 
pre-contractual trust in the expectation that things will remain as usual.   
 
Humans never entirely leave the familiar; it is the fixed place from which an actor orientates 
and moves towards the unfamiliar. The familiar is the backdrop for investigating the 
unfamiliar; ‘we know in a familiar way about the unfamiliar’ (Luhmann 1990:95) and it is a 
gate and bridge into the unknown, ‘familiarity breeds unfamiliarity. It remains a horizon that 
moves as we move’ (Luhmann 1990:95). In the human cognition process, we have to relate 
the unknown to something familiar to be able to comprehend the new.  Change is therefore a 
dynamic interaction between the familiar and the unfamiliar.  
 
According to Misztal (1996) familiarity is related to habits, close relations, and everyday 
classifications of our surroundings, and the concept of habit seems to overlap with familiarity 
as an approach to describe social prediction as the basis for trust. Giddens (1990) and 
Sztompka (1999) do not focus on familiarity as a particular aspect of trust, while Seligman 
(1997) distinguishes between trust, confidence, and familiarity. Familiarity is an element in 
Seligman’s perspective on trust, and this will be further elaborated on below.  
 
Confidence can be seen as a reliance on oneself and one’s perceptions and expectations. I 
hold that trust can be regarded as a way to bridge and cope with difference, while familiarity 
is based on resemblance. Familiarity is ’the establishment of that generic human bond rooted 
not in difference, but in sameness or identity’ (Seligman 2000:69).  
 
According to Seligman, most social activities are managed through shared role expectations 
and the mutual confidence in that they are shared, which I hold to be a pre-contractual trust 
based on presumed and taken for granted  mutual understanding. If this is insufficient, actors 
presuppose a familiarity to provide the necessary confidence for social interaction (Seligman 
2000). Trust is at stake in exceptional situations, such as those of changing role expectations, 
according to Seligman (2000:70):  
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 ‘Trust approaches the agency of the other in a different manner and does  not assume its 
circumscription by role fulfilment or by ideas of shared  community, that is, of familiarity, 
or what in Taylors’s terms would be a shared basis for strong evaluations.’  
 
This perspective has some similarities with Luhmann’s assumption that trust is relevant in 
situations that which actors employ consideration and a choice of action.  
 
According to Seligman, trust is something that is activated in open spaces, in situations of 
social change and where the familiar is not a relevant as basis for trust. These situations 
resemble situations of risk, and hence require activation of trust (Luhmann 1979, 1993). From 
my perspective these are situations where pre-contractual trust is disturbed, and has to be 
restored through reflexive processes that incorporate the new and gradually transform it to 
something familiar. Open spaces are the social interstices that represent social risk and 
opportunities for development of new social pattern, as pointed out in the previous chapter.    
 
Pre-contractual trust has a lot in common with familiarity, but it is not totally the same, 
Familiarity functions as a basis for pre-contractual trust. The pre-contractual is the basis for 
mutual understanding; it is a social backdrop and contextual social script that stretches 
beyond the familiar. It is a familiar basis for trust in unfamiliar settings and a global frame of 
reference. It is more than a human bond; the pre-contractual basis for trust includes material 
structures and cultural references in a global world, such as the Internet, mega structures (for 
example airports, hotels and sport-venues), and pop culture such as music, movies and stories 
(for instance such as Harry Potter). These are global elements of the pre-contractual basis for 
trust; a social basis that functions as a pre-contractual platform and entrance for new social 
spaces.  
 
Two forms of familiarity and the trust paradox 
I hold that the relationship between trust and familiarity is one key to understanding how trust 
and social change are connected. Familiarity is both different from trust and the basis for it 
(Seligman 2000). Familiarity consists of shared strong evaluations which are based on values 
and qualitative categories acquired from ones social milieu (Seligman with reference to 
Taylor 2000:69). The notion strong evaluation refers here to the existence of a common 
normative basis for evaluations and the identity of the actor is bound up with these 
evaluations – it is the identity element that makes it strong. Strong evaluations go beyond 
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utilitarian calculations and include shared moral norms, and they create a shared common 
identity and community (Seligman 2000).  
 
 Based on a rather complex argument, Seligman (ibid: 93) asserts that familiarity ‘exists in 
two forms: 1) as itself a basis for social solidarity and 2) as no more than a mechanism, rooted 
in the structural composition of the division of labour,’ Seligman focuses on the second form 
of familiarity, which includes shared strong evaluations as well as a trust in the other’s free 
will. This is trust in elements that cannot be taken for granted that is shared by the other and 
trust in an unknown and (structurally) unknowable other. To trust in the other’s free will 
arises from sharing a common cultural basis for interaction. Seligman’s second form of 
familiarity is a modern phenomenon that functions as a regulatory mechanism which 
lubricates general exchange.  
 
As I read Seligman, the familiarity described in the first category is about proximity in 
relations, which is the pre-contractual basis for relational trust. The familiarity described in 
second category is a way of coping with the larger society and leads to the development of 
generalised trust, which is the pre-contractual basis for structural trust. The three forms of 
trust; pre-contractual, relational and structural open up a more nuanced analysis of the social 
construction of trust and direct focus onto the social elements and social basis that are at stake 
in trusting.    
 
One of the conclusions Seligman draws from the discussion of the two types of familiarity is 
of particular interest here; namely that the increasing unconditionality of late modernity leads 
to an increasing need to rely on trust while at the same time as the conditions for this reliance, 
that is familiarity in the second sense, are diminishing (Seligman 2000:97). This conclusion 
resembles the trust paradox I have observed and described ahead – about the drying wells and 
insufficient pumps of trust – a paradox which reminds us that social change increases 
complexity and risk, which in turn increases the demand for trust, but the conditions for 
development of trust are undermined by social change. Familiarity, as ‘the known’ in 
common, is a part of the pre-contractual basis for trust. The familiar social basis is affected by 
change and this undermines the conditions for development of mutual understanding – the 




But if social change affects only some elements of the familiar basis – what influence does 
this have on trust? Will trust still be undermined? Will it be placed on alternative social 
bases? Or will a new familiarity be developed? These questions are about the social 
configuration of trust, and will need to be further investigated both theoretically, such as in 
the rest of this thesis, and empirically through in depth studies of on-going trust processes in 
particular social contexts.  
 
To conclude this discussion of familiarity and summarise my position: familiarity as a quality 
is about known and shared evaluations; it is about resemblance and the common basis for 
social life. Seligman suggests two forms of familiarity and I agree with his perspective, but 
will shift the distinction somewhat and suggest drawing a distinction between the two kinds of 
familiarity which are elements in the basis for pre-contractual trust:  
 
1) Familiarity as a quality at the individual level based on proximity, which can be 
considered as the pristine form of familiarity and  
 
2) Familiarity as a structural quality of society based on being situated in a common social 
context, a context based familiarity.  
 
Both forms of familiarity are elements of pre-contractual trust to the extent that the familiarity 
is taken for granted. For analytical purposes, the two forms are called individual and 
contextual familiarity. Social changes may affect both kinds of familiarity and/or the 
relationship between them. This distinction is useful when discussed in relation to 
modernisation and change.  
 
8.2 Familiarity – a pre-contractual key to social change and trust  
While trust can be regarded as a device to bridge difference, familiarity is based on 
resemblance. Change is an event of difference; it is about moving from the familiar to the 
unfamiliar, and about making the unknown familiar. These processes require trust to suspend 
the perceived risk related to the unfamiliar and this is why the need for trust is increasing in 
situations of social change.  
 
Everyday life in the late modern age is characterised by unpredictability caused by continuous 
changes, increasing role segmentation, role negotiation, and frequent encounters with 
strangers and/or rather unfamiliar situations. This necessitates trust as a way of bridging the 
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unknown and the familiar. At the same time, the range of familiarity seems to be crumbling. 
Or is it only changing? The position here is that there is a condition of crumbling familiarity 
at the individual level, while contextually based familiarity is gaining ground. Changes and 
unpredictability are experienced at the individual level, and the transformations and the 
unfamiliarity we face as individuals creates feelings and experiences of crumbling familiarity. 
Our basis for pre-contractual trust appears to diminish. We need trust as a strategy to handle 
the unfamiliar and unpredictable and we need something familiar as a kind of fixed point to 
bestow trust in strangers and in new situations. We therefore have to find an element of 
familiarity in a situation; the challenge is having sufficient familiarity to attain predictability 
and bestow trust.  
 
To sum up; the position is that late modernity is characterised by the following dynamics: 
Changes contribute to crumbling familiarity at the individual level, but at the same time, this 
is met by expanding contextual based familiarity. There is an increased need for trust, in 
particular an increased need for trust between strangers – that is generalised trust. Generalised 
trust is dependent on a basis of context-based familiarity as one way to create predictability. 
Structures of all kinds facilitate this predictability, as do culture, in particular popular culture 
expressed in music, movies, and sport. These cultural expressions are a kind of global 
narrative creating familiarity. Cultural and economic globalisation can be considered as global 
narratives and as huge processes that create worldwide structural based familiarity. Narratives 
are not late modern phenomena, but their content and message are historical. In pre-modern 
times, religion was one of the great meta-narratives that contributed to establishment of a 
common basis of pre-contractual trust. Secularisation, disenchantment, and the reliance on 
science – the ideas of rationalisation – have formative ideological power in the modernity and 
are competing with the decline of religion as one of several meta-narratives in the late modern 
era (Beck 1993, Touraine 1995).  
 
The belief in market and competition are modern meta-narratives and the pre-contractual 
assumption that free competition will solve ‘all’ problems, is a guiding force in the capitalistic 
economy. The assumed benefits of competition are taken for granted, and we can for instance 
observe it trickle down to the public sector as new public management (Busch et al. 2001).  
 
The consumer culture is one meta-narrative with globally recognisable elements. For instance, 
everywhere you go, an airport is a familiar structure, some of the food, shops, music, and 
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credit cards are familiar as well as football teams and heroes, and popular books such as 
Harry Potter. The European Union, World Trade Organisation and similar international meta- 
organisations create global familiarity by imposing laws, principles, rules, and an economic 
framework of interpretation on national states. Globalisation diminishes some differences and 
creates some resemblance (at least on the surface). Late modern mega cities resemble each 
other, young people worldwide share cultural expressions such as popular music, video 
games, films, and television shows. Modernisation has tremendously increased this kind of 
structural meta-familiarity.  
 
On the other hand at a more individual level, people are experiencing alienation and 
crumbling familiarity; less can be taken for granted and more must be clarified through 
reflexion and dialogue. The basis for pre-contractual trust appears to be under continuous 
reconstruction. At the individual level, widespread global narratives appear as continuous 
encounters between the familiar and unfamiliar and this is why the intensified expansion of 
structural familiarity contributes to crumbling familiarity at the individual level. These are the 
kinds of processes Luhmann describes when he asserts that trust contributes to increased 
complexity (Luhmann 1979) and that ‘familiarity breeds unfamiliarity’ (Luhmann 1990:95). 
 
Sztompka (1999) applies familiarity to describe one of five elements that contribute to 
building a trust culture. Previously in this chapter, the term narrative was referred to as a 
strategy to develop trust in the unfamiliar and in future events. Is the contemporary focus on 
narratives a means to establishing familiarity between to-day and the future, and between the 
known and the unknown? Have narratives become a new basis for trust, and are global 
narratives a strategy to reduce risk and insecurity in the encounter with the stranger? Who, 
then, are the storytellers, and which narratives are becoming familiar in a global scale? In 
what and in whom do we place our trust? These questions are open for further research. 
 
The future is open, and to create a feeling of familiarity necessitates generalisation from the 
known to reduce risk. Familiarity is under pressure in today’s society because of continuous 
change and development processes. We are constantly confronted with the unfamiliar and 
established knowledge, and truths are under pressure at the micro and macro level. According 
to Luhmann (1979, 1990) the boundaries between familiarity and confidence are being 
obliterated and the scope of familiarity is crumbling, while the range of confidence expands. 
However, this can be contradicted by the statement that both familiarity and confidence are 
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expanding. As discussed above, the new narratives function as a strategy for developing 
familiarity on a global scale, at the same time as increased knowledge facilitates a wider 
scope of familiarity, providing better social capacity for exploring the new and unfamiliar.  
 
Therefore, in spite of events of crumbling familiarity at individual level, it can be concluded 
that the scope of familiarity is both expanding and changing. The new global narratives 
pervading consumer-, entertainment-, and leisure cultures grow at the expense of religion and 
science as universal narratives in the traditional and modern epochs. Parallel with the process 
of expanding familiarity, there is an expanding confidence, a quality that has several 
similarities with structural trust.   
 
8.3 Confidence – a question of power and fiduciary obligations 
In everyday language, trust and confidence are often used interchangeably (also in scientific 
literature). Can linguistic definitions and the roots of words contribute to better clarification of 
the relationship between these different words describing various forms of trust?56  
 
Trust is described as ‘firm belief in the integrity, ability, effectiveness, or genuineness of 
someone or something’. It is also ‘assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth 
of someone or something and one in which confidence is placed’. Confidence, credence, faith, 
and stock are listed as synonyms of trust. Confidence is described as ‘a feeling or 
consciousness of one's powers or of reliance on one's circumstances’ and ‘faith or belief that 
one will act in a right, proper, or effective way’. It is also ‘the quality or state of being 
certain’.  
 
Linguistically, it appears that trust and confidence can be used interchangeably, but having 
confidence in something seems to indicate some sort of dependence and a more firm belief 
than trusting. This observation can be supported by an additional description, in Merriam-
Webster, of trust as ‘dependence on something future or contingent: hope’. Definitions of 
hope, tell us that trust is suggested as the archaic version of hope. This is not surprising, 
according to Luhmann (1990), trust as phenomenon comes into being with modernity and the 
                                                 




possibility to choose action. In pre-modern times, one could only hope or have confidence. 
Further on, the dictionary suggests that hope can also be ‘to expect with confidence: trust.’  
 
To conclude this section with linguistic definitions; there seems to be an almost circular 
relation between trust and hope. Trust in situations with high risk resembles hope, and a 
confident hope resembles trust.57 It appears that the linguistic definitions do not lead to much 
further clarification of the distinct features of trust or the relationship between trust and 
confidence.  
 
According to Luhmann (1990:98) the distinction between trust and confidence is a matter of 
perception and attribution and is ‘a highly complex research issue’. The distinction is related 
to differences between risk and danger. Danger is an unavoidable risk that you might not even 
consider, but have to entrust yourself to. Risk is a negative possibility, a possible loss, 
damage, or danger that you consider and reflect upon and can choose to avoid, that is not to 
trust. This distinction is contestable and the subjective element of perception and attribution 
make the distinction even more difficult to handle analytically. A discussion of confidence in 
relation to pre-contractual trust and social change will contribute to some analytical 
clarification.  
 
Confidence – a feeling of basic and pre-contractual trust  
The relationship between trust and confidence is a topic in several studies of trust. In a 
discussion of the distinction, Misztal (1996:16) states that ‘the main difference between trust 
and confidence is connected with the degree of certainty that we attach to our expectations’. 
Misztal does not discuss the relationship between trust and confidence in depth, but states in 
line with Luhmann that trust is about choosing between alternatives, while confidence is a 
more habitual expectation. According to Sztompka (1999:192, n.7) Seligman treats the 
distinction between trust and confidence as a question of ‘firmness of expectations on which 
action (or abstaining from action) is based’. We have confidence in our expectations that 
certain actions unfold as usual and that roles will be performed as always. This is a difference 
not of kind, but only of degree. Degree of certainty in expectations is an individual quality; it 
                                                 
57 In a previous chapter suspension of risk was discussed as a key element of making the leap of faith – that is to 
trust. To hope is a process not very different from the suspension of risk.  
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is highly difficult to decide and is therefore rather unsatisfactory as analytical distinction 
between trust and confidence.  
  
Even though Seligman (2000) provides a comprehensive discussion of the difference between 
confidence and trust, it is somewhat difficult to get a distinct understanding of his perspective 
on confidence; except that he seems to consider it as different from trust, as reliance on 
abstract systems, and as confidence in fulfilment of role expectations (ibid: 25). Seligman 
relates the distinction to his conceptualisation of trust. Trust is a quality that only comes to 
exist in negotiation of roles, while confidence is the prevailing social quality, a state of 
normality. This is a perspective on confidence similar to Luhmann who states that confidence 
is about everyday life and the familiar; ‘the normal case is that of confidence’ (Luhmann 
1990:97).  
 
We have confidence in that everyday life will progress as usual and that others will behave in 
a predictable way, though there is always a possibility that something unexpected will 
happen. Deceit as well as terrorism and sudden natural disasters can alter confidence as a 
basic trust. For instance, the sudden and unexpected event that occurred with the Tsunami 
disaster in Asia, a natural catastrophe in December 2004 that demolished the physical as well 
as the social world for those it hit. Media reported from the area that the survivors were 
paralysed. Many of them had lost everything, including probably their confidence in the 
natural order. The alternative to this confidence is not mistrust but existential angst or dread. 
Another term for this confidence is pre-contractual trust.    
 
According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary OnLine, one of the definitions of confidence is ‘a 
feeling or consciousness of one’s powers or of reliance on one’s circumstances’.58 The 
element of reliance is emphasised by Luhmann; an actor has to have confidence in the natural 
order and presuppose that the familiar world will continue to exist. Even though this position 
is not central to his further discussion of confidence, Seligman (2000:17) consider confidence 
as a kind of trust, a basic trust, related to psychological orientation acquired through early 
socialisation. 
As noted previously, Giddens (1993) discusses basic trust in relation to ontological security: 
’ontological security has to do with “being-in-the-world”. But it is an emotional, rather than a 
                                                 
58 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/confidence  
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cognitive, phenomenon, and is rooted in the unconscious (ibid: 92). This form of trust is trust 
as an individual quality and a psychological state. It develops as an experience of mutuality in 
the early socialisation process when a child experiences that a caretaker returns and that 
absence of the caretaker ‘does not represent withdrawal of love’ (Giddens 1993: 97). In order 
to build trust in others and to trust, to be trusting as a way of bridging distance in time and 
space, this experience is essential. Basic trust is reinforced by everyday habits and routines, 
which are influential elements in ontological security. Giddens concludes that basic trust, 
ontological security, and a feeling of continuity constitute a basic human quality, ‘if basic 
trust is not developed or its inherent ambivalence not contained, the outcome is persistent 
existential anxiety’ (1993:100). Basic trust is an emotion and an individual state, dependent 
on everyday routines and predictability. Confidence as an expression of basic trust and as a 
psychological phenomenon will not be further discussed here as the focus of the thesis is 
social rather than psychological processes.   
 
A close reading of Luhmann’s distinction between risk and danger might hint at another 
perspective: confidence as a lack of power. The quotation above from the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary refers to this, ‘if you do not consider alternatives [...], you are in a situation of 
confidence’ (Luhmann 1990:97). The lack of consideration might be the result of to take for 
granted or being powerless. If one lacks the ability or power to choose between alternatives, it 
is not necessary to consider them (although that does not stop people worrying). To make the 
analytical difference between trust and confidence more explicit, the next section introduces 
power as an approach to distinguish between the two.  
 
8.4 Confidence and the power to choose exit 
Trust is based on the consideration of risk and the possibility to choose between trusting and 
not trusting. As Luhmann states (1990:97);  
‘Trust, on the other hand, requires a previous engagement on your part .It 
presupposes a situation of risk. Risks, however, emerge only as a component  of 
decision and action. If you refrain from action you run no risk’.   
 
A decision of not to act, can also be an act in this perspective, ‘it is a purely internal 
calculation of external conditions which creates risks’ (Luhmann 1990:100). As pointed out, 
the consideration of risk or danger is a question of individual perception. But if the external 
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conditions are characterised by asymmetrical power relations, the powerless have no choice. 
They have to rely on the circumstances, hope for the best and feel more or less confident. 
  
Trust is about the power to choose action. Analytically, one chooses to act or refrain from 
acting after implicit or explicit consideration of the possibilities and risks. Some of these 
considerations are done through the social structure, through habits, social scripts, experiences 
and other elements in the basis of pre-contractual trust.59 Confidence is about being unable to 
choose whether to trust or not; in general, this is a state of dependency or taken for granted. 
You have to feel confidence and rely on the good intentions of the other, whether or not you 
believe in them, if you have no other choice. Trust, not confidence, depends on one’s previous 
experience, ‘the point is whether or not the possibility of disappointment depends on your 
own previous behaviour’ (Luhmann 1990:98).  
  
On the other hand, there can be situations where previous behaviour has no influence on the 
possibility of disappointment; but you can still choose whether to trust or not, this is 
particularly so when it comes to structural trust (see chapter 10). A flight is an example of the 
complex relationship between the power to choose exit, trust, and confidence.60 When 
planning a journey, the first consideration is the risk between various modes of transport. 
When one decides to trust going by plane, there is an element of structural trust in the 
technology. The next decision is the airline. This choice is based on trust; relational trust 
based on former experiences with the company, and pre-contractual trust based on the 
company’s general reputation. When the decision is made and you have finally boarded the 
plane, there is no possibility to change your mind. There is no possibility for exit and now you 
just have to have confidence and hope to be delivered safely to the destination.  
 
The air travel example also illustrates that there can be a dynamic relationship between trust 
and confidence. The crucial difference between the two states is whether there is power to 
choose to trust. If there is no possibility for exit, analytically, there is no trust, instead there is 
a state of confidence and one has to rely on the good intentions and abilities of others.  
 
                                                 
59 According to Misztal 1996, this would be confidence, but I do not follow her use of degree of certainty to 
distinguish between trust and confidence. 
60 Price and time do not matter in this example, only the perceived risk. 
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While confidence is connected to relationships characterised by dependency, trust is an option 
in relationships where one can choose not to trust, that is choose exit. Hirschman (1970) 
suggests that there are three strategies at play; exit, voice, and loyalty to express a relationship, 
for instance as a customer or a citizen. Exit means choosing not to trust, for instance by 
leaving a relationship, whether this is as a customer who changes supplier, a constituent who 
stops voting, a partner leaving for divorce or an employee leaving an organisation.61 This 
freedom to choose is impossible in a relationship characterised by dependency. Trust, 
therefore presupposes symmetrical power, or superiority – a superior has the power to choose 
– and the possibility to choose exit. The analytical distinction between trusting and 
confidence, is that individuals bestow trust through a process of consideration, they chose to 
trust or not to trust, while  confidence is the option in a situation of  being powerless or where 
there is no possibility of exit.  
 
Confidence is related to expectations in asymmetrical power relations and in situations 
characterised by powerlessness and/or dependency. Dependency or lack of influence means 
there is no freedom to decide to act or to refrain from action, to take a risk or avoid danger. If 
one decides to act, and for instance enters into a relationship, this is an indication of trust. If a 
potential risk is considered to be too great, and by corollary the trust is too low, the trustor can 
choose exit, which is leaving or avoiding the situation. The threshold for exit is an empirical 
matter of perception. Analytically, exit is a criterion of no trust. The actor may orally express 
distrust or lack of trust; but as long as she does not choose exit, provided this is an option, 
analytically there is trust. In situations of consideration, the actor expresses trust by not 
choosing exit. In situations characterised by dependency, the actor cannot escape the potential 
danger, insecurity, or feeling of doubt or disappointment, and analytically, she can only hope 
for the best, there is no possibility of exit and trust is therefore not an option. The relationship 
between savings banks and private customers for instance, was to a greater extent 
characterised by confidence than trust in the period up until the 1960s when there were few if 
any banks to choose between.62 Lack of trust in politicians can for instance be a consequence 
of disappointment with their decisions. In this situation, refraining from voting or emigration 
to another country (in the extreme version) are ways of expressing disappointment through 
exit.  
                                                 
61 If an actor consider exit, but chooses to stay, this is an act of trust. This action also can be an expression of 
loyalty, and opens voice, that is the expression of views, for instance in a customer relationship.  
62 This was the situation for the majority of private savings bank customers up till the 1960s (Nordnes 1993).  
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Confidence is about ontological security, it is a relationship to forces greater than you and a 
reliance on powerful institutions and persons, such as the government, politicians, and public 
servants. The dependent can only hope or have confidence in others’ willingness not to 
exercise arbitrary power. This is about fulfilling fiduciary obligations, such as the ruler’s 
morality and goodness; the belief that the government will act predictably and keep laws and 
rules, or that powerful people and organisations will include considerations of others’ needs in 
their decisions.  
 
In situations characterised by asymmetric power relations and/or dependency, confidence can 
function as a mechanism to reduce contingency. One can only have confidence that people in 
powerful positions will attend to fiduciary obligations and responsibility. This means that 
they will not misuse their authority to promote their self-interest and will include 
considerations of others. Confidence in this is ‘essential for the relatively orderly functioning 
of society’; according to Barber (1983:16).  I fear that this is perhaps a naïve expectation in an 
increasingly competitive society where self-interest seems to gain ground everywhere as a 
taken for granted premise for social interaction.  
      
Confidence and social change 
The importance of confidence appears to increase in uncertain times. One hallmark of modern 
societies is the growth of complex institutions and organisations which can exert great power 
and intervene into or affect many lives. Banks, organisations, insurance companies, state 
institutions, and big companies have huge power and influence. The general public can only 
have confidence that these power structures will take into consideration fiduciary obligations 
and responsibilities. For instance, measurements of trust indicate that the Norwegian 
population traditionally has high levels of trust in government (Hellevik og Børresen 1996, 
Ingelhart 1997, Skirbekk 2012). Analytically, I think these polls measure confidence rather 
than trust. The Norwegian population has high confidence that the government takes into 
consideration fiduciary obligations and responsibilities of the citizens. New ways of public 
organisation, such as New Public Management, can in the long run challenge this confidence, 
as the achievement of economic and management aims in public services becomes a higher 
priority than the needs of the population. 
 
To summarise; confidence can have more than one basis and can be regarded as a form of 
basic trust, related to taking for granted that everyday life and nature continues as usual. This 
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is confidence as an element in the general pre-contractual basis for trust.  But, as pointed out, 
confidence is also about fiduciary obligations and dependency, the expectation that someone 
will act in the interest of others. The difference then between the term pre-contractual, which 
refers to the social ‘contract’ – often tacit and taken for granted – as the basis for trust, and 
confidence, is that confidence is related to dependency and lack of power to exit. Confidence 
can therefore be an element in the pre-contractual basis for trust. 
 
Social change is one example of this difference. The pre-contractual basis for trust is under 
pressure from social change and reflexivity; the taken for granted is questioned. This process 
creates doubt and uncertainty about social premises, norms, and strategies. The uncertainty 
increases the need for strategies for normative and practical clarifying and predictability. In 
practice this means interaction and negotiation to clarify new social bases that gradually will 
be taken for granted. But this is not enough, it is also necessary that legitimate powers 
develop new formal contracts, rules and regulations. Usually one can only have confidence in 
these formal structures and the powers behind them.  
 
8.5 Pre-contractual trust – conclusions and further questions 
This chapter concludes that pre-contractual trust is about the social contracts, the taken for 
granted social basis we have in common, while the familiar is the known and individually 
recognisable. The familiar can breed both trust and distrust and is an element in pre-
contractual, relational and structural trust. Pre-contractual trust is comprehensive and a 
necessary basis for social life, it stretches beyond narratives and familiarity and into the 
unfamiliar. Through pre-contractual trust one implicitly assumes that the unfamiliar is a type 
of the familiar.  
 
The discussion about distinctions between trust, familiarity and confidence, can be concluded 
with a further analytical specification of the pre-contractual basis for trust. This is the 
individual/relation oriented basis, the contextual/structural basis and the natural order. The 
configuration of these bases will vary individually and contextually. They are not mutually 
excluding and change in one base does not necessarily affect the other bases; pre-contractual 
trust can be robust, but is at risk of being diminished by major transformations. Pre-
contractual trust bases are an understudied subject, and further empirical studies of the pre-




Without pre-contractual trust, the leap of faith and social prediction will be difficult. For 
instance, we have to presuppose that other drivers drive on the right side, that the pilot is 
sober, that we will not be killed in the cinema darkness, and that our bank is honest. In a 
society without pre-contractual trust, social interaction will be troublesome and have 
enormous transaction costs. Pre-contractual trust is a social link between the individual and 
the society; it is about having common points of reference in social life. This is a precondition 
for interaction and cooperation and presupposes a certain degree of homogeneity, including a 
common cultural-, meaning-, and knowledge base.  
 
Modernisation and processes such as deregulation, organisational restructuring, and social 
changes transform the social foundations of trust.63 Increased individual freedom and 
migration have made society less homogenous. This, together with continuous social change, 
mean that less can be taken for granted in social life – the social foundations for pre-
contractual trust are crumbling. This statement seems to presuppose the assumption that pre-
contractual trust is based on an implicit premise of societal homogeneity. This is a 
complicated premise in heterogeneous, late modern western societies and raises several 
questions for further research. If the taken for granted is reduced in the social arena, does this 
also mean that the basis for pre-contractual trust is crumbling? Following that question, what 
are the consequences of crumbling pre-contractual trust for our societies, at the practical level 
in the short run and for social organisation in the long run? If formation of stable social 
communities presupposes a minimum of pre-contractual trust, is there a limit of social 
heterogeneity that makes pre-contractual trust impossible?  
 
Finally, if pre-contractual trust is as pivotal for our society as I assert, it is of great social 
importance to explore empirically how this form of trust can be facilitated and restored. One 
form of new and widespread familiarity is based on globally recognisable narratives, and this 
emerges as a possible new common basis for pre-contractual trust. On one hand the process of 
reflexivity and reformulation of the pre-contractual basis for trust creates doubt and 
uncertainty about social assumptions and thereby an increasing need for contracts, rules, and 
strategies for normative clarification. On the other hand is the social effect of these processes 
                                                 
63 This will be further discussed in chapter 11, 12 and 13. 
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that pre-contractual trust is not declining, rather that the social basis for it is continuously 
transformed. 
 
To return to the trust paradox; this means that the well of the taken for granted is drying up 
with regard to individual familiarity, but that the contextual familiarity is expanding and that 
there are emerging multiple foundations for developing mutual understanding. The social 
challenge is how to absorb and reconstruct the apparently crumbling pre-contractual trust, and 
how to manage a continuous development of mutual understanding.  
 








9. RELATIONAL TRUST  
 
‘The complexity of the future world 
is reduced by the act of trust.’64 
–  NIKLAS LUHMANN 
 
 
Face to face relationships, interaction, and familiarity are the basis for relational trust. This is 
the interpersonal trust that pervades social life, and is constructed and re-constructed through 
social interaction and communication. Relational trust is a social glue and basis for social 
interaction; it is the quality we intuitively perceive as ‘trust’.  
 
As the literature review in chapter 2 demonstrated, relational trust can be categorised into 
different forms of trust and can be analysed from various perspectives. The concept relational 
trust is applied in the thesis to conceptualise trust as a social process. This concept is 
generated from an exploration of trust between bank and customer. The empirical focus was 
on the face to face interactions across the bank counter and the study revealed that trust is a 
dynamic social quality; it is a state and a complex process of social construction. Trust can be 
the foundation for a relationship, it is a process to maintain it and it can be an outcome of 
relational process. Trust is generated in the interaction between pre-contractual, structural and 
relational elements as basis for mutual understanding.    
 
The micro level study of the trust process revealed that trust relationships were based on 
various forms of familiarity and that there is interaction of many different expectations in a 
trust situation. This chapter focuses on these two elements in relational trust; development of 
familiarity and the content of expectations as elements in the social construction of relational 
trust.  
 
The chapter starts with a presentation and discussion of three forms of familiarity and 
thereafter follows an expectations model for in-depth studies of trust processes. This model is 
an analytical tool for an examination of how the interaction between different forms of 
expectations affects the social construction of trust. In this chapter as in the two preceding 
chapters, sociological theory is applied to make a theoretical grounding of the empirical 
                                                 
64 Luhmann 1979:20 
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grounded concept, and here the focus is on relational trust. A theoretical grounding will 
expand the analytical potential of the grounded theory and introduces new elements into 
existing perspectives on trust. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of relational 
trust in social change.  
 
9.1 Relational trust and familiarity  
Relational trust bridges the barrier between oneself and the other; it develops step by step 
through communication, interpretation, negotiations, involvement, and mutual commitment to 
the trust process. The discussion of the social construction of relational trust is based on the 
grounded theory of trust which states that the social basis for relational trust is social 
interaction based on pre-contractual elements and familiarity. Familiarity is knowledge 
acquired through socialisation and experience; it can be ascribed and mediated. Familiarity 
and pre-contractual elements are the basis for expectations; they influence interaction and the 
development of mutual understanding. Expectations are social hypotheses and assumed 
promises. Trust is a hypothesis and reliance that expectations will be satisfactory fulfilled. 
Social interaction is a ‘testing’ of this hypothesis. If the test leads to confirmed mutual 
understanding, then pre-contractual trust is maintained and relational trust is generated. If the 
‘test’ fails and the interaction does not confirm mutual understanding, the social hypothesis is 
refuted. The effect is that pre-contractual trust in this setting is undermined and the familiarity 
is questioned.  
 
The elaboration in the two preceding chapters introduced a theoretical grounding of the 
concept pre-contractual trust and pre-contractual bases for trust. The notion pre-contractual 
trust is a new construction even though the social processes included in this notion are 
examined in sociological literature. The concept relational trust is not new; various forms of 
relational trust are discussed in the trust literature. According to Rousseau et al. (1998:399) 
relational trust ‘derives from repeated interactions over time between the trustor and trustee’, 
and ‘information available to the trustor from within the relationship itself forms the basis of 
relational trust’. This definition includes two main dimensions of relational trust; interaction 
and information; elements which breed familiarity – a vital quality for developing trust 




Interaction rarely starts totally from scratch. There is a pre-contractual basis and the 
interacting partners are more or less familiar with each other.  The level of familiarity in a 
relationship varies in emotional depth and interdependence (Sheppard & Sherman 1998), it 
will vary with social and relational distance and with regard to perceived risk. The pre-
contractual basis for interaction is different among family members, friends, customers or 
foreigners. Even though relational trust is based on familiarity and acquaintance, it does not 
mean that there is always trust when there is familiarity. The greater familiarity, the greater is 
the reason for trusting or distrusting.  
 
Familiarity may be the basis for indifference (Luhmann 1979:19). The pre-contractual basis 
for interaction between, for example, family members contains a life history and numerous 
interactions. A lot can be taken for granted, but the family members do not necessarily have 
the same experiences and interpretation of their common family history.65 There can be a 
relationship of trust, or not. Family members may trust each other in some areas but not in 
others, and by interacting step by step they may develop trust and mutual confirmation of 
each other’s expectations. Interaction can also reveal that in spite of familiarity and assumed 
mutual understanding, promises are broken, there is betrayal or negativity, and the other is 
perceived as unpredictable and unreliable. Trust is undermined and can be transformed into 
indifference and even distrust.  
 
A foreigner visiting a new country for the first time may have little information in advance; 
there is low or no familiarity. But the foreigner has a pre-contractual trust that some of her 
social scripts for everyday interaction will have at least some validity in the new country and 
has to test this through interaction. These experiences and the information achieved by staying 
there will gradually create familiarity with the social life in the new place. Through repeated 
interactions with the same people, relational trust can be developed and the pre-contractual 
basis for developing trust is extended.  
 
Even though interaction can reveal deceit, misunderstandings, disagreement and other trust 
undermining events, social interaction is the most important strategy to repair and maintain 
                                                 
65 Examples of this is told in an autobiography of a family The Children of Sanchez by American anthropologist 
Oscar Lewis (1961) and the autobiography Kom ikke nærmere - Jeg og far (Don't come any closer - Me and 
father) by a famous comedian in Norway, Trond Kirkvaag (2007). Trond experienced their father very different 
form his siblings.  
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trust. Through step by step interactions common frames of reference are developed, adjusted, 
recreated and confirmed; these processes can clarify a familiar pre-contractual basis for trust, 
generate relational trust and initiate new patterns of action and interaction.      
 
9.2 Three bases for relational trust   
Relational trust is related to personal relations and reciprocity (Zucker 1986, Misztal 1996, 
Sztompka 1999), to face to face relations and small group relations where those involved 
know each other and share common norms and rules (Giddens 1993, Hart 1990, Luhmann 
1979). Developing relational trust can be a challenge in cooperation between strangers, in 
settings where familiarity is low, and when it comes to trust as a mediated quality where 
familiarity is constructed over distance.  
 
Zucker (1986) explores trust in economic relationships and on a macro level, and this 
elaboration on trust as a concept has relevance for understanding the construction of trust as a 
general social process. Trust can be categorised into three forms based on the modes of trust 
production (Zucker 1986:60). The trust forms are process, characteristic, and institutional 
based trust. According to Zucker is process based trust tied to past or expected exchange, and 
reputation, brands and gift giving are the main sources of this form of trust. Characteristic 
based trust is tied to the person and to close relations, it is ascribed on the basis of family 
background, ethnicity, gender, or nationality. Institutional based trust is non-personal trust 
and tied to formal social structures and intermediate organisations, and will be further 
discussed in the next chapter about structural trust. The three trust forms have three 
dimensions: basis, source and measures. Basis is what the trust is tied to respectively; 
exchange, person, and formal structures.  Source of trust refers to the basis for familiarity 
such as reputation and brands, family background and ethnicity, and professional associations 
and bureaucracy.  Measures of trust are related to trust as a commodity and whether there is a 
market for trust and the possibility for purchasing trust. According to Zucker (1986) process 
based trust is person or firm specific and is therefore not readily transferable. Persons or firms 
have to invest time, effort or money to develop a positive reputation or an attractive brand, 
that is process based trust. Characteristic based trust is a free trust, characteristics are ascribed 
and cannot be purchased, in contrast to institutional trust, which can be purchased; for 
example insurance or education leading to a professional title such as a medical doctor. The 
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generation of the composite concept of trust is inspired by Zucker’s (1986) trust forms and 
discussion of trust and socio economic change.  
 
The composite concept of trust refers to three social bases; pre-contractual, relational and 
structural, and the corresponding forms of trust – pre-contractual, relational and structural 
trust. The relational and structural forms of trust have some resemblance to characteristic and 
institution based trust, but the rest of the conceptualisation is somewhat different from Zucker 
(1986). The social bases referred to in the composite concept of trust are generated through 
various social processes. The pre-contractual base for trust is acquired through socialisation, 
the relational base through interaction and the structural base through institutionalisation. 
These three social processes are related to different analytical levels. Socialisation is a process 
where actors internalise social scripts and codes, interaction takes place between actors, and 
institutionalisation is the generation of larger systems of meaning which embraces societies 
and cultures. Development of trust takes place across these levels. As mentioned previously; 
the leap of faith is a psychological process, a decision with a social basis, and the social 
elements such as interaction and formal structures have different emphasis in each trust 
process – that is different social configuration – depending on the empirical context of the 
trust process.     
 
The empirical grounding of the composite concept of trust demonstrates that the relational 
basis for trust includes more than one form of familiarity. Inspired by Zucker’s modes of trust 
production (1986:60), three main forms of familiarity are suggested here as elements in the 
basis for developing relational trust. These are achieved familiarity; that is familiarity 
developed from experience and past or on-going interaction, ascribed familiarity; this form of 
familiarity is linked to family, kinship, common ethnic or religious background or subculture, 
and mediated familiarity; which is a form of perceived familiarity communicated and 
generated through media or a middle man as intermediaries.66  The three forms of familiarity 
are not mutual excluding. They are analytical constructs and sensitising concepts for further 
exploration of the social bases for expectations and mutual understanding.  
 
The thesis focuses on the characteristics of the social basis as sources of trust. The social basis 
are the foundation for the interaction process, for predictions and expectations, for developing 
                                                 
66 Hawala banking is an example of mediated familiarity; see chapter 11 about trust configurations.  
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mutual understanding and the leap of faith, and provide a bridge between the individual and a 
greater community. The social bases are not static; they are under continuous influence from 
social activity, but how and to what extent the basis is influenced by a particular activity, is an 
empirical question. The composition of the social bases of trust in a particular situation is the 
social configuration of trust.  Social change and transformation will affect the social 
configuration of trust and this will be further discussed in chapter 11. Analyses of the 
elements in the trust bases will provide insight in how trust is generated and how it can be 
maintained and repair.   
 
9.3 Mediated familiarity – an expanding social basis  
According to Zucker (1986:60) process based trust is based on exchange, and the sources of 
trust are reputation, brands and gift-giving.67 Reputation and brands are mediated sources of 
trust. Mediated sources of trust are the basis for and generate a feeling of familiarity 
independent of physical or relational proximity, which is the traditional basis for familiarity. 
Mediated familiarity is a form of relational trust, based on a sense of proximity to something 
which is distant. The term mediated familiarity embraces some relevant social processes 
which seem to have increasing importance as foundations of trust. 
 
Mediated familiarity is based on information and knowledge and communicated first and 
foremost through media such as for instance the Internet, newspapers and television, but can 
also be spread by word of mouth. Mediated bases for trust are gaining ground; they create a 
distant familiarity based on an assumed confirmation of expectations and an assumed, 
unilateral mutual understanding. Negative information can undermine the trust based on 
mediated familiarity.  
 
A good reputation can, for instance, be characterised as mediated trust. Marketing and brand 
building are efforts to create a good reputation and build trust to a product through mediated 
communication. Private businesses use marketing, logos, labels and social media (for instance 
Facebook, You Tube and Tweets) to communicate advantages, values, and ethical standards 
to the customer, and to create a feeling of familiarity between the customer and the product. 
Branding and marketing strategies aim to develop familiarity and a pre-contractual basis for 
                                                 
67 Gift-giving was perhaps more prevalent in traditional societies and tribal societies as basis for process based 
trust.   
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the customer’s trust by telling the customer what she can expect from the company or the 
product. This mediated information is also a basis for interaction and development of a 
relationship with the customer.  
 
Huge international brands, such as Coca Cola and Mc Donalds, are examples of labels 
familiar to billions of consumers who have some element of pre-contractual trust in these 
companies as a platform for development of relational trust. Consumers take for granted that 
these products are acceptable and desirable wherever they are sold, and their familiarity is 
built on standardisation and recognition. However in recent times, the pre-contractual trust in 
these global labels has been somewhat undermined, partly because of anti-American and anti-
globalisation attitudes, partly because of the poor nutritional value of the products, and partly 
because of environmentally damaging ways of producing these products (Klein 2001). This 
illustrates that trust cannot be taken for granted, but has to be continuously maintained. 
 
Trust in politicians is mediated and to some extent structurally based. Public trust in leaders, 
pop stars or other famous people is based on mediated information and probably a dash of 
cultural homogeneity. As specialisation increases, various functions are outsourced to 
strangers and the potential range for mediated familiarity and trust is expanded. Encounters 
with strangers are a pervasive feature of everyday life. Customers and clients accept that 
strangers, such as customer advisers and clerks, handle their most private affairs. The clerks’ 
task is to create familiarity and function as trust mediators between the product and the 
customer. Public authorities communicate through information brochures, service 
declarations, and web pages to establish a basis for familiarity and make the general public 
trust their services. Media such as newspapers, gossip magazines, TV, and the Internet 
contribute to a break-down in the barrier between the public and the private. Famous (and less 
famous) people from entertainment as well as politics are frequently presented in media, 
where people ‘encounter’ them and get access to the private details of their lives and doings. 
This creates a mediated familiarity which is the basis for a mediated relational trust. In the 
long run, this can develop into a pre-contractual trust.  
 
Is mutual understanding possible in one-sided relations where familiarity is ascribed or 
mediated? This form of mutual understanding is not the same as a relational quality, rather it 
is a personal assurance based on the perception or feeling of confirmation generated from the 
impressions of the other. For instance, trust in politicians can be based on their ability to 
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communicate through media, their dialogues and interaction with people and potential voters. 
Relational trust in the bank or an airline is similarly dependent upon the organisations’ ability 
to communicate with their customers through marketing and interaction. The organisations 
must clarify their promises about what customers can expect from them and how these 
promises can be fulfilled through the interaction with the organisation. The fulfilment is 
enacted by the service of the customer adviser and the crew in the airline, by punctuality and 
acceptable technical standards as well as by the way unforeseen problems are managed. 
Personal service and interaction are the building blocks in the development of relational trust, 
and are crucial when customers experience unexpected situations such as delays in airline 
transportation or changes in prices for bank services. Trust is ‘infectious’ – if personnel in an 
organisation are unable to develop or maintain trust in relation to the customers (relational 
trust is undermined), or technical standards are not met (there is a lack of structural trust), this 
will ‘infect’ the trust in the company, and thus spread among potential and actual customers 
and even to other organisations of the same kind, like other banks (Nordnes 1993).      
 
9.4 Ascribed familiarity – a diminishing quality? 
The second type of familiarity that features as an element in relational trust is ascribed 
familiarity. Ascribed familiarity can also be based on distant familiarity such as mediated 
familiarity, but the social processes for generating familiarity are different. Ascribed 
familiarity can be taken for granted and included in the pre-contractual basis for trust and is 
activated in the development of relational trust.  
 
Ascribed familiarity refers to ascribed characteristics and information about social similarity 
such as family, kin, tribe, ethnicity, religion, gender and similar forms of identity based 
community.68 One is born into ascribed familiarity and this is based on the assumption that, 
for instance ethnicity, biology and kin are basis for common binding norms and rules. This 
form of ascribed familiarity is based on a collective “we” as distinguished from “the others” 
and represents a potential basis for exclusion of those outside the community. Exclusion can 
be a barrier in cross-cultural cooperation, one’s own culture is the familiar “we” and a pre-
contractual basis different from the “others”. Cooperation across cultures is about moving 
beyond the “us and – them” distinction and interacting despite different pre-contractual 
                                                 
68 The notion ’strong evaluations’ (Seligman 2000) mentioned in the preceding chapter, resembles ascribed 
familiarity as both notions refer to common, identity based normative orientations.  
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foundations. In these situations little can be taken for granted, and a new common pre-
contractual basis has to be developed step by step, through repeated interaction, dialogue, and 
mutual confirmations. These are necessary to acknowledge that there is something in 
common. These gradual developments of relational trust will strengthen over time and enlarge 
the common pre-contractual basis for trust. Gradually, a new basis for familiarity is 
developed, but this familiarity is achieved, not ascribed.  
 
A regal example  
In addition to ascribed familiarity founded on identity and community, the social positions of 
nobility and royalty are foundations for ascribed familiarity and the subsequent trust based on 
this. Ascribed trust is linked to the expectation that people in these positions of power attend 
to responsibilities and fiduciary obligations related to their social positions. One example of 
ascribed trust, is trust in the monarchy, specifically that of trust in the Norwegian King 
Harald.  
 
The monarchy is an example of the interaction between various bases for trust. Trust in the 
Royal Family is based on ascribed familiarity; they are born into a regal system that is known 
and trusted. In addition, there is a structural basis, a formal legal structure that secures the 
legitimacy of the monarchy. The long-term survival of the monarchy is dependent on 
maintenance of trust, and to maintain the people’s trust, the Royal Family has to develop 
relational trust, mainly on a mediated basis.  
 
Development of relational trust is even more necessary if the royals marry a commoner. New 
members of the Royal Family have no ascribed familiarity and trust; they have to develop a 
new basis for familiarity. The marriage between a royal and a commoner is a basis for 
structural trust; in addition the new member of the Royal Family has to earn trust through 
working with the pre-contractual trust basis and mediated relational trust. This is an on-going 
process in the Norwegian monarchy and is an additional example of the dynamics of trust 
processes.  
 
The Norwegian crown Prince Haakon fell in love with a common girl, a single mother with a 
somewhat questionable past. Her entry into the Royal Family can be analysed as an encounter 
between different forms of trust and the development of a new configuration of trust bases. 
Her past raised discussions whether she was appropriate as a future queen or not. The 
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people’s trust in the monarchy was challenged. The Royal Court, media, the bishop of Oslo 
and the young royal couple worked hard to develop a new image of her to fit better with her 
role as a crown princess. This means to develop an acceptable basis for familiarity and 
relation based trust. The new image of the crown princess was a narrative emphasising her as 
a caring mother and the people’s Crown Princess; a Norwegian princess Diana. The public 
discourse on this subject was a reflexive process of reconfiguration of the role of the Royal 
Family and the monarchy, about what we could expect of them, how they should behave and 
shape their role in the society.  
 
This process is a reconstruction of the bases for trust in the monarchy and now, a decade on, 
and after most intensive debates, it appears that the redefinition has been successful. The 
Crown Princess appears to fit very well into her new role, at last. She has built her own basis 
of mediated familiarity and relational trust based on openness to media and interaction with 
various groups of people. But mediated trust does not seem to be as strong as the ascribed. 
Opinion polls indicate for instance, that the Norwegian Queen Sonja does not have the same 
level of trust as her husband, King Harald. Queen Sonja is a commoner, but is described in the 
media as very competent and hard-working, despite this, her popularity scores are 10 to 15 
percent lower than the King. It appears that as long as the royals behave as expected among 
people, trust is maintained – both relational trust based on familiarity and structural trust in 
the monarchy as a power structure, but it also demonstrates that the trust is conditioned and 
fragile.     
 
Trust in political leadership can have an element of ascribed familiarity, for instance trust in 
politicians from political dynasties such as the Gerhardsen or Stoltenberg family in Norway 
and the Kennedys’ in the U.S.A. The ascribed familiarity is an initial pre-contractual basis for 
trust, but politicians are dependent on continuous maintenance of constituent trust. This trust 
has to be maintained on a relational basis, though political activity and interaction with the 
constituencies, as a process of mediated and interaction based familiarity.  
 
Finally there is a question about whether ascribed familiarity has diminishing importance as 
basis for trust in the late modern society. The answer to this question is not obvious, but needs 
to be further explored on an empirical basis. On first sight it appears that some of the identity 
markers for ascribed familiarity, such as family, religion and kinship have lost ground in 
Western societies. On the other hand religious sub groups with strong (zealotical) engagement 
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and ethnicity based groups appear to have expanded. In non-Western societies the importance 
of kinship, family, kin, tribe, ethnicity, religion, and gender is undergoing transformation, and 
it is difficult to point out a particular pattern in these transformations – the pace of 
modernisation is too uneven and differs both regionally and nationally.  
 
Ascribed trust – a barrier for economic development  
Ascribed trust can have an economic impact. According to Fukuyama (1995) there is a 
distinction between low-trust and high-trust societies, and a connexion between sociability – 
the ability to develop social relations – and economic organisation. Low-trust societies are 
characterised by strong family and kinship ties, of particularistic relations but weak or no 
external ties. Ascribed relational trust is the prevailing form of trust. This means that there can 
be strong trust among the insiders but no or very little trust in outsiders; there is no common 
pre-contractual basis between these two groups. The lack of trust functions as a barrier for 
interaction between insiders and outsiders, a barrier that limits economic development. High-
trust societies have a wide basis for pre-contractual trust supported by structural trust, and 
have no or few relational barriers between insiders and outsiders or between internal and 
external economy. Transactions flow regardless of social ties and belonging. The sociability 
of these societies can be characterised by ‘the strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973). 
According to Granovetter, weak social ties have an integrative effect in the society, while 
strong social ties have an excluding effect on those outside the ties.   
 
Ascribed trust, particularistic relations and barriers between internal and external economy are 
characteristic of pre-modern occidental societies (Weber 1978), which can be characterised as 
low-trust societies. Modernisation transformed Western societies to high-trust societies 
(Fukuyama 1995). The Christian religion was an important component in this and facilitated 
economic growth by lifting barriers between insiders and outsiders (Collins 1992:93). 
Removing the barrier between insiders and outsiders’ means instituting a new pre-contractual 
basis for trust where ascribed familiarity is not the only basis for familiarity.   
 
A non-dualistic ethic, calculable commercial law, and rational bureaucracy are some of the 
intermediate conditions for development of rational capitalism. This growth of a universalistic 
rationale allowed the development of trust on a wider basis than ascribed trust (Collins 1992, 
Fukuyama 1995, Weber 1978). The Protestant ethic was a moral superstructure that, 
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combined with universalistic, formal structures such as commercial law and rational 
bureaucracy, functioned as a basis for trade and structural trust.69  
 
Religion as a basis for ascribed trust, relational trust, can function as an obstacle to economic 
growth. In economies with a religious basis that distinguishes between internal and external 
economies, between insiders and outsiders, there can be complete ruthlessness and 
unscrupulousness in trade with the external economy (Weber 1995:267). There are no 
obligations to trust or commit to the other. The reliance on ascribed trust functions as barriers 
against external economic transactions. The clan economy in China and the caste economy in 
India are examples of this (Fukuyama 1995). Tribe and clan economies have a common 
internal basis for pre-contractual trust in addition to relational trust, either developed through 
face to face interaction or ascribed. This trust is not extended to external partners; the 
economy is not based on structural trust mechanisms, neither internally or externally. Even 
today, the barrier between internal and external economies is to some extent still functioning 
in the relationship between the traditional oriented Muslim economies and Western 
capitalism; the trusting heritage of the clan economy is still active to some extent. As stated 
on the Internet page Questions on Islam: ‘It is permissible to make trade with non-Muslims. 
We can prefer Muslims if there are Muslims who buy and sell the same things’.70   
 
Another example of the interaction between various forms of trust and transformation of trust 
bases is the organisation of credit among Frafra migrants in the city slum of Accra, the capital 
city of Ghana (Hart 1990). The migrants formed a separate economic community where credit 
had to be based on friendship and interaction based trust as different from ascribed trust based 
on kinship, which would have been the traditional basis for trust among Frafra people. 
Kinship ties did not fit in with the new migrant community, and the migrants did not have 
access to the formal credit system based on contracts and structural trust. In addition, Frafras 
were not familiar with contracts and formal structures as basis for trust, papers and signatures 
did not have any binding power among them. Face to face interaction combined with 
friendship and personal commitment became the new basis for trust. When replacing kinship 
ties with friendship, the obligation became an individual responsibility between two parties, 
and not a matter for the tribe.  
                                                 
69 Development of social bases for structural trust will be further discussed in the next chapter.   
70 http://www.questionsonislam.com/question/international-trade-permissible-islam (04.10.13) 
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To sum up, relational trust is based on various forms of familiarity generated through 
achievement, ascription or mediation. Achieved familiarity will be further discussed in the 
next section. Familiarity based on lineage, clan, tribe, ethnicity, or gender is ascribed and can 
be one-sided; a feeling of belonging, or bilateral; that the belonging is confirmed by the larger 
group. The third basis of familiarity is mediated, either as knowledge transferred through 
various media or based on interactive exchange of knowledge through the Internet. The three 
sources of familiarity are based on different forms of relations; they represent different forms 
of knowledge and pre-contractual assumptions, and they are generated through different 
social processes. Mediated familiarity is the basis of trust created over distance, ascribed 
familiarity can form strong social ties, and achieved trust is based on interaction and is an 
element in everyday activities. 
 
Social change means that new ways are needed to organise the social construction of trust. 
The analytical tools for studying trust processes have to make visible the transformation of 
trust bases and changes in trust configuration. Processes such as the shift from ascribed to 
relational based familiarity and the development of structural bases for trust, are indicators of 
social modernisation. Modernisation indicates that low-trust societies based on the prevalence 
of ascribed trust have been transformed to high-trust societies with multiple bases for trust, 
and a diminishing role of ascribed familiarity. Hypothetically, if groups based on ascribed 
familiarity significantly expanded in a high trust society, might this transform the high-trust 
society into a low-trust society? This is a question about whether the trust effects of 
modernisation can be reversed, and needs further empirical exploration.   
    
The rest of this chapter elaborates on various aspects of the third basis for relational trust, the 
achieved trust, which can be described as interaction and experienced based trust. The focus is 
on how to analyse interaction as an element in the social construction of trust. Development 
of trust through interaction is an ordinary and continuous social activity that maintains or 
weakens pre-contractual and relational trust depending on the outcome of the interaction and 
the nature of the relationship. Interaction can also be a platform for innovative action, for 
expanding the area of familiarity through negotiation and creation of new bases for trust. In 
situations of role interstices, - situations where defined role expectations are no longer viable 
(Seligman 2000) or in cross cultural contact, interaction opens possibilities for development 




9.5 Relational trust and expectations – a model of expectations 
The rest of this chapter is an exploration of how trust is generated and unfolds as a micro level 
social process. Relational trust and the development of its various forms are basic social 
processes and provide the foundation of social life and interaction. Classical sociological 
concepts such as roles and expectations are useful tool to analyse how these general social 
processes unfold and how they contribute to development of trust.  
 
Trust is at stake in situations where ‘systemically defined role expectations are no longer 
viable’ (Seligman 2000:25), in situations where role performance is changing and there is role 
negotiability. These kinds of situations create open spaces of roles and expectations, spaces 
for negotiation and change. Open spaces are situations where there are differences in 
expectations and where mutual understanding is low or absent. Analyses of open spaces as 
contexts for trust and change demand a further investigation of expectations and this is the 
focus in the rest of this chapter.  
 
Trust and expectations  
Expectations have been discussed previously in relation to prediction of future actions. In the 
following section, expectations are explored in relation to the process of developing trust and 
a model for analysing the role expectations in the social construction of trust will be 
presented.  
 
Trust ‘is defined as a set of expectations shared by all those involved in an exchange’ (Zucker 
1986:54). With reference to Schutz (1962) and Garfinkel (1963), Zucker suggests two 
defining components in trust: background expectations and constitutive expectations (Zucker 
1986:57, 58). Background expectations are the common understandings that are ‘taken for 
granted’ and related to ‘the attitude of everyday life’. They are standardised attitudes and 
codes of everyday life. These forms of expectations are not specific to any situation in 
particular, but serve as general, practical, and normative framework for action and behaviour. 
Background expectations include reciprocity of perspectives, which means sharing the same 
frame of reference. From my point of view, reciprocity of perspectives can be interpreted to 
mean the same as assuming that there is mutual understanding and that the other will confirm 
and act in accordance with this. Constitutive expectations are contextual and related to a 
particular social setting: a sector, an exchange, or an interaction; and are characterised by the 
independence of persons, independence of intersubjective meaning, and independence of self-
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interest. By independence of self-interest Zucker means that the expectations are related to 
structural elements such as professional role, and not to the individual qualities of the person 
in the role.  
 
In this thesis the use of and content of the terms background and constitutive expectations are 
inspired by Zucker, but differ somewhat from Zucker’s use of them. Both background and 
constitutive expectations are elements in the pre-contractual basis for trust. As discussed 
previously, trust is more than expectations. Trust is a belief in and reliance on one’s own 
expectations and the others confirmation of them, and a belief in the other’s ability to keep the 
social promises. Trusting is a way of eliminating a perceived risk, an effect of the leap of 
faith, and based on mutual understanding which has a social basis. This social basis for trust, 
including background expectations and constitutive expectations, in addition to mutual 
understanding is developed through interaction and the other’s confirmation of one’s 
expectations.   
 
Confirmation of mutual understanding does not mean total agreement or total understanding. 
It is only an acknowledgement that there is a necessary set of common rules that need to be 
fulfilled. Mutual understanding presupposes an acceptable level of reciprocity, for the actors, 
of perspectives and intersubjective meaning. This level is a subjective construct and cannot be 
decided analytically; it is an individual element in trust. But the bases for mutual 
understanding can be explored analytically; this is the social input in the trust process and 
consists of pre-contractual, relational and structural elements as the platform for suspending 
doubt. A study of trust involves a study of the content of these elements, and expectations 
related to the relevant social context. The empirical exploration of expectations in the trust 
process can be presented as a model, a table of expectations.   
 
9.6 A model of expectations  
An actor has to make assumptions and expectations and act as if the other can be trusted, 
expectations are the key to social interaction and trust, they are based on familiarity and guide 
social behaviour. Trust is contextual, and behaviour and attitudes that are appropriate in one 
context can be inappropriate in another. To be trusted requires appropriate behaviour with 
regard to general and specific expectations. Studies of trust development, undermining of trust 
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and trust repair therefore demand examination of the nature of unfulfilled expectations and 
how an anticipated mutual understanding is not met.  
 
In analyses of social interaction at the micro level it is therefore useful to specify and 
characterise the content of expectations beyond background and constitutive expectations. In 
addition there are specific and unspecific expectations. The terms specific and unspecific are 
used as sensitising concepts (Blumer 1954), to guide what to look for, and they are inspired 
by Parsons (1979) pattern variables which describe value orientations. Here the terms refer to 
the content of expectations. Unspecific  expectations mean that these expectations are related 
to tacit elements of social interaction; to attitudes, norms, values, and non-quantified 
standards.71 Unspecific expectations can be difficult to define and articulate, they are 
normative and can be specific on some values; for instance that killing, stealing or lying is 
wrong. Then there can be difficult to decide when one is honest or dishonest, for instance 
what characterises honesty in a particular context. Specific expectations are related to action 
and practice; they are about rules, rights, procedures, and other more tangible and specified 
elements in social interaction. In this context is background and constitutive expectations are 
related to general cultural context and specific settings, respectively. Specific and unspecific 
expectations are related respectively to visible practises and assumptions about values and 
norms.   
 
Social interaction includes all four types of expectations, but they are more or less prevalent. 
Most expectations are characterised by both specific and unspecific elements. They are about 
how action and practices should unfold as well as about which attitudes, norms and values 
that should guide action and practices. Specific expectations are related to roles and 
unspecific expectations are related to social behaviour and motivations in general. Stereotypes 
(for instance about gender, religion and culture) are deep social structures, involving mainly 
tacit and taken for granted assumptions about behaviour and norms. Such stereotypes can be 
categorised as unspecific background expectations.  
 
Expectations are complex; they are about what to do as well as what not to do. A phenomenon 
is comprehended in relation to something that it differs from (Bateson 1985, Luhmann 1979). 
For instance, when we characterise somebody as a child, we simultaneously say that she is not 
                                                 
71 The Norwegian word uspesifisert which means not clearly defined, is translated by me into the term 
unspecified.       
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an adult. When we have expectations, they are not only about what to do – in addition there 
are a lot of implicit and taken for granted expectations about what not to do, in a particular 
situation as well as in general. There are a lot of tacit social codes and the not to do codes are 
probably less explicit than the to do codes. In interaction actors have to take this into 
consideration, what to expect the other to do and not to do. To maintain our trust the other has 
to fulfil both kinds of expectations acceptably. From this perspective, social interaction is 
very complex and strategies for social prediction such as expectations, social scripts, and what 
can be taken for granted are highly necessary to reduce the social complexity.  
 
In order to analyse empirically how trust is developed or weakened, one strategy is to analyse 
the expectations of the interacting actors. The categorisation of expectations into four 
different types comprise the analytical labels and elements in social prediction, they are 
neither mutually exclusive nor complementary. Together, they can be categorised into a 
fourfold table as a tool to analyse and explain the interaction between different kinds of 
expectations and the development of trust. Empirical data indicates that context determines 
whether the expectations in all the four categories have to be sufficiently fulfilled to maintain 
trust.  
 
The following table summarises different aspects of expectations that unfold in social 
relations. The table represents the outcome of analyses of empirical material (Nordnes 1993), 
it is an empirically grounded conceptualisation of expectations inspired and supported by 
sociological theory.   
 
Table 2  Model of expectations   
 Specific expectations; related to 
practice  
Unspecific expectations;  
tacit, related to attitude  
Constitutive expectations; 
defining a particular 
context 
1) Practical “how to do this” 
rules, routines and procedures 
in particular settings, visible 
action  
3) Contextual, normative 
expectations to behaviour  
in the particular setting 
Background expectations; 
social behaviour in general 
2) Normative, general “how to 
behave in this particular setting” 
rules for action, codes for 
communication and 
interpretation 
4) Common, general social 





The model provides four different qualities of expectations: background and constitutive, 
specific and diffuse.72 The four section table organises the kinds of expectations which are 
more or less prevalent in social interaction. The squares number 1 to 4 describe the level of 
expectations, from the visible  surface of actions (square 1) to deep structural tacit cultural 
values and norms (square 4). Constitutive expectations are first and foremost related to the 
social role, while background expectations are first and foremost related to the personal 
attitude.  
 
The table is relevant as a tool to examine in depth the social location of a breakdown of trust. 
This knowledge is relevant to the process of restoration of trust; to develop new 
configurations of social bases for trust. The next section discussing empirical examples will 
clarify this further. 
 
Examples and further discussion of the expectation model  
Development of relational trust is about fulfilment of expectations and tacitly assumed social 
promises. One example is being a customer in an expensive fashion store. In this setting, the 
tacit promises are helpful staff, good advices, and quality service (on the premise that the 
customer looks wealthy). On the specific level, this includes expectations about acceptable 
service in this context, such as help and skilled advice (square 1). In addition, the customer 
has expectations about a pleasant attitude from the staff (square 2). Politeness (square 3) and 
other general norms such as honesty (square 4) are more or less taken for granted.73  
 
This set of expectations demonstrates the tacit promises that the customer expects and that an 
expensive fashion store will fulfil. Entering this kind of shop, one assumes that there is a 
mutual understanding about this tacit promise; it is the social basis for expectations about how 
the promise can be fulfilled and how trust maintained. During interaction the customer will 
decide whether the expectations are sufficiently confirmed and experience whether there is 
sufficient mutual understanding. If so, she makes the leap of faith and maintains trust in this 
shop. If the expectations are insufficiently fulfilled, for instance if the staff did not show a 
pleasant attitude and the interaction revealed that there was not a mutual understanding of 
                                                 
72 These are related respectively to two of Parsons Pattern variables; diffuseness (unspecified) and specificity 
(specific). Diffuse expectations can in be specific in one sense, for instance expectations about what not to do 
and about moral norms in various situations, but here the notions diffuse points to that these forms of 
expectations are usually tacit, taken for granted and not specified. 
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acceptable attitude towards customers, then the shop has broken an important element of the 
promise. The effect is an undermining of trust, and in the next shopping event, this shop is 
avoided. (The risk in this case is rather low for the customer, who can choose another store, 
but the example illustrates the outcome of different expectations.)    
 
The development and maintenance of trust related to normative expectations are connected to 
the symbolic system, culture and norms in a society. Unspecific expectations are fulfilled by 
interpretation of the symbolic aspects of actions as well as by attitudes communicated through 
performance. Specific expectations are about action and practice and how routines, rules, 
duties, and tasks are performed. These can be specified in contracts and agreements; they can 
be technical, instrumental or quantitative routines or procedures. Lack of mutual 
understanding of norms and how they ought to be practised in a social situation may cause 
value conflicts. These kinds of conflicts are difficult to solve; they can undermine trust, 
generate distrust and result in exit from a relationship (Hirschman 1970, Barber 1983, Lipset 
1983).  
 
The classification of expectations is relevant when examining erosion of trust, generation of 
mistrust, and restoration of trust. Is crumbling trust a result of lack of mutual understanding, 
of poorly performed procedures, unexpected changes to the rules, or an unexpected deviance 
in performed attitudes and values? What is the outcome if the diffuse expectations are 
fulfilled and the specific expectations are broken – or vice versa? These matters have to be 
investigated empirically. Empirical case data indicates that erosion of trust because of broken 
unspecific expectations is harder to restore than if it is caused by broken specific expectations 
(Nordnes 1993, Weber & Carter 2003). This needs further investigation, but data indicated 
that as unspecific expectations were related to norms and values and to moral standards and 
the violation of these seemed to be harder to accept and trust more difficult to restore.  
 
According to Weber & Carter (2003:147) dignity and self-respect reside at the core of the 
person, to trust is to presuppose that one shares moral standards. In social interaction moral 
standards are activated as unspecific expectations. It is likely that violations of these 
expectations, (located in square 3 and 4 in the table of expectations), will hurt our core 
feelings. These feelings are harder to restore than a disappointment caused by violation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
73 Honesty in the sense that your handbag is safe in front of the staff, but not necessarily absolute honesty when 
it comes to comments about your look and style.  
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rules or procedures, they are more specific (located in square 1 and 2 in the table) and related 
to task and role rather than the self. In addition, unspecific expectations can be difficult to 
make explicit and thereby it is difficult to know how to restore this trust violation. 
      
9.7 Additional examples of the expectation model 
The square numbers 1- 4 in the table indicate the “emotional depth” of expectations and 
familiarity activated in an interaction. In some situations, for instance in quick encounters 
between strangers, expectations are activated on square 1-2 level. Or in other words: one 
expects mutual understanding on level 1-2. Expectations on level 3-4 are not activated unless 
something very odd happens. Terrorism, for instance, represents a severe disruption of taken 
for granted expectations on level 3-4, and this may affect basic trust for people affected as 
well as others basic trust. 
 
In enduring relations, such as in marriage and family relations, expectations can be activated 
in all four squares. It likely to assume that there is some flexibility with regard to fulfilment of 
expectations in square 1 and 2, but ruptures in squares 3 and in particular in 4 can be harder to 
accept. Breach of trust in love and friendship are hard to restore (Weber & Carter 2003). 
Kissing a person other than your partner late in the night will probably for most people 
represent a rupture of expectations in square 1-3 as well as in square 4 for many of us.  
 
In some situations, for instance in customer relationships where a customer receives bad 
treatment, rupture of expectations in square 1 can be accepted as long as those in 2-4 are 
fulfilled. In other situations, rupture in square 1 is sufficient to choose exit and not trust.  
 
The ethical trend in business is one example of the complexity in customer trust relationships. 
In the Autumn 2006 a journalist and former employee of The Norwegian celebrity gossip 
magazine Se og hør74 published a book revealing and criticising the somewhat unethical 
working methods of the magazine. Some months later the magazine had a huge drop in their 
advertising incomes, a drop of 18 percent in the first quarter of 2007.75 Several large 
advertisers had chosen exit, and some of them were quite explicit about why: they want to 
support publications that comply with the ethical principles of the press. The magazine had 
                                                 
74 ‘Look and listen’, my translation 
75 The newspaper Dagens Næringsliv 20.06.07 
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broken this implicit promise, they did not follow these principles, and customers lost their 
trust the magazine. When the unethical methods were revealed, this infringed on general 
normative expectations, square 4 in the model, in addition to ethical press standards, square 3, 
and the magazine experienced that customers choose exit. The exit can be related to broken 
expectations in square 3-4, while expectations in square 1-2 were fulfilled as the numbers of 
print were high and any other dissatisfaction with magazine was not publicly articulated. 
 
The example illustrates that social expectations are complex and the kind of expectations that 
are broken have significance for the generation of trust. The empirical material indicates that 
unfulfilled mutual understanding based on expectations in square 1, the specific constitutive 
expectations, can hamper development of trust and lead to exit, for instance in customer 
relations, but infringement of these expectations is the least harmful in relation to restoring 
trust. If the interaction continues in spite of infringed expectations and undermining of initial 
mutual understanding, mutual understanding can be restored through negotiation and 
clarifying. This appears to be the case also when mutual understanding of specific 
expectations related to general behaviour is not confirmed. If the interaction continues, mutual 
understanding can be developed and trust can be maintained.  
 
Fulfilments of specific expectations can to some extent be a tangible process, a task is 
performed according to procedures. Social interaction with a low level of familiarity seems 
first and foremost to activate expectations in square 1 and 2, and trust is developed based on 
step by step confirmation of mutual understanding of specific expectations. With regard to 
unspecific expectations about contextual norms and attitudes, square 3, and general norms, 
square 4, these may or may not be activated by interaction. Data seems to indicate that mutual 
understanding is mainly taken for granted or not activated at all when it comes to diffuse 
expectations (Nordnes 1993, Ellingsen & Lotherington 2008). But if tacit expectations are 
activated and infringed, it can be damaging for the generation of trust and difficult to restore 
it. Values, norms, and attitudes are challenging to negotiate; they are developed over time and 
change slowly.            
 
A few more examples may contribute to further clarification of the model. A relationship 
between bank and customer is characterised by specific, constitutive expectations about how 
bank procedures and bank performances are conducted. For example, that the bank is 
checking credibility and signing contracts are activities related to expectations in square 1. In 
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addition, there are unspecific, constitutive expectations that the bank will behave in 
accordance with economic rationality, relating to square 3, and there will be unspecific, 
normative background expectations about attitudes and norms communicated through the 
bank’s performance, such as behaving honestly, linked to square 4. In addition, there will be 
specific background expectations related to ordinary behaviour in general, such as not 
shouting or making faces at the customers, and this fits with square 2.  
 
In analyses of the development of trust in customer or client relations, the table illustrates 
which kinds of expectations are broken. If, for instance, a nurse is caring without empathy, 
the patient’s trust could be damaged if the patient expected care with empathy – this is 
unspecific, contextual expectations in square 3 (and may be 4). But undermined trust is not 
necessarily the case. The patient could be aware that today’s nursing does not involve care 
with empathy, but is only about fulfilment of particular tasks without an emotional element, 
and there is a mutual understanding about fulfilment of specific expectations, squares 1 and 2. 
Service declarations, aims and various rules and standards are examples of attempts to 
describe and clarify bases for expectations and make it possible to develop new mutual 
understandings.  
 
The divide between law and justice is another example of diffuse and specific expectations 
and the interaction between them. The law is the written rules and regulations; justice is about 
norms and values. Even though a decision is right according to sections and articles, it might 
be wrong according to a general view of justice. In such a case, specific expectations may be 
fulfilled while the unspecific are broken, which again may lead to erosion of  trust in the legal 
system.   
 
In these analyses of various trust processes and composition of expectations, it is a basic 
assumption that the generation or undermining of trust depends on whether expectations are 
sufficiently fulfilled to make the leap of faith or whether they are infringed. In one sense, this 
is an empirical question. It will vary whether people feel that their expectations are 
sufficiently fulfilled to make the leap of faith or not. If the gap between the expectations in a 
particular social situation and what is actually happening, is perceived to be too large, trust 
will be undermined. By specifying the elements in the expectations and the fulfilment of 
them, the model can contribute to a useful investigation about trust infringement and how to 




To sum up: relational trust develops or weakens in social processes when expectations are 
interpreted and transformed to action and interaction. Trust involves A’s belief in B’s 
motivation and willingness to comply with the obligations A attributes to her/him. To make 
the leap of faith, A assumes, on the basis of confirmation from B, that there is mutual 
understanding, that they share social scripts and that B will act in accordance with this. This 
means that trust is generated and maintained when expectations are fulfilled to a reasonable 
extent, and events proceed as expected.  
 
As long as communication and interaction run as usual and in accordance with social scripts 
and expectations, mutual understanding as well as ones competence as a social actor will be 
confirmed.  
 
9.8 Conclusion: Relational trust and social change    
This chapter has focused on two elements in the social construction of relational trust; 
familiarity and composition expectations. Familiarity can be mediated, ascribed or acquired 
through interaction and experience, it can be an explicit, tacit, and taken for granted element 
in the pre-contractual basis for trust and expectations. Analysis of undermining and 
maintenance of trust demands a further exploration of expectations, their content and the 
extent to which they are fulfilled. To do this, a model of expectations was suggested.        
 
Social change can mean that existing assumptions about how social situations unfold have 
lost their relevance, familiar patterns for action do not fit the situation, and that familiar norms 
and explanations are of less relevance. Mutual understanding may not be confirmed, and it 
becomes difficult to develop trust. In situations of social change, the bases for trust are 
changing.  
 
In previous chapters the notion of ‘open spaces’ (Seligman 2000) was introduced. Open 
spaces are situations of social change and characterised by new action patterns, low 
predictability, and limited familiarity. In these circumstances the development of mutual 
understanding can be demanding. Open spaces means increased social risk and a corollary 
need for trust and trust generating elements. At the same time the basis for this is fragile or 
absent. Seligman (2000:97) observes this as ‘more interstitial spaces with differentiation of 
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roles combined with less ability to impute familiar basis of strong evaluations’, and concludes 
that the actors’ self-reflexivity or group affiliations have to constitute the familiar basis for 
trust. Group affiliation resembles a pre-modern base for ascribed trust according to Seligman 
(2000). It may be so, but group affiliation and similar ascribed foundations for trust are forms 
of familiarity included in the bases for relational trust and are independent of the stage of 
modernisation. It is not unlikely that ascribed familiarity was more prevalent in pre-modern 
times, but it still plays a role. Increasing religious fundamentalism, growth of movements with 
charismatic leaders and mediated familiarity which may transform into ascribed familiarity 
are all possible indicators that ascribed familiarity is expanding, but this needs further 
empirical exploration.    
 
Open spaces are an effect of social change and facilitate social change as they provide 
possibilities for role negotiation and development of new social patterns, they are spaces for 
innovation and transformation, and for development of new bases for mutual understanding. 
Reflexivity, including self-reflexivity, can be an element in the process of making the leap of 
faith. Reflexivity is a precondition for role negotiation, for developing mutual understanding 
and for reconstruction of a common basis for pre-contractual trust. Reconstruction of a 
common basis for trust can be described as ‘a reflexive ordering and reordering of social 
relations’ (Giddens 1993:17), which means that ‘social practices are constantly examined and 
reformed in the light of incoming information of those very practices, thus constitutively 
altering their character’ (Giddens 1993:38).  
 
The continuous reflexivity and renewing of knowledge are elements in the process of social 
reproduction which cause changes in the familiar bases of trust and force a reconfiguration of 
trust bases. Empirically, reconfiguration of trust bases can be observed for instance as intense 
networking efforts, whether face to face or virtually; as disembedding and re-embedding of 
social relations. This social interaction is also about re-creation, clarifying and confirming 
knowledge and developing mutual understanding – and it is necessary to do this re-creation of 
relational bases for trust as continuous processes because of today’s social dynamics. 
Reflexivity and renewing of knowledge affect structural and relational bases for trust; in the 
long run these processes reshape the pre-contractual bases for trust. Mass media is one source 
for communicating a common universe of everyday knowledge, the growth of education is 
another platform for reflexivity, and cross-cultural encounters and religious groups also 
trigger debates about norms and rules for behaviour. Marketing and advertising and the global 
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entertainment culture are other sources for a form of common reflexivity that contributes to a 
reshaping of the common basis of what we take for granted in various situations.   
 
Reconstruction of the social basis for pre-contractual trust is an on-going process and element 
in social change and renewal. The creation of new bases for trust and the institutionalisation 
of these as normal practice are at the core of social change. Open spaces then are 
preconditions for renewal and development. They are arenas and possibilities for developing 
new bases for familiarity, step by step and face to face, through social interaction. This means 
that the maintenance of social interaction, communication, and social arenas are critical in 
situations of social change.  
 
If change is planned, such as for instance organisational reform, an element in the initiation of 
the change process should be information and communication about new strategies, visions, 
and aims, in addition to training, courses, and development of new formal structures and 
routines. Interaction and communication are necessary to develop new patterns and norms for 
action, and as a result new bases for relational trust are developed.  
 
In the long run the new patterns are institutionalised and included in the pre-contractual basis 
for trust, thus becoming new taken for granted ways of acting and interpreting, new relations 
and routines for interaction, and perhaps new formal structures and sanctions. Through these 
processes new bases for developing trust are formed, and as a result the development of new 
expectations. A further investigation of expectations could tell how deep and comprehensive 
changes are. Minor changes and misunderstandings do not necessarily affect trust; it depends 
on individual thresholds for mutual understanding. Deep or very sudden changes may cause 
severe breakdown in trust. It is also possible that changes can increase trust; if the new pattern 
increases the fulfilment of expectations in a positive way. Reconstruction or strengthening of 
a relationship to a friend, a spouse, a colleague or an organisation can be examples of 
increasing trust.   
 
Further analysis of the open spaces and the content of expectations in order to explore 
possible causes for undermining of trust can be done by combining the expectation table and 
various trust bases. Categorisation of expectations can tell whether the problem is related to 
pre-contractual, relational or structural trust bases, what form of familiarity that is at stake and 
the emotional depth and importance of it in the particular situation. This knowledge is critical 
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to restoration of trust, it directs the attention to which expectations that are at stake and have 
to be redefined. 
 
To conclude; maintenance, weakening, and development of trust have to be analysed in 
relation to the kinds of expectations that are broken or fulfilled. Expectations are the key to 
mutual understanding, suspension, and the leap of faith. Using the expectation table facilitates 
a systematic exploration of the various elements in the trust process. This insight can guide 
processes of development, maintenance, and reconstruction of trust.  
 
So far focus has been mainly on trust as a quality at micro level; the next chapter discusses the 









10. STRUCTURAL TRUST 
 
’The contract and its associated system of 
obligations and penalties, enforced  through a legal system, 
could fill the gap where the trust 
naturally found in families did not exist.’76 
– FRANCIS FUKUYAMA        
 
The quotation above is a statement about replacing ascribed relational trust with structural 
trust. The development of formal structures which secure compliance through obligations, 
rules, and regulations is a major social innovation that opens up trust between strangers, and 
expands the possibilities for foreign trade, credit and long-time agreements; that is 
transactions stretching over long time and distance. In the modern society the use of contracts, 
rules, standards, regulations, and explicit formulations of duties and obligations is escalating. 
This thesis contends that the escalation of formalised arrangements reflects an increasing 
demand for structural trust. 
 
The concept structural trust refers here to trust based on formal structures; on non-personal 
elements as a platform for the leap of faith. This form of trust is related to social macro 
structures and is referred to in sociological literature as institutional based trust (Zucker 1986, 
Lane 1998 & Möllering 2006, Bachmann & Inkpen 2011) and systems trust or abstract trust 
(Luhmann 1979, 1990, Barber 1983, Giddens 1993, Lane & Bachman 1996, Deakin, Lane & 
Wilkinson 1997, Sydow 1998 and Seligman 2000). These concepts have much in common 
with what I term structural trust, although the concepts are not totally congruent. Thus, in this 
chpater the development of structural trust is discussed and the distinctions between 
institutional based trust, systems trust and structural trust will be explored in more depth.  
 
In the preceding chapters, mutual understanding is presented as a prerequisite for trusting; it is 
the platform for suspending doubt and the leap of faith. Structures are not mutual; they are at 
best, a means for one-sided communication. Mutual understanding involves a mutual 
acceptance and confirmation of the other’s reading of the situation. When it comes to 
structural trust, the mutual understanding is at a deeper level and exists in the form of 
acceptance and structural legitimacy. It is a pre-contractual, contextual quality which has been 
                                                 
76 Fukuyama 1995:63 
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institutionalised over time through socialisation and experience of stability, durability, 
consistency and transparency. 
 
10.1  Structural bases for trust and modernisation  
Formal structures rooted in legitimate, non-arbitrary power are bases for trusting the unknown 
and establishing trust between strangers.77  Ideally, formal structures are firm and stable; they 
guarantee fulfilment of obligations, contribute to transparency, and can prevent abuse of 
power. A formal structure functions as an explicit promise in a broad sense; a contract or a 
law makes potential promises and obligations explicit and an infringement of these can result 
in sanctions. In relational trust processes an infringement of the social promise, which is the 
basis for trust, can lead to exit from the relationship. The threat of exit functions as a 
preventative against infringement of the promise. When it comes to structural trust, the 
element that assures the promise is the possibility of sanctions. If violations of laws and rules 
are not sanctioned, trust in the formal structures and system of sanctions is undermined, and 
by that, the structural basis for trust.  
 
At their best, structures facilitate predictability and prevent arbitrariness.78 Formal structures 
are the foundations of generalisation of trust, in which trust is based on a non-personal 
foundation. Structurally based trust facilitates predictability beyond the relational and inter-
personal level and is a generalisation of trust from particularistic relations to universal 
structures. Development of social bases for generalisation of trust involves developing 
legitimate formal structures, and this is a historical process; that of modernisation. The 
exploration of structural trust as a concept and social process is therefore also a study of social 
modernisation and trust.  
 
Two perspectives influence the exploration here of modernisation and trust: Giddens’ study of 
The Consequences of Modernity (1993) which includes discussion of the disembedding of 
social relations; and Weber’s studies of General Economic History (1995) and Economy and 
                                                 
77 Technical structures such as for instance Internet, infrastructure for transportation and systems for payment, 
are additional bases for structural trust. These trust bases are a mix of trust in the technical elements and the 
social systems these bases are embedded in. Technical structures as bases for trust will not be further discussed 
as focus here is on formal social structures.   
78 At worst, they may result in rigidity and stagnation, but this is not the focus here. 
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Society (1978).79 Weber’s treatise on economic history and the relationship between economic 
and societal development is an analysis of modernisation, although he uses neither the term 
modernisation nor trust. I interpret these analyses as a history of the premise, key elements, 
and unfolding of modernisation as a social process which involves the transition from two to 
three social bases for trust; from pre-contractual and relational basis of trust to the 
development of a structural basis. 
 
Weber’s economic history describes the development of bases and processes for generation of 
structural trust, processes which are premises for modernisation and the growth of capitalism, 
which is a modern form of social and economic organisation dependent on bases of structural 
trust. The growth of capitalism is to a large extent congruent with the development of 
structural trust. I will go so far as to maintain that bases for structural trust are one of the 
premises for capitalism. This modern economic form is made possible by the development 
and spread of new social bonds; formal structures and social organisation which made long 
term investments more predictable and secure, and therefore trustworthy (Durkheim 1984, 
Collins 1982, Fukuyama 1995, Weber 1978, 1995).  
 
The history of modernisation is also a story about transformation of particularistic bases for 
trust and the development of structural bases for trust. The decline of religious mysticism and 
hierocratic domination together with the rise of the Protestant ethics transformed the religious 
element in the pre-contractual basis for trust. The role of religion as a prevailing social script 
diminished. The development of national states as legitimate powers and development of 
codified law and rational bureaucracy as governing structures (Weber 1978, 1995) introduced 
formal structures as bases for trust. Structural bases for trust are characterised by properties 
that facilitate predictability and calculability such as stability, firmness, transparency, non-
arbitrariness, and the principle of equality.   
  
Transformation of trust bases and reconfiguration of trust patterns are key processes of 
modernisation and social transformation. These continuous processes are intensified in our 
time; a radicalisation of modernity (Giddens 1993). Social disembedding and re-embedding 
are processes which transform social bases for trust and lead to new configurations of trust 
                                                 
79 These volumes are referred to as Weber 1978, as Max Weber is on the front page as author and the main body 




bases. Configuration of trust forms, that is the composition of trust bases, is related to social 
organisation rather than historical periods per se (Zucker 1986). This means that the 
configuration of trust is influenced by transformation of social organisation and not by the 
passage of time or historical epoch. Ascribed familiarity was for instance a prevalent basis for 
trust in the Western societies in the pre-modern times. This form of familiarity has decreased 
importance in the West, while structural bases are expanding. In tribal societies, ascribed 
familiarity is still a prevalent basis for trust, and structural bases are more or less absent. 
Development of structural bases for trust is related to the institutionalisation of legitimate 
governmental structures, a process still in its very early phase in some countries.   
 
The relationship between social transformation and trust is not linear cause and effect; the 
hypothesis here is that social change and transformation are about changes in the social 
bases for trust and in the social configuration of trust bases.   
  
In the rest of the chapter this hypothesis is explored through a discussion of the concept of 
structural trust, the relationship between various forms of non-personal trust and how 
modernisation has affected trust bases. The development of trust in money is used as an 
example of the relationship between social change and development of structural bases for 
trust.  
 
10.2  Structural bases for trust and formal structures 
Formalisation does not produce trust, but can replace it through contracts and thus create a 
form of predictability (Zucker 1986, Granovetter & Swedberg 1992). Contracts are weak and 
impersonal substitutes for trust (Mayer et al. 1995, Sitkin & Roth 1993). If contracts are 
substitutes for trust, this means that a contract is a self-contradiction when it comes to trust; 
either there is trust and therefore no need for a contract, or if there is a contract, it is an 
indication that trust does not exist. This will not be discussed further because the perspective 
of the thesis is somewhat different and establishes that formal structures are bases for 
generalisation of trust, not a substitute for it. Formal structures are a platform for suspending 
doubt and making the leap of faith. If there is any form of substitute, it is related to 
generalisation of trust, which is the process where personal and relational bases for trust are 
substituted by a structural base. Formal structures function as premises for taking the risk of 
trusting. They contribute to a guarantee about the fulfilment of the stated promise. Formal 
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structures are a premise for structural trust, but are dependent on a pre-contractual trust in 
formal structures as trust bases.80  
 
Even though the term structure is frequently used in sociology, it is rarely explicitly defined. 
It appears to be taken for granted that there is a common understanding of the term – such as 
when it is used in everyday language. As a scientific term meant to identify a particular form 
of trust, the term structure has to be further specified. For our purpose, a general specification 
of the term has been developed, based on sociological definitions. According to Collins 
Dictionary of Sociology (Jary & Jary 1995:662-63) the term structure is defined as 1) ‘any 
arrangement of elements into a definite pattern’, and 2) ‘the rules (or deep structure) 
underlying and responsible for the production of a surface structure (especially structures 
analogous to grammar)’. As structure is a very general term it can refer to various forms of 
structures. Of greater relevance here is formal structure, defined as ‘procedures and 
communications in an organisation which are prescribed by written rules’ (Jary & Jary 
1995:239).  
 
The defining structural elements are a ‘definite pattern’ and ‘formal rules’, elements that refer 
to the enduring, formal and explicit qualities of the structural base for trust. Thus, structure 
refers here to a definite, enduring, explicit pattern of rules or material elements that are 
socially valid and can be verified and sanctioned.  
 
As mentioned above, ideally the structural basis of trust has three main groups of qualities. 
These are 1) legitimate power and possibilities of sanction, 2) some form of openness and 
transparency, and 3) stability and durability. These qualities are premises for generalisation of 
trust. The function of structural bases for trust is to reduce risk by clarifying expectations, 
guaranteeing fulfilment of them and creating predictability. Each of these elements will be 
further examined in the next section. 
 
Sanctions, stability and expert systems   
Formal structures are most relevant as bases for trust in situations with low or absent 
familiarity, in transactions between strangers and with high risk and/or low predictability. The 
formal structure facilitates generalisation of trust on non-relational foundations. 
Generalisation of trust is based on formal structures that refer to larger codified systems such 
                                                 
80 Structures can also be used to legitimise distrust, fear, or terror, but this is not the subject here. 
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as laws, rules, regulations, standards, and expert systems. These structures transfer 
information; they clarify and make explicit rights, obligations, demands, measurements, and 
possible sanctions (Brunsson & Jacobsson 1998, Brunsson et al. 2012). They protect 
agreements and obligations (Barney & Hansen 1994). Clarity and explicitness in formal 
structures vary; a law for instance, can have several possible interpretations, while standards 
can be quite precise.  
 
Formal structures change slowly and constitute a firm, non-relational basis for trust, 
independent of people (Deakin & Wilkinson 1998). Structures are valid beyond the individual 
level as long as they are based on legitimate non-arbitrary power, which ensures that laws, 
contacts, obligations, standards, and rules are upheld. When trust is based on legitimate 
formal structures, infringement of trust can be addressed by means of legitimate sanctions. 
Legitimate power is the social order that is held to be valid as the executor of power, and is 
based on traditional, charismatic or value-rational, legal authority (Weber 1978:36-38). 
Indirectly it is the legitimate power; usually the governmental power, which is trusted. This 
trust is upheld by the balance of power, democratic representation, open information and 
equality before the law. The development of legitimate power structures is the basic 
foundation for structural trust.   
 
The possibilities of sanctions reduce the risk of transactions with strangers, and transactions 
over time and distance; sanctions contribute to stabilised interaction (Luhmann 1979). Formal 
structures as the basis for trust provide a guarantee which would otherwise have to be based 
on familiarity or relational proximity. The development of formal structures makes it possible 
to trust that agreements are worked out as agreed and this trust can be transferred and 
established between strangers. As Gambetta (1990a:221) points out ‘contract shifts the focus 
of trust on to the efficacy of sanctions, and to either our, or a third party’s, ability to enforce 
them if a contract is broken’. The risk for being sanctioned is a reason to keep the contract; it 
contributes to reduced risk and facilitates the leap of faith. 
 
Expert systems are an expanding form of structural bases for trust. Expert systems presuppose 
an accepted and legitimate system of knowledge, but are difficult to control for a lay person. 
Trust in authority and expertise is based on a reliance on the existence of adequate internal 
control mechanisms built into the system (Luhmann 1979). Audit of business companies, 
development of global quality standards and certification of doctors are various examples of 
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this. Business auditing in Norway is a responsibility decreed by law and is an external control 
of the internal control systems in a company. This function as a structural base for trust, but 
the system is not ‘water tight’. The auditors can also commit crime as shown by huge, global 
auditing companies that have been involved in fraud operations.81  
 
Development of global standards and manuals of conduct such as ISO 9000, an international 
standard for quality management, are formal structures for securing trust. The ISO system has 
gained ground though and is continuously revised and promoted by national and European 
organisations for standardisation. Control of power and expert systems is not static; their 
status as bases for structural trust has to be continuously maintained. Standards presuppose a 
larger, universal basis and general acceptance of the standards. Today’s world wide use of 
standards and reliance of internal security systems are facilitated by information technology 
which provides extensive possibilities for control, and control structures are necessary bases 
for structural trust.  
 
The certification of medical doctors is another example of structural bases for trust and the 
dynamics between internal and external control systems. Medical work has two sets of formal 
structures as the bases for trust: the education system and governmental authority. Medical 
education is approved by the university system, but this is not sufficient to practice as a 
doctor. To be a doctor demands a license which is issued by governmental authority.82 The 
legal system adds additional structural bases for trust through sanctioning medical titles fraud. 
The function of these three bases for structural trust is dependent on trust in the governmental 
authorities; they are the final guarantee and have the power to sanction. If trust in the 
governmental authorities is low or absent, the structural bases for trust is weak, and relational 
bases for trust are probably more prevalent. In late modern societies standardisation and 
expert systems are expanding structures (Brunsson et al. 1990), they function as necessary 
bases for structural trust and the dissemination of these systems should be further explored 
empirically. 
 
                                                 
81 For example, the dismantled audit firm Arthur Andersen which was involved in the Enron scandal. A scandal 
that among others leads to the enactment of new legislation for audit companies – which is development of new 
bases for structural trust. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enron_bankruptcy, retrieved 01.11.12)  
82 The Norwegian Registration Authority for Health Personnel (SAFH) 
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The bases for structural trust presuppose an accepted and legitimate system of knowledge and 
a larger, universal basis such as a governmental body, which represents stability and 
durability, and provides assurance that premises and conditions will endure, and that promises 
will be meet. Formal structures define power relations and super- and subordination; they 
contribute to a restriction of the arbitrary use of power and this facilitates predictability.  
 
Finally, predictability is a key element of formal structures as bases for trust. Though qualities 
such as stability, openness, transparency, equality and possibilities for control, structural 
bases for trust generate a feeling of predictability and contribute to the reduction of risk. This 
makes it possible to make the leap of faith in non-familiar situations, to generalise trust from 
the familiar to the unfamiliar, illustrated by contracts about future obligations.  
 
10.3  Generalisation of trust and disembedding of social relations 
The process of moving trust from a relational and particular basis and basing it on formal, 
universal structures is a premise for modernisation as well as an effect of it. An exploration of 
the process of generalisation of trust is necessary to expand the insight in the relationship 
between trust and social change.   
 
The two terms system trust and generalised media of communication are pivotal in 
Luhmann’s (1979) analysis of how trust is generalised from close relationships to distant 
systems. The discussion of system trust is based on a communication perspective and on the 
premise that developing trust is about reducing complexity through selection. Truth, love, 
legitimate power, and money are examples of generalised media of communication. These 
media constitute structures of expectations and motives that simplify selection. Money, for 
instance, simplifies the process of valuation in exchange. Communication media are 
dependent on trust, and they contribute to maintain trust when they are activated. The use of 
money is an illustrative example of the circular relationship of trust between the generalised 
media and the use of it. If people don’t use a particular currency because they don’t trust its 
value, they contribute to diminishing the trust in this currency, and vice versa, the general use 
of money contributes to the maintenance of trust in it.  
 
In simple and undifferentiated societies, trust is based either on personal relations or ‘the 
authority of gods, saints or knowledgeable interpreters trusted as persons’ (Luhmann 
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1979:48). Modernisation involves secularisation and social differentiation, processes that 
diminish social constraints and in doing so increase social complexity. An individual has 
limited capacity for information processing, and therefore a reduction of possibilities for 
selection is necessary. According to Luhmann (1979:48) ‘there are intrinsic connections 
between the complexity of the world on the one hand and the socially regulated processes for 
differentiating and connecting multiple selections on the other.’ A differentiated social order, 
such as the division of labour, is an example of processes that create complexity and 
necessitate the development of generalised media of communication and selection. These 
media reduce complexity and are founded on trust. But reduced social complexity is also the 
foundation for increasing complexity – reduction of some choices opens other choices, and 
this demands further strategies for reduction of the new complexity (Luhmann 1979). Trusted 
generalised media of communication are structuring expectations and patterns of motivations. 
They link one’s behaviour to the behaviour of others and to chains of selections made by 
others and this contributes to circulation of trust in a society.  
 
How do these media become trusted and reliable as complexity reducing-devices, and what 
characterises the process of transfer of trust based on personal relationships to be extended to 
trust based on systems?   
 
Time-space distanciation 
Transformation of trust is one of the hallmarks of modernity (Giddens 1993). Disembedding 
and time-space distanciation are processes that involve lifting out and generalisation of trust 
from a particular to a universal basis. These are processes upon which Giddens (1993, 1993a) 
focuses, and the analysis of the relationship between time, space, and modernity provides 
further insights into the process of generalisation of trust.  
 
A shift in the social ordering of time and space is pivotal to modernity (Giddens 1993). In 
Giddens’ perspective the question of order is reformulated to a question of ‘time-space 
distanciation – the conditions under which time and space are organised so as to connect 
presence and absence’ (Giddens 1993:14). The separation of time from space, which is the 
introduction of uniform measures of time independent of place, is fundamental to the 
development of structural trust. I state that the development of structural bases for 
generalisation of trust is what makes the new order of time and space possible. According to 
Giddens (1993:16-17) there are three sources that contribute to the dynamic nature of 
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modernity: 1) the separation of time and space, 2) the disembedding of social systems and, 3) 
the reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations. Further, in the pre-modern societies: 
‘space and place largely coincidence, since the spatial dimensions of social life are, for 
most of the population, and in most respects, dominated by “presence” – by localised 
activities’ (Giddens 1993:18). 
 
This presence and the localised activities are the foundations of relational trust, but: 
‘the advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations 
between “absent” others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face 
interaction’ (Giddens 1993:18).  
 
The ‘fostering of relations’ between “absent” others constitutes the development of bases for 
structural trust. Such bases are firm, durable, and widely accepted structures which facilitate 
predictability between strangers and over time.  
 
Time-space distanciation is one of the core processes in modernity (Giddens 1993:17). The 
Middle Ages were characterised by a cyclical conception of time, and there was a separation 
of sacred and mundane time. In the perspective of eternity ‘the customary earthly progression 
of past, present and future is illusory and irrelevant’ according to Kumar (1995:71). Time was 
linked to activities and place, but the invention and diffusion of the mechanical clock from the 
late eighteenth century and the standardisation of calendars and time zones as a global date 
system in the early twentieth century provided a global, uniform system of time (Giddens 
1993:18). The widespread diffusion of uniform time from the late eighteenth century is ‘of 
key significance in the separation of time from space’ (ibid: 17). This social innovation 
separates time from place; time becomes an element by it self, independent of place and 
activity. Separation of time from space means regarding time as an abstract unit independent 
of the local activity. Uniform time and standardisation of calendars are formal structures for 
the ordering and fixing of time. These structures facilitate global predictability and constitute 
a common basis for making contracts over time and distance. For instance flight schedules, 
appointments and global project work are based on standardised, universal time. Separation of 
time and space ‘is the prime condition for disembedding’ (Giddens 1993:20), it is a social 
innovation that provides a gearing mechanism for the rationalised organisation which now 
connects the local and the global in innumerable ways.  
 
The separation of place from space is another social innovation. This allows the possibility of 
developing relations independent of face to face presence and local places are shaped by 
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processes taking place far away from them (Giddens 1993). One example is economic 
globalisation and the global industrial division of labour. Western companies have outsourced 
their production to Chinese industry with free trade zones, cheap labour and few regulations. 
In the West, this leads to industrial restructuration and the loss of jobs. The existence of small 
remote fishing communities in Northern Norway as well as huge American industrial cities 
such as Detroit and Chicago is threatened. The separation of place and space has major 
transforming consequences globally, both socially and economically.  
 
Disembedding 
Disembedding is a process that can shed light on how structural bases for trust are developed. 
Disembedding is ‘the “lifting out” of social relations from local contexts of interaction and 
their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space’ (Giddens 1993:21), or even more 
precise ‘[...] their reticulation across indefinite tracts of time-space.’ (Giddens 1993a:18). 
Lifting out is the process of transferring trust from particular relations to a general, 
standardised, and universal basis. The process of lifting out affects trust in two ways: first, it 
is dependent on mechanisms for generalisation of trust, and second, it forces re-creation of the 
social bases for trust, this is processes dependent on reflexivity and relational processes.  
 
There are two types of disembedding mechanisms, symbolic tokens and expert systems, and 
they are intrinsically involved in the development of modern social institutions (Giddens 
1993:22). Disembedding mechanisms ‘remove social relations from the immediacies of 
context’ (Giddens 1993:28), which is accepting universal structures instead of personal 
relations as bases for trust. Symbolic tokens and expert systems are universal media of 
interchange, and two examples of formal structures that facilitate generalisation of trust 
among strangers. Expert systems as structural bases for trust could include both technical 
systems and professional expertise. Trust in the doctor is based on structural trust in the 
medical expert system, but after some interactions with the same doctor, one also may come 
to develop relational trust (provided that the doctor has fulfilled ones expectations).  
 
The growth of contracts, standard rules, and regulations (Brunsson & Jacobsson 1998) is one 
indication of the strengthening of the formal bases for structural trust. EC laws consisted in 
2005 of 80.000 pages, and the laws are considered as ‘Europe’s weapon of choice in its 
campaign to re-shape the world’ (Leonard 2005). Formal structures facilitates generalisation 
of trust; it contributes to further disembedding and increases the pace of modernity. Trust in 
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money is not based on trust in the relationship to the person with whom you are transacting, 
but on trust in the monetary system. The development of trust in the monetary system will be 
further discussed in a later section as an example of institutionalisation of structural trust.  
 
Expansion of disembedding mechanisms is a presupposition for the development of modern 
social formations. They contribute to re-embedding, which involves re-creation and 
reconfiguration of trust bases. These processes are a key to understanding the dynamics of 
trust processes, a dynamic which often is described as erosion of trusting, c.f. the introduction 
of the thesis. The suggestion here is that what is perceived as erosion of trusting is, to a large 
extent about reconfiguration of bases for trust and developing new bases. This hypothesis will 
be further explored as a perspective on the relationship between trust and social change. 
 
According to Giddens (1993:29) ‘all disembedding mechanisms imply an attitude of trust.’ 
This attitude of trust is established by development of formal structures that facilitate 
predictability, durability and stability; structures that contribute to suspending doubt and 
facilitating the leap of faith.  
 
Reflexive ordering and reordering 
The third element in the dynamic of modernity is the reflexive ordering and reordering of 
social relations:  
‘The reflexivity of modern social life consists of the fact that social practices are constantly 
examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practises, 
thus constitutively altering their character’ (Giddens 1993:38).  
 
This is about trust. The development of structural bases for trust requires reordering of social 
relations and is a reordering of social relations; processes that demand reflexivity. This is the 
key to modernity and social change, a continuous re-embedding of social relations leading to 
reconfiguration of social bases for trust. The development of structural bases for trust 
increases social complexity by increasing the possibilities for action over time, distance and 
between strangers. As a result, taken for granted social patterns of interaction are changed. 
These are the pre-contractual bases for trust, and it is necessary to develop new patterns and 
bases for trust, processes that involve reflexivity and re-embedding of social relations.  
 
The continuous reflexivity and renewing of knowledge are a part of the reproduction of social 
life. These processes remove us from the familiar bases of trust and force a re-creation of trust 
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bases. As pointed out ahead, empirically, we can observe this re-creation of trust bases as 
intense networking efforts face to face and virtually through the Internet and on mobile 
phones, as being about disembedding and re-embedding social relations. This social 
interaction is also about reconstruction, clarifying and confirming knowledge and developing 
mutual understanding. It is necessary to perform this re-creation of relational bases for trust 
continuously because of the dynamics of modern life. Not only do reflexivity and renewing of 
knowledge affect structural and relational bases for trust; they are also processes that reshape 
the pre-contractual bases for trust.  
 
Mass media is a vital source for communicating a common universe of everyday knowledge, 
the growth of education is another platform for reflexivity, and cross-cultural encounters and 
religious groups also trigger debates about norms and rules for behaviour. Advertising and the 
global entertainment culture are additional sources for a kind of common reflexivity that 
contributes to reshaping the common social basis for what we take for granted in various 
situations. Time-space distanciation increases the need for system trust, and the disembedding 
– re-embedding processes increase the need for personal trust. The trust bases and their 
relationship - the trust configuration - are under continuous change in times of social 
transformation. These processes demand reflexivity, which is an intrinsic process in today’s 
society and a necessity for reconstructing the social bases for trust. 
 
To sum up; the disembedding power of formal structures is related to their functioning as a 
guarantee of a non-personal trust that otherwise would have to be based on personal 
relationships. Structural trust functions as a premise for the separation of time and space, and 
functions at the same time as a bridge over the separation of time and space. Development of 
bases for structural trust is a premise for disembedding and contributes to re-embedding; this 
promotes the development of new social relations. Development of new social relations is 
about developing new bases for relational and pre-contractual trust. The separation of time 
and space facilitates disembedding, but separation of time and space presupposes formal 
structures as bases. These structures contribute to bridging the separation of time and space 
and thus facilitating separation. Or inversely: Separation of time and space presupposes 
structures for bridging it. This circular role of bases for trust is one of the characteristics of 
trust. Trust bases are a premise for development of trust and are generated and maintained 




10.4  Generalisation of trust and system trust   
System trust and trust based on structures may appear as the same, but there are some 
analytical distinctions. From Luhmann’s perspective the system is both a source of trust and 
an object for trust. I do not disagree in this, but hold that separate analysis of structures and 
system process generates further insight into trust generating processes.   
 
Money is a relevant example of system trust, and Luhmann (1979:50) states that the trust in a 
system is based on trust in the functions of the system:   
‘Anyone who trusts in the stability of the value of money, and the continuity of a 
multiplicity of opportunities for spending it, basically assumes that a system is functioning 
and places his trust in that function, not in people’.  
This is a description of the generalising effect, the transference of trust from personal to non-
personal systems; ‘Such system trust is trust automatically built up through continual, 
affirmative experience in utilising money’ (Luhmann 1979:50). This system trust is dependent 
on ‘constant feedback’ but ‘does not require specific built in guarantees’ (Luhmann 1979:50). 
According to Luhmann, trust in the media means trust in the system, and as Möllering 
(2006:74), with reference to Luhmann, observes, ‘the object of systems trust is indeed the 
system as such’. What, then, are the main requirements or characteristics of a system to 
function as a basis for trust? To discuss this question one has to decide the main functions of 
trust systems, which according to Luhmann (1979) is a reduction of complexity.  
Reduction of complexity is about creating predictability, and therefore creating predictability 
is the main function of a trust system. By trusting, actor A decides to tolerate possible risk and 
‘the [trust] system substitutes inner certainty for external certainty and by doing so raises its 
tolerance of uncertainty in external relationships’ (Luhmann 1979:27). Trust reduces 
uncertainty, enhances predictability, and contributes to reduced complexity and social risk 
related to the unexpected and unpredictable.  
It is necessary to separate systems and structures when analysing the dynamics in trust 
systems. A system is not necessarily trust generating, it might as well have the opposite 
function. The Mafia, for instance, can be considered as a system of fear; violence is the 
media, and distrust – not trust – is the system effect, at least from outside the system. (I 
suppose distrust and fear are prevailing effects inside this system, too.) On the other hand, for 
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those on the inside of the system, the Mafia functions as a system of protection and a kind of 
substitute for the state ‘albeit in an erratic and limited fashion’ (Gambetta 1993).  
Protection does not necessarily remove fear or produce trust. This industry of protection is 
first and foremost based on relational trust processes, such as family ties and kinship, not on 
legitimate formal structures. Instead, we have a system of relational trust combined with 
violence. This system functions as structural trust mechanism in particular geographical 
settings, but it is not a basis for structural trust. There are no legitimate sanctions, 
transparency or control of power. The system does not generate predictability, it is not based 
on formal structures and the use of violence is arbitrary – the mafia system is neither a source 
of trust nor an object of trust. The formal, structural elements in the system, hence the notion 
structural trust bases, are the analytical criteria that distinguish trust generating systems from 
other systems.  
The historical development of trust in the means of payment and the monetary system is an 
illustrative example of transformation of pre-contractual bases for trust and development of 
structural bases for trust.  
10.5  Development of trust in money and the monetary system  
Rational calculation of value and budgeting are dependent on money as a stable means of 
exchange and value (Weber 1978), but money is dependent on general trust to be valid. 
Money as a medium for exchange is a social construction based on a symbolic contract 
between the issuer and the user. The premise is that the users have a general acceptance of the 
value and that this value is fixed and stable. On these conditions money can function as a 
measurement of value among the users. It expresses a simplified valuation in the form of 
precise and standardised numbers, but it depends on a general trust in that the money is 
reflecting real value. Trust in money cannot be taken for granted, in transition states, for 
instance, trust in money can be low.83  
 
                                                 
83 The Russian rouble is an illustration of this. In the early period after the disintegration of the former Soviet 
Union, in the early 1990s, Russians preferred foreign currency, particularly American dollars, a foreign currency 
that appears to be preferred among people in low trust states (Nordnes 1993). Low trust in the government 
affects the trust in money and the monetary system, and as long as the rouble is not accepted as an international, 
financial medium of exchange, its future value seems risky. It had rather low acceptance as a common medium 
of exchange even in Russia for a while. Concurrently with the stabilisation and growth of the Russian economy, 
trust in the rouble has increased. By preferring foreign currency, people disqualify their own currency; they 
express lack of trust by using exit in Hirschman’s’ terms (Hirschman 1970).    
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In pre-modern times, relational based trust was the prevailing form of trust. Exchange 
between strangers, over time, and over distance was dependent on personal relations and 
mediated by middlemen. Trust in money and the monetary system is dependent on a structural 
base, on legitimate formal structures that secure a stable value of the money. This trust is 
rather new and was developed throughout the nineteenth century (Galbraith 1975). The 
development of structural bases for trust in savings banks is an example of the parallel 
institutionalisation of formal governmental structures and structures for trust in banks, and 
this example is further discussed in chapter 12.    
 
Money as means of payment – bad coins and low trust  
The emergence of structural trust, or more precisely formal structures as bases for trust, is a 
modern phenomenon, closely related to the development of law and formal governmental 
institutions. Barter was the earliest form of trade and consisted of two simultaneous and 
reciprocal deliveries (Weber 1978), a process which presupposed only a minimum of 
relational trust. The legal protection of the barter process was related to the exchange of 
possessions and not as a process of mutual obligations or as a contractual relation. In pre-
modern banking, for instance in ancient Greece and Babylon, letters of credit or banknotes 
were used to make payment over distance or to secure future obligations. These papers, as 
well as other means of payment, were based on relational trust, on personal relations between 
familiar partners and in particular transactions; they were not a medium for general circulation 
(Weber 1995).   
 
The guarantee and basis for trust were the relationship between the partners, the early letter of 
credit was not an obligation mediated by notes and safeguarded by a larger formal structure.84 
Thus the early letter of credit system is distinguished from the modern system. In the modern 
system money is disconnected from relationships, it functions as a general medium for 
circulation of value and exchange. The use of money is an implicit credit relationship and 
contract between the state, as the issuing part, and the user of money (Simmel 2004). The 
state guarantees the value of the notes; a value that in principle should be based on the state’s 
                                                 
84 The ‘letter of credit’ is a financial document still in use. It is a bank guarantee of a payment, particularly for 
use in transactions with high risk, unfamiliar circumstances and in foreign exchanges in countries with weak 
legal structures. (As a curiosity it can be mentioned that the English term ‘letter of credit’ derives from the 
French word “accréditation” which means a power to do something, which in turn derives from the Latin word 
“accreditivus,” meaning trust! Source: an unverified article at Wikipedia, 03.11.12)        
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assets. This general trust in a piece of paper is established through the emergence of stable 
governmental structures and maintained through the general use of money.   
 
The main economic organisation in pre-modern times was the town economy. A town was a 
self-supporting unit with local money, ruled by a sovereign who controlled trade and taxes in 
the surrounding county (Weber 1995). Local craftsmen produced the coins, but coinage lords 
received the revenue. Money (coins) functioned only as a local means of payment in an 
economy characterised by face to face trade. Payment was also made in various locally 
produced assets and it was a challenge to decide equal value of different goods. This economy 
supported a culture of cheating and haggling, a mess of different local coins and frequent 
debasements, and a culture marked by low trust and suspicion (Weber 1995, Collins 1982).  
 
The worth of local currency was based on the value of the constituent metal. Economic 
exchange was based on particular relationships and relational trust. Trade across distance and 
outside the local setting was based on personal relations or middlemen and money exchangers 
multiplied because of the necessity to exchange money into the local means of payment 
(Weber 1995). After the introduction of banks in Italy in the thirteenth century, banknotes 
were issued, but they were regarded as risky means of payment. In principle, the banks were 
responsible for the money they kept on the behalf of the customers, and for the value of the 
notes they put into circulation (Galbraith 1975). The circulation of notes was dependent on 
trust in the bank, a trust that was repeatedly undermined because too many notes were issued 
against the real assets.   
 
As mentioned above, coins had a metal value, a substance value. Gradually a functional value 
developed independent of the metal or substantial value of the coin (Simmel 2004). Today’s 
money is a medium of exchange and has a functional value, while the early money as means 
of payment was based on a substantial value. This difference relates to the distinction between 
media of exchange and means of payment (Weber 1995:241). The two functions of money are 
embedded in different social and relational structures. Coins and precious metals were used as 
payment, but only in particular relationships and for items with substantial value. The 
substantial value had from ancient times been subject to fraud and the amount of metal in the 
coins was gradually reduced. A consequence of this was ’that bad money always drives out 
good money’ (Galbraith 1975:1); people kept the best money to them selves and circulated 
the bad money which had a reduced metal content. This indicates an absence of pre-
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contractual trust in the stable circulation of good money. Experience showed that the good 
money disappeared, and this maintained the circulation of bad money. In the City of 
Amsterdam, which was a commercial centre, it was decided in 1608, to solve the problem of 
bad money by returning to weighing, and this influenced payment transactions all over 
Europe.   
 
Development of trust in money is an example of an early form of non-personal and 
structurally based trust. Circulation of money as a general medium of exchange presupposes 
some formal structures with general validity. Trust in money has to be instituted through 
structural mechanisms: the development of a monetary system, a legitimate government that 
manages the monetary system, and stable and reliable organisations that mediate the money. 
Through these formal structures, goods and valuables can be quantified and made comparable 
through a common scale.  
 
The development of a monetary system is a social innovation by which valuables can be 
specified in relation to a common scale and made comparable. This allows transactions over 
distances, time, and different markets, the key elements of capitalism. If the somewhat chaotic 
organisation characterising the pre-modern economy is taken into consideration, it is evident 
that development of predictability and stability are preconditions for economic growth. This is 
still relevant. Weak or absent bases for structural trust are characteristics of today’s regions 
with weak economic development.   
 
From substantial to functional value  
The development of money as a universal medium of exchange is dependent on structural 
trust in its functional value. The development of the functional value of money is a social 
process that presupposes a general public trust in 1) the issuing body of money, such as the 
national bank and 2) that the value of the money is stable and fixed – that the value is 
generally accepted and that the value in transaction A is equal to the value in transaction B. 
Money rests on a public trust in the government as a representative of the economic 
community and that the rest of the community trust the money. The general acceptance of the 
value of money is the key to its usefulness as a medium for exchange between strangers, over 
time, and in credit relations. The acceptance and trust are linked to a sovereign or 
government; a legitimate structure which has the power to guarantee the stable value.  
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According to Simmel (2004:180):   
 The guarantee of the general usefulness of money, which the ruler or other 
representatives of the community undertakes of the coinage of metal or the printing of 
paper, is an acceptance of the overwhelming probability that  every individual, in spite 
of his liberty to refuse the money, will accept it.’  
 
This was one of the challenges in pre-modern economy – to develop a medium of exchange 
with a fixed and widely accepted value.  Functional money opens for exchange and trade but 
is dependent on formal structures. There is therefore a close relationship between the 
development of public authority, laws, and government structures on the one side and the 
development of trust in the functional value of money on the other side (Simmel 2004, Weber 
1995). The development of the florin, the Florentine gold gulden, is an early example of this 
process where substantial value was transformed into functional value parallel to the growth 
of economic power.       
 
In the medieval town economy the florin was the first exact coin. After 1252 this coin had a 
fixed substantial value in gold. In a trust perspective, florins represented a trusted, stable 
value. The coin was issued in Florence, the occidental economic centre at that time, and the 
florin was an accepted value in commerce far beyond Florence (Weber 1995). The florin was 
an early medium for generalisation of trust. Trust in the florin was based on relational as well 
as early structural elements. The structural elements are the fixed gold weight (3.5 gram), the 
economic power of the Florentine merchant guilds, and the acceptance of florins in external 
trade.  
 
The Florentine merchant guilds built their wealth on their right to collect tax and the florin 
was their only accepted means of tax payment. This created economic wealth in Florence and 
made the florin one means of exchange, but it was not a general medium of exchange. The 
florin had a substantial value based on a stable, fixed and controllable weight of gold, in 
contrast to the general use of coins which were often debased and had a contestable value. 
The stable and fixed weight gave the florin a special position as functional money, as the 
general monetary unit of wholesale (but not retail) commerce. Retail was based on different 
kinds of coins and values that were evaluated by agreement (Weber 1995).  
 
Florence had strong merchant guilds; it was the wealthiest city in the occident and had the 
most intense capitalistic development in pre-modern time (Weber 1995). It is not unlikely that 
206 
 
one of the causes for this wealth was that the merchant guilds represented an early form of 
structural based trust which provided a generalised trust in the florin. The guilds had some 
similarities with structural bases for trust. The guild system is a network organisation that 
restricts the access to a particular trade. It was the predominant form of economic organisation 
in Western Europe prior to the industrial revolution (Deakin 2006). Guilds were social 
organisations established to make a distinction between insiders and outsiders in order to 
secure trade and craftsman skills in a particular area or city.85 The distinction between insiders 
and outsiders (Fukuyama 1995:245) and between open and closed relationships (Weber 
1978:45) is one way of distinguishing between the familiar and the unfamiliar, which is a 
decisive distinction in the trust process. The guilds worked to extend familiarity and the basis 
for personal trust among the members, but to exclude outsiders. Access to the Florentine 
merchant guilds was also access to a monetary system. In this way, guilds represented an 
intermediate basis for trust, a social form between a relational and structural basis for trust. 
Guilds had some of the qualities of structural bases for trust; they functioned as familiar basis 
for trust among strangers inside the trade. At the same time guilds had strong elements of 
relational and ascribed familiarity.  
 
In summary, coins have a long history as means of payment in internal economies and in face 
to face trading. Money as a general medium of exchange is a modern phenomenon related to 
the development of social structures for generalisation of trust, from particular and internal 
relations to universal and external relations. Social change and changes in economic 
organisations are two aspects of the same process, and involves the development of new 
social bases for trust.    
 
10.6  Development of structural bases for trust  
Formal structures govern social action. The function of a structural basis for trust is to create 
predictability and by that, reduce risk. Even though structure directs action and ‘structure 
reduces the need for information’ (Luhmann 1979:37) this does not necessarily facilitate trust. 
Trust is contextual, to facilitate trust structures have to be embedded in a legitimate system of 
sanctions which safeguards the information and sanctions violation of the action directions. 
                                                 
85 Guilds have similarities with the modern professions and the professional networks which now are global 
structures including the few and excluding most of us.  
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One example of this is the pre-modern cities which had their own laws with validity in each 
particular city and the formal structure facilitated trust in the particular context.  
 
Law and bureaucracy  
Laws are the basis for structural trust. According to Durkheim (1984:25) laws are necessary 
for the development of social organisation:  
‘In fact, social life, wherever it becomes lasting, inevitably tends to assume a  definite 
form and become organised. Law is nothing more than this very organisation in its most 
stable and precise form.’  
 
Law is a form of codification of social actions; it makes obligations and sometimes sanctions 
explicit. Through the division of labour, people are dependent on each other, and this opens 
up a wider range of relationships beyond the family, founded on contractual relationships 
(Durkheim 1984). Non-contractual social knowledge is transferred through family ties, 
tradition, and religion in the traditional society; these are the pre-contractual and relational 
bases for trust. Contracts define duties and rights and are durable. The firmness and constancy 
of contracts, rules, and other formal structures facilitate predictability and structural trust, 
provided they are embedded in predictable, rational legal authority – this is the key to formal 
bases for structural trust.  
 
In pre-modern times, laws were practiced with arbitrariness and an element of superstition. 
Jurisdiction was a personal privilege of the patriarchal ruler (Weber 1995), and ’Those 
subordinated to this power had no rights against him, and norms regulating his behaviour 
toward them exist only as indirect effects of heteronomous religious checks on his conducts’ 
(Weber 1978:645). Patrimonial power was diffused into the administration of justice through 
patrimonial monarchy. Laws per se did not prevent arbitrariness or facilitate predictability 
because the patrimonial state lacked political and procedural predictability (Weber 1978: 
1095). Power was practiced arbitrarily and did not function as a basis for structural trust. 
Predictability is facilitated through stability, transparency, and absence of arbitrariness. These 
qualities are provided through laws embedded in legitimate, universal (non-particularistic) 
governmental structures, balanced control of power and predictable execution of power.    
 
One of the hallmarks of modernity is the development of the nation state as a governing 
structure. The development and diffusion of bureaucratic administration is ‘at the root of the 
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modern Western state’ (Weber 1978:223). The bureaucracy is an administrative structure 
based on knowledge and universalism and is characterised by six main principles: 
jurisdictional areas ordered by rules; hierarchal organisation; written documents; office 
management; full working capacity; and the practising of general rules (ibid: 956-958). 
Bureaucratic elements facilitate stability, predictability, transparency and objectivity and they 
should be practiced through use of knowledge and equal treatment of an issue independent of 
personal relationships or social status. Diffusion of government bureaucratic principles 
provided formal and rational administrative objectivity which made possible the development 
of the principle ‘equality before the law’ and legal guarantees against arbitrariness (Weber 
1978:979). This, I assert, is the development of formal structures as the bases for structural 
trust and an institutionalisation of legitimate power and sanctions as foundations of structural 
trust.  
 
Predictability is important for the growth of capitalism and ‘The tempo of modern business 
communication requires a promptly and predictably functioning legal system, that is one 
which is guaranteed by the strongest coercive power’ (Weber 1978:337). Predictability is 
related to trust and calculable law is one of the six general premises for capitalism discussed 
by Weber (1995:276-278). Trust is not explicitly referred to, but several of the premises are 
bases for structural trust: rational capital accounting and calculation; absence of irrational 
limitations on trading; and calculable law. These elements are concurrent with elements of the 
modern bureaucracy, they are hierarchical, firm, rational administrative structures which are 
’fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state, and in 
the private economy only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism’ (Weber 1978:956). 
The emergence of bureaucracy and rational capitalism is connected, capitalism requires the 
firm and predictable structures of bureaucracy and capitalism is a rational economic basis for 
bureaucracy (ibid: 224).  
 
Without legitimate power structures there are no formal bases for the development of 
structural trust, neither nationally or internationally. This leaves the way open for the misuse 
of power by groups who possess power in an environment of minimal social organisation. 
There are several examples of this today, for instance in new states or states with weak or 
absent governmental structures, such as in Africa and The Middle East. Here terrorist groups 





According to Zucker (1986), development of formal structures as sources of trust is the 
engine for economic development in the American economy during the period 1840-1910, a 
period of social and economic change. Zucker’s perspective is to treat ‘[...] social variables as 
causes rather than consequences of economic change’ (ibid: 54). Increased social 
heterogeneity caused by immigration and internal migration, combined with volatile growth, 
undermined the basis for pre-contractual trust; the taken for granted social scripts and ‘the 
previously taken for granted social world was no more, undermining the interpersonal bases 
for trust’ (Zucker 1986:55). The undermining of interpersonal bases of trust resulted in 
replacement of the informal, interpersonal trust by institutional trust and the spread of rational 
bureaucratic organisations, regulation and legislation as the most important formal trust-
producing structures (Zucker 1986). The emergence of capitalism and modern bureaucracy 
contributed to the disembedding and re-embedding of social relationships (Giddens 1993).   
 
Social change leads to undermining and transformation of existing bases for pre-contractual 
and relational trust and demands new structural bases for trust. According to Zucker this is a 
process of development of institutional sources of trust. In the rest of this section, Zucker’s 
perspective on institutional trust, which appears to be the most widely accepted approach to 
non-personal trust (Möllering 2006), will be discussed in relation to the general notions 
institution and structure.  
 
What is taken for granted is a pivotal element in the social bases for trust. My analytical 
contribution is to establish the taken for granted, that is the pre-contractual, as one particular 
basis for trust, as this basis has other qualities than the relational and structural bases for trust, 
and is also an element in these trust bases. Formal structures have a practical and a symbolic 
function. The practical function is to guarantee fulfilment of obligations and this is embedded 
in symbolic content. Taken together, these two elements form an institution. But in analysing 
trust as a dynamic process of social construction, reconstruction, undermining and loss of 
trust, it is necessary to make visible how different trust bases are affected by social change 
and how the social configuration of bases are affected. To gain insight in the trust process and 
to recreate trust, more exploration is necessary to determine whether trust is undermined 
because of infringed formal structures, such as contracts or laws, or whether there are changes 
in the implicit social contract and the pre-contractual bases, or if patterns in social interaction 
and the basis for relational trust have changed in unforeseen ways. This set of questions 
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focuses on processes other than exploration of institutional maladjustment or system 
dysfunction.   
 
Pre-contractual, relational, and structural forms of trust are analytical constructs and ideal 
types that interaction as bases for trust. Structural trust, for instance, has pre-contractual 
elements and can be influenced by relational elements, but the prevailing trust base is the 
formal structure. In relational trust the basis is inter-personal relations, based on interaction 
and communication. The interaction and relationship is embedded in pre-contractual 
elements, but the main basis for this form of trust is the relationship. The pre-contractual basis 
is continually adjusted and maintained through relational and structurally based trust 
processes.  
 
The three trust bases have different qualities, they facilitate trust differently, and the three 
forms of trust are to some extent developed though different social processes. Importantly, the 
three forms of trust are developed and influenced by social interaction and communication, 
and the prevalent development processes related to each of the three trust forms can be 
characterised differently, analytically. Pre-contractual trust is formed through socialisation; 
relational trust is developed through social interaction and structural trust by 
institutionalisation. The three different forms of trust have different consequences for social 
organisation, and to analyse the dynamic relation between trust, social change and social 
organisation, these three main characters of trust should be separated.  
 
10.7  Trust and institutions 
Structural trust refers to trust with a non-personal basis and institution based trust is a 
widespread notion for non-personal trust. The concept of institution has different meanings in 
various academic disciplines and is used in everyday language (Jentoft 2004:137). The 
variation in meaning of the concept and the diverse approaches to the notion institution make 
it challenging to separate process, meaning, and structure when analysing institutions and 
trust processes.   
 
In Berger & Luckmann’s (1991) discussion of the social construction of institutions, 
institutionalisation is a process of developing and legitimatising institutions. Institutions are 
built on a shared history and control human conduct by ‘setting up predefined patterns of 
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conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would 
theoretically be possible’ (Berger & Luckmann 1991:72), and institutions generally manifest 
in collectives.  
 
In sociology the term institution refers to norms and habits, large organisations, and social 
formations such as marriage, education and economic structures. The term covers systems of 
meaning as well as formal and regulative structures. This form of trust has several terms, 
including system trust (Luhmann 1979, Lane 1998); trust in abstract systems or expert 
systems (Giddens 1993); and institutional trust (Zucker 1986, Lane & Bachman 1996, 
Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). These notions of trust have in common that they refer to non-
personal bases for trust.   
 
According to Zucker (1986) the term institutionally based trust refers to trust based on formal 
societal structures and has two forms: 1) person or firm- specific trust, which is based on prior 
socialisation in a subculture or based on professional roles, and 2) intermediary mechanisms 
that serve to reduce a potential risk and invoke trust, such as insurance policies and contracts. 
These trust forms refer to formal structures and expert systems as bases for trust, elements 
which are not made explicit by Zucker who also does not comment on the particular elements 
that facilitate this trust, such as stability and legitimate sanctions. According to Möllering 
(2006:54) Zucker does not provide ‘a systematic treatment of what makes institutions 
trustworthy and how actors interpret and (thereby) come to trust in them’. However, her 
conceptualisation of trusting has inspired the composite concept of trust and will therefore be 
discussed more below.   
 
Institutional and structural bases for trust  
The concept of institutional trust is defined in the following way by Zucker (1986:63):  
The third basis of trust, institutional, generalises beyond a given transaction and beyond 
specific sets of exchange partners. In order to generalise, “the locally produced” trust 
must be re-constructed as intersubjective, exterior to any given situation, and as part of the 
“external world known in common,” objective in that they are repeatable by other 
individuals without changing the common understanding of the acts.  
 
The definition is based on Berger & Luckmann (1991), and the re-construction of trust is 
termed institutionalisation by Zucker. The definition of institution based trust is quite similar 
to the process of disembedding; the lifting out of social relationships from local contexts and 
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restructuration across time or space (Giddens 1993:21), a process based on a formal structure 
and a common understanding and acceptance of the legitimacy of this structure. This is, in 
other words, a description of generalisation of trust as a social process. However, a 
description of a process is not sufficient to reveal the basis or ‘input’ of the process. The 
absence of distinction between process and input/bases of the process contributes to confusion 
about the term institutional trust.   
 
Zucker (1983:2) makes a distinction between process and property of the term 
institutionalisation:  
First, institutionalisation is both a process and a property variable; it is a 
phenomenological process by which certain social relationships and actions come to be 
taken for granted, that is part of the “objective situation”, while at the same time it is the 
structure of reality defining what has meaning and what actions are possible. 
 
The distinction can be drawn differently. From the perspective of the thesis, 
institutionalisation is a process of social construction, a phenomenological process which 
includes the definition of meaning in a wide sense. Every social construction is embedded in a 
system of meaning. An institution is a durable system of meaning that defines possible action 
patterns. Institutions can be materially reflected as organisations or social systems, such as the 
monetary system or matrimony. Formal structures, such as laws and regulations, are the 
material sources and framework of institutions. Meaning systems and laws and regulations 
have different social qualities; meaning systems are emerging, whereas laws are passed, 
meaning systems are immaterial social constructions, but laws are written, codified 
knowledge. Meaning systems are maintained through socialisation and institutionalisation. 
Laws are implemented and institutionalised through practice. Structures can be altered by a 
stroke of the pen; sudden changes may happen as a result of seeing something in a new light 
(for instance as an effect of broken trust), but meaning systems change gradually. From the 
grounded theory based trust perspective institutions as meaning systems are the bases for pre-
contractual trust, while the formal structures are structural bases for trust. The distinction 
between pre-contractual and structural separates process and property and provides further 
insight in social dynamic and trust processes. 
 
The process of trusting and trust as a concept  
The term institutional trust has two inherent challenges: 1) the term does not make a 
distinction between the social construction of trust – the process of trusting - and trust as a 
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quality – the concept of trust – and; 2) the often confusing and ambiguous content of the 
notion institution. Institution can refer to symbolic meaning and a significant practice, to an 
established organisation or corporation as well as a durable act, such as the institutionalisation 
of a practice. The multi-faceted content of the concept institution demands some further 
discussion.  
 
Perspectives on institution provide some hints about the conceptual variety. An institution can 
be considered as an aspect of culture; as in ‘settled habits of thought common to the generality 
of man’ (Jentoft 2004:133, with reference to Veblen 1919). The term may refer to systems of 
formal rules and structures as well as systems of meaning, such as beliefs and values 
(Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). Institutions are ‘socially constructed, routine-reproduced 
programs or rule systems’, (Jepperson 1991:143), they ‘contain regulative, normative and 
cognitive elements or components’ (Deakin & Michie 1996:14), they constrain actions: 
’formal rules are an important part of the institutional framework, but only a part’ according 
to Dakin & Michie (1997:14 with reference to North 1993:20), and they are ‘patterned, 
internalised, normative role expectations’ (Seligman 2000:19). Lühiste (2006:477) discusses 
institutional trust in relation to political trust and defines institutional trust as ‘confidence that 
political institutions would not misuse their power.’ Lühiste refers to two competing sets of 
theories in this field; a cultural explanation, which intertwines trust in political institutions 
with generalised trust, and a performance theory, which considers trust in political institutions 
to reflect evaluations on regime performance in relation to citizen demands. This approach to 
understanding institutions focuses on the symbolic content of the institution and the institution 
as carrier of meaning. 
 
Institutions are both formal structures and meaning systems. Institutions establish shared 
meaning as a precondition for social interaction and involve the totality of structures and 
meaning systems (Lane & Bachmann 1996). The conceptualisations refer to institutions as 
structures, culture and meaning systems, and in practice these functions are woven together, 
but in analyses of processes that undermine trust it can be useful to distinguish between 
institutionalisation as processes, institution as meaning systems, and institutions as formal 
structures.  
    
Institutions are shared ‘reciprocal typification of habitualised action by types of actors’, and 
the typifications ‘are available to all members of the group in question’ (Berger & Luckmann 
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1991:72). In this perspective the social construction of institutions is a process of 
development and legitimatisation of institutions, they are built on a shared history and control 
human conduct by ‘setting up predefined patterns of conduct’ (ibid: 72). Institutions reduce 
social complexity by channelling action into existing social patterns and according to Powell 
& DiMaggio (1991:4) ‘institutions reduce uncertainty by providing dependable and efficient 
frameworks for economic exchange’. This perspective on the risk-reducing functions of 
institutions has similarities with formal structures as bases for trust, but Powell & DiMaggio 
do not make any connections between trust and institutions.  
 
In Selznick’s (1984) classic analysis of leadership in administration, organisations and 
institutions are separated. Organisations are systems of formal rules and objectives, ‘rational 
instruments engineered to do a job’, while ‘institution is more nearly a natural product of 
social needs and pressures – responsive, adaptive organism’ (Selznick 1984:5). The 
distinction between formal structures and systems of meaning are made explicit in Powell & 
DiMaggio (1991:15), with reference to Meyer & Rowan (1991):  
‘Normative obligations [...] enter into social life primarily as facts” that acts must take 
into account. Not norms and values but taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications 
are the stuff of which institutions are made. Rather than concrete organisations eliciting 
affective commitment, institutions are macro level abstractions, “rationalised and 
impersonal prescriptions”.’ 
 
Institutions are, from this perspective, the social macro level elements which is included in the 
pre-contractual basis for trust.   
 
The distinction between organisation as a formal, rational structure and institution as a wider 
social pattern, with structural as well as embedded normative and symbolic elements, has 
similarities to the distinction between the terms structural and institutional based trust. Here 
lies the key to the distinction between institution based trust and structural based trust. 
Institution based trust is a normative force and meaning system while structural trust 
functions to guarantee that a course of action will proceed as expected. Formal structures 
reduce a potential risk, establish predictability and facilitates generalisation of trust based on 
legitimate systems of sanctions. 
 
The different meanings of the term institution can contribute to analytical ambiguity related to 
the concept of institutional based trust – does the concept refer to trust as a process or to 
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institutions as the foundation of this form of trust? If the focus is on the foundation of 
institutional trust, which of the institutional aspects are highlighted: a significant practice, an 
organisation, a set of rules, contracts, or a particular system of meaning? Perhaps the term 
institution is too ambiguous to be the only notion for non-personal trust. The ambiguity is 
related to the mixing of process, formal structure, and symbolic content of the term, and when 
used as an analytical approach to non-personal trust, further specification is necessary. A 
distinction between formal structures and meaning systems makes it possible to analyse the 
interaction between different social bases for trust – the configuration of trusting.   
 
The suggestion here is that an analytic distinction between systems of meaning and a 
regulative order as basis for trust provides a better insight in the relationship between trust 
and social change. The term structural trust bases focuses on the key elements of non-
personal trust: legitimate, stable, explicit, formal, regulative, or technical structures as basis 
for predictability, clarification of obligations, and possible sanctions. These elements are a 
platform for suspending doubt and making the leap of faith. Stable structures can cause 
tardiness, rigidity, lack of flexibility and low capability for change. In some settings, these 
structural qualities can eventually contribute to diminishing the trust potential of a structure, 
for instance as contempt for bureaucracy, but this is not the subject here.   
 
The three terms; structural trust, systems trust, and institutional based trust have in common 
that they refer to non-personal trust and focus on different aspects of non-particular trust. 
Luhmann’s notion system trust refers to trust in the function of a system, not in people 
(Luhmann 1979:50), and control of the system is a critical factor in maintaining trust. 
Institutional trust focuses, as the term indicates, on social institutions as the basis for trust, and 
refers to symbolic as well as formal elements. This creates the ambiguity of the term. 
Structural trust focuses on formal structure with possible sanctions and control functions. 
System trust is the trust an individual has in various social systems, a trust based on 
institutional – that is pre-contractual elements and structural elements – while structural trust 
is trust based on the formal elements in a system. The analytical differences between 
institutional and structural trust may only be considered as linguistic, as the structural basis 
for trust is embedded in an institutional context of pre-contractual elements.  
 
Even though a formal structure is embedded in an institutional context, which to a large extent 
consists of pre-contractual elements, the concept structural trust makes visible the defining 
216 
 
element of this form of trust: that is the stable, formal structure which facilitates the leap of 
faith. The three elements of system, institution, and structure are necessary elements in 
structural trust. Stability is a precondition and constitutes structural trust, but is dependent on 
and embedded in a social system of power and legitimacy. These structural and system 
elements are maintained as social institutions; they include the symbolic level. 
Conceptualisation of the non-personal bases for trust is therefore a question of which qualities 
are emphasised to highlight the analytical purpose.  
 
Further clarification 
The ambiguity of the concept institutional trust can be reduced if the process of social 
construction of trust is separated from the different bases for trust. The social construction of 
trust is discussed in earlier chapters, as the development of mutual understanding, pre-
contractual trust and relational trust and as socialisation and institutionalisation and 
construction of meaning (Berger & Luckmann 1991). Structural trust is related to rule 
systems, contracts, or law as basis for trust and by using the term ‘structural trust’ one avoids 
confusion of trust as process with the social bases for trust. This term solves some of the 
ambiguity problems related to the term institutional. The term structural is not unambiguous, 
but it is not a carrier of diffuse meaning or as heavy loaded with symbolic content as the term 
institution. The term structural makes it possible to distinguish between meaning systems and 
structures such as institution, organisation, and corporation.  
 
On the other hand, some of the perspectives about institutions reflect on structures and rules 
as elements of institution, as in March & Olsen (referred in Jentoft 2004:138)  ‘collections of 
interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between 
roles and situations’, and according to Elster (1989:147) ’an institution can be defined as a 
rule enforcing mechanism. The rules govern the behaviour of a well defined group of persons, 
by means of external, formal sanctions.’  
 
This definition is related to a particular purpose – an institution which ‘seems to act, choose 
and decide as if it were an individual writ large’ (Elster 1989:147). Institutions are rule 
enforcing when they sanction through by some kind of formal ‘force’ and induce particular 
patterns of actions. Rule enforcing institutions are based on formal structures and this 
contributes to blurring the analytical distinction between these two concepts related to the 




A formal structure, such as the law, as the basis for trust, consists of explicit and tacit 
elements; that is the text of the law and the systems of meaning embedded in the law. The 
explicit elements are the law and sanctions, while the tacit elements are legitimacy and taken 
for granted premises. Taken together, these elements can be characterised as the institution of 
the law. Which of these elements are more analytically important as facilitators of trust and 
establishing the platform for making the leap of faith, for instance in the consideration of 
future obligations? Explicit elements such as obligations and sanctions written in the 
contractual law will be important as visible elements can be negotiated and reflected upon, 
while the tacit elements are taken for granted; they are pre-contractual, and usually referred to 
as institutional.  
 
The explicit and tacit elements in trust bases are concurrent with structural and pre-contractual 
elements in trust bases. This, then, leads to the conclusion that the term institution, and by that 
institutional trust, contains both structural and pre-contractual elements. These are systems of 
rules and systems of meaning; two systems that have different qualities when it comes to 
development of trust. The concept of institutional trust has to be separated analytically into 
structural and pre-contractual bases for trust. These two notions make visible different 
elements and processes of trust development. The difference is that the term structural 
focuses on the key elements of non-personal trust, and the term pre-contractual refers to 
systems of meaning. I therefore hold that the notion structural trust is somewhat less 
ambiguous than institutional trust.  
 
10.8  Conclusion – structural trust a condition for modernity 
To conclude this chapter, structural trust is a modern form of trust, dependent on a particular 
composition of formal structures. The possibility of securing trust in formal structures, such 
as law, contracts and organisations is one of the preconditions for capitalism and is closely 
intertwined with the development of the modern national state, the rational and 
entrepreneurial organisation of labour, development of bureaucracy, decline of feudal society, 
and rational ethics that displaced the sanctity of tradition. The shift in ethics is of fundamental 
importance to the development of the rational organisation of the economy. According to 
Weber (1995:313) this process is a:  
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‘lifting of the barrier between internal economy and the external economy, between 
internal and external ethics and the entry of the commercial principle into the internal 
economy, with the organisation of labour on this basis’.  
 
This is the modernisation process in a nutshell – a social change that transforms the social 
basis for trusting.  
 
In the traditional feudal society, trust had a relational basis; it was a particular quality, and the 
pre-contractual basis for trust was relatively stable. Religion, traditions, and relations were 
important formative forces influencing the basis for pre-contractual trust. The growth of the 
modern state and purposive rationality as social organising principles at the sacrifice of 
religion introduced new elements in the basis for pre-contractual trust. It altered the 
significance of relational trust and created an opening for developing formal, structural bases 
for trust. Last, but not least, the emergence of a legitimate state based on democratic 
principles, law and justice, which acted predictably compared to feudalistic arbitrariness, 
made possible the emergence of structural trust, based on universal principles such as law and 
common rules (Collins 1982, Weber 1995). The development of formal structures as bases for 
non-personal trust, which is the institutionalisation of structural trust, contributed to increase 
social predictability between strangers and over time and distance. This is the foundation of 
the modern capitalism and modern social organisation. 
 
The dynamics between the various social bases of trust can be analysed as the social 
configuration of trust – this is the interaction of different social trust bases. The separation of 
trust bases into structural, pre-contractual and relational bases provides insight in the main 
social forces in trust processes. These processes can be studied on different analytical levels 
and in various empirical contexts.  
 
This theoretical part has aimed to do a sociologically grounding of an empirical, grounded 
theory conceptualisation of trust, and through this provide a further theoretical exploration of 
trust as a social phenomenon. The exploration is also a discussion of the composite concept of 
trust as an analytical tool for studying trust processes and the relationship between trust and 
social change. However, the analytical power of the concept has to be explored through 
empirical analyses. This is the focus of the third and final part of the thesis, which is an 
application of the grounded theory of trust in analyses of various empirical examples of trust 
configuration and changes in trust configuration.  
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Before entering into the empirical analyses, a quick revisit to the question raised at the end of 
the methodological par, about how the empirical grounded theory of trust can be integrated 
into sociology.  On a more general level, this was a question about how grounded theory and 
sociology could be integrated and contributing to cumulative development of knowledge. At 
the end of chapter 5, the conclusion was the introduction of a model with four levels of 
integration. The theoretical part is a sociological exploration of the core elements of the 
composite concept of trust; mutual understanding, and the three social bases. Sociological 
theory is integrated into the concept as a theoretical discussion of the different conceptual 
elements pre-contractual, relational, structural and mutual understanding and this provides the 
theoretical grounding of the empirical grounded composite concept of trust. Is this work is 
more than an integration of grounded theory into the sociological body of theory? The model 
in chapter 5 presented a fourth level, the synthesis where a grounded theory and sociology are 
merged into a new unified theory. The next and concluding part is an application of the 
grounded theory of trust in analyses of various examples of trust configurations and of 
changes in trust configuration related to social changes. In the final, concluding chapter 14, I 




































11. THE TRUST PARADOX – NEW CONFIGURATIONS 
OF TRUST BASES 
 
‘Liquid life is a precarious life, lived under conditions 
of constant uncertainty’ 
and where 
‘Trustworthy calculations are increasingly 
difficult to make...’86 
– ZYGMUNT BAUMAN 
 
 
Trust and social change are fundamental sociological subjects of great relevance in late 
modernity. This is also a subject that demands further exploration with analytical tools that 
capture the dynamic trust processes. The third and final aim of the thesis is to explore the 
relationship between trust and social change through the application of the composite concept 
of trust as an analytical tool.  
 
This final part of the thesis also aims to demonstrate the analytical potential in the grounded 
theory of trust developed in this thesis. The part is composed of four independent chapters. 
Each chapter analyses the configuration of trust bases and the relationship between trust and 
social change in various contexts, as different social transformation processes and with 
different empirical examples.  
 
This chapter stars with a brief recapitulation of the grounded theory of trust followed by a 
discussion of the relationship between risk, modernisation and the trust paradox. Thereafter is 
a discussion of the exemplars of trust, social change and configuration of trust bases in 
various social contexts. The next chapter, 12, is a discussion of long-term social changes and 
the parallel transformation of trust bases, exemplified by institutionalisation of structural trust 
in savings banks. The following chapter 13, explores how social transformation of macro 
structures affects trust processes on micro level, that is how deregulation of saving banks is a 
deregulation of the trust relationship between bank and customer. Then the concluding 
chapter, 14, discusses trust and social change and ends with presenting the limitations of the 
thesis, contributions and with recommendations for further research throughout the chapter.  
 
                                                 
86 Bauman 2005:1-2 
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11.1  Pre-contractual, relational and structural bases for  trust 
A recapitulation of the grounded theory of trust is useful as an introduction to this section 
which focuses on how the theoretical framework can be applied to analyse trust and social 
change in various empirical settings.   
 
Trust is an individual feeling and a social quality; it is dynamic and evolves through social 
processes. Trust develops as a leap of faith into a condition of trust (Möllering 2006). Mutual 
understanding is a prerequisite for trusting; it is the trigger of the leap of faith, a leap that has 
an individual and a social platform. The individual element of mutual understanding is the 
propensity to trust, a psychological quality that is not the subject of further attention here.  
 
To trust is to take the risk of presupposing that the interpretation of a course of action is 
mutually shared, that there is a mutual understanding which means that actors will behave 
predictably. If this mutual understanding is sufficiently confirmed, an actor takes the risk of 
trusting and makes the leap of faith.87 Trust develops when mutual understanding is complied 
with as a social contract, a social contract that has pre-contractual, relational and structural 
pillars, respectively; taken for granted social assumptions, relational processes created 
through social interaction and laws, rules, and regulations backed with legitimate sanctions.  
 
To explore trust as a process of social construction on micro level involves a study of the 
dynamics between individual constructions of meaning and input from shared social bases, 
and how these are transformed to mutual understanding. To study trust dynamics on macro 
level involves exploring the interaction – that is the social configuration – between the pre-
contractual, relational and structural bases for trust. Social change is a transformation of the 
social bases for trust and in the configuration of trust; that is the interaction between trust 
forms in a particular social context. This and the next two chapters analyse these processes 
using empirical examples.   
 
The three social bases for trust are common bases for interaction and foundations for 
development of mutual understanding. Without something in common, development of 
mutual understanding must start from scratch. The trust bases are broad analytical categories 
that refer to general dimensions of social life, the bases are maintained and re-created through 
                                                 
87 The threshold of sufficient confirmation is an empirical question, as this will vary personally and contextually.   
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social interaction and are the foundation for developing expectations and mutual 
understanding. The social bases for trust are the building blocks of social life. They ‘secure’ 
expectations and trust, and enhance social predictability. Developing and maintaining trust 
under changing social conditions require the reconstruction and reconfiguration of these 
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The social construction of trust is a dynamic interaction between perception and 
interpretation, construction of meaning and confirmation of mutual understanding. Relational 
trust bridges the barrier between oneself and the other. It is based on personal relations and 
reciprocity (Zucker 1986, Misztal 1996, Sztompka 1999), on face to face relations and small 
group relations where those involved know each other and share common rules and norms 
(Giddens 1993, Hart 1990, Luhmann 1979). Relational trust can also be based on one-sided 
distant relations, as ascribed or mediated familiarity. This interpersonal trust pervades social 
life and is constructed and re-constructed through social interaction and communication. 
Relational trust is the quality that probably is intuitively perceived and referred to as ‘trust’.  
 
The basis for the development of structural trust is formal structures such as laws and 
contracts backed up by legitimate systems of sanctions, in practice this is the juridical system. 
The development of structural trust is woven together with the institutionalisation of a 
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legitimate nation state and in some cases supranational institutions. Lack of predictable legal 
structures and arbitrary legal practises result in weak or absent structural bases for trust.  
 
Development of pre-contractual trust is a continuous process inherent in everyday life. 
Socialisation means acquiring a pre-contractual foundation for action and interaction, to attain 
the tacit social codes in a given context. Action and interaction implies confirmation or 
infringement of tacit or explicit expectations and the outcome of this strengthen or undermine 
pre-contractual trust. Small daily surprises or moments of unpredictability can – but do not 
necessarily – have long lasting effects on pre-contractual trust.  
 
Pre-contractual trust is an element of structural and relational trust and permanent changes in 
these bases for trust involves transformation of pre-contractual elements. The legitimacy of 
structural trust, for instance the law, is maintained as pre-contractual elements, there is a taken 
for granted understanding (among most of us) that violation of the law will be sanctioned. 
Development of relational trust is dependent on a minimum of pre-contractual trust. Over 
time, the pre-contractual basis for trust will be expanded and strengthened through successful 
relational trust processes – processes where mutual understanding is developed and confirmed 
through interaction. Relational trust processes can be strengthened by structural trust, business 
transactions often start with personal encounters and interaction, the final agreements are 
written on paper as a contract that provides a structural frame for the relationship.  
 
The three social bases generate trust forms which develop through different social processes 
and represent different social foundations for trusting. The trust forms are not mutually 
exclusive, but co-exist and can to some extent substitute for each other. To explore the 
relationship between trust and social change through the lenses of the grounded theory of trust 
means studying the social transformation and configuration of trust bases.  
 
11.2  The trust paradox: social risk, modernisation and erosion of 
trust  
The trust paradox was proposed in the introduction of the thesis as a metaphor for the 
relationship between trust and social change. The hypothesis is that social change does not 
necessarily lead to erosion of trust, but to transformation of the social bases for trust. In the 
phase of transformation there is an increasing need for trust as this is a situation marked by 
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risk and complexity, where the familiar social bases for development of mutual understanding 
and trust are under transformation. This is experienced as an erosion of trust, while at the 
same time there is an increasing need for it. This is the trust paradox. The trust paradox 
characterises a situation with reconfiguration of trust bases. The suggestion here is that these 
processes can easily remain undiscovered unless trust is explored as a process of development 
of mutual understanding based on common social foundations.    
 
Mutual understanding is a key process in trusting and social change transforms the conditions 
for developing mutual understanding. Studies of trust and social change therefore have to 
focus on transformation of the social basis for mutual understanding. The following 
paragraphs discuss the relationship between trust, risk and modernity as an introduction to the 
empirical examples of trust and social change.  
 
Risk and danger  
Risk increases the need for trust (Luhmann 1979, 1990, Giddens 1993, Beck 1993). To trust 
means to act on a feeling of assurance, as if there is no risk, but risk is a social condition 
(Luhmann 1979). We live in the risk society, characterised by ‘distribution of “bads” or 
dangers’ (Beck 1993:3, Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994). There is social risk inherent in the 
freedom of the other and the increased freedom to choose in several arenas of life.  
 
Risk evolved as a concept which is different from danger and as an element in the issuant 
modernisation (Luhmann 1990).88 In the traditional society, danger and the unexpected had 
been apprehended as unavoidable, as fortune or fate and the domain of God. Secularisation 
and the rise of reason are consequences of modernisation; fate and belief in God was replaced 
by awareness of consequences, decisions and risk (Tourraine 1995). Modernisation increases 
the opportunities to make choices and the possibilities for taking the risk of trusting, and this 
generates new risks and increased social complexity (Luhmann 1990, Seligman 2000). 
 
                                                 
88 The term modernisation refers to the process of introducing the new, while modernity refers to the state of 
being modern. In the thesis modernisation and modernity refer to an epoch characterised by social and 
economical development processes from the traditional to the modern society. There has been an extensive 
discussion about how to conceptualise our times: as modernity, late modernity, high modernity, or post-
modernity. The discussion of terms, concepts, and perspectives on modernisation and social change is not a 
subject here, but for instance Lyotard 1984, Giddens 1993, 1993a, Lash 1996, Turner 1990, Rose 1992, Cook et 
al. 1992, Hassard 1995, Featherstone 1994, Habermas 1994, Harvey 1995, Kumar 1995, and Tourraine 1995  
analyse these processes. 
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Risk is a negative possibility and not an objective fact, it is a ‘possibility of loss, injury, 
disadvantage or destruction’ (Webster 1986), but the perception of risk is a social construction 
based on consideration of possibilities and expectations (Luhmann 1990). Danger is 
unavoidable risk or situations characterised by dependency, low predictability, arbitrariness, 
and risk intensification. A series of new political, economic and environmental risks are 
emerging, that escape the institutions which ought to control and protect (Giddens 1993). This 
risk intensification and associated low-probability, high-consequence dangers resemble fate: 
even though the dangers are man-made, no one seems to be in control (Giddens 1993, Beck 
1993). Decisions on individual level will hardly have any effect; there is no mutual 
understanding or reason to make the leap of faith. People therefore do not consider the 
danger, but rely on hope or confidence that those in power will act responsibly.  
 
Risk involves the possibility to decide action as well as being a possible harmful event that 
might be avoidable depending on choice of strategies (Luhmann 1999). Assessment of risk 
and decisions about trusting are dependent on reflexivity, increased knowledge and 
possibilities for control of the outcome of the decision. The distinction between risk and 
danger can be formulated as a question of dependency and choice among alternative actions, 
for instance to choose exit (Hirschman 1970) to avoid a perceived risk. The modern risk 
society is characterised by expanding social risk and danger, this is a social condition which 
has as its corollary an increasing need for trust.  
 
Modernisation and social risk 
This increasing need for trust is an effect of modernisation; a sweeping force of 
transformational changes ‘the sources of certainty on which life feeds’ (Beck 1993:50, n1). 
Trust is contextual; every phase in societal development has its distinctive social and cultural 
characteristics which influence the basis of trust, the need for trust, the social configuration of 
trust and the social construction of trust. This does not mean that trust is historical; trust is 
related to social organisation, not to historical processes and the passing of time (Zucker 
1986). But the social configuration of trust forms is historical in the sense that social 
organisation varies in different historical periods and historical events or development can 
affect trust configuration. Transformation of social organisation is also a transformation of the 
social bases for trust and their configuration. Social change transforms the conditions for 
development of mutual understanding.  
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Globalisation, time-space distanciation, and the disembedding and re-embedding of 
institutions are driving forces of modernity (Giddens 1993). The rapid and technologically 
based pace of change, the global scope of change and the modern social institutions such as 
the political system of the nation state, the oil-based production systems, and the 
commodification of products and wage labour, are social processes that separate the modern 
from the traditional order (Giddens 1993). The expansion of new modern institutions and the 
scope and pace of change transform the social bases for trust, such as social practice, the 
relationships between members of society, values and world views. Social transformation has 
consequences for social organisation and social perception – the way things are done and the 
way we think about them. Social change affects the taken for granted understandings of social 
life and the understandings of what we trust, where we place our trust and how stable it is.  
 
Change results in social relationships being lifted out of their existing contexts and the 
creation of new social patterns. The effect of disembedding through social change can be a 
feeling of loss and erosion of trust. Trust is not disappearing; a transformation of the social 
bases is not necessarily an erosion of social ties. Social change involves the 
institutionalisation of new social patterns, values and structures – disembedding triggers a 
process of re-embedding. Existing patterns for development of mutual understanding and trust 
are eroded, but are replaced by new ones, the social bases are re-constructed and re-
configured, processes that increase the need for trust and demand reflexivity.           
 
Reflexivity, the constant examination and reforming of practice in the light of incoming 
information about those very practices (Giddens 1993) coexists with the risk society (Beck 
1993). Reflexivity is an acceptance of the premise that no knowledge is certain but any 
knowledge can be revised, an awareness which enhances a condition of instability and 
uncertainty. Reflexivity, differentiation, social change and increasing possibilities to choose 
roles and actions contribute to increased social complexity and create social risk. There is also 
a relational risk generated out of the other’s freedom of action – one can never be entirely sure 
about predictions or expectations about the other – there is always a possibility of unexpected 
actions. It is difficult to take anything for granted; reflexivity questions pre-contractual social 
scripts and social change transforms common platforms for action and interaction, the 
familiar foundations for trust seem to erode. Transformation of trust bases generates a feeling 
of insecurity as if trust is eroding, which in turn increases the need for trust.  
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Even though reflexivity is a part of the problem by increasing the feeling of uncertainty, 
reflexivity is also an element in the solution. Reflexivity is a necessary element in the process 
of recreating social bases for trust; it is an element in negotiation of new roles and social 
scripts and in the process of reformulation of taken for granted truths. Through reflexivity and 
step by step development of new social practices, new pre-contractual and relational bases for 
mutual understanding are developed. As the familiar content of bases for trust erodes, new 
content has to be developed in common – in this way new familiar bases are gradually 
institutionalised.    
 
The trust paradox  
To conclude; the corollary of modernisation and the risk society is an increasing need for trust 
as trust provides a feeling of certainty in situations of risk and complexity; social change 
transforms the foundations of the feeling of certainty. On a societal level risk intensification 
creates a feeling of insecurity and erosion of confidence. This is enhanced by modernisation 
and rapid and widespread social transformation. Social interaction and the development of 
mutual understanding and trust are dependent on predictability. Modernisation introduces new 
risks, continuous changes and increasing social complexity that reduce social predictability 
and familiarity. These processes constitute an ontological insecurity with which the modern 
human has to cope. Modernisation increases the need for trust, at the same time the conditions 
for development of it are undermined. The social bases for development of mutual 
understanding and making the leap of faith are eroded by these social transformations.  
 
This is the trust paradox – the need for trust increases in parallel with erosion of the social 
bases for development of trust – and it is tempting to conclude that this means that trust is 
disappearing, that the wells of trust are draining and the pumps cannot keep up.   
 
A closer look at the trust paradox through the lenses of the grounded theory of trust nuances 
the picture. The assumed erosion of trust is not an erosion of social ties, but an effect of the 
growth of danger and diffused power. These processes erode confidence and the existential 
feeling of security, and the trust in authorities is diminishing. The perceived increasing need 
for trust is a demand for confidence, and the solution is the implementation of formal 
structures – resulting in an expansion of agreements, treaties, and systems of control. These 




In parallel with the erosion of confidence, rapid and widespread social transformation 
increases the need for trust to manage the expanding social risk and complexity generated by 
social change. The paradox is that the need for trust is caused by the same forces that erode 
the social basis for it, but I hold that this is a temporary situation. Social transformation 
involves reconfiguration of trust bases in situations of social change; the social foundation for 
development of mutual understanding is under construction and re-creation. This process 
generates a feeling of insecurity and erosion of trust; it is an erosion of existing social ties and 
social bases in parallel with the development of new ones. Trust as a social quality does not 
erode, but its social foundations are transformed. The process of reconfiguration of trust bases 
increases the need for trust, but does not mean that trust disappears as a social quality.  
 
To return to the wells and pumps of trust metaphor presented in the introduction, the thesis 
suggests that the wells of trust are not draining away, but they are under continuous 
transformation and the pumps are keeping up, but they can be temporarily slow and require 
some maintenance.  
 
The rest of this chapter discusses examples of how social change transforms the social 
configurations of trust. The next two chapters focus on how social change transforms the 
social bases for trust. 
 
11.3  Configuration of trust 
Trust is not a single, static quality, but a dynamic, transformative process. The various forms 
of trust are based on different social qualities; on tacit contracts, social interaction or formal 
structures, respectively. The interaction and relationship between the trust bases, that is the 
configuration of trust, are dynamic and the trust bases can reinforce or weaken each other. 
Configuration of trust is an analytical construction and difficult to measure quantitatively, but 
it can function as a reminder about what to look for to gain insight into the complex 
composition of trust forms and how these may change.  
 
The configuration of trust can be studied in all kinds of social contexts, and it will vary in 
different societies and in different social contexts within any society. The examples discussed 
below address trust in love relationships, in cross-cultural communication, in Hawala banking 
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and trust related to terror in aviation. Trust configuration can also be examined on societal 
level and as a comparison of particular processes in different societies.  
 
Love – relational trust and expansion of pre-contractual trust 
On the individual level love relationships have elements both of social change and risk. Two 
single people gradually decide to become a couple, getting married, having children, 
borrowing money and buying a house; these are huge and lifelong obligations that demand 
strong and diverse bases for trust. A successful matrimony demands that the everyday 
interaction provides maintenance of trust rather than erosion of it. Relational trust building is 
a step by step process that endures in everyday interactions, and it is a strategy to develop 
trust in low trust situations and in situations requiring reconstruction of infringed trust. 
Development of relational trust can reconstruct and expand the basis for pre-contractual trust 
and institutionalise a new platform for mutual understanding.  
 
A love relationship is one example of the dynamic of trust configuration. Initially a couple has 
a little common basis for trust. The platform for developing mutual understanding is the 
general pre-contractual trust each of them has in the other sex generally and of the first 
impressions of each other in particular. Through interaction the two gradually expand their 
common basis for mutual understanding. Initially they sufficiently fulfil each other’s specific 
constitutive and background expectations, and mutual understanding is confirmed. Relational 
trust gradually develops and a common pre-contractual basis for trust emerges. As the 
relationship deepens, their common pre-contractual basis expands and they perceive that there 
is sufficient mutual understanding of diffuse, normative expectations. Minor backlashes can 
temporarily undermine the trust process, but continuous interaction hopefully maintains and 
contributes to growing trust.  
 
The relational risk is perceived as low and the couple decides to marry. The wedding confirms 
the agreement of a (hopefully) lifelong relationship, and is based on pre-contractual and 
relational trust. Matrimony is a supplementary, structural basis of trust, but this base cannot 
substitute for relational and pre-contractual trust bases. The difference between a partnership 
and a marriage is the structural trust base (assuming that there are no formal agreements 
confirming the partnership). Whether this difference has any practical (or emotional) 
consequences, is an empirical question. Analytically, a marriage has an extended basis for 
trust, compared to cohabitation, and economic matters are better protected through the legal 
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constructs of marriage. In a love relationship the configuration of trust bases are transformed 
from the initially small common basis for pre-contractual trust to a rich composition of pre-
contractual and relational bases for trust with a structural frame. Repeated interaction 
generates a relational basis for trust and expands and nuances the pre-contractual basis. 
Depending on whether expectations are fulfilled, the pre-contractual and relational bases for 
trust will expand or contract, while the structural basis for trust is a firm, stable relationship 
frame.   
 
Trust and cross-cultural communication 
The initial phase in encounters between strangers can be typically characterised as low trust 
situations in which the common pre-contractual platform for mutual understanding can be 
very small. For example doing business across different cultures can involve high risk as the 
initial common pre-contractual basis for development of trust can be low or absent.  
 
Even though cross-cultural encounters are an example of low trust situations, this does not 
mean that there always is low pre-contractual trust in an early stage of cross-cultural 
cooperation. In to-day’s globalised world, there might be cross cultural pre-contractual trust 
based on common modern experiences like the Internet, music, movies, literature, youth-
culture or professional background. These modern elements are largely Western in origin, but 
are now spread globally, interwoven in the modernity, and can function as an initial, semi-
structural basis for pre-contractual trust across cultures. These global icebreakers among 
youth are probably not sufficient as the sole foundation for cross-cultural pre-contractual 
trust, but can be a possible platform for dialogue and an initial step in the process of 
developing mutual understanding and eventually relational trust. 
 
Cross-cultural interaction can be an encounter between different trust configurations and 
demands the development of new, common pre-contractual basis for mutual understanding. 
This has to be done step by step through interaction, creativity, and reflexivity (Möllering 
2007). Interaction allows stepwise negotiation on how to define the common social codes, 
obligations and practices and develop a mutual understanding of what to expect of the other. 
Interaction makes it possible to adjust and explain and reach agreements, through this 
interaction partners develop a common relational platform, which in the long run can emerge 
as a common pre-contractual basis for trust. Successful interaction creates relational trust 
bases and eventually this may expand the pre-contractual basis for mutual understanding.  
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The absence of well-functioning structures for development of structural trust is a challenge 
when Western companies attempt to operate in cultures based on relational trust. One 
example is the different trust configurations in Russia and the West which function as a 
barrier against cooperation and development of trust (Ayos 2004, Ellingsen 2006, 2006a). 
Structural trust is a western alternative to relational trust in transaction between strangers or 
over distance. From a western point of view, the lack of common structural trust bases can be 
a challenge in economic transactions with Russian companies. Western companies have to 
develop relational trust bases with Russians, either as long term relational investments or 
through local friends or “trust agents”. ‘In Russia it is all about relationships’ as a Norwegian 
bank manager in a Norwegian savings bank in Russia said.89 The westerners have to rely on 
the trust building capacity of their native Russian “trust agent” (Ellingsen 2006a). Lack of 
“trust agents” or the selection of untrustworthy trust agents together with little or no cultural 
competence were frequently mentioned as main reasons for North-Norwegian business failure 
in North-West Russia. Business between North-Norwegians and Russians was hampered 
through having no, or a low level of mutual understanding, differences in or absence of pre-
contractual bases for trust and no awareness of different trust configurations.90   
 
As indicated in the Russian – Norwegian example the structural bases for trust have a 
different position in the two countries. In Norway and the West, structural bases for trust are 
important to secure trust in business agreements, in addition to pre-contractual and relational 
trust. In Russian business and in other Eastern countries, relational bases for are prevalent in 
business, for instance the Chinese Guanxi, a term which refers to connections or relations that 
facilitates business (Chang 2011). Social and economic modernisation are spreading to the 
East, but it is still too early to decide whether modernisation transforms the trust configuration 
in a Western direction, making structural trust bases of greater importance. In a study of 
active trust development in China, Child and Möllering (2003) recommend strengthening of 
structural bases for trust. Chang (2011) nuances the conception of guanxi and suggests that it 
is both dynamic and adaptable to changing environments, and a static social structure that 
maintain corruption and the unpredictable use of power. Institutionalisation of legitimate 
                                                 
89 My translation of a quotation from the newspaper ‘Nordlys’, 15.10.13, an article about Norwegian banking in 
Russia.  
90 Unpublished interviews with Norwegian business actors in North West Russia. The material is from an initial 
pilot mapping in 2005-2006 of Norwegian - Russian business relationships and from a following up study of 
Russian migrant workers and Norwegian-Russian business relationship in Båtsfjord in Finnmark; June 2012.     
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structural bases for trust is very long term process and deeply interwoven in the social 
structure and culture.  
 
An encounter between two cultures independent of structural trust bases would probably have 
better possibilities for developing mutual understanding in business contexts even though the 
initial pre-contractual trust will vary as a result of different cultural elements. It is likely that 
the pre-contractual basis for trust will be stronger when the trust configuration in the two 
cultures are similar, for instance in encounters within western culture.  
 
On the other hand, national differences should not be underestimated, the pre-contractual 
basis for developing trust can be smaller than expected, and mutual understanding cannot be 
taken for granted, for instance even between Scandinavians. There are several examples of 
substantial business agreements that have failed because the interacting partners have paid too 
little attention to cultural differences. Business cooperation between large Norwegian and 
Swedish companies for instance, has failed more than once because of this. One example is 
the unsuccessful efforts to merge the Swedish company Telia and the Norwegian Telenord. 
According to Telenor group managing director and chief executive T. Hermansen, cultural 
differences were one element in the failure of the merger.91 Another example is the huge 
convenience chain Coop, which has failed twice in their attempts to maintain the Coop-
Norden Group. The cultural differences among the three Scandinavian countries were one of 
the explanations of the failure.92  
 
To conclude, in cross-cultural interactions it is likely that the configuration of trust bases 
changes over time and that the pre-contractual and relational bases are expanded. 
Institutionalisation of pre-contractual bases for trust in cross-cultural relationships is long 
term processes and the time factor should not be underestimated. The role of structural bases 
is more difficult to manage. Structural bases for trust have to be legitimised over time through 
development of formal structures which need to be embedded in systems of meaning founded 




                                                 
91 http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2004/11/08/413831.html  
92 Personal communication with the members of the Norwegian Coop-management    
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Trust in bank – a question of culture   
Trust configuration is taken for granted. In the Western banking system, structural trust bases 
are fundamental, in addition to relational trust. In other parts of the world, relational trust is 
the fundamental basis for economic transactions. In tribal cultures and traditional societies, 
relational trust provides the same kind of security as formal structures do in market economies 
(Fukyama 1995, Hart 1990). One example of this is the Hawala system in banking.93 The 
Hawala system is an example of a relational based trust system for transferring money over 
distance and between strangers. Hawala has old historic roots but is still active in South Asia, 
some regions of Africa and as a system for transferring money from immigrants in the West 
to their home countries. Money is delivered to the Hawala agent in one place and is 
withdrawn by an agent in another place; customer A trusts agent B who trusts agent C, 
therefore customer A trusts C. What is the main social basis for this trust? According to 
Zucker (1986) trust is based on intermediary mechanisms as an example of institution based 
trust. In the Hawala system the money is not physically transferred; the transaction is based 
on messages between the two agents, and agent B is mediating familiarity between customer 
A and agent C. There is no written agreement; the agent’s loss of honour is the only sanction 
of fraud.  
 
The Hawala system has relational and structural elements; it is based on pre-contractual trust 
in the importance of keeping good honour and relational trust in the agent, there is no formal, 
written agreements, but it is an institutionalised system for money transfer. Events such as 
major frauds, introduction of legitimate formal bases for trust in a majority of the areas using 
Hawala to-day and absorption of the Hawala system into existing formal banking systems, 
can provoke a reconfiguration of trust bases in the system.  Introduction of structural bases for 
trust in this system as a supplement to the relational bases would mean a reconfiguration of 
trust bases. In the long-term, a development toward this is not unlikely, as there is a 
discussion about integration between Hawala and traditional banking, but in some Western 
countries the legality of Hawala is questioned. Integration of two different systems for money 
transactions is about more than routines and procedures; it will affect the trust systems and the 
                                                 






social organisation of society. This is about the configuration between relational and 
structural bases for trust, and the legitimacy of relational versus structural bases.    
Pre-modern Western societies had formal structures such as Roman law, Early German Law 
and Anglo-Saxon Law, but as long as the ruling powers were allowed to ignore or practise the 
law arbitrarily, the law did not function as basis for structural trust. Modernisation introduces 
formal structures for control and division of powers and mediates against arbitrary use of 
power. When formal structures contribute to reduce arbitrariness and facilitate predictability, 
they function as bases for structural trust.  
 
Vicious circles of erosion of trust are examples of weak or absent structural bases for trust. 
On a macro level, mafia rule in Southern Italy and drug baron dominated cities in South-
America are examples of societies affected by diminishing or lack of trust. In Southern Italy 
the legitimate basis for structural trust was destroyed during shifting regimes in the nineteenth 
century, allowing the mafia to expand its power (Gambetta 1990b), replacing structural trust 
with violence-based power. In some South-American countries and regions, drug barons 
perform similar roles as the mafia. Legitimate structural trust bases are replaced by arbitrary 
use of power and violence. Trust is absent. Trust is not based on arbitrary use of violence, but 
presupposes the possibility of demonstrating the absence of trust by choosing exit.   
  
 
Terror and aviation – from pre-contractual to structural trust 
The examples above discussed how changes in legal structures transform the configuration of 
trust bases, the examples below discuss the effects of increasing social risk.  
 
Huge and totally unexpected catastrophes such as Utøya 22/7 in Norway and 9/11 in New 
York, the Asian Tsunami in 2004, the tragedy in Beslan 2004, the bombing of London Tube 
in 2005 and a number of school massacres, are reminders about the risk society in which we 
live, and these incidents are likely to have influenced the pre-contractual trust among those 
directly affected. The victims of these catastrophes probably no longer have the same taken 
for granted feeling of security in similar public spaces. Victims from Utøya, for instance, 
report about feeling unsecure and alert (Universitas 2012, Aftenposten 2011).94 Their sets of 
expectations are different – at least for a while. As for the rest of us, to what extent pre-
                                                 
94 Personal conversation with victims. 
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contractual trust is influenced depends on proximity to the incident and the individual basic 
trust. A study of general trust before and after Utøya shows that it was strengthened 
immediately after the terror action, and then after a year, the level of general trust was back to 
the same level as before the terror (Wollebæk et al. 2012).95  
 
The study by Wollebæk et al. does not sort trust according to pre-contractual, relational and 
structural trust bases. If the findings are grouped into these bases, data indicates that relational 
and structural trust were strengthened just after the terror and normalised one year later, 
except for the trust in the police, which has declined 8 percentage points from April 2011 to 
August 2012. There is a reduction from 77 to 69 percent of respondents who place full or 
quite high trust in the police.96 The decrease may be an effect of the report from the 22nd July 
Commission of Inquiry, presented in August 2012, which concluded that, the police and the 
authorities could have done a better job. For instance, a public opinion poll conducted on 14th 
August 2011 reported that 55 percent of the informants felt that their trust in the police was 
not undermined after Utøya, while 39 percent said that their trust was either undermined (29 
percent) or strongly undermined (9 percent) (NRK).97 The study by Wollebæk et al. (2012) 
conducted immediately after Utøya, in August 2011, reported that 81 percent of general 
public respondents had full or high trust in the police. The two studies focused on possible 
trust effects after Utøya, they posed different questions, but seen together the surveys 
indicated that trust in the police is undermined a year after Utøya. However, this is not enough 
to influence on the general level of structural trust. One year after Utøya, the level of trust in 
societal institutions is about the same as one year before Utøya (Wollebæl et al.).     
 
Norway is a society with high levels of trust (Skirbekk 2012, Wollebæk et al. 2012). 
Norwegians trust their authorities and democratic institutions; there is a high level of 
structural and pre-contractual trust. Feelings of fear and worry relate to how risk and danger 
are perceived within the context of pre-contractual trust. The Utøya terror eroded the victims’ 
pre-contractual basis for trust, and the study by Wollebæk et al. (2012) indicates that incidents 
of this nature influence the level of pre-contractual trust among the rest of the population too. 
Almost 25 percent of the population fears new terror attacks after Utøya, and Wollebæk et al. 
(2012) concludes that there is an increase in fear and diminishing feeling of safety, in 
particular among the young, and that there is an increasing acceptance among the population 
                                                 
95 The study measured attitudes to trust at four points in time; April 2011, August 2011, May 2012 and August 
2012 (Wollebæk & al. 2012) and the sample is from Internet users. 
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for intensified surveillance. The Utøya terror seems to have caused an erosion of pre-
contractual trust and a demand for strengthening of structural trust bases.  
 
Bases for relational trust seemed to have expanded immediately after the terror. Prime 
Minister Jens Stoltenberg did an outstanding job in comforting the whole nation. He 
responded to the terror – not with claims about hate and revenge – but with request for more 
democracy, openness, cohesion and dialogue. The Norwegian people responded with flowers 
and a focus on love and cohesion. There was a huge mobilisation all over Norway – people 
went to churches, comforted each other on social media such as Facebook, and went in 
torchlight processions to express sympathy and solidarity with those affected by the terror. 
Through these reactions, relational trust was maintained and expanded in the early phase of 
the catastrophe.  
  
The Utøya terror attack reduced pre-contractual trust, but the collective Norwegian reaction – 
the relational trust processes – may have contributed to reducing the damage to pre-
contractual trust. This is not an obvious outcome; the 9/11 terror attack in New York followed 
another course. The Americans loss of pre-contractual trust has been continuously reinforced 
by the rhetoric of hatred used by President Bush and his “we’ll hunt them down” philosophy, 
the American war against terror and the resulting global expansion of security measures and 
military interventions. This can indicate that pre-contractual trust is eroding at the same time 
as structural trust bases expand in the American context. The picture is not unambiguous, 
there are indications that the 9/11 event has encouraged increased political and social 
engagement among American middle class youth (Sander & Putnam 2010) – this suggests an 
attempt to expand pre-contractual and relational bases for trust.  
 
Airline terrorism is an example of increasing risk (real or assumed) and expansion of 
structural bases for trust. In the pre-terror age of aviation, entering a plane was not much 
different from taking the bus when it came to control of departing passengers. After some 
terror attacks, which violated the pre-contractual trust in airline security, authorities, in 
particular those in America, have implemented more stringent security measures which 
rapidly spread globally. Even the smallest airport in remote areas has now adopted similar 
                                                                                                                                                        
96 Figure 5, 6, 8  (Wollebæk & al. 2012) 




security measures towards the mainly local travellers, as they have on J.F.K airport in New 
York. The security measures have an explicit and implicit function. The explicit function is to 
raise the level of security by controlling and removing potential dangerous items. The implicit 
function is to restore trust in airline security. This restoration involves substituting the former 
pre-contractual trust with structural based trust mechanisms such as rules and regulations and 
formal control procedures.  
 
The trust configuration in aviation is changed; the pre-contractual trust seems to have 
diminished, with a compensating large expansion of mainly structural measures. Aviation is 
an example of an industry with a comprehensive system for structural trust. There is a huge 
set of technical rules and regulations to secure the technical quality and safety standards of air 
transport and to secure a basis for structural trust in the functioning of the plane. The 
intensified control of passengers is an institutionalisation of structural bases for trust as a 
replacement for the loss of pre-contractual trust caused by fear of terrorism. Structural trust is 
dependent on a legitimate, functioning system that can apply sanctions if the rules are broken. 
This system is the nation state or super national bodies or agreements, if there are no 
sanctions, there is no trust. Airports without adequate security systems are not used and air 
companies which do not comply with the technical rules and requirements are banned.  
 
Trust is a dynamic quality. In the long term the new structural trust elements will probably be 
incorporated into the pre-contractual basis for trust. The configuration of trust bases are 
different, but (hopefully) the feeling of is trust restored when new social bases are developed.  
Pre-contractual trust will be strengthened if there is no increase in the level of threats. One 
effect will be that if passengers arrive at an airport without the traditional security measures, 
they would probably feel some uneasiness (at least the more anxious of us) as there is no 
familiar basis for structural trust. The absence of expected measures for structural trust may 
result in some passengers choosing exit and not using the airport, if possible.  
 
11.4  Conclusion: a necessary threshold of trust? 
Does the term trust configuration bring any new insight? The contribution of the term is that 
the analytical focus is directed on trust as a dynamic social process. Trust configuration 
means that the erosion of trust is not the same as the disappearance of trust, but that existing 
bases for trust are transformed and new configurations are emerging. In-depth studies of these 
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processes provide insights into social production and reproduction, and erosion and 
transformation; an insight that enhances the possibilities to develop and repair trust.  
 
Trust bases interact with each other; weak pre-contractual trust can be supplemented by step 
by step development of relational trust; reinforcing structural trust bases can expand pre-
contractual trust. Insight in trust bases and their configuration is an important step in 
systematically developing systems and procedures to establish common bases for mutual 
understanding and trust, processes which are necessary to maintain and restore trust.  
 
Changes in the configuration of trust bases at the societal level are long-term processes; social 
change transforms trust bases and the common platforms for mutual understanding. A 
minimum of trust is a prerequisite for social relationships and holding together a society or 
social organisation. If common bases for trust are eroded, new bases have to emerge to 
maintain social structures. Does this suggest that declining trust is not a challenge, that trust is 
not eroding, or is it only a question of reconfiguration of trust bases? The answer is no. 
Reconfiguration of trust bases is one alternative; breakdown of trust and exit are other 
alternatives to trust. Social change means that familiar social patterns cannot be taken for 
granted and pre-contractual trust comes under pressure and erodes. Over time, face to face 
interaction recreates relational bases for trust and is a platform for negotiating and correcting 
erosion of trust. Expansion of structural trust bases and increasing relational trust processes is 
a response to declining pre-contractual trust. If structural and pre-contractual trust bases are 
expanding at the sacrifice of relational trust bases, it is likely that exit becomes easier, that 
social ties are dissolved – and this is one possible path of development.  
 
The main conclusion of the configuration hypothesis is that trust is a dynamic social quality 
under continuous transformation; a process which generates a temporary feeling that trust is 
eroded. Trust does not necessarily erode, but its social bases are reconfigured.  
 
The next two chapters elaborate on two empirical examples of new trust bases and new trust 
configurations. The first example analyses the institutionalisation of structural bases for trust 
in the savings banks. This is not intended to be a bank or economic history, but the bank is an 
example for exploring how long-term social change influences configuration of trust bases. 
Banks are also the empirical focus in the second example which discusses how a particular 
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event, the deregulation of savings banks, also turned out to be a deregulation of the 










12. THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF TRUST IN 
NORWEGIAN SAVINGS BANKS 1814 – 1924   
 
‘The nature of modern institutions is deeply bound up with  
the mechanisms of trust in abstract systems’.98 
– ANTHONY GIDDENS  
 
 
Trust in the money and the financial infrastructure is a prerequisite for a well-functioning 
economy. This trust is developed and maintained through long term social transformation 
processes and interaction between pre-contractual, relational and structural trust bases. This 
chapter discusses the development of structural and pre-contractual bases for trust in 
Norwegian savings banks. The focus is on the dynamic between historical development and 
trust processes. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the composite concept of trust as an 
analytical tool for studying the dynamics between social changes, in this case, the 
development of savings banks, and trust. 
  
12.1  Historical context  
Norway became independent from Denmark in 1814. Development of a stable currency, 
reliable banks and a functioning monetary system were among the prioritised tasks for the 
new nation state, in addition to establishing a governmental administration and laws. As 
pointed out in chapter 10, the issuing and circulation of money have to be embedded in a legal 
framework administered by a legitimate power and state apparatus. This is the foundation of 
structural trust in money and the monetary system as well as in banks and the banking system.   
 
Banks are cornerstones in the monetary system; their social task is to circulate savings into 
credit and to manage savings in a secure way. Trust is a prerequisite for attracting capital, for 
circulating money over distance and providing long-term credit. Banks are businesses, they 
have to gain economic surplus and make professional credit risk judgements as risk 
management is the core of banking. A global study of bank failures concludes that one of the 
most common reasons for failures is poor credit risk judgements and mismanagement 
(Heffernan 1996). The history of savings banks development in Norway supports these 
findings; bad risk management has been a major cause of savings bank crises since the 
                                                 
98 Giddens 1993:83 
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foundation of the first savings banks in 1822 (Nordnes 1993).99 Unless there is a legal 
framework that control the banks and secures the customers’ deposits, major loss can cause 
bank crises that undermine the general trust in banks and in the banking system. The fear of 
loss of general trust in the banking system has been a driving force for bank regulations and 
development of a legal framework embedding the banking system. The legal framework 
provides protection of customer capital, reduces risk, and secures trust. The 
institutionalisation of laws was an important element in modernisation and building of the 
young Norwegian national state. Inherent in this process is the institutionalisation of formal 
structures as bases for generalisation of trust.  
 
The institutionalisation of structural bases for trust in savings banks and the gradual 
development of a banking system are relevant examples of the relationship between macro 
structures and micro actions, of how trust in a particular bank and the banking system is 
dependent on a legal framework; and how the institutionalisation of structural bases for trust 
in banks co-evolved with the Norwegian governmental system. These processes involve the 
transformation of existing social bases for trust and the development of new pre-contractual 
and relational bases for trust. 
 
Control and trust effects 
The introduction of statutory provisions related to the financial activities of savings banks can 
be analytically separated into different aims; these are control, trust and regulatory aims. As 
these are analytical categories, there are no sharp distinctions between them, they are not 
mutually excluding, but they refer to different prevailing effects. The focus in this chapter is 
on control and trust effects, but first a few comments on regulatory aims. Regulatory aims 
were the main reasons for introduction of statutory provisions and regulations in banking in 
the post-war period 1945-1985 (Nordnes 1993). Regulatory aims were, for instance, 
politically decided changes in liquidity conditions for regulating supply and distribution of 
credit. Even though these regulations had control effects and probably also trust effects, the 
main aim was to regulate the circulation of money and allocate credit in accordance with 
political goals.100  
                                                 
99 Three chapters in my master thesis Konto for tillit (Nordnes 1993) goes thoroughly into how bank crises were  
a drive for institutionalisation of structural bases for trust, and this chapter is based on elements from that 
discussion.     




In the first hundred years of banking, regulations were introduced to control the operation of 
banks and secure the customers capital. This had both control and trust effects; prudential 
measures that provide change in liquidity provisions to safeguard customer’s funds is one 
example of this. Several regulations of the financial system have control and trust effects, and 
long-time transformations in the financial system can be perceived as interaction between 
control and trust effects. Bank crises infringe trust, so control and regulations are imposed and 
the long term effect is increased trust.101  
 
The interaction between financial crises and the introduction of formal structures to control 
banking and the development of trust will be explored in this chapter. The chapter analyses 
the institutionalisation of trust in Norwegian savings banks and the emergence of banking 
from a historical perspective and in two periods. The first period is from 1823 until 1887, that 
is from the foundation of the first savings bank in 1822 until the first major amendment of the 
Savings Bank Act was made in 1887. The second period is from 1887 until 1924, when the 
next formative amendment the Savings Bank Act took place.102  
 
The focus is not on the historical details, the aim is to explore institutionalisation and 
transformation of trust bases from a historical perspective through the composite concept of 
trust as an analytical lens. The analysis is an interpretation of historical processes and using 
them as data for understanding trust processes; that is how societal development transforms 
the social bases for trust and the configuration between structural, pre-contractual, and 
relational bases for trust. The empirical data are economic history, general bank history, the 
history of some Norwegian savings banks, the Savings Bank Act and the literature discussing 





                                                 
101 See chapter 13 for further discussion of this. 
102 The terms bank and savings banks are hereafter used synonymously. Commercial banks have firms as their 
main customers and the Savings Bank Act is not a legal framework for these banks. The customers referred to in 
the thesis, are personal customers and not firms.    
103 See appendix one for further discussion of selection, collection, interpretation and discussion of reliability and 
validity of data. 
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Precursors of structural bases for trust 
Trust is a challenge in the development of a monetary system with notes and coins that have a 
functional and not substantial value. In the initial phase of the development of a Norwegian 
monetary system the aim was therefore to provide stable money with the value linked to 
silver. The Norwegian national bank, Norges Bank, was established in 1816 and based on a 
silver fund, paid by means of the so-called “silver tax”. There was a fear of foreign 
speculation with the silver fund, and to strengthen the fund the government demanded that 
customs had to be paid in silver (Bergh et al. 1983). Even though the aim was to increase the 
silver fund, this had probably negative trust effects, indicating that the government did not 
trust its bank notes. The silver fund was meant to guarantee the value of the bank notes from 
the national bank, which, at least in theory, could be redeemed in silver, but the bank notes 
were in practice non-redeemable. The rising of the fund proceeded slowly and one reason was 
probably that there was low trust in the non-redeemable bank notes.  
 
Towards the end of the 1820’s the state administrative apparatus was strengthened and the 
authorities started systematically stabilising the exchange rate of the ”spesidaler” (the main 
Norwegian coin). The Norwegian notes had low exchange value, but as the Norwegian 
economy became more predictable, it gradually gained trust abroad and the country’s 
currency became internationally convertible and held a stable rate of exchange. In 1842 the 
duty to redeem was opened and the value of the “spesidaler” was pegged to silver. Norway 
had now achieved a stable monetary unit and in parallel with this a state administrative 
apparatus had been instituted (Bergh et al. 1983).    
 
The development of a well-functioning monetary system was a demanding process according 
to Bergh et al. (1983). One challenge was the development of bases for trust. It is hard to 
decide in retrospect whether there was a pre-contractual trust in the new Norwegian state and 
new organisations such as the national bank. Probably there was some initial trust, as an effect 
of the new independence. The silver fund was one attempt to secure the functional value of 
money in substantial value and this can be regarded as a precursor of structural bases for trust, 
but as the bank notes was non-redeemable the trust effects were low. This meant that the most 
prevalent basis for trust in the money was probably a belief in that the national bank could 




The new nation gradually began to establish itself as an independent legitimate state power 
and the initial phase of the administrative nation building process was settled in the first half 
of the 1840s, with lawyers at the forefront (Berg et al. 1983, Slagstad 1998). This process 
developed a foundation for structural trust in the Norwegian monetary system. The 
development of a state administrative apparatus, institutionalisation of legislation and the 
opening of the silver fund can be regarded as the bases for institutionalisation of structural 
based trust in the monetary system. Structural bases for trust creates predictability, it reduce 
the risk in financial transactions over long distances and between unfamiliar partners. Long-
term credit and calculations became less uncertain when the partners could trust that the value 
of a “spesidaler” remained stable from one day to the next. Stable and convertible currency 
simplified the mutual valuation and opened new opportunities for trade, investments and cost 
accounting.  
 
A well-functioning monetary economy is also dependent on the existence of financial 
institutions for circulation of money between savers and investors, and a few years after 1814 
the first savings banks were established.    
 
12.2  The early savings banks – social or financial institutions?  
Access to and circulation of capital was a challenge in the new nation state. The wealthy had 
savings and access to credit abroad. Farmers, tradesmen and the common people had to resort 
to usurers who charged sky-high interests, to commercial creditors and trade credits. The 
establishment of banks could solve these problems according to the authorities.  
 
Trust in an organisation is based on mutual understanding of the aim and role of the 
organisation among its customers and collaborators. In the first years of banking there were 
probably low levels of pre-contractual trust in banks, these organisations were unfamiliar to 
most people and there were no formal structures or regulations to secure customers deposit. 
Banking was dependent on relational and pre-contractual trust from the customers. This trust 
is based on interaction and experience as bases for creating familiarity. A historical analysis 
of these bases for trust has to explore the social embedding and context as possible bases for 
pre-contractual and relational trust as we do not have access to data from the actual 




The paternalistic bank 
Initially, savings banks had a social as well as an economic aim; to promote saving of money 
among the peasantry and working class as a way of preventing them from spending their few 
coins on alcohol, among others, and to give credit and facilitate circulation of money 
(Rønning 1972, Nordnes 1993).  
 
In 1821 the editor of the newspaper “Morgenbladet” took an initiative to Stortinget (the 
Norwegian Parliament); and advised that it ought to ‘establish a universal charitable 
institution’ especially for widows and fatherless children. The model was similar to 
institutions in England, Scotland and on the continent (Rønning 1972:15). On 6th October 
1821 a Royal Commission was established with the aim of creating a plan for a public 
pension fund connected to savings banks. This seems to have been an urgent matter; already 
in April 1822 the Commission issued a public invitation for creation of Norway’s first savings 
bank, Christiania Sparebank. In the invitation to sign up for the new bank’s primary capital, it 
was pointed out that the bank should promote diligence and frugality, it should play a role in 
combating poverty and contribute to moral betterment amongst the working classes. Savings 
banks were obliged to be a bank for the common people, whom were assumed to be ignorant 
in monetary matters (Rønning 1972). 
 
Savings banks should, according to this, operate as paternalistic socio-political agents; they 
should have an educational role and function as a pension- and sickness fund. In this way the 
state provided a kind of solution to the problem of poverty – the problem was transferred to 
the bank. Kirkedepartementet (The Ministry of Church Affairs) had the jurisdiction of savings 
banks, and this emphasises their role as social institutions.  
 
The establishment of Christiania Sparebank and its statutes was a template for subsequent 
savings banks. The bank’s objective was, according to its statutes, to receive and collect 
interest on savings in particular from workers and servants. To be able to pay interest on 
savings, the bank had to circulate the money. Provisions from credit quickly proved to be the 
banks’ main income. Christiania Sparebank’s social political intentions were soon overcome 
in pursuit of commercial aims. In other countries the saving banks’ funds were placed in the 
treasury to earn interest, in Norway there was no such arrangement. The money had to be 
loaned out, and according to the banks statutes, at ‘the highest possible security and price’ 
(Rønning 1972:17). The statutes also stated that the old and sick who sought the poor relief 
248 
 
could have the bank’s recommendations providing they had been customers. This 
recommendation was probably unattainable for poor people; they had most likely not been 
bank customers and it is unlikely that they had money available for savings.   
 
The combination of business activities and moral paternalism towards the common people 
was probably difficult to balance. Despite good intentions in the first years, the savings banks 
were not popular in the target group. It soon turned out that it was rather difficult to encourage 
savings from ordinary people; three of nine banks established in the 1820s had to close down 
after a short time (Rønning 1972). The savings banks were not successful in the early years; 
they did not contribute to improving social conditions or advance the common people’s 
willingness to save. The savings banks received only small deposits, and the economic 
explanation was that the common people were of limited means (Rønning 1972). They did not 
have surplus money to save, nor could they afford to pay for credit and they had little or no 
mortgage security.  
 
On the other hand, banks were a new and unfamiliar organisation and a stable monetary unit 
was not fully established. Common people did probably not have pre-contractual trust in the 
stable value of the money or that the bank could take care of their few savings and they were 
not familiar with the leading men in the bank. These elements perhaps weakened the 
willingness to put money into savings banks (Nordnes 1993). Depositing money was risky for 
a customer as he literally had to hand over the money to the bank. The deposited funds were 
kept in the bank, in a box with three locks and the money was not secure against 
embezzlement, theft or speculation. The funds were not secured other than by pre-contractual 
and relational trust in those persons who were responsible for the bank’s activities and the 
bank’s trustworthiness which based on its financial reserves. Potential customers, at least 
from the peasantry, may not have had knowledge of how the bank performed its duties or of 
its financial resources. In the absence of structural trust, the customers had to depend on pre-
contractual and relational trust bases; on personal ties, interaction and familiarity with the 
leading men in the bank. And vice versa, the bank had to develop familiarity with the  
customers to attract their deposits. 
 
Even though the savings banks were initiated as a bank for the common person, they soon 
became a financial tool for merchants and the middle class. This was not only for financial 
reasons, but also because banking is a matter of customers trust. Lack of pre-contractual , 
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relational and structural bases for trust is most likely one additional explanation of the 
absence of deposits from the common people. 
 
The middle class bank 
When the first savings bank was established in 1822, there was no legal framework for these 
kinds of organisations. The first Savings Banks Act was passed on 20 July 1824, but it was a 
weak foundation for development of structurally based trust. The aim of the act was 
governmental control and the act provided no security for depositors’ funds. The Savings 
Bank Act was based on the premise that the income of savings banks was so low that the 
banks needed some economic and business-related privileges in order to exist; this was called 
“approbation”.104 From 1836, all public foundations were allowed to place their cash into the 
nearest approbated savings bank. Approbation required that the bank permitted regulation of 
their activities by statutes (plans) approved by the government. New savings banks had to 
copy the statutes of previously approved banks as the ministry prioritised conformity between 
the savings banks. Divergent statutes were not approved, and thereby was a shared system of 
statutes instituted for creation of savings banks.  
 
In the first 50 years, governmental control of the savings banks was primarily to provide 
approbation. Approbation can be interpreted as an official approval of these banks and that 
these banks therefore were entrusted with a responsibility to be cautious and behave 
trustworthy. Approbation provided income privileges and imposed control related to the 
banks’ potential for income, but it did not institute any obligations or security on behalf of the 
government. Approbation was therefore not a sufficient basis for structural trust, but a 
combination of the savings banks’ beneficial aims and approbation could have installed a 
basis for pre-contractual trust in these banks. This was a trust in that these organisations had 
prudential duties and took care of special considerations.  
 
The savings banks were established as independent organisations with a primary capital as 
equity base. The founders could be private individuals or municipal authorities. The primary 
capital contributions were either gifts or interest free loans (Rønning 1972:16). Deposits in the 
primary capital provided the depositor with a seat in the bank’s leading authority; 
                                                 
104 Approbated banks received, amongst other things, the right to demand 5% interest on mortgage loans; for 
other banks the interest on mortgages was, right up to 1857, fixed at 4%. For further descriptions of privileges, 
see Rønning 1972, Nordnes 1993. 
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Forstanderskapet (the team of elders) which elected the Board of directors. The Board of 
directors was an unsalaried management of the bank. The members of the committee of 
representatives were called forstandere, in English elders, a term that reflects the paternalism 
of the savings banks.105 Elder is usually associated with the church and leaders with a paternal 
responsibility for their flock.  
 
The use of the term elder and unsalaried management for everyday work may indicate that 
savings banks were perceived as generally beneficial organisations; an image that perhaps 
could provide trust and accountability. However, it is likely that there were few or no bases 
for trust between common people and the savings banks’ leading men who belonged to the 
social elite. The groups had probably nothing in common, no reciprocal ties, no mutual 
understanding and consequently there were few, if any bases for developing relational or pre-
contractual trust in the relationship. The effect of social differences in a society is low 
familiarity and little interaction between the different social classes. In a retrospective trust 
perspective it is not surprising that the savings banks had problems with receiving deposits 
from common people.  
  
After 1830, the normal practice was to have a salaried Board of directors, which indicated that 
savings banks were businesses rather than charities. According to local bank histories, it 
appears that the absence of common people as customers was most prevalent in the towns, 
perhaps because the social differences and class distance were most apparent here.  
 
The savings banks were established by the wealthier class. In the towns it was senior civil 
servants, merchants and businessmen who paid shares into the primary capital and established 
savings banks. These elites were aware of the potential benefit in the savings banks as a 
source of credit and they had the means to become bank customers. The wealthy could offer 
security as mortgages or trustworthy endorsers. They also had a platform for pre-contractual 
trust through belonging to the same class as the bank’s Board of directors. Consequently it is 
likely that there also was relational trust between the bank and these customers; they belonged 
to the same social strata and interacted in a number of different contexts. Some of the central 
government’s senior civil servants were given a seat in the bank’s Board of Directors, not on 
behalf of the government, but by virtue of their local position and influence (Rønning 1972).  
                                                 
105 The term is translated by me. 
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Being a senior civil servant was not only a basis for pre-contractual and relational trust, it 
could also support the image of savings banks as a kind of public institutions. Provided that 
people had trust in the state, this trust could be transferred to the savings banks if they were 
perceived to represent the state.  
 
Even though there were few arenas for interaction across different social classes, there may 
have been instances of interaction and relational trust between common people and savings 
banks’ management, but this was probably more of an exception than the rule. Interaction 
across social classes does not necessarily lead to trust; it can have the opposite effect and 
provide unilateral or reciprocal scepticism and distrust.   
 
Not every savings bank wanted to attract common people as customers. Bergens Sparebank 
(Bergens Savingsbank) for instance, adjusted the discount rate up to the interest level that was 
normal between merchants because they preferred to have merchants and not common people 
as customers. Bergens Sparebank decided to avoid small loans as they had low security and 
were inconvenient, they represented much work and low profit. These loans were for the 
common people ‘who, by virtue of their lower socioeconomic status would be unknown to 
most of the Board of directors’ (Rønning 1972:25).106  
 
There were exceptions from this attitude. Hammerfest Sparebank, (Hammerfest Savings 
Bank) established in 1847, had a large number of deposits from common people. This bank 
seems to have been a common people’s bank from the outset and was supported by almost the 
entire population, with the exception of fishermen and the upper class, according to an 
overview of bank depositors from 1850 (Jacobsen 1974). Wives and widows were the largest 
group of depositors in addition to state funds. One of the founders of the bank and chairman 
for many years was known as a man with a heart for common people and concern for 
humanitarian and social work. He supported public education and progress amongst the 
working class (Jacobsen 1974:78). Among common people this could be a basis for pre-
contractual trust and development of relational trust in the bank, but perhaps it also reduced 
the trust among the upper classes. The upper class in Hammerfest were not customers in the 
                                                 
106 It is interesting to note that in a study of female entrepreneurs by Lotherington and Ellingsen (2002) bank 
clerks used the same argumentation when they where asked about credit for female entrepreneurs and single 
mothers. The banks preferred not to have these groups as business customers as they expected female 




local savings bank; they continued to use their foreign credit sources, particularly in Northern 
Germany. They probably had low pre-contractual trust in the chairman of the bank.  
 
12.3  Interaction between relational and structural bases for trust 
Until about 1840 the savings banks were first and foremost established in the towns. 
Throughout the next decade there was a significant growth of savings banks in the rural 
communities and municipalities. This was because of general economic growth and the 
introduction of municipal self-government.  
 
 Formannskapsloven (The Act on Executive Committees) of 1837 demanded that the 
municipal administration was financially responsible for the care of the poor. Establishing 
savings banks were, as previously mentioned, perceived to be a solution to this problem, and 
in some municipalities the entire local council was in the bank’s committee of representatives. 
The local savings banks could be so closely linked with the local authorities that they could be 
perceived as a civic institution – suggesting that the pre-contractual trust in these institutions 
could be transferred to the savings banks.  
 
Savings banks were often established on initiatives from the municipal executive committee 
who demanded to have representatives amongst the bank’s Board of directors and/or 
committee of representatives. In addition to pre-contractual trust related to the societal role of 
the savings bank, the composition of the Board of Directors could be a basis for trust. It is 
likely that those who had a seat in the local council were among the trusted men in the rural 
community. Including them could provide some support from the common people and 
provide an initial basis for pre-contractual and perhaps relational trust. 
 
It was normal practice that the municipal treasury’s cash was stored in the savings bank; this 
money was the engine of the local economy. In many municipalities, the granary was 
converted into the savings bank’s primary capital. The granaries were the rural communities’ 
common property and in the non-monetary economy the granaries had functioned as banks by 
lending out corn during times of hardship. In some cases the granary had not functioned as 
intended, the corn was sold during the 1830s-1840s, and the income was used as primary 
capital to establish a local savings bank. The basis for using the corn money was that the 
savings bank’s purpose was to ensure supply of credit in the regions (Hals 1972, Rønning 
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1972). The use of common resources as primary capital for establishing savings banks 
reinforced their social role in the municipalities and was probably a basis for pre-contractual 
basis for trust.  
 
The establishment of many small local savings banks was necessary as familiarity and local 
relationships were a prerequisite for relational trust, in particular because structural bases for 
trust was still absent. In rural communities with no granaries, the capital had to be acquired 
from personal contributions, such as for instance the establishment of Målselv Sparebank 
(Målselv Savings Bank) in 1861 (Kiil 1976). In these cases it was important that persons 
representing the bank were among those who were trusted in the municipality. In Målselv the 
district sheriff headed the establishment of the bank and its activities. In Lyngen municipality 
this role was performed by one teacher and two merchants when the savings bank was 
established in 1907. It is likely that the trust bases related to these people were a combination 
of pre-contractual and relational elements and that their social positions provided a form of 
ascribed familiarity as basis for trust. The leading men in the rural communities belonged 
probably to highly regarded families or were personally trusted. People with a formal societal 
position, such as the sheriff, could be attributed a kind of structural trust and their position 
would be a basis for pre-contractual trust.  
 
The savings banks’ tasks were often performed by persons seated on the bank’s board and the 
local council. These persons did not represent the municipality as such, but then as now, 
holding office seems often to have a cumulative effect. Those who are entrusted with one 
position often receive other positions. Trust acquired in a formal position seems to be 
transferred to the person. The municipality can function as a structural base for trust, this base 
could be generalised to the savings bank and provide a symbolic image of the bank as 
something similar to the municipal administration. The savings banks’ position as the 
mainstay of the local society was underlined by the fact that the banks were managed by local 
prominences.  
 
The savings banks were often called a “rural bank”. This is a symbolic name based on 
practical realities. The relationship between the savings bank and the local community was 
founded on personal and official ties. Initially it was the wealthier members who were the 
bank customers. This was also the situation in the rural communities, for instance freehold 
farmers. Gradually smallholders, who could take control of their own farm, also become bank 
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customers. This was probably because there were more people who had property they could 
mortgage and this provided broader group of potential bank customers than in the towns. In 
addition, it may be surmised that the conditions for developing mutual trust between bank and 
customer were probably better in the rural communities because of the close link between the 
savings bank and the municipal administration.  
 
The idea of a savings bank as a local bank and a bank with a special societal responsibility is 
therefore an idea which has long and deep historical roots and is an element in the basis for 
pre-contractual trust. It was developed in the early years of the savings bank, based on their 
early aims as societal institutions, and even though the aims, to a large extent, have changed, 
the idea still existed in the 1990s.107 This idea was one reason for the loss of trust after 
deregulation, which will be further discussed in the next chapter.       
 
12.4  From relational to structural based trust    
In 1851 Finansdepartementet (the Ministry of Finance) took on the responsibility for 
approving the savings banks, this confirmed that banks were now economic rather than social 
institutions. The national bank was the primary lender for the industry, in 1834 for instance, 
90 percent of the mortgage loans were to the industry. This was in conflict with the national 
bank’s regulations and in 1851 a national mortgage loan bank was established for long-term 
credit. Norges Bank could now prioritise national bank functions and short-term commercial 
loans to the banks (Rønning 1972).  
 
Norway had a free-trade and laissez-fair policy from the 1850s up to well into the 1870s. This 
was a period of growth for industry and commerce. After 1875 there was a period of 
economic stagnation; a tight financial market, a substantial demand for credit and restricted 
supply of deposits. Risk management was not well performed. This caused bank crises and 
the savings banks lost money; many of them went bankrupt in the 1880s. The banks had large 
shares of their loans in short-term bills of exchange associated with personal security and 
relational trust in the customer. Adequate formal protection mechanisms for bank activities 
had yet not been established.  
                                                 
107 Several customers mentioned in the interviews about their relation to the savings bank that they perceived the 
savings bank as a kind of public institution. This is probably an effect of the bank role that was instituted more 




In this turbulent economic phase, both common people and politicians asked questions about 
savings banks’ operations. The savings banks’ dependence on relational trust resulted in 
diminishing support for some of the banks. Security measures were necessary, measures that 
also had trust effects and ensured that the banks did not abuse their trusted responsibility for 
the customer’s funds. There was also a disagreement about whom the bank was for; the lower 
classes or the middle class? This was an important question with regard to who should have 
the right to a seat in the committee of representatives and to exert influence on the bank. The 
question was raised when it was necessary to supplement the committee of representatives 
and the new members were taken on by self-supplementing; the members of the committee 
selected the new members. In some towns, trust disappeared because of disagreement about 
this question, and whole groups, for example, craftsmen’s associations, chose exit and 
established their own savings banks (Rønning 1972).108   
 
As pointed out, the savings banks in the rural communities appears to have had a broader 
basis for trust than in the towns. In the 1880s, two thirds of the rural banks had a committee of 
representatives completely or partly controlled by the municipality (Egge 1972). The main 
reasons for municipal control of the savings bank were that the bank could be based on the 
community’s funds, and the bank was important for the municipality’s economy. The savings 
banks granted credit to the depositors and the municipality, and became gradually an 
important buyer of government and semi-government bonds. This, together with public 
approbation, may have given the savings banks an appearance of being public institutions, 
without actually being so. The image as a kind of public institution was also an element in the 
basis for pre-contractual trust in the savings banks (Nordnes 1993). 
 
Throughout the laissez-faire period the state was against interfering with industry and 
commerce (Bergh et al. 1983), but the savings banks were considered to be in a special 
position in relation to this. The Ministry of Finance sharpened the requirements for 
approbation and introduced administrative injunctions on the savings banks during this 
period. New rules for administration and the daily operation of savings banks were 
imposed.109 The new regulations had both control and trust effects; the Ministry of Finance’s 
                                                 
108 “Exit”, according to Hirschman (1970:4), means to "stop buying or leave the organisation". 
109 For instance, from 1861 the primary capital had to be no less than 300 “riksdaler” (the new Norwegian 
currency), and the savings bank were required to provide annual accounts to the Ministry. Managing directors of 
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increased the control of how the savings banks operated. The control mechanisms were 
intended to strengthen the safeguard of depositors’ funds, to prevent the bank management 
misusing or gaining unnecessary benefits based on their trusted position. These regulations 
probably provided strengthening of the depositor trust in the bank.  
 
Throughout the first fifty years of banking, the founding fathers of the bank had a strong 
position. They were the management and could in principle handle the deposit capital as their 
own money. In this situation, relationships and word of mouth were the prevalent basis for 
trust. Gradually a separation was instituted between the persons in management and their role 
as bank staff, the bank organisation was established and a modern bureaucracy emerged with 
formal roles and hierarchal structures. Together with a major revision of the Savings Banks 
Act in 1887 this established a foundation for structural trust in banks and banking. The history 
indicates that institutionalisation of structural bases for trust are long-term processes that have 
to be continuously maintained to avoid trust crisis.    
 
The savings banks and local democracy – expansion of the basis for trust 
The change in the Savings Banks Act on 6 July 1887, did not take place without prior debate 
in the Norwegian Parliament. There was ,for instance, a political disagreement about the self-
supplementing system. This system had contributed to narrowing the bank’s basis for trust 
and the question was whether the self-supplementing system should be replaced by a 
depositor supplementing or a municipal supplementing system. The savings banks were still 
partially regarded as public banks, in contrast to the private banks.  
 
Rural banks were partly considered as a form of cooperative society.110 Municipal 
supplementing was based on the premise that the local authorities and not the state should 
govern the savings banks’ equity, which many felt was the town’s or the rural community’s 
funds (Egge 1972). The Savings Banks Act of 1887 banned self-supplementing after hard 
debates in the Norwegian Parliament, and also ensured that the committee of representatives 
would be chosen from the depositors. Democracy gained ground and common people were 
entrusted with the potential to control their own funds. Customers with deposits above a small 
                                                                                                                                                        
new savings banks were not allowed credit in the bank or to guarantee without mortgage in real estate or 
deposited securities. This was necessary because there had been several cases where bank management had 
supplied them self with risky credit and lost the banks deposit capital.  
110 The savings banks owned themselves; they had to take care of the interests of depositors and not yield profit 
to owners.  
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minimum were able to participate in deciding the composition of the committee of 
representatives. This was adopted with a narrow majority; the argument was that the new 
system would contribute to better safeguard of the depositors’ interests (Egge 1972). In 
addition it probably also contributed to strengthening of the pre-contractual basis for trust in 
the bank.   
 
The savings banks administrated societal interests via credit and investment, and had 
therefore to be under some degree of state control; the question was just what form of control. 
Opposition towards government control was also an element in the defence of municipal self-
ownership. Banking was included in the agrarian policy, and became gradually an element in 
governmental decentralisation policy. The image of the savings banks as different from 
business enterprises appears to have been strengthened in the rural communities during this 
period. The distinction between town and country bank might be partly related to the 
perception of what the savings banks’ function in society should be. In the towns, many were 
of the opinion that the savings banks should be viewed as private enterprises. Even though the 
savings banks were not intended to operate for profit, the opinion was that these banks should 
have the private banks as model for their activities.111  
 
Depositors’ interests were the key argument for several amendments to the 1887 Act. The 
introduction of audit committees which intended to monitor the committees of representatives 
and statutes that restricted the bank’s leaders and representatives’ freedom of action, were 
fixed by law. A law was also introduced stating the requirement of primary capital, and two 
prudential clauses were introduced relating to the requirement for the bank’s security and 
liquidity position. The right to use the word save was linked to the obligation to operate safe 
and make profitable investment of saved funds. From now on a savings bank was required to 
have official approval for carrying out their activities. The decision was justified by the 
consideration of the “common people of limited means”, who could lose their entire savings 
capital (Rønning 1972). Through legislation the public authorities also had to ensure that the 
banks did not abuse their position towards the customers. The Savings Banks Act was 
intended to ensure control of the bank’s management as well as the customers’ funds and 
instituted a basis for structural trust that ensured that the bank attended to its entrusted 
                                                 
111 Later private banks were called commercial banks.  
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responsibility. In addition was the claim that the savings banks had fiduciary obligations 
towards the customer a basis for pre-contractual trust. 
 
The creation of unity in the savings bank system was another reason for establishing by law a 
part of the provisions, which until then were stipulated by regulations and ordinance. Prior to 
the act of 1887, the state could first and foremost exert control in relation to approbation of 
the bank’s statutes.112 Approbated banks had received approval for their statutes and could not 
be subjected to change, except in respect of laws. This had led to great variation in the savings 
banks’ activities. Government control and approval enforced homogenous practice and 
common frameworks – equal treatment facilitates predictability and is a basis for structural 
trust.   
 
Apart from the provisions of the Savings Banks Act, the savings banks retained their 
autonomy in respect to administrative matters, which were regulated via the banks’ statutes. 
The bank organisation began to take form. From the 1890s and beyond, expansion in the 
savings banks’ administrative apparatus was based on changes in law and regulations. This 
had trust effects; it prevented large, abrupt changes in the savings bank’s practice towards of 
their customers. Salaried bank managers and tellers were employed, the control apparatus was 
strengthened and accounting procedures tightened up (Egge 1972). Introduction of formal and 
hierarchical bank organisations, expansion of the recruitment system for the bank’s committee 
of representatives and tightening up of the bank’s freedom of action via the Savings Bank 
Act, professionalised the banks and instituted structural trust mechanisms.  
 
12.5  Instituting a basis for structural trust 
Towards the end of 1890, the international economic situations improved, and a new wave of 
industrialisation and economic growth started in Norway. This included considerable 
borrowing abroad and foreign investments at home. The commercial banks expanded and in 
total they became larger than the savings banks. There was a minor economic backlash 
around the turn of the century, but the economy did not stagnate severely. Capital flowed into 
Norway as foreign investments and sale of Norwegian government bonds abroad, and the 
country entered a long-lasting boom after 1905 (Bergh et al. 1983).  
 
                                                 
112 Non-approbated banks had not been obliged to comply with the legislation. 
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The boom came to an end with the first post-war slump in 1920-21 which resulted in low 
production and high unemployment. Banks are vulnerable to economic changes in the 
industry, and after a couple of years there was a run of bankruptcies. About 100 banks had to 
close in 1923, primarily commercial banks (Bergh et al. 1983). The depositors did not trust 
that their money was safe, and several banks had a “run” of customers who withdraw 
investments. The “run” was related to diminishing trust from the customers and driven by 
needs. Unemployment forced people to live on savings, this strained the banks’ cash flow 
further, and they were unable to meet their obligations towards the customers. Many 
commercial banks went bankrupt in the 1920s despite that Norges Bank (Bank of Norway) 
offered support as cash loans or deposits.  
 
Later in the 1920s the savings banks were affected, particularly because of crises in the 
municipal economy. The municipalities pursued a policy of expansion the first years after 
World War I, and were noticeably affected by the parity policy as well as the failure in 
industry. Municipalities suffered from significant budget deficits and could not meet their 
obligations to the banks. During the period 1922-33, the municipalities’ taxable nominal 
income dropped by 50 percent and assets were reduced to at least 60 percent of the 1922 level 
(Nordvik 1972). The economic problems seemed to have affected the trust between bank and 
customer differently. 
 
Insolvent banks and depositor interests  
The close relationship between the municipality and the savings bank made the banks 
vulnerable towards decline in income and payment problems in the municipal sector. Several 
banks had to ask for public debt settlement when the bank’s liquidity was insufficient to cover 
the depositors’ requirements. Tromsø Sparebank (Tromsø Savings Bank) was a typical 
example of this.  
 
Tromsø Sparebank had to ask for public debt settlement in 1929. This was because loss of 
credit to the fishing industry and industrial companies as well as credit to the municipality and 
the county, which had loans to construct electrical utilities and other infrastructure (Harbitz 
1986). Tromsø municipality was in a poor economic position and the bank had also provided 
loans to ease the municipal cash flow in difficult times. Tromsø Sparebank emphasised that 
the bank had to make a debt settlement which protected depositors’ interests as much as 
possible, thereby the banks secured the depositors’ trust. Debt settlement means that the 
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depositors receive a percentage share of their outstanding balance in instalments. It turned out 
that a number of customers did not take out their investment in instalments, but let them 
remain in the bank.  
 
It is likely that the strong prioritisation of the depositors’ interests in the difficult situation for 
the bank had the effect that an unexpectedly large number of the customers kept their deposits 
in the bank. This indicated that the loss of trust in the bank was not as severe as might have 
been expected. The customers’ trust was one of the factors to which Norges Bank attributed 
significant weight in the consideration of bankruptcy or debt settlement. For Norges Bank the 
problem was whether the customers would continue to trust a bank that had gone through a 
debt settlement, or whether it would be better to close down the bank and to enter into public 
debt settlement and create a new bank.   
 
The challenges in the bank industry made it necessary to improve the legislation relating to 
insolvent banks. The customers could risk losing their investment in the event of bankruptcy, 
and credit customers risked that their entire loan was withdrawn by the bank. In 1923 an act 
of public administration was created for banks which had stopped payment to depositors. 
Norges Bank appointed an administration board for insolvent banks and these banks were set 
under public administration. This law was replaced by an act in 1925 which allowed 
liquidation of insolvent banks, with the exception of the savings banks. They received debt 
settlement and in 1928 an act on administrative debt settlement was created as an alternative 
to bankruptcy.  
 
Financial support, regulations and control 
There was a political debate about how the government should assist the banks. It appeared to 
have been politically acceptable that the savings banks were social institutions with great 
importance for the community economy and as administrator of small depositor funds. The 
legislation had, therefore, to ensure consistent formal procedures that could address 
consideration of depositors in the best possible way and help facilitate reconstruction of the 
banks.113 In addition to benefits from Garantifondet (The Guarantee Fund), the savings banks 
received support through the national budget.114 This provided credit to savings banks that 
entered into liquidity problems due to municipal debt settlement.  In the period 1929-34 this 
                                                 
113 See Nordnes (1993) for further description of debt settlement and bankruptcy arrangements. 
114 This became later Sikringsfondet (The Security Fund), see next page. 
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support comprised NOK 9.8 million (Nordvik 1972). New credit institutions were also 
established which were intended to convert the savings banks’ claims among the 
municipalities and in primary industry, for instance was Norges Kommunalbank (the 
Norwegian Municipal Bank ) established in 1927 and the credit for farmers and fishers in 
1932 and 1934 respectively. These credit institutions took over some of the savings bank’s 
most risk-exposed loans.  
 
Trust and government effects were important in this difficult situation. The interests of the 
depositors had to be safeguarded via structural trust mechanisms. After about 100 years of 
banking, the customers had probably developed some pre-contractual trust in banks and 
banking, but this was most likely still quite fragile, Banks and the authorities therefore had to 
work together to maintained trust through economic turbulence.  
 
The year 1924 can be regarded as a memorable year in the development of the savings bank 
system. The bank historians have described the amendments in the Savings Banks Act in 
1924 as comprehensive, detailed, and more restrictive than previously amendments (Nordvik 
1972, Harbitz 1986, Bryhni et al. 1991, Knutsen 2007).115 Three general comments can be 
made about the new act: 1) it marks the start of an era where the government becomes more 
engaged in increasing regulation and control of the banks and especially the savings banks 2) 
it safeguarded the interests of depositors 3) the act included detailed regulations for limiting 
of the banks’ roles and defines the competence of its various bodies.  
 
The new Savings Banks Act sharpened the distinction between the committee of 
representatives and the board, and between the democratic and administrative bodies in the 
bank. The establishment of savings banks was now subject to regulations. With regard to 
safeguarding the interests of the depositors, the banks were required to have a cash reserve of 
1/10th of the investments, a somewhat less stringent requirement than 1/8th in the 1887 act. 
The concept of a security fund was introduced by the banking industry, it became a law and 
the banks had to set aside 2 percent of their net profit to a security fund. In 1932 a separate 
law on Garantikasse for sparebanker (The Guarantee Funds for savings banks) was created, 
this was later changed to Sikringsfondet (The Security Fund). These funds were to provide 
loans or support income to banks in difficulties. New legislation was established to provide 
                                                 
115 In the same year came the act on commercial and shareholder banks, an act which had many similarities with 
the Savings Bank Act. 
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more exacting bank inspection and a requirement for keeping of accounts, auditing, and use of 
profit. This was intended to protect the depositors, and particularly the interests of small 
depositors.  
 
It is the depositor, not the borrower, or customer, around whom the Savings Banks Act is 
built. Savings banks’ activities are anchored to the depositor; the credit function remains a 
means of securing the return of the investments.116 The purpose of instituting structural trust 
in the savings banks was to reassure the customer that the deposit was safe when it was left to 
the bank. Structural trust mechanisms ensured that the bank took over responsibility for the 
customers' money and administered them in a safe manner, which is the banks’ fiduciary duty. 
 
The fact that the savings banks did not go bankrupt, but entered into debt settlement 
reinforced their image of responsibility. The strict loan regulations contributed to giving 
customers the impression that banks took responsibility for and looked after the customers' 
money, and that they made prudent decisions in credit activities. Gradually it has been 
institutionalised as an element in the pre-contractual basis for trust that the savings banks 
were cautious and responsible institutions. This together with the institutionalisation of 
structural bases for trust, and increased familiarity of the banks as institutions not only for the 
wealthy, but also for the common people, provided a compound basis for trust in savings 
banks and banking. 
 
12.6  Conclusion: new configurations of trust bases  
The changes in the savings banks’ legal frameworks resulted in new procedures and 
institutionalisation of new, normative foundations for activities. Over time, customers and 
society’s expectations of savings banks' role were changed – the customers developed an 
image of the bank as reliable and as an institution that took care of their interests. The 
development of structural bases for trust and familiar relationships between bank and 
customer contributed in the long run to strengthen the pre-contractual basis for trust, but trust 
can be fragile and needs to be actively maintained, particularly in periods of social change and 
crisis. 
 
                                                 
116 After the deregulation in the mid eighties, the focus shifted to credit. 
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The development of the relationship between savings bank and customer can be described as 
different configurations of trust bases. The development in trust bases and their configuration 
can be illustrated in a figure which shows possible configurations bases for trust in savings 
banks among common people during the first hundred years of banking.  
 
Each of the three bases for trust are marked as different circles; the relational trust basis is red, 
pre-contractual trust is marked as   and structural trust is marked as . 
The relative size of the circles indicates the prevalence of trust base at a particular time.  This 
is analytical suggestions of how possible trust configurations could be in different periods of 
time, based on analysis of bank history. 
 
Figure 2 Configuration of trust bases for the relationship between common people and 
savings banks  
 
From 1820 => a few if any bases for relational trust, hardly any 
pre-contractual trust, and even less bases for structural trust.  
 
From 1850 => relational and pre-contractual bases were 
developed, at least in the countryside and structural bases for 
trust became gradually institutionalised.  
 
From 1887 => pre-contractual and structural bases for trust 
were strengthened through democratic control and bureaucratic 
management.  
 
From 1924 => strong bases for structural trust were introduced, 
pre-contractual and relational bases for trust were expanded. 




After about a hundred years a set of bases for trust is institutionalised and some equilibrium 





one of them is weakened, the other can become more important. The changes in the bank laws 
during the inter-war period could also be perceived as an expression of political 
acknowledgement of the banking system’s vital significance for the economy and society.   
 
Throughout the twentieth century the savings banks have become tightly interwoven in 
society’s economic system.  Even though shifting political ideologies affected banking 
policies; the tendency was that trust effects were the main aim of bank regulations up to 
World War II. At the same time, there seems to have been a trend where considerations of the 
individual customer gradually have had to give way to what is felt to best serve the nation’s 
economy. The need to secure trust in the country’s financial system together with maintaining 
stability and predictability in the economy, required government support measures that 
contributed to rebuilding of the banks and signalised security.   
 
The banks were important tools in the financial policy throughout the rebuilding of Norway 
after WWII and in the mid-eighties the saving banks were deregulated. As pointed out several 
times throughout the thesis, this was a process that severely affected the trust relationship 
between bank and customer. The next and final example of trust configurations will discuss 
how deregulation changed the foundations for this trust. It is an in-depth study of the 














13. DEREGULATION OF TRUST 
 
‘If it is so that all customers are treated differently, but believe that there is equal treatment, 
whereas the reality is that the bank every time it enters into an agreement with a customer 
consider this as an isolated transaction to ensure profitability, then there is a tremendous gap 
between the customer’s  expectations and the realities.117 
 
 
The dynamic between social and economic change and trust is an understudied topic; the 
main perspective on trust has been to analyse it as a static quality rather than a dynamic social 
process (Möllering 2012). However, Zucker’s analysis of the transformation of the US 
economic system during 1840-1920 is an example of how the dynamic between social 
change, economic change and new forms of trust can be explored (Zucker 1986). According 
to Zucker, social organisation is the premise for economic organisation; social change 
transforms trust relations, which again leads to organisational transformation of economic 
institutions. In other words: social change affects trust which again transforms economic 
organisation. 
 
The question to be discussed in this chapter is the reverse: I argue that organisational change 
in the economic sphere, such as the restructuring of transactional relationships and 
interactions, impacts on the social basis for trust to the extent that one can talk about a more 
fundamental transformation of social institutions. Put differently, I hold that trust is affected 
by a change in the way markets are organised and work, which in turn affects society at large.  
 
Zucker’s distinction between social and economic organisation is somewhat diffuse, but her 
causal chain is relevant as an introduction to a discussion of the relationship between trust and 
social and economic change. Trust is, according to her, one of the cornerstones of social and 
economic organisation, but there is no clear cut distinction between these forms of 
organisation. The premise for the discussion here is that economic organisation is one form of 
social organisation. Economic organisation comprises the formal structures which are framing 
and regulating the economy, economic transactions and the social interaction in the economic 
field.118 A corollary of this premise is that change in economic organisation can have 
consequences for social organisation.  
                                                 
117 Bank customer (in data material Nordnes 1993)  




As an empirical example of the relationship between trust and social change, this chapter 
explores how deregulation, as a macro level change in the economic organisation of banking, 
also has effects on the meso and micro levels. Banks were transformed into financial market 
actors, and this process affected the social bases for trust on a micro level; the trust between 
customer and savings bank. The chapter also discuss this transformation process as an 
example of the relationship between trust and social modernisation.   
 
The aim of the chapter is also to demonstrate the power of the composite concept and 
expectation model as tools for analysing the relationship between trust and social change. 
This is done by means of the data the conceptualisation is generated from; the research on the 
bank-customer trust relationship. These data describe social processes which still are relevant 
as example of a general process; that is how major organisational change can affect trust 
relationships.  
 
The chapter introduces the background of economic crises and fluctuation in levels of trust. 
Thereafter follows an introduction of the historical context for the deregulation of banks. An 
outline of the regulation systems and the process of deregulation are given to provide insight 
in the structural and pre-contractual basis for the bank - customer relationship. This is 
followed by a discussion of market competition as the new basis for the relationship and the 
new configuration of trust. The analysis of the trust process is finally discussed in relation to 
social change and modernisation. The focus of the trust analysis is first and foremost on micro 
level processes; on the actors’ social construction of trust and the transformations of the social 
bases for trust. These bases are the common platform for development of mutual 
understanding and trust. 
 
13.1  Deregulation, bank crisis and loss of trust 
Economic history indicates that financial liberalisations are followed by crises in bank and 
finance (Kaminsky & Rogoff 1999, Reinhart & Rogoff 2008, Kindleberger & Aliber 2011). 
Banking is vulnerable and bank crises contain systemic risk which can spread to the rest of 
the economy (Heffernan 1996). Bank crises can lead to a major loss of trust with the effect 




A political and ideological shift took place throughout the Western world during the 1980s, 
the banking and the finance sector was deregulated; political control and regulation gave way 
to market competition. Economic liberalisation is the backcloth for the bank related financial 
crises that hit the Western economy throughout the 1980ies and until the mid 1990s 
(Reinhardt & Rogoff 2008). In Scandinavia, the crises were protracted and both Sweden and 
Finland were harder hit by the crises than Norway (Heffernan 1996). In Norway the effect of 
the deregulation was an overextension of credit and a subsequent extensive bank crisis at the 
end of the 1980s and early 1990s (NOU 1992/30, Nordnes 1993, Imset & Stavrum, 1993, 
Berg & Eitrheim 2009). Several of the large savings- and commercial banks were put under 
public administration and the Norwegian Banks’ Guarantee Funds had to act to secure 
customers deposits.119  
 
Deregulation and liberalisation of the finance system was introduced as means to 
improve competition and efficiency; and because regulations created unintended 
effects because of twisting and evading of the rules (NOU 1980/4, 1986/5, 1989/1, 
1992/30). Norwegian banks were deregulated during 1984 – 87, and laws and 
regulations that formerly had restricted the banks’ credit policy and equity was 
repealed.120 One effect was a huge supply of capital, both from the so called “grey 
capital market” and Norges Bank (The Bank of Norway). Norges Bank supplied the 
banks with approximately eighty billons in extraordinary credit funds and financed 
about 25 percent of the savings banks’ growth in credit in the period 1984-87.121 In 
this period several of the restrictions on equity and the balance between debt and 
equity were removed. The increased inflow of money allowed the banks to take huge 
risks and several banks lent out far more money than their equity capital ratio allowed. 
A disproportionately large part of the loans was lent out to customers without 
repayment ability. The result was major losses. Management misjudgement of risk, 
                                                 
119 More precisely, it was the Savings Banks' Guarantee Fund, as the Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund was 
established on 01.07.04 as a merger of the Commercial Banks' Guarantee Fund and the Savings Banks' 
Guarantee Fund.  
120 The period 1984 – 87 is used because different regulations were abolished at different points of time and 
partly reintroduced for a shorter period (Nordnes 1993). 
121 During March to May in 1986, the banks’ loans in Norges Bank increased from five to seventy-five billion 
(Imset & Stavrum, 1993), without the central bank’s extraordinary supply of capital, the lending boom would not 
have been possible. The rest of the lending funds were supplied from customer deposits, from the so-called grey 
money market and borrowings abroad (NOU 1992/30).  
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missing signals of trouble and general managerial deficiency are the most common 
causes of bank failures (Heffernan 1996, Knutsen 2012). The bank crisis resulted in 
merging of banks, depreciation of their share capital, and in some cases they became 
subjected to public control for a period.   
 
The first signs of economic crises started in 1987 and the bank crisis was at its peak in 
1991 (Nordnes 1993, Kaminsky and Rogoff 1999). At the same time trust in banks 
was at its lowest. The table below shows the fluctuations in the general level in trust in 
banks during the period 1985 – 2012.  
 
Table 4 Trust in Norwegian banks 1985-2012 
Year  Pretty good trust  Very high trust  Trust  (sum) 
1985 66 % 10 % 76 % 
1988 47% 4 % 51% 
1991 28% 1% 29% 
1994 54% 6% 60% 
1999 65% 10% 75% 
2005 62% 14% 76% 
2012122 74% 10% 84% 
 
The table is a summary of MMI figures. All the figures up to 2005 are from MMI, from 2006 
called MMI-Univero. MMI is a former Norwegian survey company that made regular, 
national surveys of the level of trust in various organisations and institutions. These surveys 
were not a public service, and there was limited access to the results for non-customers.    
 
Trust is here the sum of pretty good trust and very high trust. The MMI surveys indicated that 
in 1985, the first year after the deregulation, 76 percent of the respondents had trust in banks. 
In 1991, when the bank crisis was at its peak, trust was at its lowest level, only 29 percent of 
                                                 
122 These numbers are from The Norwegian financial barometer (Norsk Finansbarometer) which is a survey TNS 
Gallup has conducted annually in the markets of banking, general insurance and life insurance. The survey 
covers about 3000 interviews conducted among the population from 18 years and older. In the bank market it is 
conducted every year since 2004. The scale on the 2012 data is from 1-6, where 1 is very high and 6 is very little. 
To create comparable data, category 2-3 is merged into pretty good.   
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the respondents had trust in banks. After twenty years, in 2005, trust in banks appears to have 
grown stronger than before the crisis. The very high trust score has now increased, from 10 to 
14 percent of respondents say they have very high trust in banks and the level of pretty good 
trust is restored to the same level as in 1985.123 In 2012, trust in banks seems to have grown 
even stronger; 84 percent had now pretty good trust in banks and 10 percent has very high 
trust.124  
 
The fluctuations in trust indicate 1) that people’s trusting is quite sensitive to the crisis in the 
bank and financial sector and 2) that trust is not a static and fixed quality; it is dynamic and is 
continuously constructed and re-constructed. The figures tell about variation in trust, but not 
how and why trust in banks is so vulnerable to crises. To discuss this question it is necessary 
to make an explorative study of how trust in banks is generated, maintained, eroded and 
restored through everyday action and interactions.  
 
As crises in banking and finance are recurrent (Reinhart & Rogoff 2007, Kindleberger & 
Aliber 2011) an exploration of the dynamics between trust and bank crises are of general 
interest. Even though the international bank, finance and trust crises so far have not affected 
the Norwegian financial sector, the European economy, in particular in Southern-Europe, is in 
2014 still ridden by a financial crisis that started around 2007 in USA, and later hit Europe. 
Trust in banks and financial institutions has dropped globally with 11 percent from 2008-
2013, from 56 to 45 percent. In some European countries (Netherlands, Germany, UK, Spain, 
Ireland) this drop has been around 25 percent. In Ireland do only 11 percent of the 
respondents now trust banks, in Greece it is 16 percent (Edelmaninsights 2013). These figures 
confirm that trust in bank is very vulnerable for crises.  A study of trust and financial crisis in 
Nederland, by van der Cruijsen et al. 2013 confirms this and indicates that reduced trust in the 
financial sector also affects generalised trust in society negatively.  
 
An in-depth study of trust processes in the relationship between customer and banks is 
relevant in understanding loss of trust in banks as a social process, and combined with insight 
in longitudinal fluctuations, this provides a better understanding of the current loss of trust in 
bank and financial institutions. 
                                                 
123 MMI-Univero, May 2006 
124 The fluctuations between the two groups pretty good trust and very high trust can also be an effect of 
different ways of posing questions as the opinion-research institutes has changed during the statistical period.   
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13.2  The account of trust   
Trust in banks and banking is made up of several elements; face to face interaction, 
experience, reputation, and trust in the formal structures and regulations that secures financial 
transactions. To recapitulate from earlier chapters, trust is a personal feeling based on 
individual disposition and socialisation. It is a relational quality generated and maintained 
through social interaction and a structural quality institutionalised through formal, legitimate 
structures. Development and maintenance of trust – trusting – is a dynamic social interaction 
between processes on personal, relational and structural level. Trust is generated as a leap of 
faith (Möllering 2006) triggered by an anticipated or acknowledged mutual understanding 
which has a social platform. I have argued that this platform has pre-contractual, relational 
and structural bases, and serves as a base for expectations and trusting according to the 
grounded theory of trust.   
 
An exploration of this question involves a study of trust as a process of social construction 
and sense-making, an exploration of the social basis for trust between bank and customer, 
their expectations and platform for mutual understanding. The idea here is that deregulation of 
savings banks, which is a macro level change, transformed the platform for mutual 
understanding between bank and customer on several levels. It affected the face to face 
interaction across the counter, the banks’ rationality and the tacit social contract between bank 
and customer and people in general. This means that changes in the structural bases for trust 
also affected the relational and pre-contractual bases.  
 
An exploration of change demands insight in both the status before change and afterwards. A 
study of trust consequences of deregulation requires understanding of the social basis for the 
trust relationship between bank and customer before deregulation. This insight is constructed 
from data collected a few years after deregulation (1989-1992). The presentations of 
expectations before deregulation are interpretations of the informants’ reflections on the 
differences between their expectations and experiences before deregulation and their 
expectations and experiences with the bank and banks a few years after deregulation. The 
analysis of retrospective data can indicate what people used to expect from their bank and 
how they perceive this has changed – how the pre-contractual, relational and structural basis 
for mutual understanding changed.125  
                                                 
125 See the appendix for further description of these data. 
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The initial meeting between bank and customer has a pre-contractual basis for trust, acquired 
through socialisation. Experiences and mediated information have impact on the customer’s 
expectations about how a bank ought to perform its role, how it should operate and which 
norms and values it should practice. This mix of tacit and explicit expectations is the social 
basis for trust. The expectations are also based on relational experiences from interactions 
with the bank and on formal structures such as rules and regulations that generate stability and 
predictability. 
 
General trust and customers trust is a capital for the bank, perhaps one of its most precious 
assets. The trust capital is a reflexive capital; it is socially constructed and individually stored 
in the customer’s memory. Customers have an account of trust which is being filled up or 
reduced through interaction and other experiences with the bank. Through the event of 
interaction relational trust is created, maintained or eroded. If the bank’s performance fulfils 
customer’s expectations in an acceptable way there is mutual understanding and the 
interaction process runs as usual – relational and pre-contractual trust is maintained without 
much further reflection. The relational experiences are deposits in the account of trust. In the 
long run these experiences interact with the general image of the bank and mould the pre-
contractual basis for trust. Social change can erode trust, in particular if the changes are a 
unilateral transformation of an expected common foundation for mutual understanding – the 
account is overdrawn when expectations are repeatedly broken.  
 
Deregulation affected the relational development of trust because it transformed the basis for 
making deposits in the account of trust. New procedures and routines made the bank stand out 
as unpredictable to the customer, and trust was eroded. The changes in the role of the bank 
and the bank clerks’ enactment of the new roles created open spaces for role negotiation 
(Seligman 2000), but trust eroded as the customers were not able to negotiate a new role in 
the first years after the deregulation. Trust can erode in phases of rapid change if the changes 
are a unilateral transformation of an assumed common foundation for mutual understanding. 
Trust can be restored through development of new mutual understanding, based on 




13.3  Stability and regulations as structural bases for trust 
The deregulation of Norwegian bank sector transformed banking from administering credit to 
become involved directly in market competition. This was a change in how banks performed 
services, pricing, risk perception and general rationality towards the customers. The pre-
contractual, relational and structural bases for trust were changed – and this affected the trust 
relationship and eroded trust in the bank and banking.  
As pointed out in the preceding chapter, structural bases for trust are platforms for 
generalisation of trust between strangers and over time and distance. The institutionalisation 
of bases for structural trust in the savings bank is a long term process, starting with the 
formation of the independent Norwegian state in 1814 and the parallel growth of savings 
banks and institutionalisation of a Norwegian state apparatus. Since then, periods of financial 
liberalisation has led to recurrent bank crises and subsequent development in legislations. 
These regulations aimed at strengthening the structural and financial base for trust and to 
protect the customers’ assets and deposits, to prevent risk taking and secure trust in the 
savings banks and banking. For the customers there is a strong structural base for trust in the 
savings banks; the Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund with roots back to 1924. In this year 
there was a major revision of the legal framework for savings banks, strengthening the 
governmental control and the protection of customers deposits (Nordnes 1993). Membership 
of the Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund is mandatory for all banks with headquarters in 
Norway and the fund secures up to two million Norwegian crowns per depositor per bank 
(Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund).126  
Strong regulations of the savings banks in the post-World War II period were another base for 
structural trust. The regulations were an important premise for how the savings banks worked, 
how the customers perceived the bank, and what bank and customer took for granted in the 
relationship. The regulation regime was an element in the pre-contractual basis for trust. The 
regulations aimed first and foremost to secure economic stability and governmental control of 
the credit supply (Eitrheim et al. 2004). In addition to control effects and allocation effects, 
these regulations had trust effects. The regulation policy set premises for the customers’ trust; 
it was a structural framework for the credit supply and safeguarding the customers’ deposits. 
The bank relationship was a long-term transaction and the traditional savings bank’s role was 
designed to distribute credit, not to compete for customers. 




The post-war period was in Norway marked by steady economic growth, and most people 
increased their income from decade to decade from the 1950s. Until the mid- 1980s, there was 
a political consensus about employing the interest rate as a political tool and means of 
regulating the economy. A low and stable interest rate was assumed to providing favourable 
distribution consequences. It was a prerequisite for achieving political aims such as increased 
house building, keeping the cost of living low and provide long-term investments (Norges 
Bank skrifter nr. 2/1974, Østerud 1979, Jansen 1992). The interest rate level was settled as 
declarations of fixed interest based on an agreement between Ministry of Finance and The 
Bank of Norway, and this policy lasted until the deregulation in 1984. The consequences of 
the post-war financial policy were that the interest was fairly low, stable, and predictable 
(NOU 1986/5, Berg & Eitrheim 2009, Knutsen 2012). The low and stable interest level was 
not subject for negotiation; it was taken for granted by the customers (Nordnes 1993).   
 
To prevent pressure on prices and inflation, credit allocation was regulated by the 
government. The government and Ministry of Finance set a limit on the total credit supply 
and distribution and target figures for the credit supply were an element of the National 
budget.127 Banks had to report lending volumes and lending purposes to the Norges Bank. 
Each bank had a quota of loans, and the frame for the bank’s amount of loans was set through 
forced placement of investments and quota systems related to lending purposes.128 When the 
quotas of loan were filled, the banks were obliged to stop lending out money (NOU-86/5). 
The practical implications of this were that credit was a scarce resource, and the customers 
expected that it had to be righteously distributed among them.  
 
To sum up; the regulations set strong restrictions on credit supply to the banks’ with the effect 
that the banks credit policy and interest was tightly regulated. Regulated credit allocation 
meant that credit was distributed in accordance with politically determined aims and to a 
politically determined price.  
 
                                                 
127 Whether low interest rate really had positive distribution effects is difficult to decide in hindsight, but the 
expectations of beneficial effects contributed to cementing administrative decisions of the interest rate (NOU 
1980/4). 
128 This was forced placement of capital which binds the bank’s liquidity in relation to its credit volume.  
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13.4  Familiarity and prudence as pre-contractual and relational 
bases for trust  
The institutionalisation of structural trust in banking is also a process of instituting a common 
basis for pre-contractual trust between bank and customer, and an institutionalisation of taken 
for granted expectations about bank practice and values. As pointed out above were low 
interest, stability and equal treatment of customers’ pre-contractual expectations that governed 
the relationship between savings bank and customer.   
 
Savings banks were local banks. Around 1960 almost every municipality had its savings bank 
that was familiar with the local context and local customers. These banks were tightly woven 
into the local communities; they acted as societal institutions and had close ties to the 
municipality. According to data, customers perceived their savings bank as a societal 
institution with a responsibility to care for the customers and society rather than a business 
organisation (Nordnes 1993). This idea was enhanced by savings banks role in effectuating 
financial policy. To distribute credit in accordance with politically determined aims and to a 
politically set price emphasised the savings banks role as prudent, entrusted and careful 
administrators of deposits. The customers expected that the savings bank would execute their 
tasks to the best of the local community, and to maintain trust, this role demanded that the 
savings banks practised values such as carefulness, responsibility and equality. A savings 
bank represented stability, familiarity and prudence, values which were instituted as elements 
in the pre-contractual basis of customer’s trust in the bank.    
 
Before deregulation, bank services were free, there were hardly any competition or price 
variations between the savings banks and credit was scarce. The challenge was to get credit 
approval; most customers were dependent on the decisions of their local bank. As mentioned 
above, loans had to be in accordance with political decided purposes and each bank could not 
exceed its quotas of loan for the particular lending purpose. Credit was approved after 
thorough assessment of loan purposes and the customers’ security, background and payment 
ability. A good relationship to the bank was necessary to be entrusted with credit as the banks 
had to be cautious and avoid taking financial risks. The focus was on deposits more than 
credit (Nordnes 1993).129 Customers were rarely allowed to borrow as much as they wanted 
                                                 
129 One indication on this is for instance the bank education, which up till late 1980s had focus almost entirely on 
deposits and not credit (Nordnes 1993).  
275 
 
to; the lending purpose was strictly assessed. Consumer goods such as cars and cottages were 
difficult to get financed as house building had priority.130 The customers expected that credit, 
as a scarce resource, was quite righteously distributed among them and that each customer 
was treated equally and thoroughly (Nordnes 1993).  
 
Throughout the post-war period, the customers got accustomed to the practice that the bank 
rather than their own judgements determined their credit supply. This reinforced the image of 
savings banks as institutions promoting attitudes of paternalism, and values of responsibility 
and prudence; these attitudes were elements in the pre-contractual basis for trust and had 
governed the development of relational trust in the interaction between bank and customer. 
The customers expected that these values governed the bank practice.  
 
Expectations are keys to predictability in social interaction; they are the platform for 
development of mutual understanding and trust. To be trusted requires behaving as expected 
and confirming the anticipated mutual understanding on which trust is based. In other word, 
to maintain customers trust, the banks had to perform services and practise the values that the 
customers expected. Expectations can be summarised into model, a table of expectations, and 
classified into four ideal types; as background and constitutive, specific and unspecific 
expectations (see chapter 9.5).  
 
To recapitulate, social interaction includes the all forms of expectations, but they are more or 
less prevalent. The squares number 1 to 4 in the table describe the level of expectations, from 
expectations of specific, visible actions (square 1) to expectations based on deep tacit cultural 
values and norms (square 4). Constitutive expectations are related to the social role and 
practise in specific settings, while background expectations are related to attitudes, norms and 
values in the cultural context. To recapitulate, unspecific expectations mean that these 
expectations provide some tolerance about how to behave. Specific expectations are related to 
action and practice; they are about rules, rights, procedures, and other more tangible and 
specified elements in social interaction. Classifying expectations provides a deeper 
understanding of expectations that have to be fulfilled to develop trust. This knowledge is also 
                                                 
130 In the late 1970s, when people became better off economically and the supply of consumer goods increased, it 
was better access to house financing than consumer loans, and the banks therefore suggested adapting the 
lending purpose to the available credit purpose (Nordnes 1993).   
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relevant to understand the process of restoration of trust and to develop new configurations of 
and social bases, here in particular, pre-contractual and relational bases for trust.  
 
The main elements in the customers’ platform for mutual understanding and trust before 
deregulation can be summarised into the table of expectations. These expectations are 
analytical constructions based on customer data and the table below summarises some of the 
more prevalent customer expectations before deregulation. 
 
Table 5 Customer expectations before deregulation 
 Specific expectations;  
related to practice  
 
Unspecific expectations; tacit, 
related to attitude  
Constitutive expectations; 
defining a particular 
context 
1) Low and stable interest, 
free services, thorough 
service, control 
 
3) Credit is scarce, equal price 
and distribution, carefulness, not 
taking  risk, paternalism, 
dependency, security 
Background expectations; 
social behaviour in general 
2) Familiarity and local 
knowledge, interaction 
based on mutual 
understanding   
4) Honesty, responsibility, behave 
as societal organisations, a kind 
of ‘other-orientation’    
 
To maintain trust the savings bank had to fulfil these expectations to an acceptable extent. 
Customer data indicated that all the four types of expectations were affected by deregulation, 
and that deregulation was a deep and comprehensive transformation of practice and values in 
the relationship between bank and customer. Data indicated that violations of unspecific 
expectations was perceived as betrayal, and this made restoration of trust more difficult, a 
finding confirmed by Weber and Carter’s (2003) study of trust in relationships. Deregulation 
created a huge gap between the customers’ expectations of the savings bank and how they 
were fulfilled. This gap eroded the customers trust.  
 
13.5  The deregulated savings bank: competition, risk and profit 
Deregulation changed the legal framework of the banking sector and the formal basis for 
structural trust. It was a change in the social organisation of the economic sector, and in the 
relationship between bank and customer. Banking was now transformed into an industry 
marked by strong competition. This change of practice and norms changed the premises for 
interaction and mutual understanding between bank and customer, but the customer was not 
involved in this transformation. The banks had unexpectedly changed the pre-contractual 
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basis for mutual understanding. New procedures, routines and role enactment transformed the 
relational basis for trust and made the bank unpredictable to the customer. Trust eroded. The 
change in the role of the bank and the bank clerks’ enactment of the new roles created open 
spaces for role negotiation, but customers were unable to negotiate new roles in the first years 
after the deregulation. Their relationship to the bank was deregulated, or more precisely, the 
social basis for the relationship was deregulated without the customers’ knowledge, 
acceptance or influence.  
 
Institutionalisation of new bases for trust between banks and customer is a long-term process 
while deregulation is a rather sudden, unilateral transformation of a tacit contract – the pre-
contractual basis for mutual understanding and trust were deregulated as well as the trust 
relationship. Deregulation transformed the basis for making deposits into the account of trust.  
 
The new savings bank - high prices and lost carefulness 
After deregulation, credit was allocated through demand, and the new aims were price and 
competition, competition and profit. To compete meant to treat the customers differently. The 
banks started to charge for services that had previously been free; they increased the interest 
on credit frequently and without warning, and differentiated between customers. One 
customer summarised the feelings many of them expressed about the banks’ new behaviour:  
“I thought that the bank wanted me well and would work to do the best for me. There I 
was wrong. They just think about their wallet. They provide loan approvals without 
considerations of the consequences for the customer’s wallet.”   
 
According to the new bank attitude attractive customers could negotiate better prices from the 
bank, but most customers were unfamiliar with this and did not expect to negotiate. They had 
taken for granted that the bank treated everyone equally. When customers after a while 
discovered that practice had changed, they felt as if the bank was dishonest and had cheated 
them. Price variation was perceived among customers as a serious violation of their pre-
contractual expectations about the values a bank should promote. For a majority of the 





As some customers told about the new savings bank practice:131  
“I thought everyone had to pay the same high price on loans – but that is not so. The 
bank has different prices. I didn’t know until I talked to my neighbour about this. The 
bank is not fair. I feel that they fool me.” 
 
“I thought the others had the same terms as me. When you deal with a social 
institution as the bank, you expect fairly the same conduct as when you deal with the 
public bureaucracy, namely equal treatment. This principle is absolutely when it 
comes to banks I expect. I hold that it has to do with honesty.”   
 
“I thought the bank treated us customers equally, but no, the bank looks at each of us 
as a profitable transaction, this is a huge discrepancy between expectations and 
reality.’   
 
The informants pointed out the new practice in pricing, the variation in interest and that the 
bank started to charge for services that had previously been free, as important reasons for 
erosion of their trust in the bank.  
 
One aim of deregulation was to create equal conditions for competition in the financial sector, 
but within a few years the effect was aggressive marketing of loans, lack of risk assessments, 
huge economic losses and financial crises. Hard competition, easy access to expensive capital 
and a high interest level characterised the new credit situation. The politicians urged creative 
and daring banking enterprises (Nordnes 1993, Imset og Stavrum 1993), but even though the 
banks were positive about deregulation, they were poorly prepared culturally and had little 
expertise to handle their new role as competition exposed business (Reve 1990, Nordnes 
1993).  
 
Profit aims and expensive credit funds necessitated that the banks charged the highest 
possible interest and that they promoted a risk seeking credit policy. The high risk was 
intended to be compensated by a high interest; this was risk pricing. Risk pricing is an 
approval of subprime loans (Knudsen 2012). High prices should make good profit and some 
losses could be tolerated according to bank managers (Nordnes 1993). As one manager told:  
 
“We have to take risk to expand and make profit, but we charge high interests on risky 
credit. That’s how we can earn money.” 
 
                                                 
131 The quotations referred here and throughout the chapter are selected because they express main trends in the 
data material.  
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A lot of risk projects proved not to be viable. Several risk customers had no plans for paying 
back their credit whatever interest they were charged. The risk was enhanced by geographical 
expansion. Before deregulation the local savings bank had almost a monopoly on distributing 
credit to private households, particularly in rural areas. After deregulation the savings banks 
were allowed to expand beyond their municipality, but when local savings banks expanded to 
new areas they were unfamiliar with these customers. New banks often accepted unreliable 
customers rejected by local banks. In addition had most of the savings banks had low 
competence in credit work, their focus and education had been on deposits (Nordnes 1993). It 
soon turned out that the losses became far greater than the banks were able to cover by their 
equity capital; the earnings were simply too low and the effect was as we know; a severe 
bank- and financial crisis.  
 
According to the new bank strategies profit and growth should consolidate the competitive 
power. Credit was the main source of profit in addition to charges, and banks had to compete 
to attract credit customers. Profit seeking banks advertised, offered, and virtually requested 
the customers to take loan with high interest. The banks’ eagerness to lend money was 
unfamiliar to the customers, and many of them therefore questioned the banks’ responsibility: 
 
“I became sceptical when the bank just gave me the credit, they didn’t ask any 
questions, even though we had not become customers yet.”    
 
“How can the savings bank send me letters offering credit? Their task should be to 
urge me to save my money!”  
 
The customers were used to the careful savings bank that promoted savings in in schools, in 
advertisements, through their practice and even through their name savings bank. Credit had 
now become an important means in the competition, and customers got huge loans with out 
questions or considerations from the bank. The deregulated bank’s practice was hardly 
recognizable for the customers and many of them perceived this new and risk seeking credit 
policy as a violation of their expectations about serious bank practice. The customers 
expected stable interest, limited access to credit and careful consideration of creditworthiness; 
the savings banks role was to be responsible and act with carefulness and prudence. From the 






New practice and concerned bankers 
The shift in attitude and practise was unfamiliar also to most bankers, traditionally loans had 
been a scarce benefit and the profit aim was a new focus, as one middle manager about the 
new policy:  
“Previously we had no focus on earning money; we didn’t hear anything about that. 
We just had to do our job.”  
 
Many of the experienced bank clerks were worried about the credit expansion:  
“The best ones among us, the management assert, are those lending out most. Doesn’t 
our management see the risks this involves?”  
 
With hindsight, the ‘worriers’ were right. A number of the banks proved to have operated in a 
financially borderland. Some of them operated partly outside of what were legal transactions 
in the 1980s, but the control mechanisms were weak and partly absent when it came to new 
and complicated financial transactions (Nordnes 1993).  
 
Experienced clerks and managers spoke about the new behaviour that was expected from 
them and the transformation of the old savings bank rationality. An old and experienced 
manager in a little small and independent savings bank made these observations:  
In the old days, bank work went on in traditional ways, it was no demands of profit or 
allocations to fund or reserves, the profit was what it was. Our concern was that we 
were the local savings bank, that was our mission, we did not consider the market, 
profit and those matters. We thought tradition, and our work went on year by year. But 
now we have to do business, we have to take the market into consideration, which is 
today’s popular way of thinking.” 
 
Customers felt that the change in focus and rationality of the bank happened over night. Most 
of the customers were not aware of these new bank expectations. They experienced that there 
was no real competition in the new bank market. The banks had the same prices and it was 
almost impossible and very expensive to swap banks. In addition most customers lacked 
information about prices and bank products. In a market “exit” is the solution for discontented 
customers (Hirschman 1970), but in real life exit is not always an option because there is no 
real competition or real market. The customers felt that the banks exploited them, as one 
customer pointed out: 
“They say that there is a competition among banks, but that is not the case. The banks 
have a monopoly on money, they have similar prices and as a customer you are at 




Being at the banks mercy was not new for the customers, but the economic consequences 
were suddenly harder because of the banks’ strong emphasis on profit and a change in 
taxation policy. During the first years after the deregulation, inflation and full tax deduction of 
interests reduced the credit expenses. At the beginning of the 1990s the factual price on 
lending increased seriously as the tax authorities limited the value of interest reduction. The 
frequent increase in interest rates and bank charges made customers feel that they had lost 
control of their own economy (Nordnes 1993). Those with huge loans could be strongly 
affected in their disposable income by the heavy rise in credit pricing. Around 1990 the real 
estate market collapsed and the price and mortgage value of houses were declining; selling the 
house to get rid of debt created new economic problems for people.132 Customers fell into 
debt and could not afford to pay for their liabilities, and the bank forced some of them to sell 
their houses at low prices (Nordnes 1993). The savings bank no longer appeared as the 
customer’s steady and predictable collaboration partner, someone they could rely on in 
economic matters.   
 
The main changes and deregulated bank practices are indicated in the expectation table below.  
 
Table 6  Deregulated bank practice and new values   
 Specific practices; 
tangible, related to 
practices  
 
Unspecific practices;   
tacit, related to attitude  
Constitutive practices; 
defining a particular 
context 
1) High interest, charges, 
‘selling’ credit 
 
3) Risk seeking, profit seeking, 
competing, expansion, great loss, 
unfamiliar ethical standards 
Background practices; 
social behaviour in general 
2) New practices, lack of 
mutual understanding, 
focus on credit  
4) Business organisation, 
unfamiliar role, honesty was 
questioned by customers, ‘self-
orientation’   
 
 
To sum up; towards the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the bank customers experienced 
that the pre-contractual basis for the bank - customer relationship had been transformed. 
Banks performed new procedures and were governed by new aims and values, the familiar 
bank practice had eroded, and the development of relational based trust was difficult as bank 
practice was unfamiliar to the customers. They did not know what to expect as the basis for 
                                                 
132 This is not unlike the situation in USA and EU in today’s financial crisis 
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mutual understanding was changed. The new risk attitude had resulted in great bank losses, 
and customers questioned both practices and honesty of the banks. The social bases for trust 
were undermined on a micro level in the interaction between bank and customer and on a 
meso level as the bank transformed into a market based, risk and profit seeking organisation 
that wasted money. The structural bases for trust, macro level trust, were maintained. The 
Savings Banks' Guarantee Fund protected the assets of deposit customers and the structural 
bases for trust were not affected. 
 
13.7  Stable, structural bases for trust 
In a transitional period (1988-1994), surveys (MMI) showed that the bank crisis eroded banks 
trust capital. The banks’ honesty, ethical standards and competence were questioned, the 
newspapers wrote frequently about the erosion of trust, and bank management and politicians 
were concerned about the loss of trust (Nordnes 1993). Trust declined, but there was no 
exploration of why trust was affected by the crisis. The focus was on the financial 
consequences and the fear of a breakdown of structural trust in the banking system, which 
could lead to consecutive collapse of the financial infrastructure. Widespread erosion of 
structural trust in the banking system could ‘infect’ and erode the pre-contractual trust in this 
system. The fear of trust being undermined in the financial infrastructure can hamper inflow 
of capital into the banking system, with negative consequences for the economy and society; 
as reduced circulation of money will hamper credit, investments and trade.    
 
Interview data indicated that erosion of trust was a complex phenomenon. The informants in 
the study of savings banks distinguished between relational and structural trust; between trust 
in their bank, in the familiar bank clerk, and trust in the financial system (Nordnes 1993). 
Surveys of trust did not distinguish between bank as a service provider and the banking 
system, but informant and cross-checking data indicated that trust in the banking system was 
unchanged; structural trust did not seem to be affected. The bank crisis caused an erosion of 
the pre-contractual trust in banks, but not the pre-contractual trust in the financial system as 
such. This was despite the fact that deregulation was a transformation of structural bases for 
trust. Regulations that should prevent banks to providing more loans than their asset allowed 
were removed and the risk for loss was increased, but this did not affect structural trust.   
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Even though customers lost their trust in the bank for a period, as the relational and pre-
contractual bases for trust changed, very few customers chose exit or few (if any) withdrew 
their bank deposits and the structural trust did not erode. The high general trust in formal 
structures in Norway was an advantage for the banks.133 The customers trusted that their 
deposits were safe and protected by the Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund. This was a trust 
in formal structures; in the Norwegian laws and in the government rather than the banks. In 
retrospect considered, it appeared that the crisis functioned as a reinforcement of the structural 
trust in the banking system; the authorities acted as expected, the deposits and customers’ 
money remained safe.134  
 
13.8  Deregulated trust: reflexivity and choice    
Deregulation was an engine for modernisation of the banking sector. Banks were transformed 
into modern organisations; as instrumental, profit oriented and goal directed systems. The late 
modern bank-customer relationship is marked by a new trait: reflexivity.135 Trust can no 
longer be taken for granted, but has to be developed through reflexive processes. When a 
common social basis cannot be taken for granted, mutual understanding is developed through 
questions, discussions, and negotiations. Social homogeneity and stability is to some extent a 
precondition for pre-contractual trust, but the late modern society is characterised by frequent 
changes and social heterogeneity. A common social basis for action cannot be taken for 
granted to the same extent as before. Reflexivity and choice pervade the late modern daily life 
(Beck 1993, 1994, Touraine 1995), including the bank relation.  
 
Familiar platforms for social interaction are transformed and private and public organisations 
are marked by continuous changes and reorganisations. This means that people and 
organisations have to be reflexive and open for reformulation, development, and specification 
                                                 
133 Norway is among the countries with highest level of general trust (Skirbekk og Grimen 2012) 
134 Those who lost money directly because of the banking crisis were those who had invested in banking shares 
and investors co-financing risk projects.  
135 Reflexivity is here used as a simple version of Bourdieu’s idea of reflexivity, as systematic reflection on the 
unconscious presupposition (categories) of our knowledge (Beck 1994), and in Giddens sense (1993:36), as 
“reflexive monitoring of action”. Beck (1994:176) refers to this form of reflexivity as becoming free from or 
redefining of structure, and separates this from his approach to reflexivity which is the following: ’the further 
modernisation of modern societies proceeds, the more the foundations of industrial society are dissolved,  
consumed, changed and threatened.’ Becks’ point is that these processes may well ‘take place without reflection, 
beyond knowledge and consciousness’ and his concern is with processes inherent in modernisation, while the 
positions above and including Lash (1994:200) points to that transformation of structures ‘forces’  reflexivity as 
‘self-monitoring and active construction’. Reflexivity as reflection related to these processes; transformation of 
structure, self-monitoring and active construction is the concern here.  
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of taken for granted, habitual acting patterns and norms. Bank and customer have to be 
reflexive, interact, negotiate and develop a new, common pre-contractual basis for trust. 
 
An organisation’s capacity to be reflexive, to reformulate, and to articulate the pre-contractual 
basis for trust is an important precondition for successful organisational change. One element 
in organisational change is clarification and development of a common image of reality, of 
visions, goals, and strategies. This has to be embedded in a profile, an image of the 
enterprise’s self-understanding which is communicated internally and externally. Profiling, 
visions, and development of goals are processes where the organisation questions and works 
with its pre-contractual basis for trust, this is the late modern organisation’s self-reflexivity. 
The outcome of these processes communicates the basis for expectations the organisation 
directs to itself and what customers and others can expect. Image, profile, visions and goals 
express the enterprise’s self understanding; it communicates how this particular service 
provider aims to meet the customers’ expectations and is the basis for development of trust. 
The right mix of profile, products and price attract customers in a context ruled by 
competition and freedom of choice.  
 
Deregulation introduced the market transaction as framework for the bank-customer 
relationship. The trust relationship was transformed from being based on the customer’s 
confidence and dependency to being based on competition and the possibility of customer 
exit. The transformation to market competition deregulated customer loyalty, and the trust 
between customer and bank lost it’s taken for granted character. Maintenance of trust means 
to maintain mutual understanding, consequently, the pre-contractual basis for trust had to be 
renegotiated; the premises for interaction between bank and customer had to be redefined. Or 
to be more precise, the bank had defined the rational marked actor as the pre-contractual basis 
for the customer relationship. If this should be the platform for mutual understanding, the 
customer had to adapt to this premise and take it for granted.   
 
The traditional, loyal bank customer was replaced by the idea of a modern, economically 
rational and calculating market actor. As ideal types market actors are “anyone” to each other; 
they perform standardised exchanges where trust is based on contracts and formal structures 
rather than relational ties of loyalty; the idea of a market actor is based on the assumption 
about the strategic individual who wants to maximise self utility. In practice most savings 
bank customers do not fit with this model.  
285 
 
13.9  The rational economic actor 
The banks had redefined their role to be profit seeking business actors in a financial market. 
Banks now expected that the customers behaved as rational market actors in a bank market. 
Interview data indicated that the ideal-typical assumption of the customer as a rational, 
economic actor is an important part of, in particular, the bank managers’ image of the 
customer. They assumed that the preferences of the customer are complex, that price is one of 
several important elements in the selection process, and that the importance of price varies 
depending on person and product (Hagen 1995, Nordnes 1993). Banks spend considerable 
resources on discovery and segmentation of customer preferences in order to be able to 
answer the question about what is of value to which customers and what is the basis for their 
preferences. Explorations of customer behaviour indicated that attractive consumer segments 
in fact behave as market rational actors with regard to collection of information and choice of 
provider based on economic utility reflections (Poppe 1990). However, later studies carried 
out in some larger savings banks show that the customers’ preferences in choice of bank 
relations have an element of price, but qualities such as security, honesty, personal contact, 
and competence have a decisive impact on the customers’ selection of banks.136  
 
Market competition presupposes that customers behave as competent market actors. To 
behave as a competent, rational actor in a complex market requires competence. An ideal 
market actor has to take the initiative, pick up information, calculate price and risk, judge, and 
select based on maximising economic utility. The deregulated financial market can be 
characterised as a mass market with a complex set of products which is difficult to compare. 
Television, newspapers and magazines dedicated to personal economy present numerous 
comparisons and price assessments to help the customer to choose in the bank market, but 
behaving as a competent market actor is time-consuming and demands competence. Trust 
may compensate for the lack of competence and capacity, and therefore it can be the most 
rational strategy.   
 
Savings bank customers are very loyal, 88 percent of the respondents said they expected to 
have the same bank next year (2003). Another study of customer behaviour indicated that 
only 4 percent of the customers swapped bank in 2009 (FNO 2010, web). Even during the 
                                                 
136 These data are based on in-depth interviews with bank managers in 1996 and 1997, which referred to bank 
internal surveys of the customers’ preferences regarding selection of bank. 
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bank crisis when customers trust eroded and their voice said low trust, they could have chosen 
exit to articulate dissatisfaction, but their behaviour was loyalty (Hirschman 1970). There is 
probably an element of convenience in the customer loyalty; relational trust is an additional 
element. Relational trust capital is developed over time; it provides a bank with strong glue to 
the customer and a buffer against exit in situations of trust fluctuations. Relational and 
structural trust provided the banks with a trust capital which was large enough to contain the 
loss of pre-contractual trust caused by the transformations in banking.  
 
Banks compete in a standardised market, services are quite similar and the price variation of 
the products is rather low. Under such circumstances a bank has to develop advantages that 
differentiate it from the competitors. One strategy is to work with active trust development 
(Giddens 1994, Möllering 2006) and development of relational trust.  
 
Relational trust is based on interaction, and this form of trust seems to be the key to 
trustworthiness in ever more arenas in the public sphere, not only in the bank - customer 
relationship. Market transactions are dependent on a minimum of pre-contractual trust; the 
market is not an arena for building trust relations but for economic transactions. The personal 
customers, however, are not only unilateral economic actors; they are also social actors – they 
build relational trust and networks. This is to the advantage of the banks.  Personal contact 
and development of relational trust are essential as trust creating elements between bank and 
customer; it can be the decisive element in the process of selection between banks. 
Development of relational trust is done step by step and secures long lasting trust and loyalty. 
Ties of loyalty in addition to the inconvenience of changing bank provide the banks with 
‘slack’; a reservoir of trust that makes the customer relation less price sensitive and more 
robust with regard to exit.   
 
New market actors and new trust configurations 
Bank services are a relational product; the service is created in the very moment of 
production. The experience of it is a construction in the minds of the customers, dependent on 
fulfilment of expectations and the development of mutual understanding.  
 
Bank relationships are dependent on trust; a general, pre-contractual trust in the concept of 
banking and in the particular bank, structural trust in banking as trustworthy economic 
infrastructure, and a more specific, relational trust between the particular bank and the 
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particular customer. As pointed out, a bank’s trust capital is perhaps one of the most 
important elements of its equity. As other kinds of capital, trust capital will increase and 
diminish through the activity that takes place. Banks have to provide maintenance and growth 
- not erosion - of their trust capital. Their competitive challenge is how to generate trust, and 
how to avoid erosion of it.   
 
The attractive customers could behave as market actors and select between banks. In this 
situation banks experienced that trust is an essential part of the relationship to the customer. 
They had to work and compete for a trust they had formerly taken for granted. To re-establish 
trust between bank and customer a new common basis for trust and a new mutual 
understanding of the relationship had to be developed.  
 
Trust is the basis of voluntary relationships. It is a key factor for bank and customer when 
there is market competition – the customer can choose exit. The providers in the financial 
market have to appear as trustworthy in order to attract customers. Then the customer and the 
provider have to develop trust through communication and interaction in order to establish a 
relationship. To be a bank customer means repeated interaction, a customer relationship is a 
process where the relationship is durable and evolves over time. A lasting customer 
relationship can be considered as a mutual expression of trust. An indication of distrust, that 
the relationship is broken, is when the customer chooses exit.137 Market competition is driven 
forth by the “threat” of customer exit, and the challenge to the banks is to maintain the 
customers’ trust, to develop customer loyalty and prevent exit. This requires hard work.  
 
Development of relational based trust becomes a key element in the savings banks’ 
production of services. Customers seek a familiar contact in the bank, either through e-mail, 
telephone or face to face interaction (Sparebankforeningen 2003, web). Technology has 
become a platform for development of relational trust. E-mail, for instance, opens up an 
individual dialogue between bank and customer in a way that is partly characterised by the 
proximity provided by the encounters across the desk. At the same time this is a very flexible 
arena, contact can take place whenever it is suitable and needed. Late modern production of 
services is not based on equal treatment and standardised services; it is based on tailoring of 
products and the development of relational trust between individuals. On the other hand, as 
                                                 
137 A relationship can last despite distrust; for instance if someone is in a strategically weak position. 
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there now are less frequent face to face encounters between customer and bank, the few 
interactions are of critical importance to strengthen the relationship. Weak trust can easily 
result in exit, while strong relational ties and trust can provide a higher threshold for customer 
exit, a ‘slack’ for mistakes.  
 
The customer’s trust in a particular bank is based on several elements, and it is an empirical 
question about what the individual customer prefers. However, an analytical distinction can 
be drawn between customers who first and foremost emphasise price elements, and those who 
emphasise familiarity, service, and competence as basis for trust. A bank decides the 
configuration of the two groups of elements in the development of its profile and products.  
 
Organisational change transforms the social configuration of bases for trust. The transition to 
market relations has in the long term perspective led to increased importance of relational 
trust as a means in social coordination and organisation beyond the domain of the primary 
groups. These transformations have changed the roles and behaviour of both bank and 
customer, and gradually has new pre-contractual and relational bases for trust been taken for 
granted. After about 15 years from 1986, in 1999, the trust in banks was restored (table 4), but 
the configuration of trust bases are not restored to the pre-crisis configuration. Restored trust 
does not mean that the pre-contractual basis for trust is the same, for instance to-day as it was 
before deregulation. Restoration means that customers now have adapted to deregulated 
banking. A new common basis for pre-contractual trust and development of mutual 
understanding between bank and customer has been established and the customers have learnt 
how to interact in the market competition. There is also a new generation of customers not 
accustomed to savings banks with a non-profit orientation and with social responsibility. The 
new generation has institutionalised marked competition as pre-contractualbasis for trust.  
 
13.10 Bad banking and the trust paradox 
The changes in the role of the bank and the bank clerks’ enactment of the new roles 
diminished trust. At the same time this created open spaces (Seligman 2000) for development 
of new bases for trust. To restore trust, bank and customer had to develop a mutual 
understanding of the new roles and norms. “The account of trust” between bank and customer 
is dynamic, to keep the balance, deposits have to be filled in regularly.  It is a reservoir rather 




The extensive bank crisis led to a consecutive loss of trust because of bad banking, the banks’ 
wells of trust were drained off from two sides; the customer lost trust because the familiar 
bank disappeared and also because of mismanagement. In one sense this is two sides of the 
same coin; new practices and new values resulted in mismanagement, unfamiliar bank 
practice and loss of trust. The loss of trust is compound and has different causes. The trust 
paradox indicates that in situations of social change, the need for trust increases because 
change increase risk. At the same time social change means that the social basis for trusting 
erodes. This process drives a reconfiguration of trust bases and restoration of trust.  
 
In the case here, the loss of trust in banks was enhanced by the effects of mismanagement in 
banking. The banks had to work to restore trust on two levels; to develop a new common 
platform for mutual understanding with the customers and to acquire new competence to 
perform good banking under new conditions. The first mentioned task has to be performed in 
interaction with the customer; the second task is first and foremost an organisational task, but 
the effects of this work influences customer trust.  
 
Market competition requires competence from both customer and bank. Competent customers 
expect competent service. To appear as trustworthy, banks must have competent staff with 
sufficient knowledge to meet the customers’ demands and questions. Bank clerks have to 
know their products, they have to be able to communicate with different kinds of customers 
and to make independent judgments and choices in order to develop trust and provide 
competitive service (Ellingsen 1998). This seems obvious, but the bank crisis was worsened 
by the lack of these skills.  
 
The case bank in this study for instance, was severely hit by the crisis and suffered hard loss 
of trust.138 It was the first bank to be subject to governmental administration (Nordnes 1993, 
Ellingsen 1998). This bank started a major internal transformation process that included a 
program for development of formal competence for middle managers and clerks to develop 
competent staff as a platform for trust. Competent service was an important factor in the 
competition for customer and an element in the development of new platforms for relational 
                                                 
138 Internal customer surveys indicated that this bank still had quite severe trust problems in the late 1990s 
(confidential bank data), when trust levels were restored on national level according to MMI surveys (se table 
introductorily in this chapter).  
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and pre-contractual trust (Ellingsen 1998). Through improvement of competence, the bank 
established new platforms for mutual understanding in the organisation, the internal 
communication was enhanced and the employees acquired analytical tools to reflect upon 
their experiences with the customers.  
 
With hindsight, could the trust crisis have been avoided? Probably not as the transformations 
of banking were comprehensive and took place quickly. Administering credit in accordance 
with political aims did not demand or develop any expertise in risk management, therefore the 
banks were poorly qualified to handle both the  risk and the huge access to credit they faced 
after deregulation. As pointed out previously the banks were not culturally prepared to act as 
competitive marked actors. The erosion of trust because of mismanagement was a sound 
warning to the banks. The most important structural base for trust was not affected by 
deregulation and customers did not choose exit from the savings banks or withdraw money.  
 
Perhaps there could have been less erosion of trust related to the transformation of the 
relational and pre-contractual basis for mutual understanding, if the banks had been more 
aware of the tacit contract with the customers, and transformed the social bases for trust more 
slowly and in dialogue with the customers. On the other hand, the introduction of marked 
rationality and new bases for trust institutionalised new social patterns and meaning systems. 
Maybe loss of trust is an inherent element of this process; that social change is not feasible 
without trust effects? But that does not mean that trust disappears.   
 
13.11 Trust and social change  
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the analytical potential of the composite concept 
of trust to explore the erosion and fluctuations of trust related to bank crisis. The empirical 
example was an analysis of how deregulation transformed the trust relationship between 
customer and savings bank.  
 
The discussion of trust and deregulation is also related to the questions raised in the 
introduction; can changes in economic organisation transform trust relations and how does the 
relationship between trust and social change. The aim here is not to provide a comprehensive 
and exhaustive discussion of these fundamental issues, but to draw attention to some findings. 
The main point in the study was that deregulation as a change in economic organisation had 
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trust effects and social consequences on the macro, meso and micro levels and pre-
contractual,  relational and structural bases for trust were affected. The conclusion is that the 
causal chain described by Zucker (1986) can go either ways, both social and economic 
changes can have trust effect. This conclusion is perhaps somewhat obvious as the premise 
laid in the introduction was that economic organisation was a form of social organisation. The 
focus in the following is therefore on the causality between trust and social change.  
 
At the macro level, deregulation changed the legal framework of banking and opened for the 
transformation into a financial industry. Banking was one of the first sectors that changed into 
competitive, profit seeking organisations, a change that affected pre-contractual, relational 
and structural bases for trust, although the last mentioned base was affected to a lesser extent. 
On the meso level changes in the bank organisation, bank culture and new practices caused a 
loss of trust among customers. These trust effects were first and foremost generated by the 
changes in pre-contractual and relational bases for trust. On the micro level the familiar 
platforms for mutual understanding disappeared as pre-contractual and relational bases for 
trust was under transformation. Formal structures can be changed with the stroke of a pen, 
changes of social meaning systems are long-term processes. Deregulation transformed the 
social frame for the economy and the effect was market relations as platforms for interaction. 
Market relations and profit aims are now taken for granted as governing values in ever more 
relationships and as platform for the social construction of trust.  
 
In the deregulation example changes in economic organisation created open spaces in the 
familiar social patterns of action and interaction. Open spaces reduce predictability and 
increase social risk, processes that may cause loss of trust. At the same time open spaces 
function as arenas for renegotiation of social contracts and for renewal of taken for granted 
social patterns (Seligman 2000). As social bases for trust are dynamic, and have to be 
maintained through interaction and acknowledgement of mutual understanding, open spaces 
are arenas for re-creation of trust bases through interaction and stepwise development of 
mutual understanding. These processes contain the potential for social change and renewal 
and should be in focus for better understanding of social change.  
 
The empirical example indicated that social change transformed the social foundations of 
trust, and this leads to the conclusion that social change is about transformation of our social 
bases for trusting. Trust is a social quality, and transformation of social organisation affects 
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the bases for trust as well as the dynamics between different forms of trust. Social change 
transforms social organisation and social perception – the way things are done and the way 
we think about them, the tacit perceptions and taken for granted patterns; what we trust, 
where we place our trust and how stable this trusting is.  
 
Deregulation and organisational transformations are planned and goal directed changes in 
social organisation, while changes in trust bases are unintended consequences of social 
change, and the consecutive trust effects are unnoticed as trust effects. However, unnoticed 
does not mean that they are invisible. On the contrary, changes in trust may appear in many 
disguises; for instance as exit from a relationship, silent (or open) resistance against change, 
lack of cooperation or voices of disappointment and complains. More precise knowledge of 
what and where we place our trust will provide better insight in the social construction of 
trust.  
 
Contributions and further research  
Social change involves reconstruction of reality. In the short run it is about introducing 
something new and unknown; in the long run it is about the institutionalisation of new social 
patterns for action and interpretation. These processes diminish familiarity and expand the 
unfamiliar and unpredictability. This is the trust paradox; the familiar basis for trust is 
diminishing, while the need for trust is increasing. The practical consequences of this finding 
are that to prevent loss of trust in situations of social change, it is necessary to be aware of 
trust bases and trust effects. They are social constructions that have to be made explicit. An 
examination of which of the pre-contractual, relational and structural trust bases will be 
affected by change and how they will be affected is recommended as one of the preparation 
measures for planned and intended changes in social organisation. On the basis of this 
knowledge it is possible to prepare for, avoid and minimise loss of trust. This can, for 
instance, be through making explicit the implicit elements of the pre-contractual basis for trust 
and renegotiating the pre-contractual basis for trust. This means developing new bases for 
mutual understanding as dialogue, not as one sided and unexpected change, such as in the 
bank case. Other measures can be to enhance the possibilities of developing relational trust or 
strengthening structural trust bases. Loss of trust caused by unintended social change can be 
repaired by the measures suggested above; however, it will probably take a longer time, as the 
deregulation case shows.  
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The main contribution of this chapter is a perspective on the relationship between the bank 
crisis and trust, and on the dynamics between trust and social change. The exploration of 
these questions has also discussed trust and social change in a short and long term time 
perspective. There is a gap in the trust research when it comes to the relationship between 
trust and time. This chapter contributes to increased knowledge about this subject, but there is 
still much research to do on this and the relationship between social change and economic and 
social change and trust. This is a huge and understudied topic that needs further exploration 
both empirically and theoretically.  
 
Social bases for trust are dynamic, and have to be continuously maintained though 
development of mutual understanding. These are complex social processes that need further 
research through questions for instance about the social contracts and patterns which are 
under transformation, what characterises the open spaces, and which elements, participants 
and processes are important for renegotiations of social contracts. 
 
Further exploration of the relationship between economic change, social change and trust is 
needed; this is so far almost an analytical black box. One reason for this is probably that 
change and process have not been the analytical focus in trust research. The analyses that can 
be provided are dependent on the analytical tools; the methodology and theories. The 
researchers 'gaze' and analytical tools mould the discoveries. Studies of trust as process and 
social construction are dependent on methodology and theory that explores these elements. 
This chapter and the thesis aims to demonstrate the work and fit of the composite concept of 
trust and grounded theory methodology as analytical tools for explorations of the social 
construction of trust and the relationship between trust and social change.  
 
In the consecutive, final conclusion, the composite concept of trust is discussed further as an 
analytical tool for exploring trust and social change. This will demonstrate the applicability, 








14. FINAL REFELCTIONS: TRUST CRISIS OR TRUST 
PARADOX? 
‘I do not put forward the “true” meaning of trust.  
There is no Platonically essential notion of trust.’139  
– RUSSEL HARDIN 
 
Trust is what holds people and societies together. Without trust society would not be able to 
work. Social interaction would not function and the relations between people and institutions 
would erode. Mending social relations and institutions would have to start with building trust 
and trust building requires that we take the perspective of the other into account in our 
actions.  
 
Trust is ‘located’ in the diffuse, social interstice between the psychological self and the social 
self. This is a dynamic space where the process of trusting can be influenced. Understanding 
what trust is, how it works in social relations, how it erodes and can be rebuilt if lost is 
therefore essential. For that we need a conceptual framework that makes such analysis 
possible. This is what this thesis aims to provide. 
 
According to Möllering (2012) one has to put a stronger emphasise on conceptual 
development related to trust as a dynamic process. There is a gap in the knowledge of trust as 
a dynamic process and the relationship between trust and social change. I hold that a study of 
the relationship between trust and social change is not feasible without a dynamic 
conceptualisation of trust.  
 
This thesis is based on a dynamic conceptualisation of trust as a composite concept, and it has 
explored trust as a process of social construction and the dynamics between trust and social 
change. The composite concept is generated through a grounded theory methodological study 
of trust processes in an empirical context of social change and the concept is then grounded in 
sociology. The focus has been on exploring how grounded theory can be related to existing 
theory, discussed as the potential for theoretical grounding.  
 
 
                                                 
139 Hardin 2002 :xx  
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14.1  Mutual understanding – a key to trust 
Trusting is an active process at the micro level. The trust literature is scarce on the moment of 
trusting, on how and what that triggers the moment of transition from doubt or indifference 
into trusting. To develop knowledge about these processes it was necessary to explore how 
trust was socially constructed empirically, and grounded theory was an appropriate 
methodology for doing this (chapter 4-5). After the empirical discovery of the elements in the 
trust process and the construction of the composite concept of trust, I started to question how 
the empirical conceptualisation could be related to and integrated with existing sociological 
theory. This became the theoretical ambition of the thesis – discussion of the composite 
concept and its elements in relation to sociology (chapter 6-10). One main finding in the 
empirical material was that mutual understanding, or lack of it, is a key in trust processes; 
either it is development, maintenance, reconstruction or erosion of trust. Development of trust 
is based on a “leap of faith” and mutual understanding is the trigger of this leap, the trigger of 
taking the risk of trusting (chapter 6). A common social basis with pre-contractual, relational 
and structural elements is the platform for mutual understanding, which is achieved through 
fulfilment of expectations, or the assumption that the trustee will fulfil the trustor’s 
expectations. The social bases are analytical labels, the empirical content of the bases not 
fixed entities, but social processes related to different social domains.  
Mutual understanding does not mean total agreement or total understanding; it is, at a 
minimum an acceptance of common rules and fulfilment of these. For the trustor, mutual 
understanding is a satisfactory level of acknowledged mutual understanding. It means that the 
potential trustee indicates acceptance of a common definition of the social situation and that 
she will act in accordance with what she perceives are the trustor’s expectations.  
The acknowledgement of acceptable mutual understanding and the trigger point for the leap 
of faith is an individual construction with a social platform, and based on the perception of 
signals from the trustee. It can be as an immediate impression or developed step by step 
during the interaction. In trusting based on ascribed or mediated familiarity, mutual 
understanding is based on a perception or belief that one’s expectations and assumptions will 
be fulfilled (chapter 8, 9). Trust in politicians or in a company brand, can for instance be 
based on a belief that these can fulfil ones expectations. Depending on the situation and the 
relationship it can turn out that the potential trustee decides that there is no mutual 
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understanding, and there will be no leap of faith. Or that there is a leap of faith, but it turns 
out that expectations are not met, and the leap of faith was a mistake, resulting in erosion of 
trust. Studies of expectations will reveal how and why there is a lack of mutual understanding 
and loss of trust.  
Everyday interaction is based on trust, it is a social coordination mechanism based on taken 
for granted mutual understanding about social norms and action patterns, that there is a 
common pre-contractual basis for action (chapter 7). Without this basis, social predictability 
is low and trust is under pressure in situations where common social bases cannot be taken for 
granted. In these situations the social bases for trust have to be made explicit and subject for 
reflection, for instance in situations of social change, in social risk and danger or in cross-
cultural encounters. Social change and modernisation transform the social bases for mutual 
understanding. To maintain or restore trust the pre-contractual, relational and structural social 
bases have to be re-constructed through reflection, negotiation, communication, and dialogue 
to clarify norms, obligations and interpretations to develop new mutual understandings. A 
formal structure, for instance the passing of a new law or regulation can lead to redefinition of 
a pre-contractual basis for trust by instituting new patterns of action. When these are taken for 
granted a new basis for pre-contractual trust is developed (chapter 13).    
14.2  Trust and social change – mutual understanding and the 
trust  paradox  
The main title of the thesis is ‘The trust paradox’. The trust paradox is a metaphor for a 
relationship between trust and social change and the dynamics between erosion and 
reconstruction of trust (chapter 11 and 13). It is a finding in the empirical analysis, and is 
therefore not an explicit element in the theoretical grounding of the concept. The trust paradox 
is an analytical construction made years after the empirical grounding of the concept and is an 
observation generated through the application of the composite concept in various research 
projects conducted in my work as an applied researcher.140  
                                                 
140 The concept has been fruitfully applied in the study of trust processes in other contexts such as micro credit 
for women (Lotherington and Ellingsen 2002, 2005), (Ellingsen & Lotherington  2008), in regional development 
(Ellingsen 2003), partnership in regional development (Ellingsen 2005), in various minor studies of cross-
cultural cooperation (Ellingsen 2006, 2006a), in analyses of trust dynamics across nursing cultures (Ellingsen et 
al. 2007), in analyses of trust in internal customer relations (Tobiassen et al. 2007), in studies of gender culture in 
the Norwegian army (Ellingsen et al. 2008), in studies of electronic interaction in hospitals (Ellingsen & 
297 
 
Social change may erode the familiar social bases for trust, this is perceived as if trust is 
disappearing and therefore the need for trust increases. However, I hold that trust does not 
disappear into thin air; it is not a static quality that vanishes, but a dynamic process of social 
construction. Everyday social interaction depends on trust. Loss of trust increases the need for 
trust, but the opportunities for developing trust disappear. This observation can be further 
specified; when trust erodes, it is the familiar bases for trust that erode, the need for trust 
increases but the possibilities to meet this need has changed. Trust has not disappeared; it is 
the familiar social bases that erode – not the capacity for development of trust. Trust is 
dependent on mutual understanding and new platforms have to be developed for mutual 
understanding. This is the engine for trust processes.      
An increasing need for trust indicates that the social bases for trust are under transformation, 
and that the familiar foundations for trusting are eroding. At the same time this process is a 
source for development of new bases for trust – the erosion of trust is at the same time the 
source of its reconstruction. Trust is like the phoenix bird. It does not disappear – it is re-
constructed through development of new bases for mutual understanding (chapter 11, 13). But 
trust does not reconstruct itself. The development of mutual understanding is, as the concept 
indicates, a mutual process of social construction. Reconstruction of trust demands ability, 
capacity and intentions of trust development. 
Social change transforms the pre-contractual bases for trust; established truths and norms 
become invalid, and new social contracts and patterns have to be established to develop new 
social bases for trust. These processes increase the need for formal structures such as 
organisations, rules, regulations and standardisation that clarify the bases for trust (chapter 
10). Even though structural bases for trust have become more prominent, relational bases 
have not lost their importance. Dependence on personal relationships and networks, the 
relational bases for trust, is still prevalent features. The rapid pace of social change and the 
corollary transformation of pre-contractual bases for trust, increase the development of 
structural and relational bases (chapter 12, 13). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Aanesen 2008), studies of innovation in public sector (Ringholm et al. 2011)  and in studies of trust and 
innovation (work in progress).   
298 
 
14.3  Erosion of trust or transformation of trust bases? 
If trust is the answer to the question of social order, the social glue that makes social life and 
societies possible, what happens to the social fabric if trust erodes? Perhaps this fear is what 
triggers concern about erosion of trust and trust crises. If there is a crisis of trust, what are the 
indications of a crisis?   
Risk increases the need for trust. Increased risk consciousness (Beck 1993), risk 
intensification (Giddens 1993) and the culture of suspicion (O’Neill 2002), such as the fear of 
terror, can indicate that pre-contractual trust as a societal quality is under pressure. This 
pressure can be enhanced for instance by globalisation and intensified cross cultural 
interaction. Or the opposite may happen, globalisation and cross culture interaction can 
facilitate development of new, common pre-contractual bases across cultures, regions and 
nations. The concept of mutual understanding does not presuppose cultural homogeneity, but 
cultural heterogeneity means that the pre-contractual basis for trust is different and can to a 
lesser extent be taken for granted. If the implication of globalisation and the fear of terror is a 
feeling of loss of pre-contractual trust, does this mean that there is less trust on societal level? 
The answer can be yes in the sense that the feeling of loss of trust may have expanded.  
On the other hand the answer can be no, there is only a reconfiguration of trust bases at the 
societal level. Pre-contractual bases for trust have eroded and structural bases have expanded. 
Laws, regulations, standards and organisational measures such as control, surveillance and 
guards are established to reduce potential risk and increase trust. Cultural heterogeneity 
demands awareness of cultural differences, clarification of norms and action patterns and 
negotiations over platforms for mutual understanding. These interactive processes involve the 
development of relational and gradual pre-contractual bases for trust. In addition there are 
established formal structures which regulate cross cultural interaction, for instance anti-
discrimination laws.  
Laws and standards are bases for structural trust, made to suspend potential risk and clarify 
obligations and responsibilities. Creating a common set of laws has a precautionary function 
in terms of establishing a common basis for predictability and can facilitate development of 
pre-contractual trust in a long term perspective, given that the law practices are predictable 
and not perceived as corrupt. Extensive use of surveillance in public places is one effect of 
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fear of terrorism and violence, extensive control of passengers on flights is another example 
of diminishing pre-contractual bases for trust and expansion of structural bases. This 
development can indicate that pre-contractual trust is replaced by fear and formal control 
mechanisms.    
Structural trust bases function as platforms for suspension of particular risks specified in the 
structure, but do not suspend other potential risks. Structurally based trust in public space is 
another kind of social coordination mechanism, rather than a taken for granted pre-contractual 
trust in that others will behave predictably and that everyday life will go on as usual. Pre-
contractual trust, on the other hand, functions as a taken for granted suspension of unspecified 
risk. Pre-contractual trust is an ontological quality, a feeling of security related to “being-in-
the-world” (Giddens 1993). The development of structural trust mechanisms is costly, while 
pre-contractual trust is inherent in socialisation.  
Further questions… 
The issue of erosion of trust on a societal level raises several questions that need further 
exploration. For instance; is it a wanted societal development that pre-contractual bases for 
trust erode while structural bases expand, or is this an inevitable process in the complex late 
modern society? Is the reconfiguration of pre-contractual bases of trust with structural bases 
an indication of diminishing trust at a society level, or is it only about transformation of trust 
bases, in the sense that the social basis for trust does not matter as long as there is trust? Do 
new structural bases for trust suspend fear, or do the structural mechanisms have to be 
incorporated into the pre-contractual bases for trust? Another set of questions is related to 
whether reconfiguration of trust bases and development of new bases are sufficient to catch 
up with eroded trust bases. Can development of structural bases for trust compensate for the 
erosion of pre-contractual trust bases at a societal level?   
Another question is whether relational trust is an alternative basis for trust on a societal level? 
Does relational trust substitute for structural bases at the macro level? Absence of structural 
trust bases hampers social and economic development and in the discussion of structural trust, 
the development of structural bases for trust was a prerequisite for modernisation. Does 
technological development, the rise of new global professional, political and economic elites 
enhance a reintroduction of the importance of relational trust bases for trust on macro level? 
300 
 
Or have pre-contractual bases for trust not lost importance, but have been supplemented with 
structural bases? Furthermore, does this indicate that in the future, relational trust will gain a 
kind of pre-modern role also at the societal level, facilitated for instance by technology?      
The question of the relationship between trust and social change is a huge issue that need 
further exploration and the composite concept of trust is one tool in this exploration.   
14.4  Social change and trust – the empirical example revisited 
Social change and trust consequences are discussed as long and short term processes, 
respectively as institutionalisation of trust in the savings banks and as erosion of trust after 
their deregulation (chapter 12 and 13). In the first example trust development starts from a 
relational platform. Gradually and in parallel with the emerging Norwegian state, structural 
bases for trust are developed. Pre-contractual trust is institutionalised in a dynamic between 
relational and structural trust bases and through experiences in recurrent bank crises. In the 
deregulation case there is an erosion of the pre-contractual bases for trust, while the relational 
bases in some cases erodes and in other maintains trust. Structural based trust prevents exit 
from the bank system, and it is a platform for interaction and negotiation of new bases for 
relational trust. Gradually this leads to institutionalisation of new bases for pre-contractual 
trust. The deregulation example showed how the structural based trust was maintained 
throughout the crisis, while pre-contractual trust bases had to be re-constructed, and the 
relational bases were either maintained or re-constructed, depending on the individual case.  
In both the deregulation and institutionalisation example is the configuration of trust dynamic 
and inherent in social interaction. The antecedents of trust are in the social bases, which are 
the platforms for mutual understanding. Trust is emerging as an opportunity in the space 
between us, in the social elements which we have in common; it is socially constructed, 
maintained and re-constructed.  
Is there a difference between the two processes – the long term and short term transformation 
of trust bases?  
I hold that social change is about transformation of the social bases for trust. Modernisation 
processes such as differentiation, specialisation, and rationalisation transformed social 
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relations and expanded social complexity. In a long-term perspective the effect of these 
processes is a society with highly specialised work roles, bureaucratic administrative 
structures, and further complexity. Structural bases for trust expanded on societal level, and 
relational trust bases have gradually lost some of its importance as platform for societal 
coordination. The institutionalisation of structural bases for trust in savings banks was an 
important social innovation as it moved people’s savings from being kept at home into 
circulation and investments and is an example of the societal importance of trust.  
Internet banking has gained ground over the last ten years and is a technologically mediated 
form of trust which presupposes a pre-contractual trust in the technological structure. The 
Internet is disembedding the relationship with the customer, it is lifted out of the local place 
and the service is performed independently of time and place. In the financial market, price 
and product have gained importance as criteria for selection between banks. The role of 
relational trust in this process has to be further examined to reveal whether and how the trust 
relationship between bank and customer has been transformed as an effect of social and 
technological changes.  
If trust processes in banking are relevant as examples of dynamic trust processes in general, 
one finding in this study is that the process of continuous transformation of the foundation for 
trust is the normal situation (see table 4 over trust variation in chapter 13.1). It is the social 
dynamics of trust, and if there is no transforming event, this process runs as imperceptible 
steps in the maintenance of the social bases for trust. This thesis discussed the development 
and modernisation of the banking system in a long term trust perspective. Modernisation is a 
general social transformation process going on at different levels and phases in the society. 
Transformation of the bases for trust and variation in the configuration of trust forms are 
general social processes and should be analysed as that.  
Crises and erosion of trust are discussed as macro processes, and as processes at the meso 
level related to the bank organisation. The analytical point of departure has been trust in the 
relationship between the customer and organisation, the analytical focus has not been on trust 
as an emotion and as individual trust crisis. Erosion of trust at the micro level related to 
personal experiences among individuals is a different issue. Individuals can have trust crises 
of several kinds; trust can erode slowly or vanish during a few seconds.  
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Individual trust crises as personal emotions have not been the focus here, but findings in the 
savings bank study indicate that trust crises at the personal level are first and foremost about 
transformations in the relational and pre-contractual bases for trust. If friends, a partner, or 
children disappoint the trustor too much, then trust erodes. Depending on the situation, the 
alternatives are exit or reconstruction and re-creation of the trust basis. Reflexivity, dialogue, 
negotiation, interaction, and, according to Weber and Carter (2003), forgiveness are among 
the tools for establishing a new basis for mutual understanding and development of relational 
trust. Longitudinal and in-depth studies are necessary to explore these processes. Perhaps, in 
the long run, the pre-contractual basis for trust can be restored or a new common platform for 
the relationship can be established.  
Reconfiguration of trust bases in the sense that eroded bases for relational trust are 
supplemented with formal structures such as contracts or agreements are not very likely. At 
the personal level, new trust bases and mutual understanding have to be developed as a 
process of re-creation of trust bases and not a reconfiguration in the sense that relations are 
substituted with structures. However, the transition to Internet banking (and other Internet-
based services) indicates that in the relationship between person and organisation this is a 
possibility, but this has to be further explored.   
So far, the conclusion is that the trust paradox is an indication of dynamic trust processes. I 
will hold that trust is under continuous transformation as an element of social change. Or 
rather – social change is about transformation of our social bases for trust.  Reformulation and 
re-creation of trust bases are pervasive, on-going processes in our time characterised by 
continuous changes, and social change demands reflexivity (Giddens 1993) 
14.5  A global trust paradox?    
Reflexivity (Giddens 1993:38) involves the examination of existing praxis and reforming it. It 
is an input in the process of creation and reconfiguration of trust bases. Reformulation and re-
creation of trust bases are about developing mutual understanding as a reflexive process. 
Mutual understanding is one ingredient of the social glue, and the platform for making the 
leap of faith, suspending doubt, and bestowing trust. Development of mutual understanding 
can be a challenge, not only when the pre-contractual bases for trust are under transformation, 
but also when these bases are absent or minimal.     
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Re-creation of bases for pre-contractual trust is an on-going process that involves developing 
mutual understanding of new social promises and obligations. Over time these are 
transformed into a taken for granted social basis for interpretation and action – a gradual 
development of a new basis for pre-contractual trust. Communication and interaction, step by 
step, provides relational trust and every little step that confirms and maintains mutual 
understanding is contributing to the institutionalisation of this pattern and of a basis for pre-
contractual trust.  
Arenas for face to face interaction are critical in situations characterised by low trust or when 
trust bases are under transformation. Social networks and personal interaction have become 
increasing important. Facebook and similar Internet based social networks facilitate 
development of mediated relational trust, as do use of smartphones and similar tools. The 
increased possibilities for developing relational trust and social networks are facilitated by 
structural trust, such as trust in the Internet. They are new and globally expanding bases for 
contextual familiarity. Globalisation, for instance as dissemination of Western popular culture 
and youth culture, can function as a basis for pre-contractual trust and for developing 
relational trust. The current focus on narratives, visions, information management, 
advertising, and branding can be perceived as a redefinition and creation of new bases for pre-
contractual trust. I suggest that marketing is a presentation of a ’narrative’ about an 
organisation and an invitation to trust this ‘narrative’. These narratives provide information 
one can get familiar with and base expectations and pre-contractual and relational trust on. 
This mediated information provides a feeling of familiarity without having anything in 
common, and can be a platform for mutual understanding. The development of relational trust 
over distance or across cultures has to be based on a minimum of pre-contractual trust in the 
technical structure, and in the other, as someone with predictable behaviour and intentions. 
This means that there must be some basic mutual understanding which can be facilitated by 
globalisation.  
There is however a global trust paradox. Globalisation involves in one sense encounters 
between strangers, which mean that there can be few bases for pre-contractual trust. Cultural 
heterogeneity creates a pressure on pre-contractual trust. So globalisation creates an 
increasing need for trust, but the pre-contractual bases can be few and fragile and structural 
bases are mainly related to the nation state or a particular cultural context. This means that the 
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creation of relational bases for trust is of vital importance, they are the platform for 
developing mutual understanding and gradual institutionalisation of pre-contractual bases for 
trust. International rules, regulations and treaties are structural bases for trust established 
through gradual development of relational and pre-contractual bases for trust. New 
relationships grow deeper through step by step interactions and gradually some premises will 
be taken for granted, given that mutual understanding is confirmed through action. These 
processes establish the pre-contractual basis for trust and agreements can be formalised and 
function as structural platforms for trust.        
On societal level there are continuous efforts to restore and recreate trust bases. I asserted in 
the introduction chapter that there is a trust paradox; that social changes affect and impair 
trust, and at the same time require trust – the needs for trust increase while the bases for 
development of trust is eroding. A closer examination of trust processes on micro and macro 
level indicates that the trust paradox has to do with a shift in time. Social change creates open 
spaces in the social bases for trust, and social change runs faster than the reconstruction of 
trust bases. A temporal or constant ‘undersupply’ of trust is one effect. There are also other 
possibilities; social risk and fear increase faster than the possible development of trust bases – 
and this can result in a situation of trust crisis. To facilitate the development of trust it is 
necessary to have arenas for social interaction, communication, and development of mutual 
understanding.  
Further exploration of the interaction between different forms of trust and processes of social 
change can provide increased knowledge about trust processes as well as societal 
transformation, as social change is changes in the social bases for trust. This requires deeper 
studies of the transformative qualities of trust. 
14.6  A crisis of trust? 
If the wells of trust are drying up – is this an indication of erosion as a loss of trust on a 
societal level, and a symptom of social disintegration and erosion of society’s social basis? If 
that is the case, we have a crisis of trust. The analyses presented in the thesis (chapter 12, 13), 
based on the composite concept of trust, indicate that there is not a crisis of trust in the 
meaning ‘loss of trust’. On the contrary, the challenge is that the trust dynamics in our time 
are too rapid and too extensive. The comprehensive, continuous and fast rate of social change 
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contributes to speed up the on-going reconfiguration of trust. This accelerating trust dynamics 
appear as crises of trust, as drying wells and insufficient pumps.  
The trust paradox means that the demand for trust runs parallel with the erosion of social 
foundations of trust. An exploration of these processes as configuration of different bases of 
trust at the macro level indicates that erosion in one basis of trust can trigger expansion in 
another basis. Trust is often an unnoticed social quality, it is taken for granted and not noticed 
until it erodes or is absent. The development of trust is likewise, (and erosion of trust, too, for 
that matter) an element in ordinary, everyday social processes. This means that there are a lot 
of invisible and unexplored social processes going on that maintain or erode trust. The 
composite concept of trust is an analytical tool to explore these processes.  
Further research in different empirical settings is necessary to prove the work and fit and 
strength of the concept; the explanatory power of the concept. Relevant further research 
questions might include exploring the social basis for trust in contexts of social and 
organisational change, in cross-cultural encounters, or in situations of introduction of new 
regulations, technology or new practices. 
14.7  Limitations and further research  
The work with this thesis has been conducted over years and in parallel with my employment 
as a researcher. I have chosen an in-depth approach to trust, and discussed my 
conceptualisation in relation to classic sociological works, in particular Luhmann (1979), 
Zucker (1986), Giddens (1993) and Seligman’s (2000) work on trust, in addition to Weber’s 
work on history and economic history (1985, 1987). The focus has been on trust as a process 
of social construction and on the relationship between trust and social change. This means 
that there are other trust relevant topics which are out of scope for this work, for instance 
subjects such as trust and culture, trust and deception, and trust and control. Further research 
could explore the analytical power of the composite concept to understand the role of trust in 
these social processes.  
This thesis is first and foremost a theoretical exploration of an empirical conceptualisation of 
trust as a process of social construction and a discussion of the relationship between grounded 
theory conceptualisation and sociological reasoning (chapter 3-5). The savings banks study 
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(chapter 12, 13) exemplifies how the composite concept can be applied to analyse trust 
processes and this study has been a platform for generalisations about trust processes. 
Grounded theory methodology recommends studies of similar processes in different empirical 
settings (theoretical sampling) to strengthen and expand the empirical grounding. Similarly 
designed in-depth studies of trust processes from other sectors than banking would have 
strengthened the concept further, but this has not been practically feasible. This could indicate 
that the foundations for generalisation of the findings are weak. That is not the case, I hold. 
As pointed out previously in the thesis, the composite concept of trust has been applied in 
several research projects on various subjects and empirical contexts throughout my work as 
an applied researcher. The application of the concept has been conducted as a form of 
theoretical sampling process in various social contexts and the concept has proven work and 
fit. That means it has demonstrated analytical power to explain and understand how trust 
processes unfold and the role of trust in various social processes and contexts.141 In the thesis 
I have chosen to use only the savings bank study as an example to enhance stringency and to 
communicate the inherent relationship between the empirical grounded concept and the 
analytical tool.  
14.8  Contributions and further research 
Through use in applied research the composite concept has demonstrated relevance for 
generation of knowledge about trust processes and social change, and its analytical power has 
been strengthened. The generalisations of analysis in the thesis have therefore been based on 
the experiences of empirical work and fit, and that the elements in the concept are grounded in 
existing sociological theory. This means that the concept has both empirical and theoretical 
grounding and demonstrates potential for further research on the subject trust and social 
change     
Much trust research has focused on the relational dimension of trust. Pre-contractual and 
structural trust bases are related to less examined dimensions of trust, in the trust literature 
these are often merged into the concept institutional trust. This is an underexplored, but 
ambiguous concept. It includes two different dimensions in the process of trust development; 
meaning systems and formal structures. In practical life these are not separated, but I hold 
                                                 
141 See note 140 in this chapter for references. 
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they should be separated in analyses of trust processes. Formal structures makes 
generalisation of trust possible. Generalisation is facilitated by the possibilities of sanctions 
and because the structures clarify a platform for mutual understanding. Development of pre-
contractual bases for trust is about production of meaning and is an element inherent in all 
social activity, in the creation of relational and structural bases for trust. The suggested 
distinction in the thesis, between structural and pre-contractual bases for trust needs further 
exploration and can be related to the discussion about the qualities of institutional trust 
(chapter 10).  Related to this is also the multilevel character of trust. The composite concept 
of trust has been applied as a multilevel concept to analyse processes at the micro, meso, and 
macro level, but the relationship and connections between the levels need further research.   
Then there is the question of terminology and trust. Möllering (2012) suggests that the term 
trusting should be used to indicate the process character of trust; that is how trust is produced 
and used. This thesis contributes a process perspective on trust. The composite concept of 
trust and mutual understanding conceptualise trust as a social construction and sensemaking 
process. To follow Möllering’s suggestion, the concept could be called the composite concept 
of trusting to emphasise the process perspective in this work and to sharpen the distinction 
between trust as a social quality and trust as a process. On the other hand, how sharp is the 
distinction between trust and trusting? What is the difference between trust as a quality and 
trust as a process - when is trust not a social process - given that the bases for trust are a social 
quality, and not stable, but subject to change. These questions need further research.  
The theoretical and methodological contributions from this thesis are the development of the 
idea of theoretical grounding of empirical grounded concepts. This expands the theoretical 
potential of grounded theory and provides a bridge between grounded theory and existing 
theory. The theoretical grounding is demonstrated through a discussion of the potential of 
integration between grounded theory conceptualisations and existing theory (chapter 5). The 
discussion concludes with a model of integration between empirical and theoretical 
grounding. This is exemplified by the sociological grounding of the empirical grounded 




The main theoretical contribution to trust research is the development of a dynamic 
perspective on trust as a process of social construction at the micro level based on mutual 
understanding as the trigger of trusting and pre-contractual, relational and structural bases as 
platform for making the leap of faith. These concepts demonstrate key elements in the social 
construction of trust, and the composite concept show how the trust process can be analysed 
with a temporal dimension, both as a short- and long term process. The concept presents a 
perspective on the relationship between trust and social change. The analytical tools for 
analysing trust processes are supplemented with a model of expectations to analyse and 
characterise expectations as elements in the micro level study of trust processes. 
This work has also demonstrated the composite concept as a dynamic and multi level 
analytical tool for studying trust processes at the micro, meso and macro level, and in short 
and long term perspectives. The application of the composite concept has provided new 
insights in the complex dynamics in trust processes that otherwise would have been 
undetected. The work has established that theoretical grounding of empirical 
conceptualisation enhances the analytical power of a concept. Further, a sociological 
grounding of an empirical grounded trust concept has expanded the sociological theory of 
trust and demonstrated how empirical studies can supplement existing theory.    
 
This study provides new analytical perspectives on trust as a multifaceted concept and a 
dynamic social process. It generated new empirical knowledge about trust and has 
demonstrated that there is analytical power in the conceptualisations to explore trust as a 
dynamic, multi-level phenomenon. And it has raised new and further questions about trust 
and the relationship between trust and social change.  
 
The theoretical part is a sociological exploration of the core elements of the composite 
concept of trust; mutual understanding, and pre-contractual, relational and structural social 
bases. Sociological theory is integrated into the concept as a sociological discussion of the 
different elements in the concept and this provides a theoretical grounding of the empirical 
grounded composite concept of trust. Through this, I hold, it provides a further theoretical 
exploration of trust as a social phenomenon. The empiricalpart provides an examination trust 
processes at the micro, meso and macro level through application of the composite concept of 
trust. The empirical basis of sociological knowledge about trust is expanded through 
integration of a grounded theory, and there is generated new insight in trust processes in 
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various social contexts. The composite concept of trust has also generated new questions 
related to the role of trust in social change.  
 
Has the generation of the grounded theory of trust contributed in expanding the sociological 
insight in trust? The aim of generating grounded theory is to contribute new empirically based 
knowledge, which the grounded theory of trust has done through the development of the 
composite concept of trust. The composite concept highlights a new core concept, mutual 
understanding and the three social bases as conditions for trusting. The concept provides 
deeper insight into the process of trusting, and focuses on it as a process of social 
construction. This conceptualisation of trust draws attention to trust as a basic social process 
and key issue in sociology. The discussion of the trust paradox and the relationship between 
trust and social change contributes to deeper insights into the social role of trust and points 
out how social change and trust interacts. In the author’s view the theoretical elaborations on 
various aspects of trust and the sociological grounding of the composite concept have 
expanded the sociological knowledge about trust.   
 
The methodological part raised the question about how the empirical grounded theory of trust 
can be integrated into sociology and concluded, at the end of chapter 5, with the introduction 
of a model with four levels of integration.  To recapitulate, the four levels of interaction were 
separation; grounded theory and sociology are separate communities of knowledge, 
incorporation; sociological elements are used in the generation of grounded theory, 
integration; grounded theory is worked into the sociological body of theory and synthesis; 
grounded theory and sociology are merged into a new unified theory. The question is whether 
this is more than an integration of grounded theory into the sociological body of theory. Can 
the work in the thesis be characterised as a synthesis, as a new sociological theory of trust as a 
process of social construction?  
 
As pointed out, the theoretical work in the thesis is an integration of sociological theory into a 
grounded theory concept. The integration is a sociological elaboration on the grounded theory 
of trust, and I stated above that this contributes to new sociological knowledge and new 
empirical insight. Sociology extends the content and analytical power of the grounded theory, 




I therefore hold that these analyses can be regarded as both grounded theory and sociological 
analysis of trust. On the basis of this I conclude that the thesis presents a synthesis of 
grounded theory and sociology into a unified whole characterised by the empirical work and 
fit of a grounded theory and embedded in a sociological theoretical frame and grounding. 
Further research is needed to explore the analytical strength of the grounded theory as a 
synthesis and a new unified sociological theory of trust.  
 
14.9  A final comment…. 
This thesis started with questions about the dynamics between trust and social change; how 
does rapid and widespread social change affect trust? And the other way round – how does 
trust affect change; are changes in trust an effect or a cause of social change? The work with 
this thesis has convinced me that this is a wrong question; the relations between social change 
and trust are not a question of cause and effect; social change is about change in our social 
bases for trust. Change transforms the basis for developing mutual understanding on which 
trust hinges. Perhaps not every social change has trust consequences, the challenge is to be 
aware when social change affects trust and work to maintain or re-construct trust.   
Scholars have questioned whether we are facing a breakdown of trust in our society. This 
thesis is an inquiry into this complex and important question and it is an attempt to push our 
knowledge about trust and trust processes ahead. I also think that this work contributes with   
optimism on this question. Trust is not vanishing; it is our social bases for trust that are 
changing. Trust appears to be under continuous construction and reconstruction at the same 
rapid speed as our societies change. Social change is transforming our bases for trust; the 
wells are not drying out, but perhaps the pumps are not being sufficiently maintained?  
A more pessimistic approach would be to assume that some pumps are in danger of being 
severely damaged; particularly with regard to the conditions for development of pre-
contractual trust related to the public space. The fear of terror intensifies the development of 
subgroups and subcultures; the general separation between ‘insiders’ of a social group and the 
‘outsiders’ of the group seems to be increasing in parallel with increasing socio-cultural 
differentiation. The consequence of this is that relational trust is strengthened among the 
insiders and that the pre-contractual basis for trust between insiders and outsiders is under 
pressure. On the other hand, there are formal and technical structures that provide bases for 
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structural trust world-wide and which facilitate mediated relational trust. In the long run, these 
processes will probably strengthen pre-contractual trust – at least among a globally expanded 
group of insiders. 
Increase in cross-cultural encounters will demand reflexivity and negotiation of the social 
basis for interaction. In the short term, increased social heterogeneity may diminish the basis 
for pre-contractual trust although in the long run, globalisation can probably expand it. But 
there are two main conditions that have to be protected to secure trust; these are 1) the social 
spaces for developing mutual understanding and 2) the freedom to choose exit, that is, not to 
trust as a way of reducing our sense of vulnerability. Mutual understanding and exit are two 
necessary social conditions for developing trust. Mutual understanding is a door into the 
“Other “, and without the possibility of “exit”, there is no trust, but only dependency.  
The works on trust by Niklas Luhmann have been an important source of knowledge and 
inspiration in this doctoral thesis and my other works on trust. Every new reading of his 
challenging book from almost thirty five years ago; ‘Trust and power’ (1979), has provided 
further thoughts – which is an important function of knowledge. I will therefore conclude the 
thesis with the following quotation from Luhmann (1979:84):  
 ‘The very multitude of the ways of creating trust makes it fruitless to search for general 
formulae. Rather one is forced to recognize that it is just this multitude of possibilities 
which provides some safeguard against the  breakdown of trust in society. Trust is 











Appendix – collection and selection of data 
The empirical basis for the analysis and generation of the composite concept of trust is a 
qualitative, grounded theory based in-depth study of the trust relationship between customer 
and savings bank. This appendix provides information about the empirical data collected as 
the basis for the initial generation of the grounded theory of trust. I have chosen to present it 
in an appendix since the initial generation of the concepts is not the focus of the thesis and is 
thoroughly described in Nordnes (1993).  
 
Validity and reliability 
Qualitative studies are well suited to identifying causal sequences and tracing the processes 
involved in enactment of change (Campbell 2004:79). The analysis of trust examples in 
chapter 11, 12, and 13 is first and foremost, based on qualitative data and a constructivist 
perspective. The premise is that empirical data is not objective social facts, they are social 
constructions developed in the interaction between researcher and informant; they are 
selected, interpreted and constructed (Charmaz 2008).  
 
Some of the aspects related to collection and selection of data for theory generation has been 
described in the methodological part. Here is a presentation of some of the challenges related 
to the selection, collection and construction of qualitative data, in traditional methodology, 
discussed as questions of reliability and validity. These questions are relevant in grounded 
theory methodology also, but they are addressed differently; as questions of conceptual work 
and fit in the relationship between data, concepts and empirical context. Work and fit means 
that the concept and grounded theory has explanatory power with regard to the empirical 
processes in question, and this has been discussed in the thesis. As the thesis addresses the 
relationship between grounded theory and traditional sociological theory, it is relevant to 
make some reflections on the data material in the light of traditional methods.     
 
Qualitative and quantitative studies are different constructions of knowledge and should be 
evaluated on different foundations. In practice, though, objectivist criteria function as tacit 
premises, and among hard objectivists, qualitative studies can be perceived as no more than 




The validity and reliability of qualitative studies have to be evaluated on their own premises. 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1998), trustworthiness is one of two sets of criteria for 
evaluation of the inquiry in constructivist research. Even though the criteria are developed 
within a constructivist perspective, they are relevant in evaluating qualitative research in 
general. Trustworthiness is built up of four elements – credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability. These elements correspond to conventional benchmarks of 
proper scientific inquiry but they have a different content and emphasise different processes. 
In addition, different perspectives in qualitative research may not have corresponding 
interpretations of the four elements. There are, for instance, differences between critical 
theory and constructivism with regards to this (Kincheloe & McLaren 1998, Guba & Lincoln 
1998). It is therefore necessary to define explicit criteria for the evaluation of qualitative 
work. Explication of criteria can prevent an overly positivist interpretation of the criteria 
(Strauss & Corbin 1998).  
 
Credibility refers to the correspondence between findings and reality, corresponding to 
internal validity. Evaluation of credibility will vary with ontological and epistemological 
paradigms, with the perspective on reality and on how, or whether, reality can be represented. 
Transferability is related to the extent findings are relevant to generalising and how they 
correspond with external validity. Given the interpretative and naturalistic basis of qualitative 
research, generalising can be considered as an ‘explanatory power’, as an ability to explain in 
similar situations (Strauss & Corbin 1998:267) or as a reshaping and anticipatory 
accommodation (Kincheloe & McLaren 1998). The third element is dependability, 
corresponding to reliability; this refers to stability and the possibility of replicating the study. 
Given the complexity and fluidity of social life, replicating contexts or findings are hardly 
possible (Law 2007), but research should be able to reach very similar theoretical 
explanations following the same research step in the gathering of data and analysis, according 
to Strauss and Corbin (1998:267). The last element is confirmability, corresponding to 
objectivity and relates to distance and neutrality in the work (Guba and Lincoln 1998:213, 
Haavind et. al. 2000). Representing the material fairly, giving the informants a voice 
independent of the researcher, and applying a comparative approach are techniques that can 
contribute to controlling bias (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Alternatively bias or more precisely, 
the researcher’s background, herself and her views, can be considered as a resource in the 




Collection of interview data – focus, access to the field and informants 
‘Sometimes the setting itself comes first – an opportunity arises to investigate an interesting 
setting’ (Hammersly & Atkinson 1993:36). This quotation has some relevance in describing 
the choice of setting and sampling of informants. As previously pointed out, I was familiar 
with bank and had observed over years the radical changes the sector was going through. I 
had followed the emerging bank crisis from the inside over several years and had easy access 
to interesting data. When I started on my master thesis, the trust in banks was at a minimum – 
so the question of trust between bank and customer was a relevant topic in several ways.   
 
The aim of the data collection was to get as comprehensive material as possible, given 
available resources. The bank–customer relationship was considered as a case, but this was 
not a methodological choice of a case study methodology, but it was a choice of object to 
study (Stake 1998:86) as data was analysed through the grounded theory methodology. The 
focus in the qualitative data collection was on how deregulation and the consecutive bank 
crisis transformed the trust relationship between bank and customer.  
 
The collection of data is based on the premise that trust is a social quality developed and 
maintained as processes of social construction. This means that the empirical exploration of 
trust is made as a study of the social relations between bank and customer. The aim was to get 
a thick description (Morse 1998), to gain insight in the informant’s sense-making, their 
experiences of the relationship and what they were actually doing in the interaction. 
 
The analytical focus was on the dynamics between banks and customer, and relational data 
was collected through structured and open in-depth interviews (Hammersley & Atkinson 
1993) from both sides of the bank counter. This material was supplemented with informant’s 
narratives of experiences they felt were relevant for understanding their trust in bank and 
banking. The guiding research questions were: How did bank and customer perform their 
roles? What did they expect from each other with regard to actions, routines, and attitudes? 
To what extent were their expectations fulfilled? Why or why not? Did the customers 
experience changes in the relationship after deregulation? Was they satisfied with the bank 
and did this change after deregulation? Did the informants trust the bank as customers, or was 





Access to the field and informants 
Bank data was collected from interviews with employees and management at the head office 
and two local branches of a Northern-Norwegian savings bank group, which was severely hit 
by the crisis. To contrast this, data was also collected from a small, local independent savings 
bank in Trøndelag, which was almost unaffected by the crisis. The aim for the data collection 
was to gain insight in how the banks had changed their competitive strategies and how they 
worked to attract and keep the customer’s trust.  
 
Interview data was first collected in the period 1990 – 92, when the bank crisis in Norway 
was at its peak. The grounded theory of trust is based on this material which consists of as 10 
in-depth customer interviews and 10 in-depth interviews with bank clerks and management. 
In addition there are several interviews with three key informants. They are a customer from a 
local countryside bank, a bank manager and a clerk. The customers were average middle class 
Norwegians who had been bank customers for at least 10 years. There were a few more males 
than females, the age varied between 25 to 50 years, and apart from three customers from the 
countryside, the rest lived in the town. The selected customers were articulate, some were 
distantly acquainted with me, and others were suggested by the bank clerks.  
 
In addition to these customer informants, there are about 100 cross-checking talks/interviews 
with various customers over a period of 10 years.  The cross-checking was done to prevent 
bias and selective perception of only the elements fitting in with the existing observations and 
thoughts (Altheide & Johnsen 1998, Denzin 1998:327). In addition to these informants, 
national surveys (chapter 13) and bank customer surveys confirmed the lack of customer trust 
in the banks. Quantitative data from large surveys of trust in banks provided a longitudinal 
study of transformation of trust between bank and customer. The trends indicated in the 
quantitative material were rather congruent, and supported the findings in interviews and the 
cross-checking materials.  
 
Interview data from bank consisted of interviews with 10 bank employees; clerks, 
management and middle management who were interviewed in the period 1990-91. The 
management informants were male, the clerks were female. This is the same gendered pattern 
as in the whole banking group. All the informants had more than 10 years of experience in 
banking. The bank employees were interviewed about how banking was transformed after the 
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deregulation and crisis. All the customer quotations referred in the thesis are from these 
interviews, and employee materials are from this data and the data material described below.  
 
During the period 1996-99 the data material was extended with almost one hundred hours of 
structured interviews with bank managers and bank clerks. They were interviewed about how 
banking was transformed after the deregulation and crisis and the banks’ strategies to achieve 
customer trust in a new financial structure (Bye and Ellingsen, 1996, Ellingsen 1999). On a 
group level these informants had the same characteristics as the first 10 bank informants, 
except that there also were informants with less than 10 years of experience from banking. 
The bank interviews were supplemented with internal bank material, such as customer 
surveys, internal evaluations, plans, internal reviews, various documents, and advertising 
material and observation data from several meetings with the banking group management in 
the same banking group as in the first study. The bank and customer data were further 
supplemented by articles from two regional (‘Nordlys’ and ‘Tromsø’) and four national 
newspapers (‘Dagbladet’, ‘VG’, ‘Dagens Næringsliv’, and ‘Aftenposten’) during the period 
1989-92. In addition customer views were systematically collected from letters to the editor 
about bank in the two local newspapers of the same period, and more infrequently from three 
of the national newspapers. These variety of data sources, various slices of data as Glaser & 
Strauss (1967) call it, were supplementing the data collected through interviews.  
 
Biased material findings? 
If there is a bias in the empirical data, it is that the customer’s voice is probably more focused 
than the bank’s views. As previously mentioned I had two years of various working practice 
from two different banks in the period of strong regulation of banks. Even though this was 12 
years before the study, my experiences were still useful as a basis for asking relevant 
questions. In addition to several friends in banking, I was married to a bank manager who had 
worked his way upwards in the system. As mentioned previously, this background was as a 
resource in several ways; it gave access to deep and wide knowledge, and made me quite 
independent of ‘gatekeepers’, (Hammersley & Atkinson 1993, Marshall & Rossman 
1989:63). I knew whom to ask and what to ask about and had been following the 
transformations in banking from the inside for 15 years, both from banks in the countryside 




However, the contextual familiarity and focus of study could have resulted in bias. One 
danger was to take the perspective of the banks, but in practice it was rather the opposite. I 
was on the customer’s side in a sense – and when findings were presented for customers, they 
recognised the findings. An additional risk was that bank informants did not trust me; most of 
the informants knew that I was married to a manager in the upper management. My 
experience was that the informants trusted me, perhaps because they knew that I was familiar 
with their situation, or perhaps they found it interesting and satisfying to have a reflective talk 
about their work.142 A good research interview is a dialogue between two equal partners, and 
when theoretical knowledge meets practical experiences through reflections and dialogue, this 
can contribute to new insights for both (Haavind et. al. 2000). Dialogue and reflection are 
based on a concept of symmetrical knowledge – the knowledge in the field is equal in worth 
to the scientific knowledge.  
  
The informant data provides unique material from customers and savings bank employees in a 
turbulent period of transformation, but it also has a general relevance for understanding how 
financial crises can affect trust. Data was interpreted, categorised and analysed through 
grounded theory methodology, which is appropriate for explorative studies, to get thick 
descriptions and to discover social patterns (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Grounding theory in 
data, generating, and discovery are analytical processes dependent on the researcher’s 
theoretical sensitivity, and not on testing of hypothesis generated by logical deduction from a 
priori assumptions.  
 
When I presented my findings to bank management, clerks and customers, they all recognised 
my research findings. What does it mean that the analytical constructions were experienced as 
familiar to the field? The informants recognised my descriptions of their experiences and the 
analyses of how trust was constructed. Do this indicate that I have grasped and interpreted the 
informants’ experiences, that their voices have been a part of the research process? Or is it 
that the findings are trivial and non-scientific or that the analysis has voiced some tacit 
experiences in the field? That the theory work and fit?  
 
                                                 
142 Researcher experiences from several interviews I have conducted have confirmed this – the appreciation of a 
reflective talk.  
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The role of research is to develop new insights and knowledge, but what are the criteria on 
new findings? Is it that the field recognises the analysis? What if the analysis are not 
recognised - does this mean that the researcher has done a poor job and created a totally new 
and for the field, unfamiliar story, or are they excellent and new discoveries? How should this 
be evaluated – as new insights or wrong interpretations of data?  
 
These questions can be reduced to methodological questions concerning trustworthiness and 
the relation between analysis and description. One position is to separate analysis and 
description. The description of the empirical field is the data and has to be recognisable for 
the stakeholders. The challenge in this position is that there is a large plurality out there. 
Which description is valid and reliable? Data and analysis are social constructions, if there is 
diversity in the description this contributes to increasing the validity of the material. On the 
other hand, capacity sets a limitation on diversity – how should the range for sufficient 
diversity in descriptions and data be defined? Reliability has to be maintained through the use 
of ordinary scientific tools, through systematic methods, transparency, and reflection. The aim 
of data collection was to explore what had caused the lack of trust and whether or how it 
could be restored. On the basis of the diversity of the collected customer data and congruent 
findings, I hold that the material is regarded as sufficient. 
 
Historical data and document studies 
Document studies of the development in the Savings Bank’s Act, the deregulation of the 
Norwegian banking system in the 1980-1984 and the governmental measures to handle the 
crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s are important background material to analyse the 
institutionalism of the structural and pre-contractual basis for trust between savings bank and 
customer. This material consists of Official Norwegian Reports (NOU), white papers, draft 
resolutions and bills (Stortings proposisjoner og meldinger) in addition to publications form 
the Norwegian national bank (Norges Banks skriftserie).    
 
The study of institutionalisation of structural trust in the Norwegian savings banks is based on 
an interpretation of bank history and the Savings Bank Act. There were no historical data or 
studies that explicitly discussed trust in the savings banks at the time of the generation of the 
composite concept of trust. The analysis of the institutionalisation of trust in savings banks is 
my interpretation of the historical material, and my (re-)construction of this process. The 
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historical material consists of savings bank history, historical economic analysis, banking 
laws and novels where the relationship to the bank was one of the elements in the story.   
At first glance, some of the dilemmas raised by the historical analysis do not seem to fit well 
in with dilemmas related to qualitative research in general. A further look though, reveals 
similarities. Questions of trustworthiness of interpretations are relevant. Even though the 
researcher does not have direct influence on informants, such as in an interview situation, 
historical research is based on the researcher’s interpretations of primary or secondary 
sources. This study of the trust processes is based on secondary sources, which are material 
that is selected, collected, interpreted, and presented by others (Tuchman 1998). Secondary 
sources were sufficient here, as the analysis is not an extensive historical study, but a study 
where historical data are used to illustrate an analytical point such as in the chapter discussing 
the development of structural bases for trust as an element in social modernisation.  
 
The historical data material was generated from local bank history, historical analysis of 
social and economic development, and law books about the Savings Bank Act. These sources 
present various perspectives on banks and banking and they are written for different 
audiences. Local bank history is written for the general public. Most of these histories, but not 
all of them, were not written by professional historians, and they were descriptive rather than 
analytic. Local bank histories have mainly a positive foundation; they aim to describe the 
local importance of the bank as an economic and social institution and as an engine for 
economic development. The reader has to take this in consideration as a possible bias in the 
material and be aware of it in the interpretation of the material. Comparing the various local 
bank histories and other historical literature provided a picture of general trends in the 
relationship between banks and their social context.  
 
History is written for scholars, and the literature used in the thesis is selected from 
recommendations and references. I am no historian and do not have sufficient background 
knowledge to decide the quality of these analyses, but have to rely on the recommendations 
and competence as a social scientist. In addition to this material, I use the Savings Bank Act 
and a few books written about this law. Some of this material was targeted at legal 
professionals and the rest was aimed at bank managers. This material is not totally unfamiliar 
(on the basis of some education in law and banking), but I do not have sufficient competence 
to ask critical questions related to it. As a whole, the material has given a rather concurrent 
image of the studied historical period. The described trust configurations are analytical 
320 
 
constructions based on interpretations of the material and the assumptions related to the 
composite concept of trust. It turned out that trust was not a topic in any of the historical 
sources I have used.        
 
Finally, not every aspect of trust that is discussed theoretically is exemplified in the empirical 
examples. The examples are selected because they have a common subject: trust and credit 
relations. They throw light on different elements of this relationship; they exemplify trust at 
different analytical levels and illustrate the analytical potential of the composite trust concept. 
In addition, the examples represent the two stages in generative theory; substantive theory and 
the composite trust concept as formal theory.  
 
To sum up the data collection; the findings in the interviews are expressions of single 
customer experiences. The trend in these findings is supported by the rest of the material and 
the cross-checking (Nordnes 1993, Ellingsen 1998). Consequently, I am convinced that the 
interview findings are relevant as descriptions of the trust relation between bank and customer 
in the period 1989-92 when data was collected for the grounded theory study. Even though 
this is some years back, later data collections (theoretical sampling) have indicated that the 
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